« AnteriorContinuar »
argument in the brief of appellant could be properly addressed to the jury upon the evidence before it, but it is not applicable to the case here. We cannot say that the damages are so excessive as to require a remission, and no error of law occurring, the judgment is affirmed.
Gordon, C. J., and Dunbar and Fullerton, JJ., 'concur.
NOTE. -Jurisdiction of State Courts Over Maritime Contracts and Admiralty.-Under the constitution and statutes of the United States, the district courts have exclusive original jurisdiction of all civil causes of admiralty, and the admiralty jurisdiction of local State courts is now superseded by the jurisdiction of the United States district courts in such cases. War. ing v. Clarke, 5 How. 201; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. *411; Portland v. Lewis, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 201. There is one exception, however, to this exclusive jurisdic. tion of the district courts as courts of admiralty. The Judiciary Act of 1789 (Rev. St. U.S., sec. 563), pro. vides: "District courts shall have jurisdiction of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; saving to suitors in all cases the rigbt to a common law remedy where the common law is competent to give it.” Under the saving clause of this statute suitor suing on a maritime contract may proceed in rem in the district court of admiralty or be may elect not to go into admiralty at all, and may proceed in personam in the proper State or federal court in those cases for which a remedy is provided at common law. Steamboat Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555; Taylor v. Car. ryl, 20 How.583; Leon v. Galceron, 11 Wall. 183. Tous a suit in personam by a seaman for wages is main. tainable at common law, and therefore may be brought in a State court. Leon v. Galceron, 11. Wall. 185. So also a proceeding in personam growing out of a collision. Schoonmaker v. Gilmore, 102 U. S. 118. The decision of the principal case on this point is clearly in line with these decisions and there can therefore be no doubt as to its correctness. The case of The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, upon which the de. fendant so strongly relies, decides as follows: That a contract for the transportation of passengers by a steamboat on the ocean is a maritime contract, and there is no distinction in principle between it and a contract for a like transportation of merchandise, tbat a distinguishing and characteristic feature of a suit in admiralty is that the vessel or thing proceeded against itself is seized and impleaded as the defend. ant and is judged and sentenced accordingly; that by the common law process property is reached only through a personal defendant, and then only to the extent of his title; that a statute of any State which authorizes actions in rem against the vessels for causes of action cognizable in admiralty to that extent attempts to invest bei courts with admiralty jurisdiction and are void against the legislation of congress; that the clause of the ninth section, saving to suitors "the right of a common law remedy where the com. mon law is competent to give it," does not save a pro. ceeding in rem as used in the admiralty courts, such a proceeding being not a remedy afforded by the common law.
Breach of Contract by Common Carrier for Failing to Carry a Pussenger to His Destination.- There is no question in law so difficult of detinition and lim. itation as the negligence of common carriers and the extent of their liability for such negligence. The re. ports are filled with a multitude of such cases, but in very few of them do the courts seem to recognize any
definite principles, each case standing upon its own bottom and decided upon its own peculiar statement of facts. If there is any question of law in regard to which the "case" lawyer may flaunt his alleged su. periority in the face of the practitioner of law who prides bimself upon his thorough knowledge of its principles, it is this liability of the common carrier for negligence resulting in injury to its passengers and the elements that enter into the measure of dam. ages. While no definite principle can be laid down which will solve all questions arising under every different and peculiar statement of facts, still there are a few well recognized general principles wbich it is profitable to bear in mind. The contra t of a common carrier is different and distinct from contracts made by private citizens or private corporations. The common carrier is a public servant to whom exclusive privileges and advantages have been given and from whom extraordinary care and exceptional service is required. It must serve all persons without discrim. ipation, and the convenience of the public depends upon the safe, continuous and impartial operation of its franchise. Therefore, its negligence, or the negli. gence of its servants, may not only be a breach of contract, but also a breach of its duty as a public seryant, and therefore a tort. It is for this reason that the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, relied upon so strongly by the defendant in the principal case, and enunciating a well recognized general rule as to the elements and measure of damages, is not to be firmly relied upon in cases of this kind. This rule is as fol. lows: “Where two parties bave made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect to such breach of contract sbould be such as may be fairly and reasonably construed, either arising naturally from such breach of contract itsell, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of botb parties at the time they made the contract as the probable result of a breach of it.” Ia determining what injuries may be construed as "arising paturally," or may be presumed to have been in the "con. templation of the parties," the jury is allowed a wider latitude in cases of injuries to passengers resulting from the negligence of the common carrier or breach of its contract of carriage than in ordinary breaches of contract. The case of Evans v. The Rail. road, 11 Mo. App. 463, furnishes a clear idea of this distinction. This case decided that where a passen. ger was unlawfully put off a train at a flag station at midnight in a wintry storm, a great distance from his starting point and his destination; and in endeavor. ing to walk to the next station falls through a cattle guard and is injured, it is proper to submit to the jury the question as to whether the injury was the proximate consequence of the wrong done in putting a passenger off the train. The court said: “The question is whether the lower court erred in permit. ting the plaintiff to prove that after being put off the train, and while walking along the track toward the next station, he received an injury by falling through a cattle guard. Was this such an injury as might reasonably be expected to flow from the act of put. ting the plaintiff off the train at the time and place and under the circumstances shown by his testimony? Was this damage a proximate or remote consequence of the wrong of putting bim off the train? We must remember that it was a very dark and rainy night and that the plaintiff was totally unacquainted with the country. A traveler put off at such a place and at such a time would be most likely to do what the plaintiff did do, and it is not, we think, straining any
legal principle to hold that the burt which he re. charged with the duty of stopping at her station," ceived was the proximate consequence of Where the officers of a steamboat agreed to stop the wrong of putting him off the train under at a certain landing it is no excuse for a failure to do the circumstances, But
regret to find so that the night was so dark as to render the stop. a modern decision of the English Court of page dangerous. Porter v. Steamboat, 17 Mo. 290. Queen's Bench somewbat opposed to us in this view. There is a limitation, however, to the liability of a Hobbs v. Railroad Co., L R. 10 Q. B. 111. In tbat common carrier in the failure to carry a passenger to case a husband and wife, passengers on a railway his destination. For instance, a railroad company is train, were taken to the wrong station and there put not liable for taking a child seven years old beyond off, through the negligence of the carrier's servants. its station, notwithstanding the promise of the con. They could obtain neither accommodation nor con ductor to look after the boy. thcompany's duty veyance, and consequently were obliged to walk ended when the station was called out. Gage v. Illi. several miles in the middle of a wet night, in conse nois Central R. Co., 21 South. Rep. 657. It is the duty quence of which the wife caught cold and was sick of a person about to take passage on a railroad train, for some time. It was held that they could recover to inform himself when, where and how he can stop for tbe personal inconvenience which they both had under the regulations of the railroad company suffered, but nothing for the wife's illness. · Ar ex: against which ordinary care in this respect would amipation of the opinions of the judges will show bave protected him, he has no remedy against the that the ground on which they proceeded was that company for the consequence. And where a train the plaintiffs were on y entitled to recover such dam. not scheduled to stop at a certain station, is boarded ages as might reasonably be supposed to have been in by a person bolding a ticket for such station, without the contemplation of the parties at the time of the informing himself as to whether he can stop there or making of the contract. That unquestionably is the not, the mere failure of the conductor to inform him correct rule by which to determine the measure of at the first opportunity that the train cannot stop damages for breaches of contract; but I could never there, is not a breach of the company's obligation so feel satisfied with the application there made of it. as to render it liable for damages caused to the pas. In case of the mere breach of such a contract, the senger by being put off at the last preceding station refusal to perform it at all, this would no doubt be where he is subjected to great inconvenience and exthe correct rule, but it is not so when to the breach posure. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Ludlan, 57 Fed. Rep. of the contract there is added the element of the 481; Beauchamp v. Railway Co., 56 Tex. 239. But tort springing out of the breach of a public duty as where a railway passenger through no fault of his is carrier. In this case the plaintiff's cause of action carried some distance beyond his station on a dark does not arise ex contractu merely. It is an action night and there put off the train, and in going back for a tort as well, founded upon the breach of a pub. to the station falls through a trestle and is injured, he lic duty by a public carrier. And hence the measure may recover the damages from the railroad company; of damages is, not what might reasonably be sup. and in such case the injury received is not a remote posed to have been in the contemplation of the parties consequence of the wrong done by the railroad com. at the time when the contract of carriage was made pany in carrying him beyond the station and put. that is, when the ticket was sold by the carrier-but ting him off at a point beyond where he was entitled rather what this conductor might reasonably bave ex. to get off. In estimating the damages in such case pected to flow from his wrongful act of putting this the nature and extent of the injury and the plaintiff's man off at that place at that time of the night and mental and physical suffering should be taken into under those circumstances.”
consideration, and an amount should be fixed which The contract of a public carrier to transport a pas. will reasonably compensate him for such injury and senger to a certain place designated in its contract suffering; also for the expense of medical treatment with him is broken when the passenger is put off or and the length of time he was incapacitated from his abandoned at a point other than the point of destina business in consequence of the injury. Winkler y. tion, and for any damages whether in the nature of The Railroad, 21 Mo. App. 99. loss of time, health or comfort proximately resulting St. Louis.
A. H. ROBBINS. thereby, the contracting carrier is liable. Tbis statement of the law hardly needs the citation of any au. thorities to substantiate it. Where a person goes on the train of a railroad company and pays the fare to a
JETSAM AND FLOTSAM. given point, and the conductor before the journey is completed tells the passenger that the train will not go to such station, whereupon the passenger leaves
RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRUST SECURITIES. the train and walks to his destination, resulting in The New York Supreme Court, in the case of the sickness to himself, he bas a right of action against Colonial Trust Company against Morrison, laid down the company for damages. Florida Southern Rail. an important rule with reference to responsibility road v. Katz, 23 Fla. 139. To same effect: Colwell for trust securities. The facts of the case appear to v. Richmond Railroad Co., 89 Ga. 550, in wbich the be that Daniel Morrison, when acting as trustee for court says: “A railroad conductor should not col an estate, bad Francis S. Weeks act as his agent and lect and accept from a passenger her fare to & par. attorney. (Weeks has since been in State prison for ticular station, knowing she intends and desires to get extensive misappropriations of trust funds.) Weeks off there, unless he expects to stop the train at was permitted to handle the trust funds and to that station and allow her to alight. In this discharge the duties of trustee in Mr. Morrison's case the plaintiff paid her fare and at the stead, during which time he embezzled some of the same time informed the conductor where she trust moneys, subsequently succeeding Mr. Morrison wished to leave the train. It was his duty, if he as trustee. At least a portion of the securities had did not intend to stop there, to tell her so, decline to been in Weeks' possession as attorney for some time take her money and allow her to get off. By accept prior to Mr. Morrison's appointment as trustee, and ing the fare under these circumstances he became Mr. Morrison continued Weeks as his attorney, leav.
ing the securities under his control. The Colonial court, part III, of the first department, New York
unnecessary to determine whether the proofs subs requires to his duty as trustee, he would have dis.
mitted by the plaintiff sufficiently establish the covered that the funds which Weeks obtained upon invalidity of the divorce. The complaint must be the collection of certain securities were not reinvested dismissed." for the benefit of the trust estate, but were invested Here it will be seen that the plaintiff was applying in securities which were taken in the name of for relief, not because of acts committed by the Weeks individually.”- Albany Law Journal.
defendant, but affirmatively and purely for the
annulment of her own acts. As far as this State is IGNORING FOREIGN DIVORCES.
concerned, she seeks to be relieved in her own beball The law is very well settled in New York that a from the consequences of ber own wrong or her own divorce procured in another State without personal mistake of law. As far as her status in Texas is service of process upon the defendant within the involved, our own courts have no good reason for territorial limits of such State, especially for a meddling with it.-New York Law Journal. cause not recognized here, is void in New York. People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78. In Holmes v. Holines, 4 Lans. 388, 57 Barb. 303, a judgment of divorce obtained in a foreign tribunal was relied on as an
BOOK REVIEWS. estoppel in a subsequent action by the same plaintiff in this State, he asking the court to ignore it, although THE LAW IN ITS RELATIONS TO PHYSICIANS. the defendant had relied upon it in contracting a This book treats of the right to practice medicine new relation. In overruling eur:h defense the General and surgery; contract of pbysician with patient; Term used the following language: “That the contract of patient with pbysician; rights and plaintiff is not estopped from denying the validity of liabilities of third parties; right to compensation; the divorce obtained by him will be seen when it is recovery of compensation; civil malpractice, inconsidered that if it did not, in fact, dissolve the cluding general liability of pbysician to patient; marriage, the courts will not allow either party to criminal liability; privileged communication. That deny the existence of the marriage. The parties portion of the field occupied in common by the legal have no power of themselves, either in form or effect, profession, known as medical jurisprudence, has to dissolve the marriage contract, as would be done received the attention of many able writers of both if effect should be given to the estoppel claimed in professions, with the result that nearly every question behalf of the defendant. See, also, Todd v. Kerr, of law requiring elucidation as to its medical aspect 42 Barb. 317."
has been worked out, and is accessible to the lawyer. Although the court went quite far in making this But upon the other hand, that portion of the field decision it seems logical on principle. If the foreign occupied by the two professions wbich relates to the divorce is so thoroughly void that a spouse who needs of the physician in his own practice has been remarries on the faith of it in New York is guilty of singularly neglected, so that the physician is left bigamy (People v. Baker, supra), it is difficult to see without reliable information regarding his legal how an estoppel either by judgment or even in pais rights and liabilities; and, what is equally serious, can arise. If the defendant husband or wife under without the opportunity of having recourse to such the former marriage assumes to remarry, the New information except as stress of circumstances may York courts do not violate the consistency of their drive him to seek legal advice in some particular position in ignoring the divorce and the subsequent case. This book will be found of great assistance to marriage, and treating any relations contracted in the lawyer in giving the proper legal advice to the reliance upon the void divorce as meretricious. physician, being a systematic treatment of those
In the case of Jeneks v. Jencks, recently decided by questions of law' which present themselves most
which he may at any moment be required to advise upon. The chapter upon privileged communications is especially interesting. At common law the pro. tection arcorded to professional coinmunications was very limited and applied only to the legal profession, nor does the protection which that profession en: joyed seem to bave been as full and adequate as that now accorded to it by the courts and legislatures. The medical and clerical professions were botb out. side the protection of the common law both in England and in this country, and wbatever protection these two professions now enjoy are expressly con• ferred by statutes. We recommend this book to the favorable notice of the legal profession. The author is Arthur N. Taylor of the New York bar. It is 12mo, bound in buckram, contains 550 pages, printed on excellent paper. Published by D. Appleton & Co., New York,
A Treatise on Electric Law, Covering the Law Gov.
erning all Electric Corporations, Uses and Appli. ances, also all Relative Public and Private Rights. By Joseph A. Joyce, Author of Joyce on Insurance, and Howard C. Joyce. New York, The Banks Law Publishing Co., 21 Murray Street, 1900. Sheep, pp. 1130, price $6.50. Review will follow.
OF ALL the Carrent Opinions of ALL tho Stato and Territorial Coarts of Last Resort, and of the Saprome, Ciroalt and District Courts of the Onited States, except those that are Pablished in Fall or Commented apon in our Noten of Im. portant Docisions and except those Opinions in which no Important Legal Principles mro Dis. cussod of Interest to the Profession at Large.
defense of want of a partner's authority to execute the firm's accommodation pote to a second firm, of which he is also a member, cannot be urged agalost a holder taking the note before maturity as collateral security for the debts of the second firm, though the note was not indorged to such bolder till after maturity.-FT. DEAKBORN NAT. Bank V. BERBOTT, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 340.
6. Bills AND NOTES - Payment Before Maturity-In. terest.-A payee loaning money and takirg a note therefor has a right to legal interest thereon, notwithstanding the payor pays the note in full brfore ma. turity; there being po agreement between them for a rebate of interest on this account.- CROWLEY V. KOLSKY, Tenn., 57 $. W. Rep. 386.
6. CARRIERS - Ejecting Passenger.-Noright of action accrues to a passenger upon a railway train lor ejec. tion therefrom when it appears th:t under a reason. able regulation of the company the ticket wbich bo of: fered as his right for transportation was limited as to the time in which the carriage was to be performed, and such limit had expired.-SOUTHERN RY. Co. Y. HOWARD, Ga., 36 S. E. Kep. 213.
7. CARRIERS-Limiting Llabilily.-The liability of a common carrier of goods is that of an insurar, and in cases of loss no excuse avails such carrier, unless oc. ca:ioned by the act of God or the public enemies of the State. He may not limit his legal liability by a notice to the shipper, but be may, with certain restrictions, make an express contract, and botb parties entering into it will be bound by its terms.-CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RY. CO. V. LIPPMAN, Ga., 36 S. E. Rep. 202.
8. CARRIERS-Limiting Liability-Negligence.- While the section of the Codo which denies to a currier the right to limit his legal liability by a notice or entry on receipts given or tickets sold, but declares that he may do so by express coutract, applies only to carriers of goods, yet, under general law, a carrier of passengers cannot limit bis legal liability for the consequences of his own degligence by such notice, or even by express contract.-SOUTHERN RY. Co. v. WATSON, Ga., 36 S. E. Rp 209.
9. CARRIERS- Live Stock-Limiting L'ability.- A car. rier of live stock may by special contract so limit h s liability for loss or damage that be will be liable only in the event he is guilty of "gross negligence."COOPER V. RALEIGH & G.R. Co., Ga., 36 S. E. Rep. 210.
10. CARRIERS-Live Stock-Negligence.-A live-stock shipper drove cuttle for shipment into a receiving pen of a railroad company. The gate leading the reto was sagged so that it could not be fastened without lifting the gate. The einployees of the abipper made no effort to raise the gate, and left the cattle without notily. ing the railroad company of the condition of the gate. The cattle, in rubbing against the latch, pushed the gate open and escaped. A part of them were lost, and the rest were recovered by the shipper at some ex. pense. Held, that the loss was due to the degligence of the shipper, and the railroad company was not lia. ble therefor.-ST. LOUIS, ETC. RYCo. v. Law, Ark., 57 S. W. Rep. 258.
11. CARRIERS-Passengers-Burden of Proof.- Where plaintiff sued for injuries sustained in alighting from defendant's train, which did not stop a reasonable time to let off passengers, the burden of proof was on defendant to show contributory negligence, and not on plaintiff to show his want thereof, notwithstanding his petition alleged he exercised ordinary care and diligence in alighting.- PARKS V. ST. LOUIS S. W. RY. CO. OF TEXAS, Tex., 57 8. W. Rep. 301.
12. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS - Street Railway.-A newsboy who jumps on a street car without signaling it to stop, for the purpose of selling papers, and jump. ing off again, is not a passenger, so as to charge the company with special care to avoid injuring bim, though he intended to pay fare if the conductor asked bim; it appearing that the conductor did not see him, and that the gripman, wbo had no authority to grant or refuse him permission to ride, tried to eject him.
10. 48 GEORGIA..
1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 16, 19, 36, 45 KENTUCKY................... .2, 22, 25, 26, 34, 41, 47, 61, 56 MISSOURI..
..12, 43, 58 NORTH CAROLINA...
14, 15, 28, 42, 44, 46 TENNESSKE... .......5. 20. 21, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 39, 40, 57 TEX 48..3, 4, 11, 17, 18, 23, 24, 29, 35, 37, 38, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55
1. ADJOINING LINDOWSRRS Excavations. The owner of land adjsining that of another has a right, on giving potice of bis intention to do so, to make all proper and needful excavations for purposes of constructione, even up to the line, but he must use ordi. nary care and take reasonable prrcaution to sustain the land of the adjoining owner.- B188 v. WEST, Ga., 35 8. E. Rep. 241.
2. ADVERSK POSSESSION - Parol Purchaser.- Posses. sion of land made under a parol purchase for 30 years, being adverse to the vendor, bars his right under either the 15 or 20 years' statute ol limitations.-GIL. BERT V. KELLY, Ky., 57 S. W. Rep. 228.
3. BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS-Pront of Death-Ag. sessments. Where the by-laws of a beneficial associatlon do not require that an assessment be recorded in the mloutes the lact that an assessment was made may be shown by parol.-SUPREME COUNCIL AMERICAN LEGION OF HONOR V. LANDERS, Tex., 57 8. W. Rep. 307.
4. BILLS AND NOTES – Accommodation Note.-Under Sayles'civ.st. art. 307, providing that when a negotiable fostrament has been assigned, for value and before maturity, to a person without notice, he shall be com. pelled to allow only just discounts against hiinsell, the
RAMING V. METROPOLITAN ST. Ry. Co., Mo., 87 8. W. 21. E 18EMENT8 - Creation-Prescription. Complain. Rep. 268.
ant's vendor and defendant's ancestor and predeces. 13. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Title of Act-Election.
ror in ownership were owners of adjoining lands, and Where an act was entitled "An act to amend the char:
opened a lade between their premises as a private passter of" a named city by incorporating as a part thereof
way for their personal convenience. Subsequently certain described contiguous territory, to define the
they closed the lane, and erected a partnership tence duties and powers of the inunicipal authorities in the but complainant's vendor continued to use the way for annexed territory, "and for other purposes," any legis. 13 years ag an outlet from his residence to the public , lation could constitutionally be embodied in the act road, and complainant used it for 17 years; such use which was germane to the general subject of amending being permissive merely. Held, that neither the comthe charter of the city.-MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF
plainant nor his vendor acquired a prescriptive right MACON V. HUGHES, Ga., 36 S. E. Rep. 247.
to its use.-MURRAY V. EALY, Tenn., 57 8. W. Rep. 412. 14. CORPORATION – Insolvent Corporations-Claims 22. EMINENT DOMAIN-Void Proceedings-Dámages — for Salaries.-Where a receiver was appointed to take When certain condemnation proceedings instituted by control and entire management of all the assets of a
by a bridge company were vold, and it had been so ad. corporation, it was not liable to an officer for salary
judged by the circuit court, the fact that an appeal, during such receivership, since the performance of with supersedeas, had been prosecuted to the court of the contract between the corporation and the officer
appeals from that Judgmept, did not preclude the landwas rendered impossible by judicial action, and not by
owver from suing the bridge company to recover dam. the fault of the corporation.--LENOIR V. LINVILLE IMP.
eges for the wrongful entry upon the land.-NEWPORT Co., N. Car., 36 S. E. Rep. 185.
& C. BRIDGE CO. V. GILL, Ky., 57 8. W. Rep. 229. 15. CORPORATION-Mortgage Foreclosure.-Code, s
23. EXECUTION-Claims by Third Parties.-Where de. 685, provides that any conveyance of a corporation's
fendant, in an action to recover the value of goods property shall be void as to torts committed by the
taken on execution, pleaded specially tbat the busicorporation, provided the person injured shall enforce
ness in which the goods were used, though carried on his claim within 60 days of the registration of the deed.
In the name of the plaintiff, was in fact the business et Held, that it was error to permit a landowner claiming
the execution debtor, and that it was so conducted for damages for the flooding of bis lande by a dam owned
the purpose of defrauding creditore, and evidence was by a corporation to intervene in a suit to foreclose the admitted sustaining the plea, it was reversible error to corporation's mortgøge, he not having prosecuted his
submit only the abstract issue whether the goods beclaim within the limit provided by section 695.-WIL
longed to the plaintiff or the execution debtor, and to LIAMS V. WEST ASHEVILLE & S. S. RY. CO., N. Car., 36 8.
refuse to submit the real issue raised by the special E. Rep. 189.
plea.-P. J. WILLIS & BRO. V. SIMS' HRIRS, Tex., 57 s.
W. Rep. 325. 16. CORPORATION - Xote - President Authority.Where the president of a bank had general authority
24. EXECUTION-Claim by Third Person.-Under Rev. to take, in settlement of a paper due to it, property
St. 1895, arts. 6293 5295, requiring the oficer, when propother than cash, his so doing in a particular instance
erty levied on is claimed by a third person and a bond was binding upon the corporation.-MERCHANTS' NAT.
given, to indorse on the bond the value of the propBANK OF ROME V. CAMP, Ga., 36 S. E. Rep. 201.
erty assessed by him, and return the bond to the
proper court having jurisdiction of the amount, where 17. CRIMINAL LAW – Burglary - Accomplice Testi.
the officer omits to assess the value of a part of the mony.-Where, in a prosecution for burglary, prose
property the court is not bound to determine its juris. cutor testified that he took defendant to his place of
diction by his assessment, but can hear evidence of business, and there stated to him that, if he would
value.-CULLERS V. GRAY, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 305. bring back the goods, he would let him go, but, if be did not, he would hand him over to the sheriff; tbat
25. FIRES-Negligence.-A railroad company is not defendant was then told what had been stolen, and
liable for injuries resulting from sparks escaping from
a locomotive furnished with the best and most ap. said that he would go and bring back all he had, and did return the goods, failure of the court to cbarge
proved screen and spark arrester in practical use, prothat the prosecutor was an accomplice, and as to the
vided these appliances were in perfect order.-LOUI8law relative to an accomplice's testimony, was error.
VILLE & N. R. CO. V. SAMUELS' EXRS., Ky., 57 8. W.
Rep. 235. - CAMPBELL V. Sratu, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 288.
26. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-Husband and wife18. CRIMINAL LAW - Seduction-Promise to Marry.
Alimony.-Ky. St $ 2126, providing that sales and con. Where the mother of defendant, a minor, charged with
veyances made to a purchaser without notice, in fraud seduction, refused to allow him to marry prosecutrix,
or hindrance of the right of the wife or child to mainthe fact that he offered to marry her was insufficient to tenance, shall be void as against them, does not apply relieve him from prosecution, under Pen, Code, art.
to a conveyance made by a divorced husband to defeat 969, authorizing the dismissal of prosecution if defend the wife's claim for alimony; but, as she is a creditor, ant offered to marry the female in good faith, since
she may, like any other creditor, maintain an action defendant's promise without ability to perform was under Id. $ 1907–, to subject the land fraudulently con. not made in good faith, within the meaning of the stat.
veyed, without first obtaining judgment and return of ute.- MERRELL V. STATE, Tex., 57 8. W. Rep. 289.
"po property."-CAMPBELL V. TROSPER, Ky., 57 8. W. 19. DEED-Delivery - Registration.-A proper and
Rep. 245. legal registry of an instrument raises a presumption of 27. HUSBAND AND WIFE.-A married woman is bound delivery sufficient to establish the fact unless rebutted. by her husband's acts, where she places notes which An upauthorized registry raises no such presumption, are her separate estate in his hands to deal with, elther and in that case the validity of the instrument is not as owner or as her agent.-WHITAKER 7. LEE, Tenn., established until delivery is affirmatively shown. 57 S. W. Rep. 318. STALLINGS V. NEWTON, Ga., 36 S. E. Rep. 227.
28. INSOLVENCY-Attachment Liens - Judgments.20. DEED OF TRUST Acknowledgment - Setting Where foreign creditors of an insolvent domestic cor. Aside.-A married woman, whose husband had aban. poration procured judgments in the State of their residoned her, sued to set aside a deed of trust on her dence, where the corporation had a place of business, property, purporting to have been executed by herselt the fact that such judgments were irregular, and were and husband, and acknowledged in due form by both used in evidence in a subsequent attachment suit of them. Held, that such deed of trust should not have against the corporation in North Carolina, in which been set aside on her unsupported testimony that she such creditors were decreed to have a lien on the atdid not appear before the officer and acknowledge the tached property, did not affect the attachment lien so deed, and that his certificate was false.-KENNEDY V. as to require such creditors to sbare equally with other SECURITY BLDG. & SAV. A88N., Tenn., 57 8. W. Rep. 388. unsecured creditors in a subsequent suit in equity to