« AnteriorContinuar »
subject all the property of the corporation to the elaims of its various creditors.-GERMAN LOOKING GLASS PLATE 00. V. ASHEVILLE FURNITURE & LUMBER Co., N. Car., 36 S. E. Rep. 199.
29. INSURANCE-Breach of Warranty - Where a policy stipulates that assured, on acceptance of it, warrants certain statements to be true, among which is a statement that he will report to the insurer any other insurance taken out by him, the obligation not to take such further insurance without notice cannot be held . warranty, imposing forfeiture for breach.-FIDELITY & CASUALTY CO. OF NEW YORK V. CARTER, Tex., 57 s. W. Rep. 315.
30. INSURANCE-Forfeiture-Waiver-Loss.-Where an insurance company adjusts a small loss under the pol. Icy knowing that a condition against incumbrances has been broken, such act constitutes a waiver of the forfeiture, and the company cannot afterwards deny its liability when a second loss occurs.-WESTCHESTER FIRE INS. Co. v. MCADOO, Tenn., 57 S. W. Rep. 409.
31. JUDGMENT-Revival-Notice to Creditors.-Ajudg. ment against a former husband cannot be revived, after his death, against decedent's wife, his adininistratrix, and her second husband, over his objection, merely because he is the husband of decedent's wife. Realty which a former husband, prior to his demise, conveyed to an assignee for benefit of creditors, can. not be subjected to execution at law on a judgment against such former husband which has been revived against decedent's wife and a second husband.-WES. SELL V. GRO88, Tenn., 57 8. W. Rep. 371.
32. LIFE ESTATES-Lease by Life Tenant.-Under Shannon's Code, $ 4184, authorizing apportionment of rent and recovery therefor until the death of a tenant for life, where such tenant shall die before the expiration of a lease created by him out of his life estate, and before the terın fixed for payment of rent, lessees of a deceased life tenant are not entitled to retain possession, as against the remaioder man, during the term of their lease, of lands prepared for a crop, but on which no crop is planted, since such statute does not authorize creation of a lease to extend beyond the life estate, and only authorizes recovery for rents due on its termination.-COLLINS V. CROWNOVER, Tenn., 67 8. W. Rep. 357.
33. LIFE INSURANCE-Suicide-Burden of Proof.-Under a policy denying liability in case of the insured's suicide, whether sane or insane, a recovery could be bad where the insured's death was caused by taking an overdose of morphine, but the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that insured, in taking the drug, intended to end his life.- BROWN V. SUN LIFE IN8. Co., Tenn., 57 S. W. Rep. 415.
34. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - New Promise.-After a debt which A owed to C, his daughter-in-law, was barred by limitations, he made a payment thereon, and claimed that the remainder was due him for boarding C's children,-his grandchildren. Crefused to admit the claim, and threatened to sue, whereupon A an. swered that she need not bring suit as after his death and that of his wife everything would belong to the children,-that he would will his property to them; and O responded that, if he would will everything to the children, she would accept that proposition in satisfaction of her claim. Held, that there was no sucn un. qualified acknowledgment of the debt as raised a promise to pay, and therefore the debt was not revived.-SCHONBACHLER V. SCHONBACHLER, Ky., 57 s. W. Rep. 232
35. MARRIED WOMAN-Personal Injury-Action by Married Woman.-Where a woman sues for damages To her own name, alleging herself to be a feme sole, and the evidence warrants the subinission of her claim to the jury, but also shows that she is a married woman, who has been abandoned by her husband under cir. cumstances wbich would entitle her to sue in her own Dame, it is error to direct u verdict for defendant on the theory that she was not authorized to sue alone.BENNETT V. GILLETT, Tex., 57 8, W. Rep. 302.
36. MASTER AND SERVANT-Injury-Contributory Neg. ligence.-The Alabama statute, now embodied in sec. tion 2590 of the Code of that State, rendering a master or employer liable to a servant for an injury "caused by reason of any defect in the construction of the ways, works, muchivery or plant connected with or used in the business of the master or employer," does not pre. vent the defendant in an action brought under this statute from setting up as a defense that there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.SOUTHERN RY. Co. V. HARBIN, Ga., 36 S. E. Rep. 218.
37. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Detective Streets.Where plaintiff was injured by falling from a bridge forming a part of a public street because of a defective railing against which he was leaning wbile conversing with another, such fact did not establish tbat he was not using the street for the purpose for which it was constructed, since by such use he did not per se forfeit the protection from injury enjoined on cities to keep their streets in proper repair.-CITY OF WHITEWRIGHT V. TAYLOR, Tex., 57 8. W. Rep. 311.
38. MONICIPAL CORPORATION – Obstruction to Street, -Under city ordinance requiring a city to establish barriers and danger signals along ditches in its streets, it is proper, in an action against the city for injuries from an insufficiently guarded ditch in its street, to in. struct that a failure to comply with the ordinance in this regard was negligence as a matter of law.-CITY OF CORSICANA V. TOBIN, Tex., 57 8. W. Rep. 319.
39. OIL LANDS-Lease-Forfeiture.-Where a lease of oil lands provided that the lessor should have the right to forfeit it if the lessee failed to begin operations thereunder within a certain time, unless the lessee, on written notice of tbe forfeiture, should elect to pay a certain sum annually during the delay, such written notice was essential to a forfeiture, and the mere delay in beginning operations beyond the time limited way not of itselt suficient to forfeit the lease and let in a subsequent lessee, whose lease was conditioned on the avoidance of the first.-SOUTH PENN OIL CO. V. STONE, Tenn., 57 S. W. Rep. 374.
40. PARTNERSHIP — Infants as Partners.-A business was conducted under the firm name of "J. L. Sidwell & Son," the son being a minor. The merchant's li. cense was in the firın name, and the correspondence, purchase of goods, and drawing of all checks were by the firm. The father, previous to his death, stated that such son was a partner; and the son also bad represented bimself to be a partner and owner of a halt interest in the stock, but after his father's death he denied such partnership. Held sufficient to establish the relation of partnership, giving the son the right, as surviving partner, to wind up the business and pay the partnership debts.-PARKER V. OAKLEY, Tenn., 57 S. W. Rep. 426.
41. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Release of Indemnitors. -Where six stockholders of a corporation, for the pur. pose of raising money for the corporation, agreed that one of their pumber should sign a note as surety for the corporation, and that each of the others should ex. ecute his note to the corporation for one-sixth of the amount, to be indorsed by the corporation to the surety, and pledged to him as indemnity, the obligorg in the collateral notes executed pursuant to this agreement did not occupy the relation of guarantors or sureties to the surety in the principal pote, as the debt was created for their common benefit, and tberefore the renewal of the principal note without their con. gent did not release them.-KOEHLER V. HUSSEY, Ky,, 57 S. W. Rep. 241.
42. RAILROAD COMPANY - Crossings-Negligence.-Where plaintiff's intestate was killed on a crossing by being struck by a backing train after it had stopped and discbarged its passengers, plaintiff muy show defendant's custom as to where it stopped its trains for the discharge of passengers, and the custom of defend. ant and the public in using the crossing, as bearing on defendant's negligence in backing its trains, as to the notice to be given, and whether intestate was negli
gent.-BRADLEY V. Outo RIVER & C. Ry. Co., N. Car., 51. TRUST8-Power of Trustee to Sell and Reinvest.36 8. E. Rep. 181.
The power conferred by will on a trustee to sell the 43. RAILROAD COMPANY Negligence.-Io an action land devised, with consent of the beneficiaries, and against a rallıoad to recover for injuries to a boy,
reinvest tbe proceeds, was not exhausted by one sale where the plaintiff claims that the boy was sucked un
and reinvestment.--OwSLEY V. EADS' TRUSTEE, Ky., 57 der the train by the current of air created by its run.
S. W. Rep. 225. ning at a speed prohibited by ordinance, and the de 52. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Vendor's Lien-Rescis. fendant claimed and introduced evidence tending to sion of Sale-Failure to Pay.-In an action by a vendor prove that the boy was standing so near to the cars against his vendee, whom the former has put in posthat he was struck by some projection thereof, testi. session, to recover possession of land sold, and for mony of an expert as to whether or not it would have which the former retained a vendor's lien, on the been possible for the boy to have fallen in the manner ground that the vendee had falled to pay the balance in which witnesses have testified that he did fall, with of the price, the vendee cannot recover for improve. out the train striking him, is incompetent, since such ments made on the land, nor for payments made.question was for the jury, and not a proper subject for BANKS V. MCQUATTERS, Tex., 678. W. Rep. 334. opinion evidence.-GRANEY V. ST. LOUIS, ETC. Ry. Co.,
53. VENDOR'S LIEN--Executory Contract.-A deed of Mo., 57 S. W. Rep. 276.
lands, in which is reserved a lien to secure a part of 44. RAILROAD COMPANY-Negligence-Fires.-Where
the purchase money, is an executory contract; and the a tire was alleged to have been caused by sparks superior title to the land remains in the grantor, and emitted by a particular engide, it was error to admit can be deleated only by payment of the purchase evidence of other fires caused by sparks from other en. money.- EFRON V. BURGOWER, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 306. gines, and of fires caused by passing trains in fields past which another railroad ran, without showing the
54. WATERS-Surface Water- Adjoining Lands.-A condition of the engines or the attending circum.
landowner who has so constructed a dam on his lands stances.-HYGIENIC PLATE ICE MFG. Co. v. RALEIGH &
as to form a tank in wbich surface water is collected, AUGUSTA AIR-LINE R. CO., N. Car., 36 S. E. Rep. 279.
until it overflows adjoining land, is liable for the dam.
ages resulting to the adjoining land, since the common. 45. RELIGIOUS SOCIETY-Action Against.-No action
law rule tbat the owner of the lower estate may repel can be maintained against a religious society, when
surface water, which is made a part of the laws of sued as such, when such society has not been incorpo
Texas by Rev. St. § 3258, providing that the common rated, nor had recorded its name and objects, as pro.
law sball be the rule of decision until altered or revided by law. The members of such society are liable
pealed by the legislature, applies only to flowage in on its contracts as joint promisors or partners.-THURMOND V. CEDAR SPRING BAPTIST CHURCH, Ga., 36 8. E.
natural ways and quantities.--GEMBLEB V. ECHTER
HOFF, Tex., 57 S, W. Rep. 313. Rep. 221. 46. REMOVAL OF CAUSES – Foreign Corporations
55. WILLS-Election by Widow.-A widow, to whom Constitutional Law.-The refusal to permit a foreign
a deceased husband has devised all his property for corporation which has become a domestic corpora.
life, cannot be held to have elected to take under such tion, in pursuance of Pub. Luws 1899, ch. 62, to remove
will, by baving probated it and taken possession of an action against it for personal injuries to a federal
and assumed control of all the devised property, where court, does not abridge Its privileges and immunities
the property belonged to the community estate of deas a citizen of the United States, or deprive it of its
cedent and his surviving wife, the possession of which property without due process of law, and of the equal
she was entitled to as a homestead and exemption, and protection of the laws, as guarantied by the United
it was not shown that she received anytbing of value States constitution.-DRBNAM V. SOUTHERN BELL TEL.
under the will to which she was not otherwise entitled. Co., N. Car., 36 8. E. Rep. 269.
-MCCLARY V. DUCKWORTH, Tex., 67 S. W. Rep. 317. 47. REPRESENTATIONS-Right of Corporation to Plead
56. WILL-Estate Created-Life Estate with Power.Claim of Stockholders.-A corporation cannot recover Where a life estate is given in express terms with damages for alleged false representations to the stock. power to dispose of the fee by last will, a limitation holders, whereby they were induced to purchase prop over in the event the life tenant shall die intestate is erty which they transferred to the corporation subse valid.-LER V. FIDELITY TRUST & SAFETY VAULT Co., quently organized.--LEBANON STEAM LAUNDRY Ky., 57 S. W. Rep. 239. DYCKMAN, Ky., 57 8. W. Rep. 227.
57. Wills-Widow-Life Estate.-A testator devised 48. SALES-Reservation of Title-Bona Fide Pur. to bis widow all his real estate for life, remainder to chasers.-Where, by a contract of sale, the buyer is to his children, with the privilege to the widow of selling execute his notes for the purchase price, and the title and conveying it or any part of it, and making title to to the goods is to remain in the seller until the goods the same, for her use and support. The children par. are fully paid for, the execution of the notes, or of a titioned the remainder among themselves by deed. renewal note, for the debt, is not a payment, unless by The widow sued to set aside these conveyances as agreement of the parties they are taken as such. clouds on her title; claiming that, by reason of the TRIPLETT V. MANSUR & TEBBETTS IMPLEMENT CO., Ark., privilege of sale given her. she took in fee, and the re57 8. W. Rep. 261.
mainder over was void. Held, that the widow took a 49. SHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES-Indemnity Bondg.-life estate, with authority to sell such portions as The suretles on an indemnity bond given a sberiff for migbt be necessary in case the rents and profits were the seizure of goods under process are pot relieved insufficient for her support, and hence the children's from liability by the loss of the goods by fire, where deeds were not clouds on her title.-WATSON V. War. the sheriff was not negligent in caring for the goods. SON, Tenn., 57 S. W. Rep. 385. VICKERY V. CRAWFORD, Tex., 57 8. W. Rep. 326.
58. WILL CONTEST – Appeal-Administration.-Rev. 50. TELEGRAPH COMPANY-Messages-Damages -Men St. 1889, $ 13, provides that if the validity of a will be tal Distress.-Where a telegraph company, on receiv. contested, or the executor be a minor, or absent from ing a message for transmission, was informed that the State, letters of administration shall be granted plaintiff's purpose in sending it was that the recipient during the time of such contest, minority, or absence should prepare a grave to receive the body of plaint to some other person. Held, that an order of the proiff's deceased child, and should meet him with rela. bate court revoking letters of administration issued tives on his arrival with the body, plaintiff was en. under such section, made after the determination of a titled to recover for mental distress and mortification will contest in the circuit court, but during the pepcaused by the recipient's failure to meet him with rel. dency of an appeal therefrom, was erroneous, the ap. atives, through the company's negligence in failing to peal to the supreme court being a part of the "time of deliver the message.- WESTERN UNION TEL. Co. v. such contest,"-STATE V. GUINOTTE, Mo., 57 8. W. Rep. GIFFIN, Tex., 57 8, W. Bep. 327.
“Every citizen,” says Hammersley, J., speakCentral Law Journal.
ing for the court “has an equal right to use his mental endowments as well as his prop
erty, in any harmless occupation or manner; ST. LOUIS, MO., AUGUST 31, 1900. but he has no right to use them so as to in
jure his fellow citizens, or to endanger the
vital interests of society. Immunity in the The case of Roehm v. Horst, recently de mischievous use is as inconsistent with civil cided by the Supreme Court of the United liberty as prohibition of the harmless use. States, 'involving a question of breach of con Both arise from the equal right of all to protract by renunciation before performance, is tection of law in the enjoyment of individual perhaps as interesting and instructive as any
freedom of action, which is the ultimate that hus recently come before the courts.
fundamental principle. This truth is plainly The facts are somewhat complicated and expressed in the language of sections 3 and 5. too lengthy to state here, but the ruling of The liberty protected is not the right to perthe court was, in substance, that an
petrate acts of licentiousness, or any act inqualified and positive refusal to perform a consistent with the peace or safety of the contract, though the performance thereof is State. Freedom of speech and press does not yet due, may, if the renunciation goes to not include the abuse of the power of tongue the whole contract, be treated as a complete
or pen, any more than freedom of other acbreach which will entitle the injured party to tion includes an injurious use of one's occubring his action at once, and that the dama- pation, business or property.” ges for breach of a contract by renunciation The court held also that the legislature has thereof before performance is due are meas the power to declare that the publication and ured by what the injured party would have
sale of a newspaper devoted to criminal news soffered by the continued breach of the other and stories of crime endanger the public party down to the time of complete perform- morals, and to probibit the same, and it is ance, less any abatement by reason of cir
immaterial whether the conduct described in cumstances of which he ought reasonably to the statute has been theretofore held suffi. bave availed himself. The opinion of the cient to support an indictment at common court by Mr. Justice Fuller is very learned, law for nuisance or libel. and exhaustively reviews the authorities on the subject.
Another interesting question of constitu
tional law, and one concerning the police A recent legislature of Connecticut under power of municipal bodies, was presented to took to suppress the publication of criminal the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in news, and to that end enacted a statute pro State v. Hill. It was there held that a city viding for the punishment of persons who ordinance providing that all scavenger work shall sell, or have in possession with intent to of the city shall be done by licensed scavensell, papers devoted to the publication of gers, fising the time when closets must be criminal pews, police reports and stories of cleaned and the charges for cleaning them, crime.
and giving the board of health power to deIn the late case of State v. McKee, the cide who are competent bidders for this Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut work, is in derogation of common right, and, passed upon the constitutionality of the act. in the absence of a showing that it is reasonIt was contended by those opposed to the ably necessary and just, must be held in. enactment that it was in violation of the con valid, so far as it applies to a defendant stitution providing that every citizen may prosecuted under it for cleaning a closet freely speak, write and publish his sentiments without a license as a scavenger.
The court on all subjects, and also declaring that no law very properly says that the ordinance sball ever be passed to restrain the liberty of "takes away from the citizen a natural and speech or of the press. But the court thought necessary right without apparent necessity, and held otherwise, deciding that the act was and substitutes nothing adequate to take its within the police power of the legislature. place. The owner
The owner cannot clean his own
premises, no matter how filthy they may be the Circuit Court of the United States. But in come, and the public scavenger cannot be
response to the plea it was shown by proof that made to clean them oftener than once a
appellee had paid all the costs in the State court
and in the federal court in the case described in month without an order from the superin
the plea of abatement, and had filed in each of tendent of health. This case does not ques said courts a motion to dismiss the former cause, tion the right of the city to clean all closets, and elected to abandon the former and prosecute or to have them cleaned or kept clean; but it
this suit. This right of election seems to have involves the right of the owner himself to
been recognized and approved by our supreme
court. Payne v. Benhem, 16 Tex. 364; Trawick clean up. If the ordinance has that effect
v. Martin Brown Co., 74 Tex. 522, 12 S. W. Rep. and the State claims that it has such an ef
216. See, also, Wilson v. Millican (Ky.), 42 S. fect-then it is void, at least pro tanto. In W. Rep. 660, 42 L. R. A. 449. Furthermore, we this particular the effect of the ordinance is concur with counsel for appellee that, as the fed
eral courts derive their power and jurisdiction not to keep the city clean, but rather to keep
from a different sovereignty from that of the it dirty, for the time being. It is a matter of
State courts, in that sense they are foreign juriscommon knowledge that refuse matter quickly dictions, in like manner as the courts of different decays during the summer months, and it can States are foreign to each other; and, therefore, scarcely be contended that merely a monthly the pendency of a prior suit in a federal court will cleaning is sufficient to keep a closet in a
not abate a suit subsequently brought in a State
court between the same parties and for the same healthy condition in a warm climate. Are
cause of action, although the two courts may sit the rates allowed to the public scavenger
in the same State and have the same territorial reasonable? If the ordinance were other jurisdiction. On this subject there is conflict in wise valid, we would hesitate to interfere the decisions, but we think the weight of authority with it on this ground alone, and we do not
supports appellee's contention. Cooper v. Newdecide it as a matter of law; but to us it
ell, 173 U. S. 555, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 506, 43 L. Ed.
808; Gordon v. Gilfoil, 99 U. S. 169, 25 L. Ed. seems questionable.”
383; Hyde v. Stone, 20 How. 170, 15 L. Ed. 874; The Kalorama, 10 Wall. 204, 19 L. Ed. 944; Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 448, 23 L. Ed. 983;
Insurance Co. v. Harris, 96 U. S. 331, 24 L. Ed. NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.
959; Short v. Hepburn, 21 C. C. A. 252, 75 Fed. Rep. 113; Latham v. Chafee (C. C.), 7 Fed. Rep.
520; Logan v. Greenlaw (C. C.), 12 Fed. Rep. 10; ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL - ACTIONS IN DIF Crescent City Live Stock, Landing & Slaugbter FERENT JURISDICTIONS. - The Court of Civil
House Co. v. Butchers' Union Live Stock, LandAppeals of Texas decide, in International & E.N.
ing & Slaughter House Co. (C. C.), 12 Fed. Rep. R. Co. v. Barton, 57 S. W. Rep. 292, that where 225; Weaver v. Field (C. C.), 16 Fed. Rep. 22; two suits are pending between the same parties Hurst v. Everett (C. C.), 21 Fed. Rep. 218; for the same cause of action, plaintiff, on the Briggs v. Stroud (C. C.), 58 Fed. Rep. 720; Coe filing of a plea in abatement in the one, may, by v. Aiken (C. C.), 50 Fed. Rep. 640; Pearce v. paying the costs and dismissing the other, pro Feagans (C. C.), 39 Fed. Rep. 587; Beekman v. ceed in the former; and that the pendency of a Railway Co. (C. C.), 35 Fed. Rep. 3; Rejall v. prior suit in a federal court will not abate a suit
Greenbood (C. C.), 60 Fed. Rep. 786; Merritt v. subsequently brought in a State court between
Barge Co., 24 C. C. A. 530, 76 Fed. Rep. 228; the same parties and for the same cause, though Zimmerman v. So Relle, 25 C. C. A. 518, 80 Fed. the two courts may sit in the same State and have Rep. 419; Hughes v. Green, 28 C. C. A. 537, 84 the same territorial jurisdiction, since federal Fed. Rep. 833; Bank v. Bonney, 101 N. Y. 173, 4 courts, deriving their powers from a different N. E. Rep. 332; Litchfield v. City of Brooklyn sovereignty from State courts, are foreign juris (City Ct. Brook.), 34 N. Y. Supp. 1090; Checkley dictions. The court said:
v. Steamship Co., 60 How. Prac. 511; Wood v. “The principal question presented for decision Lake, 13 Wis. 84; Wurtz v. Hurt, 13 Iowa, 518; is the ruling of the court on the plea in abate Hampton's Heirs v. Barrett, 12 La. 159; Caine v. ment. This question has been elaborately and Railway Co. (Wash.), 41 Pac. Rep. 904." skillfully presented in the briefs submitted by the respective parties, and, after due consideration, ALIENATION OF HUSBAND'S AFFECTIONS we have reached the conclusion that the plea was ACTION OF WIFE. - It is decided by the Court of properly overruled. It presented, in substance, Appeals of Kentucky, in Deitzman v. Mullin, that the following facts: Appellee had instituted a under Kentucky Statute, sec. 2128, empowering former suit in the District Court of Travis County, å married woman to sue and be sued as a upon the same cause of action presented in this single woman, the wife may maintain an action suit, against appellant and the Pullman Palace against one who entices her husband from her Car Company, wbich suit had been removed to and alienates his affections. The court says:
"The question presented here is, can a married right to the society of his wife is no greater to the woman maintain an action against one wbo en husband than her right to his society. Marriage tices her hushand from her and alienates her af gives to each the same right in that regard. fections? At common law marriage is considered Each is entitled to the society and affection of the in no other light than a civil contract, and the other. They both spring from marriage conholiness of the matrimonial state is left entirely tract and are mutual in character. It has been to the ecclesiastical law. The temporal courts said by some courts that these reciprocal rights consider unlawful marriage as a civil incon are regarded as property of the respective parties. venience. To punish or annul unscriptural'mar It is not necessary to enter into a discussion of riages is the province of the spiritual courts, the question as to whether this action could be which act pro salute animæ. 1 Bl. Comm. 432. maintained under the common law. If she could The common law recognizes the right of either not maintain such an action at common law, it busband or wife to maintain a suit for the restitu was because there was no remedy available to her tion of conjugal rights when either is guilty of for a vindication of the right. If the statutes supply injury of subtraction without sufficient reason, in the remedy, she is clothed with a right to enforce which case the ecclesiastical courts compel them a meritorious cause of action. In Big. Torts, to come together. 3 Bl. Comm. 94. At common 153, it is said: "To entice away, or to corrupt law the husband and wife are treated as one per the mind and affections of one's consort, is a civil son. Marriage operates as a suspension, in most wrong for which the offender is liable to the inrespects, of the legal existence of the latter. All jured husband or wife.' The gist of the action is the disabilities of married women spring from the not in the loss of assistance, but the loss of consupposed unity of husband and wife. At common sortium of the wife or husband, under which law the right of the wife to the consortium of her terms are usually included the persons, affection, husband exists. In the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, society and aid. Cooley, Torts, 228, says: “We which is exercised concurrently with that of the see no reason why such an action should not be common law, the rights of the wife to the con supported where by the statute the wife is alsortium of the husband are recognized and en lowed, for ber own benefit, to sue for personal forced. While the court did not give her dama wrongs
suffered by her.' In Jaynes v. Jaynes, 39 ges for the loss of the consortium of the husband, Hun, 40, it is said: “These reciprocal rights may but restored to her the thing itself, this was a be regarded as the property of the respective distinct recognition of the rights of the wife by parties, in the broad sense of the word, property, the ecclesiastical law of England, which was which includes things not tangible or visible, and founded upon the principles of the civil law. 1 Bl. applies to whatever is exclusively one's own. In Comm. 442; 3 Bl. Comm. 139, 140. If the domin Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. 1, 18 Atl. Rep. 1027, 6 L. ion which the common law gave the husband R. A. 829, it was held that the right of the busover the property and personal rights of the wife band to the affections and society of the wife bas has been taken away from him and conferred ever been regarded as a valuable property right, upon her, and remedies conformable with the and he has always been permitted to sue for the spirit of the civil law have been given to the wife loss of it. Upon principle, this right is as valfor the redress of injuries to her person, property uable to her as is that of the husband to him. and personal rights, an action in her own name In Seaver v. Adams (N. H.), 19 Atl. Rep. 776, it for the loss of the consortium of her busband, is said: “As, in natural justice, no reason exists against one who wrongfully deprived her of it, why the right of the wife to maintain an action may be maintained, unless the consortium of her against the seductress of her husband should not husband is not one of her personal rights. It is be co-extensive with his right of action against not questioned that the law gives the husband the her seducer, nothing but imperative necessity right to maintain an action against one who de would justify a decision to the contrary.' The prives him of the consortium of his wife. The law right of the wife to maintain such a suit as this gives the wife the right to her husband's support, is supported by Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio society and affection. If the right is invaded, a St. 633; Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584, 23 N. flagrant wrong has been committed. It is the E. Rep. 17, 6 L. R. A. 553; Jaynes v. Jaynes, 39 boast of the common law that there is no wrong Hun, 40; Warner v. Miller, 17 Abb. N. C. 221; without a remedy. It would be a reproach to the Haynes v. Nowlin, 129 Ind. 581, 29 N. E. Rep. law if there was no remedy for a wrong like this. 389, 14 L. R. A. 787; Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. 1, 18 There is a maxim that “reason is the life of the Atl. Rep. 1027, 6 L. R. A. 829; Seaver V. Adams law. Certainly it would be against reason to (N. H.), 19 Atl. Rep. 776. If the wife was degive the husband the right of action for an injury, prived of a redress at common law when her husbut deny the same to the wife for suffering a like band was taken away from her by the improper one. The reason which gives the husband an ac influence of others, it is because of its barbarity, tion against one who deprives him of the society which made the wife the mere servant of the and affection of his wife supports a rule which husband, and deprived her of all right to redress would give the wife the same remedy. Some her personal wrongs, except by his will. The courts hold that at common law an action like the doctrine of feudal times gave many and compreone here can be maintained by the wife. The hensive rights to the baron, but few to the feme.