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est thereof. Not the paper writing, but the obligation to pay expressed by it, is the thing of value, and, in the nature of things, this can have no actual locality. The general rule is that debts attend the person of the creditor, and are taxable at his domicile. A number of cases involving the principle have arisen in this court. "When credits are made the subject of taxation, it is appropriate that their locality should be referred to the residence of the owner." City and County of San Francisco v. Lux, 64 Cal. 481, 483, 2 Pac. Rep. 255; Mackay v. City and County of San Francisco, 113 Cal. 398, 399, 45 Pac. Rep. 696; People v. Park, 23 Cal. 138. "The property to be assessed in such cases is money at interest or debts. The money at interest, debt, or obligation is the principal thing, and the mortgage is only a securitya mere incident to the debt or obligation. The mortgage has no existence independent of the thing secured by it, and payment of the debt discharges the mortgage. The thing secured is intangible, and has no situs distinct and apart from the residence of the holder. It pertains to and follows the person." People v. Eastman, 25 Cal. 601, 603.

The executors urge that those cases (other than Mackay v. City and County of San Francisco) related to the situs of credits for purposes of taxation only as between different counties of this State, and that here the question is the wider one of the jurisdiction of different States; also that those cases concern non-negotiable choses in action, while the bonds assessed in the present case are negotiable in form; and it is contended that these differences in fact are sufficient to distinguish the law of the present case from those referred to. The negotiable character of the bonds of the West Virginia railroad corporations does not appear from the record; but in our opinion, if it were so apparent, neither that circumstance, nor the mere fact that they are kept out of the State, can affect the rule that they have locality for purposes of taxation at the place where they are held—that is, owned. The principle on which the cases above mentioned were decided does not depend on the presence in the State of the evidences of the debt, nor whether they are negotiable or non-negotiable in form, although it may be allowed that cases might arise where these considerations, co-operating with other circumstances, would affect or modify, or possibly forbid, the application of the principle. The present is not such a case. A negotiable railroad bond deposited without the State is no more the debt or credit which it represents than is a non-negotiable bond kept within the State. In neither instance is the paper the only evidence by which the debt or credit might be proved. If it were destroyed, the thing it represents would still exist, and in contemplation of law have its locality at the residence of the owner. At that place, therefore, it should be held to be taxable; and to this effect are far the more numerous authorities and those more consonant with legal reason.

Cooley, Taxn. (2d Ed.) 79, 372; Hunter v. Board, 33 Iowa, 376; Board v. Cutter, 3 Colo. 349; De Vignier v. City of New Orleans (C. C.), 16 Fed. Rep. 11, 12; Myers v. Seaberger, 45 Ohio St. 232, 235, 12 N. E. Rep. 796; Thomas v. County Court, 4 Bush, 135; State v. Earl, 1 Nev. 394; Foresman v. Byrns, 68 Ind. 247; City Council of Augusta v. Dunbar, 50 Ga. 387; Hayne v. Deliesseline, 3 McCord, 374; Boyd v. City of Selma, 96 Ala. 144, 11 South. Rep. 393, 16 L. R. A. 729; Ferris v. Kimble, 75 Tex. 476, 12 S. W. Rep. 689; State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 21 L. Ed. 179; Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491, 25 L. Ed. 558. For further enunciations of the rule and citations of authority, see City of New Albany v. Meekin (Ind.), 56 Am. Dec. 522, 529, note; 25 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 126, 127; Cooley, Taxn. (2d Ed.) 56. There is an exception which has obtained extensive recognition. Where the paper evidences of debt are in the possession and control of an agent of the owner in a State foreign to the domicile of the latter, and are held by the agent for management in the course of the permanent business of the owner, as, for example, to collect the money to become due thereon and to reinvest it, the securities are deemed to be taxable at the domicile of such agent. Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt. 152, seems to be the leading case holding this doctrine. People v. Smith, 88 N. Y. 576; Finch v. York Co., 19 Neb. 50, 26 N. W. Rep. 589, and Goldgart v. People, 106 Ill. 25, are further illustrations. We are not at present concerned with the validity of such exception, for the bonds owned by the estate of Fair are not shown to be within the conditions to which the exception relates.

The executors lay stress on the decision in People v. Home Ins. Co., 29 Cal. 533. In that case certain bonds of the State of California owned by a non-resident insurance company, but deposited in bank here pursuant to the requirement of a statute making such deposit a condition of the right of the company to carry on business in this State, were held to be rightly taxable here; from which it would seem to follow that they could not be rightly taxed at the domicile of the owner. That case is dependent on so many special conditions that it affords no precedent for the case at bar. The bonds there in question were held to be separated from the owner and his domicile, and in the hands of an agent or trustee in this State, for purposes indispensable to the business of the owner here. The decision evidently took color from the principle of Catlin v. Hull, supra, and other cases of like impression, which are not authority in the present case. Again, the court regarded the bonds, in consequence of the requirement of the statute (St. 1864, p. 131), as really part of the capital stock of the company, and in this respect to be taxed like any other property similarly employed; and it may also be observed that said statute required the deposit of public stocks of this State "not exempt from taxation," a provision which also seems to have influenced

the result reached by the court. 29 Cal. 549. The court below was right in holding that the answer of the executors showed no defense to the demand for taxes on the bonds of the foreign railroad corporations; but, since it appeared from the answer that the taxes on the other bonds assessed were not authorized by law, it was error to sustain the demurrer to the answer as a whole. The order appealed from should be reversed.

NOTE. Place of Taxation of Intangible Personal Property. The proper, just and uniform taxation of personal property has always been one of the most perplexing problems of government. And probably the most exasperating question in this connection, in that it is as needless as it is troublesome, is the question of what is the proper rule to be consistently ap plied in determining at what place personal property shall be taxed. The difficulty of a proper solution of this question is further aggravated by the fact that every State makes its own rules and the interference of the federal judiciary in establishing a uniform rule cannot be asserted except in certain extreme cases. The first principle to be borne in mind, however, is that the quid pro quo of taxation is protection to person or property. If neither person nor property is within the jurisdiction, taxation is unwarranted. State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300. If person and property are both within the jurisdiction, the right of taxation is evident and beyond question. But if the person is in one jurisdiction and owns personal prop. erty in another jurisdiction, in which jurisdiction is he to be taxed in respect of the property situated in the foreign jurisdiction? On this point the authori ties are hopelessly in conflict, one line of decisions, following the maxim mobilia personam sequuntur, hold broadly that personal property follows the person of the owner and should be taxed at the owner's domicile. Bemis v. Boston, 14 Allen, 366; Commissioners v. Dredging Co., 122 Pa. St. 386; Phelps v. Thurston, 47 Conn. 477; State v. Bentley, 23 N. J. L. 532. Some authorities claim this to be the gen. eral rule and the most logical. As far as tangible personal property is concerned, however, we apprehend the contrary to be the case and believe the general rule to be that the fiction,mobilia personam sequuntur, has no place in the law of taxation, and that tangible personal property such as horses, cows, wagons, etc., are to be taxed like real property at the place where it is situated, and not at the owner's domicile. Hoyt v. Commissioners, 23 N. Y. 25; People v. Home Ins. Co., 29 Cal. 533; Eversole v. Cook, 92 Ind. 222; Commissioners v. Gaines, 80 Ky. 489; Colbert v. Leake Co., 60 Miss. 142. The case of Hoyt v. Commissioners, supra, is undoubtedly the leading case on this subject and established the rule for the State of New York, being approved by all the later decisions. In this case there was an attempt to tax a resident of New York for personal property held by him in another State. The court denied the right of taxation under the cir cumstances. In closing a strong and vigorous argument the learned judge said: "If, proceeding on the true principles of taxation, we subject to its burdens all goods and chattels actually within our jurisdiction, without regard to the owner's domicile, it must be understood that the same rule prevails everywhere. If we proceed on the opposite rule and impose the tax on account of the domicile, without regard to the actual situs of the property, while the same property is taxed in another sovereignty by reason of its situs there, we necessarily subject the citizen to a double

burden of taxation for which no sound reason can be given. I can think of no more just and appropriate exercise of the sovereignty of a State or nation over property situated within it and protected by its laws than to compel it to contribute toward the maintenance of government and law. Accordingly, there seems to be no place for the fiction mobilia personam sequuntur in a well adjusted system of taxation."

In regard to intangible personal property more dif ficulty is encountered, but the same principles apply. In regard to ordinary debts not evidenced by bills, notes or bonds, the general and undisputed rule is that they follow the person of the creditor and are taxable at his domicile only. The leading case on this point is State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wis. 300. In this case a law of Pennsylvania required corporations in that State to retain five per cent. of the interest due on bonds issued by such corporations and owned by non-residents and held by them out of the State. It was held that this was not a legitimate exercise of the taxing power of the State, for the reason that under the pretense of laying a tax it impaired the obligation of the contract between the parties. The theory of the taxing State was that debts could be taxed in the hands of the debtor. In proving the fallacy of this reasoning, Justice Field said: "Debts owing to foreign creditors, by either corporations or individuals are not the subject of taxation. The creditor cannot be taxed, because he is not within the jurisdiction, and the debts cannot, be taxed in the debtor's hands through any fiction of the law which is to treat them as being, for this purpose, the property of the debtor. They are not the property of the debtors, they are the obligations of the debtors, and only possess value in the hands of the creditors. With them they are property, but to call them property in the bands of the debtors is simply to misuse terms." In regard to debts represented by some concrete evidence, such as bills, notes or bonds, the same conflict of authority exists as in case of tangible personal property. Does the fact that these debts are in substantial and tangible form take them out of the rule of ordinary debts and place them within the rule of tangible personal property? Undoubtedly the weight of authority favors the view that the paper is mere evidence of the indebtedness, that the debt is a debt still without any situs apart from the person of the creditor and should therefore be taxed at the latter's domicile. Lansborough v. County, 131 Mass. 424; Great Barrington v. Commissioners, 16 Pick. 572; Worthe v. Ashe County, 90 N. Car. 409; Territory v. Tax List, 24 Pac. Rep. 182. Where notes were kept in a bank vault for protection against fire, the owner was taxable at his place of residence. Ferris v. Kimball, 75 Tex. 475. Where an insurance company of Louisiana was doing business in another State in which foreign State it was necessary to deposit bonds of that State in the treasury, as an indemnity for the payment of its risks therein, held that such bonds were incidents of the insurance business and separated from commerce and were consequently taxable at the domicile of the company. State v. Assessors, 47 La. Ann. 1544. Another line of authorities announce a contrary rule and insist that evidences of debt of a negotiable character are as tangible as coin or any other tangible personal prop. erty, and that the same rule of taxation should be applied to both, the actual situs of the property determining the place of taxation in both cases. People v. Insurance Co., 29 Cal. 533; State Bank v. Richmond, 79 Va. 113; People v. Ogdensburg, 48 N. Y. 390; State v. County Court, 69 Mo. 454; Poppleton v. County, 18 Oreg. 377. Notes held by a bank are

taxable in the State where the bank is situated, no matter where the makers reside. State Bank v. Richmond, 79 Va. 113. Where bonds were sent out of the State for safe-keeping and not to avoid taxation, it was held that they were taxable to the owner within the State. State v. County Court, 69 Mo. 454; but see Rev. St. Mo. 1899, sec. 9121, changing the rule an nounced by the court in this case. It cannot be denied that the reasoning of these cases is strong and arrives at the most logical conclusion. The case of People v. Insurance Co., supra, relied upon by the appellants in the principal case, takes a strong posi tion on this question and was at least persuasive authority why the court in the principal case should have consistently applied the principle therein announced. In that case it was held by the Supreme Court of California that bonds of that State, which were owned by a foreign insurance company doing business in that State and deposited with a proper authority in that State in accordance with the act of the legislature requiring such companies to deposit bonds there as security for their liabilities, were subject to taxation in that State. The court said: "Whatever the legal fiction may be as to the situs of personal property, such as horses, coin, and other things of a corporeal nature, they have an actual situs which subjects them to the jurisdiction of the government where that actual situs is; and the same is equally true of things incorporeal. Whether tangible or intangible the rule is or may be the same. If bonds are to be regarded as property they are of course within the State, but if only as the evidence of the existence of property in some other form, they represent the thing whatever it is; they are the outward semblance by which its actual presence is manifested, and by which it is manipulated and actually controlled. Whatever the legal fiction, therefore, as to the situs of these bonds may be, it is plain that there is an actual situs in this State, and that the thing constituting the property is 'within the State' and subject to the provisions of the Revenue Act."

However, even these authorities which adhere to the more generally recognized rule that debts evidenced by bonds, notes and bills, follow the person of the owner and are taxable at the latter's domicile, recognize the well established exception, that "where the paper evidences of debt are in the possession and control of an agent of the owner in a State foreign to the domicile of the latter, and are held by the agent for management, as for example, to collect the money due thereon and to reinvest it, the securities are deemed to be taxable at the domicile of such agent." Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt. 152; Goldgart v. People, 106 Ill. 25; Williams v. Board, 78 N. Y. 561; Boyd v. Selma, 96 Ala. 144; In re Delinquent Taxes of 1897, 78 N. W. Rep. 962. The court, in Goldgart v. People, supra, gives a clear idea of the extent of this exception: "The statute requires 'credits,' as well as other personal property, to be listed by the owner, if a resident of the State, or if it be controlled by an agent, then by the agent. If the owner be resident in the State, there is jurisdiction over his person, and over his credits also, which in legal contemplation, in the ab. sence of anything showing they have a situs else. where, accompany him. If the owner is absent, but the credits are in fact here, in the hands of an agent, for renewal or collection, with the view of re-loaning the money by the agent as a permanent business, they have a situs here for the purpose of taxation, and there is jurisdiction over the thing."

The rule recognizing the taxation of vessels engaged in interstate commerce and registered under act of

congress is now uniform and well settled throughout the country. The domicile of a vessel duly registered under the acts of congress is the port where the vessel is registered, and which must be the nearest to the place where the owner or owners reside. The leading case establishing the rule just announced is that of Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471. In this case a resident citizen of New York, owning a vessel duly regis tered in the port of New York, with the name of a port upon her stern, as required by the act of congress, sent her to ply between Mobile, Ala., and the City of New Orleans. The vessel was regularly enrolled at the custom bouse in Mobile by her master, and the agent conducting the business bad an office in that city. The vessel was assessed as personal property in Mobile, belonging to the non resident. The court held that the vessel was not subject to taxation in Moblie, and was only liable in New York, her home port. It was stated by the court that the physical presence of the vessel in Mobile when the taxes were assessed did not decide the question, and that the vessel being owned by and employed in the service of a resident of New York, was primarily taxable under the authority of that State only, and that it was not important whether the owner in fact paid such taxes or not. In regard to vessels not registered under the laws of the United States a different rule might apply, as they would then come within the general rules announced by the different State courts. For a full discussion of this subject and the authorities, see the late case of Johnson v. Merchants' Line, 37 Fla. 499.

Another phase of this question arises under the construction of the collateral inheritance tax laws of the different States. Under the Collateral Inheritance Act of New York, it was provided that "all prop erty which shall pass by will or the intestate laws of that State, from any person who may die possessed of the same, or, if such decedent was not a resident of this State at the time of his death, which property or any part thereof which shall be within this State," shall be liable to a tax. It was held that personal property in that State owned by a non-resident intestate at the time of his death, which was kept or invested by him there, was liable to taxation. Matter of the Estate of Romaine, 127 N. Y. 80. In Pennsylvania the contrary rule is laid down, the court adhering to the maxim mobilia personam sequuntur, which is rejected by the New York courts, and holding that bonds, no matter where deposited, have no situs apart from the domi cile of their owner. Orcutt's Appeal, 97 Pa. St. 179. The rule announced by the New York decisions, however, seems to be gaining recognition as the most log. ical and just in such cases. Alvaney v. Powell, 2 Jones Eq. 51; State v. Dalrymple, 70 Md. 294; In re Burr's Estate, 38 N. Y. Supp 811, in which case it was held that money belonging to the estate of a non resident decedent on deposit in a New York savings bank is deposited in New York. The court said: "The principle upon which such property is taxable is that it is under the protection of our laws, and should, therefore, pay a share of the expenses of the government. This case is one of hardship for the reason that the whole estate of the decedent is taxable in Pennsylvania, whose courts uphold the fiction mobilia personam sequuntur. It is certainly unfortunate that the laws of the different States relating to taxation are not uniform and framed to prevent double taxation."

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS FROM

RAILROAD EM PLOYEE'S RELIEF ASSOCIATIONS AS A DEFENSE TO ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE RESULTING IN PERSONAL INJURIES OR DEATH.

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

Please publish the following as an Addenda to my article on the subject of "The Acceptance of Benefits from Railroad Employees' Relief Associations as a Defense to Actionable Negligence Resulting in Personal Injuries or Death," which was published in your issue of August 24th, 1900.

ADDENDA.

The particular point here noted which renders the case valuable is not covered by the syllabus, hence it would escape notice in the ordinary method of search. In Helman v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 58 Ohio St. Rep. 400, 50 N. E. Rep. 986, it was held that where the widow receives and accepts payment of the designated benefit from the relief fund, the action will proceed as an action for the recovery of damages sustained by the children only, and no dissent from this position of the trial court was expressed by either party. In the latest reported case involving the "relief defense," McKeering v. Penn. R. Co. (N. J.), 46 Atl. Rep. 715, the views expressed by Mr. Justice Boggs in Maney v. C., B. & Q. R. Co., 49 Ill. App. 105, were quoted with approval by Van Syckel, J., speak ing for the Supreme Court of New Jersey. It ap peared that McKeering, the decedent, belonged to a relief association managed by defendant and had made bis sister beneficiary in his certificate of membership. She accepted the death benefit of $500 and executed a release; and these facts were set up by special plea as a defense to the statutory action by the administratrix on behalf of all his next of kin, including the sister who had released. The court held that a demurrer to the plea ought to have been sus. tained, that the right vested in all the statutory beneficiaries upon decedent's death under circumstances that would have entitled him to maintain an action for personal injuries had he survived, and such right could not be defeated by the release given by the sister, such act on her part being unauthorized by the other next of kin. W. B. MORRIS.

Danville, Ill.

CAPITALISM IN COURT.

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal: The judiciary as well as the bar have contributed very much indeed to make our liberty substantial, yet the recent drift in all the courts to the unreason. able demands of capitalism is alarming to those who carefully study the question. Follow any line of cases you may choose to investigate, wherein there has been a conflict between capitalism and those in the less wealthy walks of life, and you will find that the earlier decisions were in accordance with logic and justice, while the latter depart from the rules and precedents already established and give to the capitalistic demands their contentions. The railroad rate cases are examples of this assertion. In the cases that have gone before the Supreme Court of the United States, the law has been uniformly held to be that the legislature may, either by direct act or through a board or commission established for that purpose, regulate the tariff of freight and passenger rates of domestic commerce, but so that the railroad may earn a reasonable per cent. upon the money invested in the enterprise, which seems fair in its operation, but when they apply this law to individual cases,

the holding has been that the rate established was not reasonable and refused to enforce it; so far has the Supreme Court of the United States gone in this line that one is forced to the conclusion that no rate is "reasonable" unless it is made by the company itself, so that the right to regulate the charges of railroads, while it is said to exist, and does perhaps, theoretic ally, yet it is so hemmed in by the decisions of the courts that it has become a snare and a delusion. The law relative to damages received by employees or per sonal injury case also furnish a very notable example of this tendency on the part of the courts.

The earlier cases establish the doctrine that an employee may recover of a master for an injury received, unless it was due to the negligence of himself or a fellow servant, but fixing the line between fellow serv ants and vice-principal one, who stands in the place of the master. See Ross Case, 110 U. S. 510, in which this doctrine received the sanction of the supreme court and had become the well established law of the country, but the recent cases have abrogated that doctrine, and now all persons who are in the employ of a common master are fellow servants, and a recovery by one of them for injury so received is very rare. See Jackson v. R. R., 43 W. Va. 229. The income tax is another example. In this case the Supreme Court of the United States overruled cases standing for nearly a hundred years, and established at the behest of cap. italism a new rule of law-one that exempts the rich from taxation, and leaves the poor to bear the bur den. The numerous tax cases in which the wealthy corporations are exempted from taxation on the great bulk of their wealth are also examples which might be cited and commented upon, but I do not think it is necessary to more than call attention to these, as all know that the courts of to day are making the demand of the capitalist the law of the land with little regard to the former adjudications upon the subject. The practical question presented in this matter is, the cause of this tendency and how it may be arrested. I cannot rest satisfied with the assertion that this is but a necessary part of our evolution to a higher and better civilization. On the other hand, I feel that we are to a very large degree respon. sible for the condition of affairs ourselves, and that each individual, by doing the part allotted in life to him, may at least assist in bringing about the desired reformation. The selection of corporation lawyers as the judges of the courts is undoubtedly one of the greatest causes of the change of front on the part of the courts. They have been trained and schooled in the interest of the money power and, perhaps unin tentionally, they have become so fully absorbed with these contentions that they, when elevated to the bench, have no hesitancy in declaring them to be the law. Another cause is the life tenure of the federal judiciary. When once the office is reached they hold for life. They may decide as they please and none will dare criticize. A man is but a man under any and all circumstances, and no one is free from the influence of wealth in this country, so it may not be in contempt of court to say that wealth has and does influence the judiciary of this nation, and the castle built for its protection by the life tenure is a fortifica tion almost impregnable.

The law punishing for contempt of court has also been carried to such length as to do much to bring about the bad results of which we have spoken. No matter how culpable the action of the court may be, it is contempt for any one to speak of it in severe terms, for which he may be punished by fine and im. prisonment. To say that a judge decided a case igno

rantly or corruptly is a very gross offense, for which one might be punished severely. The dignity of the court must be protected, while any other officer of the country may be denounced in the vilest terms and no punishment be inflicted except to respond in civil damages for slander or libel.

Thus the courts are exempt from all criticism and are left free to act as they choose and no way to challenge their decision except by impeachment for malfeasance in office, which is nearly impossible, as has been demonstrated by the fact that but three cases of impeachment have been made within the existence of this government though it is well known that corruption has existed and one judge of the federal court was allowed to resign to escape punishment.

The people are the source of all power in this country and no one rules over them by virtue of any inherited right. They should have the power to elect their officers and to criticise their actions at pleasure and to remove whenever they see fit; and for myself I can see no just reason why this rule should not apply with full force to the judiciary as well as to any other branch of the government. The dignity of the bench should be preserved, but not at the expense of justice, and the time has come when the false halo that has surrounded the judiciary of this nation should be torn away and their acts sub jected to the just criticism. Williamson, W. Va.

ROBERT H. HOYLE.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

COPYRIGHT LAW.

The house of lords has finally determined an interesting question under the law of copyright. During the year 1896 Lord Rosebery made a number of public speeches at meetings which reporters were invited to attend. The Times sent its representatives, who prepared reports of the speeches, which were then published. Other reporters were present, and also reported the speeches for publication. In 1899 a publisher, Lane, issued a book entitled "Appreciations and Addresses by Lord Rosebery," which was made up of verbatim copies of the Times' reports, the copying being without its consent. Lord Rosebery made no claim to copyright in his speeches. The Times then brought its action against Lane, alleging that he had infringed its copyright, it having duly registered its reports according to the requirements of the copyright law. There was no dispute concerning the facts, the sole issue being whether reporters of the public speeches of other people were authors or not, within the meaning of the statute. It was also admitted that the reports were practically exact re productions of Lord Rosebery's words. They left out nothing, they added nothing, and there was no para phrasing or epitomizing or composing. The speeches might, in fact, have been reproduced by a phonograph, so far as any personal contribution by the reporters was concerned. An injunction was granted in the chancery division, but the decision was re versed in the court of appeal. Now the house of lords, four judges against one, has definitely estab lished the reporters' right, or that of their employers. Lord Rosebery, it was contended by counsel, was the author of his speech; but the reporter was the author of the report of his speech. One of the most effective arguments employed for the Times was that if a man had a perfect memory, and wrote out by heart with

complete accuracy a speech which he had heard, he would have no protection, whereas, if he only' gave the substance of it in his own words, he would be entitled to copyright. The case was extremely well argued, Mr. Augustine Birrell doing his best for the publisher, Lane; and the full report of the decision will be awaited with interest.-The Nation.

BOOK REVIEWS.

JOYCE ON ELECTRIC LAW.

A treatise covering the law governing all electric corporations, uses and appliances; also all relative public and private rights. This work seems to be a complete treatise on the powers, rights and duties of all electric corporations in their relations to the pub. lic, the government and individuals, the position of these companies on the question of common carriers, subways, damages, misdemeanors, license fees, taxa. tion, damages, constitutional and legislative powers, interstate commerce, relative rights of the public and of individuals, negligence, municipal and police pow. ers, condemnation law, rights of abutting landown. ers, rights of passengers, master and servant. The sources of electric law are to be found in the funda mental doctrines of law and equity. The fact that applied electricity was unknown when these princi ples were first asserted does not prevent their extension and adaptation nor are such doctrines really changed thereby. Electric law is new only in the sense that the uses of electricity have necessity for a new application. Recourse must therefore be had to these laws and principles found chiefly in authoritative decisions and treatises in order to deduce any governing rule applicable to the various circum. stances peculiar to electric causes. This has involved much research and much critical comparison and dis. cussion. The authors have prepared this treatise with much care and must have devoted mach time and patient study in grouping together the numerous points and have made a logical and exhaustive work. They have conscientiously examined the decisions covering electricity by a thorough investigation of the authorities in analogous law, and have presented the law applicable to the varying circumstances under which the courts have been called upon to apply old principles to this growing branch of the law. The authors have succeeded admirably in preparing not a mere reference text book, but a treatise, and one which can be consulted with advantage. English and Canadian cases have been fully presented, and where statutes have been construed in judicial rulings, such statutes have been examined and cited, and the statutory citations have been included with the table of cases. One rule laid down is that no monopoly can be maintained by any person or corporation to the use of the earth adjoining or adjacent to any wire line for the purpose of a return current. The return current is obtained by grounding the electric wires, a fact which may be of some importance in estimating the chances of corporations owning the earth. Another rule laid down is that telephone companies are com. mon carriers, and it is within the power of a State to regulate the charges which may be made by such companies for the rental of telephones. The power to regulate such charge is a legislative and not a judicial function. Mandamus will not lie to compel such at less rates than charged, on the ground that

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