same room with him. If, as before shown, they sign within his hearing, knowledge and understanding, and so near as not to be substantially away from him, they are considered to be in his presence.' But, as was said, in substance, in the same case, we agree that this will was validly executed expressly on the ground that the whole transaction was an entirety in fact, and that, immediately after the witnesses had attested, the instrument was returned by them to the hands of the testator, his attention was called to their signatures, and he expressed his satisfaction and approval of what had been done. This view, which does no violence to the spirit and intent of the statute, is not without precedent and authority aside from the Michigan case, although it may, as said by the court below, run contrary to a majority of the decisions. See Sturdivant v. Birchett, 10 Gratt. 67, and Riggs v. Riggs, 135 Mass. 238."

CRIMINAL LAW HOMICIDE-EVIDENCE DYING DECLARATIONS.-One of the points decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana, in Shenkenberger v. State, is that a dying declaration of a deceased person to the effect that she knew that her mother-in-law (defendant) had poisoned her, and that that was the way she met her death, is, in form, the statement of a fact, and not an expression of opinion, and is admissible. The court says:

reason,

"It is true that matters of opinion contained in a dying declaration are not admissible, and that the statement must be such as would have been competent if the declarant were sworn as a witness. Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 338; Boyle v. State, 97 Ind. 322; Boyle v. State, 105 Ind. 469, 5 N. E. Rep. 203; Whart. Cr. Ev. (9th Ed.), § 294. The difficulty is not in determining the rule, but in its application. In Boyle v. State, 97 Ind. 322; Id., 105 Ind. 469, 5 N. E. Rep. 203, the declarant, answering the question, 'What if any, had the man for shooting you?' said: 'Not any that I know of. He said he would shoot my damned heart out.' It was held that this answer was not the expression of an opinion. In Brotherton v. People, 75 N. Y. 159, the deceased at first did not recognize the person, who was disguised, but said: "When he' (the latter) 'drew his pistol and commenced his pranks, he knew it was the prisoner.' Held not an opinion, and admissible. In Wroe v. State, 20 Ohio St. 460, the declarant, in speaking of the fatal wound, said 'it was done without any provocation on his part.' The court held that the same was not an expression of an opinion, saying: 'Whether there was provocation or not is a fact not stated, it is true, in the most elementary form of which it is susceptible, but sufficiently so to be admissible as evidence.' The statement of the deceased in People v. Abbott (Cal.), 4 Pac. Rep. 769, was that 'the man cut him with a knife, and he had no cause for it whatever,' and it was held the statement of a fact. The statement of the dying per

son in State v. Nettlebush, 20 Iowa, 257, was in answer to a question whether the shot was accidental or intentional, and the answer was that it was intentional. The evidence was held competent. In Payne v. State, 61 Miss. 161, it was held that the statement of the deceased that the defendant shot him without cause, was not the expression of an opinion. In Fuller v. State (Ala.), 23 South. Rep. 688, the dying declaration was: 'Mr. Fuller cut him to death for nothing. That he went to loose the mule, and Fuller came up and cut him in the neck. That his knife was never open, and that he did not cut Fuller's hat.' Held admissible. It was held in State v. Reed (Mo. Sup.), 38 S. W. Rep. 574, that a dying declaration that the deceased was not armed at the time he was shot by the accused was admissible. In Sullivan v. State, 102 Ala. 135, 15 South. Rep. 264, the declaration: He cut me for nothing. I never did anything to him,' was admitted. In Jordan v. State, 81 Ala. 20, 1 South. Rep. 577, the words were, Jule shot me, and Handy cut me, all for nothing,' and were held to be competent as facts. In Walker v. State, 39 Ark. 221, the declaration was, 'Nick Walker shot me.' It was proved that the declarant was shot through an auger hole at night. The evidence was held to be competent, and that it was to be dealt with by the jury. In State v. Clemons, 51 Iowa, 274, 1 N. W. Rep. 546, the declaration was: 'Ed. Clemons shot me. Ain't that right?' Held competent; the court saying that the testimony is to be excluded 'only when the declaration shows upon its face that it is a mere opinion,' and that it is for the jury to say, on the whole evidence, if the deceased intended to state a fact. In State v. Saunders, 14 Oreg. 300, 12 Pac. Rep. 441, the declaration was, 'He shot me down like a dog,' and it was held competent. In White v. State, 100 Ga. 659, 28 S. E. Rep. 423, it was decided that the declaration, 'He shot me down like a dog,' was admissible. In Richards v. State, 82 Wis. 172, 51 N. W. Rep. 652, a declaration that the declarant was stabbed without provocation was held competent. In Roberts v. State, 5 Tex. App. 141, the statement was, 'Sam Roberts killed me for nothing.' Held the statement of a fact, and not an opinion and admissible. In State v. Arnold, 13 Ired. 184, the declaration was, 'A B has shot me or killed me, and none other.' The court said: 'It must be presumed that the declarant intended to state a fact, and not an opinion. That it did not appear that deceased knew or could know the facts seems to go to the credit, and not to the competency, of the declarations. As they purport in themselves to disclose the facts, the court was bound to submit them to the jury.' In State v. Gile, 8 Wash. 12, 35 Pac. Rep. 417, the declaration, "They butchered me,' was held admissible as the statement of a fact. In State v. Mace, 118 N. Car. 1254, 24 S. E. Rep. 798, the declaration, 'He murdered me,' was held admissible. In Lipscomb v. State, 75 Miss. 559, 23 South. Rep. 210, 230, the declaration, ‘Dr. Lips

comb has killed me-has poisoned me with a capsule he gave me to night-was held to be the statement of a fact, and not an opinion, and therefore competent testimony. Whitfield, J., speaking for the court as to the admissibility of the dying declaration, said: 'Any process of reasoning which seeks to distinguish between the statement, "Dr. Lipscomb poisoned me with a capsule he gave me to night," and, "Dr. Lipscomb killed or shot me," seemed to be a refinement not only too uncertain and visionary to serve in the practical administration of justice, but essentially inaccurate. The expression to be poisoned by my mother-in-law,' is a mere repetition of the first part of the declaration, My mother-in-law poisoned me,' and is in effect the same. Such expression is no more the statement of an opinion than are the declarations, 'He shot me,' 'He murdered me,' 'He butchered me,' 'He cut me,' which have been held admissible in many cases. The court, therefore, did not err in overruling the motion to strike the last answer of the witness from the record."

VALIDITY OF JUDGMENTS RENDERED IN A FOREIGN STATE WITHOUT PERSONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS.

And

The courts of no State or territory have any extraterritorial jurisdiction, and the judgments of any State must rest upon authority to render same had within the State where the court sits. The person of the defendant, so long as he remains away from the State of the forum, is absolutely free from the process and authority of any foreign court. should any foreign court attempt to render a personal judgment against a non-resident without personal service within the State of the forum, the proceeding would be simply void and could not in any case serve as the basis for the assertion of any legal right whatever. The foreign judgment may recite the fact that personal service of process was had, but this, of itself, does not make valid the foreign proceeding. If, in point of

1 Douglass v. Forrest, 4 Bing. 686, 13 E. C. L. 693; Kilbum v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462; Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East, 192; Dearing v. Bank, 5 Ga. 497; Kibbe v. Kibbe, Kirby (Conn.), 119, 126; Darrance v. Preston, 18 Iowa, 396; Hakes v. Shupe, 27 Iowa, 465; Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121; Mitchell v. Gray, 18 Ind. 123; Pawling v. Bird, 13 Johns. 192; Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714; Freeman v. Anderson, 119 U. S. 185, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165; Needham v. Thayer, 147 Mass. 536, 19 N. E. Rep. 429; Lovejoy v. Albee, 33 Me. 414; Blackman v. Wright, 96 Iowa, 541, 65 N. W. Rep. 843.

fact, no service was had upon the defendant, the judgment cannot take any validity by reason of a false recital therein. It must rest upon truth in order to be able to stand, and this being the reasonable theory it must necessarily follow that a defendant, upon being sued on a foreign judgment, may plead the want of service, and when he has fortified this plea by proper and legal evidence he will be entitled to a discharge. The rule, too, applies as well to judgments in the federal courts as to those rendered by the State tribunals. There is no distinction in principle, and should be none in practice. But if the foreign judgment recite the fact of process, it is not necessary that it recite the very kind of service which would be required in the State where it is attempted to enforce it. A recital of service, such as was required by the laws of the State where the judgment was rendered, is sufficient, where there is no contradiction of the service of the process recited. And in the absence of a showing to the contrary, where the foreign judgment recites personal service in some manner, it will

2 Gilman v. Gilman, 126 Mass. 26; Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N. Y. 272; Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U. S. 265, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1370; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269; Simmons v. Saul, 138 U. S. 439, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 369; Grover & B. S. M. Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U. S. 287, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92; Fer- . guson v. Crawford, 70 N. Y. 257; Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457; Kimball v. Merrick, 20 Ark. 12; Carlton v. Bickford, 13 Gray (Mass.), 591; Wright v. Andrews, 130 Mass. 149; Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend. 148; Benton v. Bengot, 10 S. & R. (Pa.) 240; Hillsborough v. Tonsley, 56 Ohio St. 540, 47 N. E. Rep. 541; Elliott v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328; McDermott v. Clary, 107 Mass. 501; Scott v. Noble, 72 Pa. St. 105; Noble v. Oil Co., 79 Pa. St. 354; Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East, 192; Shumway v. Stellman, 6 Wend. 447; Supreme Council Royal Arcanum, 52 N. J. Eq. 642, 29 Atl. Rep. 813; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 16 N. Y. 30; Elliott v. McCor mick, 144 Mass. 10, 10 N. E. Rep. 705; Teel v. Yost, 128 N. Y. 387, 28 N. E. Rep. 353; Marx v. Fore, 51 Mo. 69; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 232; Bank v. Anderson (Wyo.), 48 Pac. Rep. 197; Harris v. Hardeman, 14 How. 334; Aldrich v. Henney, 4 Conn. 380; Davis v. Headley, 22 N. J. Eq. 115, 121; Needham v. Thayer, 147 Mass. 536, 19 N. E. Rep. 429; Wilson v. Bank, 6 Leigh (Va.), 584; Bank v. Beebe, 53 Vt. 177; Pond v. Simons, 17 Ind. App. 84, 45 N. E. Rep. 48; Cone v. Hooper, 18 Minn. 531; Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Campbell, 5 Kan. App. 423, 49 Pac. Rep. 321; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462; Bartlett v. Knight, 1 Mass. 401.

3 Southern Ins. Co. v. Wolverton (Tex.), 19 S. W. Rep. 615.

4 Hamil v. Talbott, 72 Mo. App. 212; Green v. Equi. table Mut. L. & E. Assn., 105 Iowa, 628, 75 N. W. Rep. 635; Dodge v. Coffin, 15 Kan. 277; Ward v. Baker, 16 Kan. 31.

be presumed that the mode of service recited was in conformity to the laws of the foreign jurisdiction. Indeed where the the foreign court is shown to be one of general jurisdiction it will be presumed, in the absence of anything in the record affirmatively showing a want of jurisdiction over the subject-matter at issue, as well as the person of the defendant, that the court proceeded regularly and with due authority. In other words, when the foreign judgment recites all the jurisdictional facts, it will be conclusive upon the parties until set aside by some direct proceeding for the purpose. But the recitals in the record stand upon a different footing from the pleadings, for the record is presumed to be based upon proper and legal evidence, with the proper parties regularly in court. But the pleadings are not evidence, only allegations of fact. These, therefore, are not sufficient, alone, to show validity in a foreign judgment where the record is silent as to facts necessary to acquire jurisdiction of the person.8 And it has been held that a judgment procured by fraud in the foreign State may be impeached for this reason in the State of residence of the defendant, though personal service was had in the foreign State." If a person against whom a foreign judgment has been erroneously rendered appears in the foreign court for the purpose of assailing the judgment therein rendered, and appeals from an order denying his motion to quash the summons, he thereby makes himself a party, and while the appellate court will reverse the judgment for want of service in the first instance, yet it will remand the cause with directions to proceed with the case, giving the defendant leave to answer, for by prosecuting the appeal the defendant

5 Westervelt v. Jones, 5 Kan. App. 35, 47 Pac. Rep. 322; Dodge v. Coffin, 15 Kan. 277.

6 Westervelt v. Jones, 5 Kan. App. 35, 47 Pac. Rep. 322; Laing v. Rigney, 160 U. S. 531, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 366; Tourigny v. Houle, 88 Me. 406, 34 Atl. Rep. 158; Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 195, Supreme Council Royal Arcanum v. Carley, 52 N. J. Eq. 642, 29 Atl. Rep. 813.

7 Brickhouse v. Sutton, 99 N. Car. 103, 5 S. E. Rep. 380; Harrison v. Hargrove, 120 N. Car. 96, 26 S. E. Rep. 936. But see, contra, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714; Boswell v. Otis, 9 How. 336.

8 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404.

9 Bank v. Anderson (Wyo.), 53 Pac. Rep. 280. And see Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269.

thereby submits to the foreign jurisdiction.10 A foreign judgment rendered upon the authority of a power of attorney may be defeated by showing that the power of attorney was never in fact executed or the judgment authorized by the non-resident defendant."1 Nor is it necessary before a non-resident defendant can have relief against a judgment rendered against him in a foreign State or country, that he show a meritorious defense, to the cause of action upon which the judgment was procured, for the recovery in actions on foreign judgments must be upon the ground that the judgment is valid. This is the cause and ground of action. If it be bad, the suit must fail, for no action can be maintained by reason of a thing which is void and of no force.12 A judgment procured against a non-resident who is represented in the litigation by an attorney having no authority to act for him stands upon the same footing as judgments rendered without service. And though the foreign defendant execute a warrant of attorney authorizing a confession of the foreign judgment, yet the judgment will not be valid if confessed after the period within which the authority to confess was circumscribed by the warrant itself.14 But of course where a foreign judgment is rendered upon confession authorized by a valid power of attorney and in conformity thereto, it will become a judg

ment entitled to the full faith and credit required to be given all regular judgments. If a judgment cannot be enforced in a foreign State because rendered without jurisdiction of the person, it is equally void in the State where rendered, for the courts of a State can no more enforce judgments against a nonresident where there has been no service of process nor appearance than they could in case of a similar judgment against a citizen. The judgment in all such cases would necessarily be void for want of jurisdiction, and being void for this reason in one place it is

10 Arkansas Coal, Gas, F. C. & Mfg. Co. v. Haley, 62 Ark. 144, 34 S. W. Rep. 545.

11 Wilson v. Bank, 6 Leigh (Va ), 570.

12 Bartlott v. Knight, 1 Mass. 401; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462.

13 Hays v. Merkle, 67 Mo. App. 55.

14 First National Bank v. Cunningham, 48 Fed. Rep. 510.

15 Teel v. Yost, 128 N. Y. 387, 28 N. E. Rep. 353.

equally so in another.16 It is sometimes attempted to assert that foreign judgments rendered without service or appearance are not void, though jurisdiction of the defendant has never been acquired; but this cannot be correct. If the want of jurisdiction exists the judgment and all proceedings thereunder are void, not voidable. The judgment is an absolute nullity and can form the basis for the assertion of no right or privilege.17 But of course this does not imply that all foreign judgments must be treated as void. If the judgment recites the facts necessary to show jurisdiction it will be presumed regular and valid until the defendant plead and prove otherwise, notwithstanding the recitals of service may show that a different mode of procedure was had than that which would be required in the jurisdiction in which the judgment is sued on.18 So, the mere fact that the judgment of a foreign court may fail to recite that there was a trial by jury will not invalidate it when sued on in a State other than that of rendition, for the issues may have been such that a jury might not have been legally demanded, or the parties may have waived a jury trial.19 But the judgment may be void, not only for the want of personal service, but for the want of right in the plaintiff to sue for any reason. Thus in many States the law requires a residence for a prescribed length of time before a litigant will be entitled to maintain an action for a divorce. Until the litigant has lived in the State the required period of time, he has no right to invoke the assistance of the courts of such State to grant him relief for any grievance under the divorce laws. And if he should, through fraud, collusion or even ignorance, procure a judgment before he had resided in the State the required length of time, the decree would not bind the defendant, and probably not the plaintiff. For, in cases of this kind, the residence for their prescribed period is a prerequisite to jurisdic

16 Picquet v. Swan, 5 Mass. 35: Fenton v. Garlick, 8 Johns. 194: Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121; Babcock v. Marshall (Tex. Civ. App.), 50 S. W. Rep. 728; Rob. ertson v. Pickerell, 109 U. S. 608, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 107; Frame v. Thorman (Wis.), 79 N. W. Rep. 39.

17 Doyle v. Brown, 72 N. Car. 395; Harrison v. Har grove, 120 N. Car. 96, 25 S. E. Rep. 936; Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380; Whittier v. Wendall, 7N. H. 257; Pauling v. Willson, 13 Johns. 192.

18 Dodge v. Coffin, 15 Kan. 277; Ward v. Baker, 16 Kan. 31.

19 Stewart v. Sholl, 99 Ga. 534, 26 S. E. Rep. 757.

tion with like effect as the service of a summons in an ordinary action. But in the absence of fraud or bad faith, the ascertainment of the fact of residence for the necessary time by the foreign tribunal will be conclusive as to the validity of the judgment to the extent that it might be assailed on the ground that the plaintiff had not resided within the State for the time required.20 It has been held that a judgment of divorce had in a foreign jurisdiction without service of process or appearance is a nullity as to the defendant, at least so far as the judgment. affects any property rights." And especially should this be the rule where neither party is a bona fide resident of the State in which the judgment is rendered.22 Where the bonds of matrimony are dissolved in a proceeding for divorce, and by the law of the State where the divorce is rendered one or both of the parties are forbidden to again marry within a certain time under prescribed penalties, a marriage by one or both beyond the State in which the judgment is rendered will neither be invalid nor subject the party marrying again to the penalty denounced by the foreign law. 23 It is held in North Carolina that the decree of a foreign court regular upon its face and which recites proper service of summons on the defendant, is valid to the extent that an innocent purchaser buying land sold thereunder will take a good title.24 The rule is different, of course, where the purchaser knows of the want of service, or has knowledge of facts sufficient to put him upon inquiry which, if properly followed up, would reveal the true state of the judgment; for then the purchaser would be estopped to allege his innocence. 25 The jurisdiction of the courts cannot be extended beyond the limits

20 Fairchild v. Fairchild, 53 N. J. Eq. 678, 34 Atl Rep. 10; Magowan v. Magowan (N. J. Err. & App.), 42 Atl. Rep. 330.

21 Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121; Raymond v. Ray. mond (Ind. Ter.), 37 S. W. Rep. 202.

22 Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y. 30; Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N. Y. 272.

23 Dickson v. Dickson's Heirs, 1 Yerg. (Tenn.) 110; Wilson v. Holt, 83 Ala. 528, 3 South. Rep. 321; Succes. sion of Hernandez, 46 La. Ann. 962, 15 South. Rep. 461; Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458; Cox v. Combs, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.), 231; Van Voorhis v. Britnall, 86 N. Y. 18: Thorp v. Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602; Moore v. Hageman, 92 N. Y. 521; Ponsford v. Johnson, 2 Blatchf, 51; People v. Chase, 83 Me. 205, 23 Atl. Rep. 114; Frame v. Thorman (Wis.), 79 N. W. Rep. 39. 24 Harrison v. Hargrove, 120 N. Car. 96, 26 S. E. Rep. 936.

25 Chambers v. Brigman, 75 N. Car. 487.

of the State by statutes authorizing personal judgments upon certain prescribed, actual or

constructive process.

And statutes which

26

authorize the service of process in any manner or by any person or officer upon a litigant or party to an action who is beyond the limits of the State when served, are absolutely void to the extent that they authorize a personal judgment by virtue of such service of summons or like process." And if a return to a summons upon which a foreign judgment has been rendered shows that the defendant was served out of the State in which the litigation was pending, this will be sufficient proof of the want of authority in the foreign court to render the judgment.27 There is potent reason for the rule holding such statutes unconstitutional and void. No State has any right to thrust its courts upon the citizens of another and compel them to be bound by such foreign tribunals simply by a legislative enactment or any other kind of law. Every State is absolutely sovereign except as its powers are circumscribed by the federal constitution, and the lawful acts of congress passed in pursuance thereof, but this sovereignty does not, and cannot extend, in the least beyond the limits of the sovereignty. | Indeed, it naturally forbids any invasion of any foreign court. Of course, a foreign judgment recovered without jurisdiction of the court rendering the same, does not extinguish the obligation sued on, for such a judgment is but a nullity, and the is not absorbed by reason of the doctrine of merger. There is nothing for it to merge into.28 And such a judgment being void, it cannot be pleaded as res adjudicata in another action upon the same liability.29 But a judgment of a foreign court, which has jurisdiction of both the person and subject-matter, is conclusive, in the absence of fraud, as to all matters which might have been pleaded by the defendant, though there might have been irregularities or informalities in rendering same.30 Upon

debt

26 Lovejoy v. Albee, 33 Me. 414; Dearing v. Bank, 5 Ga. 497; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714; Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East, 192.

27 Hinton v. Penn Mut. Ins. Co. (N. Car.), 35 S. E. Rep. 182.

28 Tourigny v. Houle, 88 Me. 406, 34 Atl. Rep. 158. 29 Whittier v. Wendell, 7 N. H. 257; Bank v. Beebe, 58 Vt. 177; McCadden v. Slausen, 96 Tenn. 586, 36 S. W. Rep. 378.

this principle it is correctly held that a domestic court will not inquire whether a foreign court correctly interpreted the statute of limitations.31 And where the parties to an action are once regularly in court, the fact that after judgment one of them becomes a non-resident and proceedings against him in error are prosecuted upon constructive notice, or service, in conformity to the laws of the foreign State, the decision on appeal will bind him just as though he had remained in the foreign jurisdiction.32 foreign jurisdiction.32 And the fact that a foreign judgment might or should have been reversed cannot avail a defendant in an action thereon where the foreign court had jurisdiction. The courts of the State of the domicile would not sit as courts for the correction of errors of law, or procedure, to correct the rulings of a foreign court having jurisdiction. In short, the only defense to a judgment rendered by a court of a foreign State, as a general rule, is fraud, or want of jurisdiction of the parties. or subject-matter. 34

The federal constitution provides that "full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other State."'35 And, in order to make this requirement of the national constitution effective, congress, in 1790, passed an act providing the manner of authenticating the judgments of foreign States, and that the records and judgments of other States thus authenticated should have full faith and credit given them in every court within the United States, as by law or usage they have in the courts of the State in which the judgment is rendered.36 In an early case, construing this act of congress, the Supreme

30 Fitzsimmons v. Johnson, 90 Tenn. 416, 17 S. W. Rep. 100; Taylor v. Smith (Tenn. Ch. App.), 36 S. W.` Rep. 970; Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 195; Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457; Fisher v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 92, 34 Atl. Rep. 714; Cox v. Barnes, 45 Neb. 172, 63 N. W. Rep. 394; Peel v. January, 35 Ark. 331; Elliott v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340.

31 Fitzsimmons v. Johnson, 90 Tenn. 416, 17 S. W. Rep. 100.

32 Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 195; Fitzsimmons v. Johnson, 90 Tenn. 416, 17 S. W. Rep. 103; Cone v. Hooper, 18 Minn. 531; Becquet v. McCarthy, 2 Barn. & Ald. 951.

33 Central Trust Co. v. Seasongood, 130 U. S. 482, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 575.

34 Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308. 35 Const. U. S., Art. 4, § 1.

36 1 Stat. at L. 122.