Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Story, held that "the act duly authenticated shall have such faith and credit as it has in the State court from which it is taken. If in such court it has the faith and credit of evidence of the highest nature, viz: record evidence, it must have the same faith and credit in every other court.''87

But this early decision of the highest federal tribunal has not been literally adhered to by either State or federal courts. In the later case of Thompson v. Whitman,38 the court, referring to the earlier ruling, said: This decision has never been departed from in relation to the general effect of such judgments where the questions raised were not questions of jurisdiction. But where the jurisdiction of the court which rendered the judgment is assailed, quite a different view has prevailed.59 And it is held, in a still later case, that the act of congress and the first section of the fourth article of the constitution do "not prevent an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court in which the judgment is rendered to pronounce the judgment, nor into the right of the State to exercise authority over the parties or the subject-matter, nor whether the judgment is founded in, or impeachable for, a manifest fraud. ''40 It is clear from these authorities that the federal laws are in no sense opposed to the views taken of the validity of foreign judgments.

When a judgment has been recovered in a foreign State, it cannot, of course, be utilized as a basis of process in the nature of an execution, or similar writ, for the enforcement thereof in any other State than that in which it is rendered. As to all other States, it is not a judgment, but an evidence of indebtedness, adjudicated and settled, and entitling the plaintiff therein, when regularly obtained, to a judgment in personam against the defendant in the State of his residence, or elsewhere, he may be found.

This discussion of the validity of foreign judgments should not be understood as denying the court of any State the authority to

37 Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481, 484. 38 18 Wall. 457.

39 See M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 224; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714.

40 Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269; First Nat. Bank v. Cunningham, 48 Fed. Rep. 510.

Court of Appeals of Colorado, June 11, 1900.

1. One who has signed and put into circulation a negotiable note containing an unfilled blank, thus rendering a change in the instrument increasing his liability, not discernible in its appearance, easy of execution, cannot be heard to allege that it was altered, or that the plaintiff paid no consideration for it, in a suit by one who has taken it after maturity from a bona fide purchaser.

2. Want or failure of consideration cannot be averred against an innocent purchaser of a negotiable note before maturity.

THOMPSON, J.: The complaint alleged the execution by the defendant, John H. Stone, of a promissory note for $200, payable on the 1st day of September, 1896, to himself; the indorsement and delivery of the note by him to the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York; its transfer, before its maturity, by the company, to the State Bank of Monte Vista; and its subsequent transfer by the bank to the plaintiff, William O. Statton. Non-payment was averred, and judgment prayed. The answer alleged that a material alteration was made in the note by the insurance company after it had passed from the hands of the plaintiff, and while the company owned and held it; that the alteration consisted in so filling certain blanks as to make the note payable with interest from date until paid at the rate of 10 per cent. per annum. An alleged copy of the note as it was when the company received it is contained in the answer, and with reference to interest in its language was as follows: "With interest at the rate of

per cent. per annum from until paid." The alteration charged was the insertion of the figure "10" in the first blank, and the insertion of the word "date" in the second. The answer admitted that the bank was a purchaser of the note, for value, before its maturity, but averred that it was transferred to the plaintiff after it became due, and that he paid no consideration for it. The answer stated further that the note was delivered to the company in consideration of its agreement to issue to the defendant a policy of insurance upon his life, but that the company had failed to perform its agreement. The plaintiff demurred to the answer on the ground that the facts which it stated did not constitute a defense. The demurrer was overruled. The defendant prevailed at the trial, and the plaintiff appealed.

The defendant testified that the consideration of the note was the agreement of the agent of the

Mutual Life Insurance Company to issue two policies on his life for $5,000 each; that he signed a blank application, and trusted the agent to fill it out; that it was not filled out in accordance with his directions, the applicant's age be exaggerated, thus increasing the amount to be paid as premium; that because of this error he refused to receive the policies; that no rate of interest was originally specified in the note; that the word "date" was in it when he signed it, but that the figure "10" was not; and that in verifying an answer which stated that both the figure and the word were absent he was mistaken. The other evidence leaves it in considerable doubt whether the note was not completely filled at the time of its execution, but leaves it entirely clear that when the bank bought the note there was nothing in its appearance to excite suspicion, and that the bank was an innocent purchaser of the paper. At the close of the trial, the plaintiff requested the court to direct a verdict in his favor. The request was refused, and a number of instructions given, concerning which all that need be said is that there was nothing in the case to justify them. The answer stated no defense, and none appeared in the proof. Both on the pleadings and evidence the plaintiff was entitled to the judgment. The demurrer should have been sustained; but, as it was not, and a trial was had, upon the evidence the court should have instructed the jury to find for the plaintiff. The difference between the testimony of the defendant and his answer was immaterial. Whether he delivered the note with one unfilled blank, as he testified, or two, as he answered, is of no manner of importance. According to both answer and testimony, he signed and put into circulation a negotiable promissory note, unfilled as to one or more blanks, thus rendering easy of execution a change in the instrument increasing his liability, but not discernible in the appearance of the paper. Having, by his gross negligence, put it into the power of the agent of the insurance company to impose upon the bank, and to obtain its money upon the faith of his signature to a note regular and honest in its appearance, he cannot be heard to allege in this suit that it was altered. Rainbolt v. Eddy, 34 Iowa, 440; Davidson v. Lanier. 4 Wall. 447, 18 L. Ed. 380; Angle v. Insurance Co., 92 U. S. 330, 23 L. Ed. 556; Yocum v. Smith, 63 III. 321; Garrard v. Haddan, 67 Pa. St. 82; Abbott v. Rose, 62 Me. 194; Van Duzer v. Howe, 21 N. Y. 531; Blakey v. Johnson, 13 Bush, 197. "Whenever one of two parties must suffer by the act of a third, he who has enabled that third person to occasion the loss must sustain it himself rather than the other innocent party." Wyman v. Bank, 5 Colo. 30. We are referred to the decision of Hoopes v. Collingwood, 10 Colo. 107, 13 Pac. Rep. 909, as announcing a different doctrine, but that it does not will be seen by a glance at the opinion. There the bank, in whose behalf the suit was brought, made the alteration in the note. Instead of being an innocent purchaser of the paper after the altera

tion was made, it was itself the guilty party, and the court righteously held that its wrongful act precluded a recovery in its favor. It is true that the plaintiff took the note after its maturity, but he acquired the title which the bank had, and that was good. All the rights and remedies of the bank in connection with the paper passed to the plaintiff with the transfer; and it is immaterial what, if anything, he paid the bank for the note. The legal title was in him, so that he could maintain the suit in his own name, and the consideration or want of consideration of the transfer is something into which the defendant has no right to inquire. Walsh v. Allen, 6 Colo. App. 303, 40 Pac. Rep. 473. It is also entirely unimportant whether the insurance company performed its agreement with the defendant or not. Want of consideration or failure of consideration cannot be averred against an innocent purchaser of negotiable paper before its maturity. The court erred before the trial in overruling the demurrer to the answer, and it erred after the trial in refusing to direct a verdict for the plaintiff. Let the judgment be reversed. Reversed.

NOTE.-Alteration of Negotiable Instruments by the Unauthorized Filling up of Blanks, as Against a Bona Fide Holder.-The alteration of negotiable in. struments is a much litigated subject and one of more than ordinary importance, since under the marvelous extension of the credit system to the transactions of trade and commerce such instruments are rapidly increasing in use and favor as medium of exchange. It is the general rule uncontradicted by authority that any material alteration of a note will render it in. valid as against any party thereto not consenting to such alteration, even in the hands of a bona fide holder. Horn v. The Bank, 32 Kan. 518; Middaugh v. Elliott, 61 Mo. App. 601; Bank v. Lawson, 31 N. Y. Supp. 18; Derr v. Keaough, 96 Iowa, 397. And this is the case even though the alteration is in favor of the maker, as in changing the rate of interest from ten to eight per cent. Middaugh v. Elliott, supra. In Missouri the courts have gone still further and held that any alteration by the holder of a note, after delivery and without the consent of the maker, however immaterial in its nature, will vitiate the instrument and render the same void even as to innocent third persons where the note was not carelessly drawn with blanks left unfilled. Kingston Savings Bank v. Bosserman, 52 Mo. App. 269; Bank v. Fricke, 75 Mo. 178; Haskell v. Champion, 31 Mo. 136. In the latter case, Scott, J., said: "The law dealing with the subject of the alteration of written instruments looks further than to the materiality or the immateriality of the alteration. Aware of the danger of countenancing the most trifling change it has not permitted those intrusted with such instruments to alter them and afterward defend their conduct by alleging the immateriality of the alteration. As the nature and purposes of contracts require that they should pass to the hands of those who are interested in altering them to the prejudice of those who executed them, and as the facilities for making alterations are numerous, and the difficulty of proving them is great, all means should be employed to impress on the minds of those who are in possession of such paper a sense of its inviolability." Such is the general rule also in New Jersey. Bell v. Quick, 1 Green (N. J.), 312; Hunt v.

Gray, 10 Am. Rep. 232.

V.

The execution and indorsement of commercial paper in blank has given rise to questions of peculiar difficulty upon some of which the authorities are in hopeless conflict. The execution of a negotiable instrument in blank, even as to any of its material terms, is, to say the least, unwise and dangerous, and is and should be discouraged by the courts. A negotiable instrument is more than a private contraet be tween the immediate parties thereto. Between the date of its issuance and that of its maturity it has all the attributes of a medium of exchange and the pub. lic generally are interested in its careful, certain and unambiguous execution. It is the duty of the maker of a note to guard not only himself but the public against frauds and alterations by refusing to sign negotiable paper made in such a form as to admit of fraudulent practices upon them with ease and without ready detection. Van Duzer v. Howe, 21 N. Y. 538. It is the general rule that any one who signs his name either as maker or indorser to a negotiable instrument executed in blank and delivers it to another thereby impliedly authorizes the holder to fill it up as he pleases in any manner not inconsistent with the character of the instrument itself. Goodman Simonds, 61 U. S. 843; White v. Alward, 35 Ill. App. 195; Geddes v. Blackmore, 132 Ind. 551; Snyder v. Van Doren, 46 Wis. 602; Jones v. Insurance Co., 58 Ky. 58; Frank v. Lillienfeld, 33 Gratt. 377. This rule applies as to the name of the payee (Bank v. Johns. ton, 97 Ala. 655); as to the amount (Gothrup v. Williamson, 61 Ind. 599); as to time and place of payment (Lowden v. Bank, 38 Kan. 533; Shephard v. Whet stone, 51 Iowa, 457), and also in some States as to the rate of interest. Visher v. .Webster, 8 Cal. 109. For instance, where A and B, as sureties of C, sign an instrument in blank as to date, amount and time, and delivered it to C, the principal, with the agreement that it should not be filled up for more than $1,500. C filled it up for $10,000 and discounted it, and it was held that the parties were bound. Fullerton v. Sturgis, 4 Ohio St. Where A, an accommodation maker for B, signed a note upon the upper left hand corner of which were the figures $45, but the amount of which was left blank, with the understanding that B should fill the blank so as to make it a note for $15. B, however, before delivery, added cipher to the figures and filled in the blank with the words "four hundred and fifty dollars". Held, first, that the figures were no part of the note, and an unauthorized change in them did not vitiate the note; second, that A, having intrusted the blank to B, was, as against persons having no knowledge of his want of authority, bound by the act of B. Johnson Harvester Co. v. McClean, 57 Wis. 258. See also Ives v. The Bank, 2 Allen, 236; Diercks v. Roberts, 13 S. Car. 338; Hopps v. Savage, 69 Md. 402. But the authority in the holder to fill up blanks left in the instrument by the maker would not authorize him to make any addition to the terms of the note, as by adding the words "with interest," nor to vary or alter the terms of the instrument by erasing what is already written or printed there. Ivory v. Michael, 33 Mo. 400; Angel v. Insurance Co., 92 U. S. 331; Coburn v. Webb, 56 Ind. 100.

As far as the certainties of a note are concerned, the date, the payee, the amount and the time of payment, there should be no doubt as to the implied authority in the holder to fill them up as he pleases, in order that the paper may be made perfect as a negotiable instrument. Moreover, if the whole instrument was

in blank, with spaces for the rate of interest and place of payment, and there existed no agreement to the contrary, there would seem to be no good reason to deny the right of the holder to fill up such spaces also; with this limitation, that in the case of interest, no authority is conferred to insert a rate higher than that allowed by law. Bank v. Carson, 60 Mich. 437; Hoopes v. Collingwood, 10 Colo. 107. The insertion of a rate of interest in a blank left for that purpose and unfilled by the maker or indorsee in executing the note is a fruitful source of more unfortunate and unnecessary litigation than arises under any other phase of this question. This is probably due in the first place to the fact that notes are generally written out upon forms or engraved with the usual terms of such instruments so that if a man wishes to draw a note without specifying any rate of interest he must draw his pen through the space left for that purpose. If he leaves the space blank difficulty arises, but this only when the rights of the maker clash with those of a bona fide holder. For as between the immediate parties it would seem to be the correct rule that where an instrument is properly filled out in all its parts, with the exception of a blank space left for the insertion of the rate of interest, the holder acquires no right to fill in such blank without authority from the maker. The maker by leaving the space blank shows an evident intention that no rate of interest shall be inserted in the contract, and as between the parties it would be a clear case of a material alteration such as would avoid an instrument in the hands of any one but a bona fide holder or his transferee, and applying the general rule as to alterations would be a good defense even against the latter if the maker or indorser leaving such blanks unfilled were not es topped by their own negligence from setting up the defense. This we believe to be the rule announced by the weight of authority. Bank v. Armstrong, 62 Mo. 67; Rainbolt v. Eddy, 34 Iowa, 440; Visher v. Webster, 8 Cal. 109. Another line of cases, however, hold that a forged insertion of interest in a blank for that purpose in a negotiable promissory note will discharge the maker even as against an innocent purchaser for value before maturity. Washington Bank v. Ecky, 51 Mo. 272; Bank v. Stowell, 123 Mass. 196; Bank v. Clarke, 51 Iowa, 264. In the case of Capital Bank v. Armstrong, 62 Mo. 60, however, overruling the case of Bank v. Ecky, supra, it was held that the indorser or maker of a note will not be held bound by a fraudulent alteration made subsequently to his indorsement, unless through negligence blank spaces have been left in the instrument or the instrument has been so loosely drawn as to easily admit of alteration and in a manner not calculated to place a man of ordi. nary prudence on the alert. The court gives a succinct statement of the rule regarding the negligence of a maker in omitting to fill blanks in a negotiable instrument: "Where a party to a negotiable instru ment permits it to be so loosely drawn as to render the addition of words enlarging his liability a manner of comparative ease and such instrument is nego. tiated before maturity to an innocent purchaser for value, the maker will be held bound by the altera tion. As, for instance, where a blank is not completely filled but space is left for the easy addition of other words, in a manner not providing attention. This rule prevails in accordance with the maxim, a sound one alike in ethics as in law that 'where one of two innocent parties must suffer, that party must be the sufferer who gave occasion to the commission of the wrong.""}

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Jewish Laws and Customs. Some of the Laws and Usages of the Children of the Ghetto. By A. Kingsley Glover, Wells, Minn. W. A. Hammond, Publisher, 1900. pp. 259. Cloth, Price, $1.50. Review will follow.

Psychopathia Sexualis, with Especial Reference to Antipathic Sexual Instinct. A Medico-forensic Study, By Dr. R. v. Krafft Ebing. The only au thorized English Translation of the Tenth Ger man Edition. Chicago, W. T. Keener & Co.. 52 Randolph Street, 1900. Half Morocco, pp. 585. Price, $5.00. Review will follow.

A Treatise on the Law of Roads and Streets, by Byron K. Elliott and William F. Elliott, Authors of "General Practice," ," "Appellate Procedure," "The Law of Railroads." Second Edition. Indianapolis Kansas City. The Bowen Merrill Company, 1900. Sheep, pp. 1185. Review will follow.

ing. In this lecture the theory of evolution finds a strong champion. Both Moses and Jesus may be considered as committed to the doctrine of evolution. It was not pretended that the Jewish law was ideally perfect, the original of justice devinely revealed, but it was to be regarded as simply relatively excellent, and adapted to the state of society for which it was promulgated. This book is 8vo., bound in buckram, contains 270 pages. Published by Baker, Voorhis & Co., 66 Nassau St., New York.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.
TRADE MARK.

We notice a statement in the September issue of the American Lawyer, that another law periodical is infringing upon its trade mark or copyright by calling itself the American Lawyers' Quarterly. We know nothing of the merits of the controversy, but if it is as stated by the American Lawyer, it would seem that the latter named periodical has good grounds for complaint.

BOOK REVIEWS.

OUTLINE STUDY OF LAW, THIRD EDITION.

This work is intended as a first book in law and a general introduction to the whole body of American jurisprudence. The subject is presented in a way calculated to attract the attention of the reader and whet the appetite for more. The author with much elegance of language, with much condensation and brevity, discusses in part the following subjects: Popular fallacies regarding law and lawyers, public law of nations, international law in time of peace, and in time of war, the new magna charter, Roman law, Christianity and Roman law, legal evolution, domestic relations, corporations, wills, commercial paper, partnership, bailments, insurance, wills, leases, torts, shipping, copyrights and many other subjects of equal interest. These various subjects are lectures by Isaac Franklin Russell, D. C. L., LL. D., Professor of law in New York University. The lecture on popu. lar fallacies regarding law and lawyers is worth the price of the book. We quote a short paragraph from this lecture: "It is seriously urged that no lawyer has a right to represent a client or a cause that may happen to be in the wrong. But how is the lawyer to know that his client is a rascal or that his suit is hopeless? Who can tell the end from the beginning? Shall he reach his conclusion from a one side inquiry? Hear the other side, is the rule which governs the procedure of the court. Shall the attorney be less thorough in his investigation? But he should know the law so as not to undertake a case that is bound to fail. True; but who does know the law? Not the judges of the United States Supreme Court; for dis senting opinions appear in about one-third of the reported cases. Truth can only be ascertained by sin. cere and fearless inquiry. It cannot suffer from the honest zeal of the advocate, and these propositions apply as well to questions of fact as to questions of law. Why ask an attorney to prejudge a case and decide his own client to be in the wrong without hear. ing the other side? Why hold him responsible for a miscarriage of justice as if he were the only officer of the court, and as if there were no judge and no jury? Shall we usurp their functions? The public has called him to no such responsibility." The lecture on Christianity and Roman law is especially interest

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CHINA.

The sequence of events in China this week has simplified what has been for some time, from the point of view of international law, an anomalous situation. Armed forces, military and naval, of the Great Pow. ers have been directed against the irregular and, in a large measure, the regular troops of the Yellow Empire. And yet, diplomatically speaking, Europe is at peace with China. No doubt there were excellent reasons of policy for the maintenance of the theory that the Chinese Government has been co operating with the Western Governments in the suppression of the Boxers' insurrection. But in practice the point is soon reached at which this fiction of international law becomes no longer capable of being supported, and the tone and terms of the recent Chinese Imperial edicts have now undoubtedly brought that critical point very near to us. The nearest analogue, however, to the position of matters during the past few weeks is perhaps to be found at the time of the cam. paign of Dettingen, when an English king was leading English troops against the French while diplo matic relations between the Court of St. James and that of Versailles were nominally undisturbed.London Law Times.

1. ACTION ON BOND-Pleading-Extension of Time.A plea setting up extension of time of payments to the principal by the obligee of a bond must show a con. sideration for the agreement to extend, in order to give it legal effect as a release to the surety. In this respect it differs from the rule of pleading which applies to a declaration.-PALMER V. WHITE, N. J., 46 Atl. Rep. 706.

2. ADMINISTRATION-Decedent's Estate-Mortgagee's Claim.-Where a mortgagee of land probated his claim against the deceased mortgagor's estate, unsecured creditors of the estate could not compel him to first foreclose his mortgage before sharing in a pro rata distribution among creditors ordered by the probate court, as secured, and unsecured claims are classed and paid on the same basis.-LOFLAND v. CowGER, Ark., 57 8. W. Rep. 797.

3. ADVERSE POSSESSION - Boundary Agreement.Where two coterminous proprietors, disputing over a boundary line, agreed to abide by a certain survey, and moved their buildings and fences accordingly, one proprietor's possession of the disputed land became from that time adverse to that of the other.SCHWARTZER V. GEBHARDT, Mo., 57 S. W. Rep. 782.

4. ADVERSE POSSESSION - Mortgagor against Mortgagee. Where a mortgagor made interest payments to a mortgagee within 20 years prior to an action to foreclose, though more than that time had elapsed since the maturity of the mortgage debt, such action was not barred by the statute of limitations (section 16), providing that entry to lands shall be made within 20 years after the right to enter shall accrue, since the possession of the mortgagor while he continued to make payments was not adverse to that of the mort. gagee.-DEPEW V. COLTON, N. J., 46 Atl. Rep. 728.

5. ASSIGNMENT-Partially Executed Contract.-An as signment of the right to do the work specified in a contract, made after a portion of such work had been completed by the assignor, refers only to the work still to be done, and does not vest in the assignee the right to recover the retained percentage due on the work previously done.-CONNOLLY V. DUNBAR, U. S. C. C., E. D. (Penn.), 102 Fed. Rep. 44.

Where a

6. ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS. debtor made an assignment for the benefit of his creditors, but the assignee never filled an inventory, or qualified as such, and the assignor subsequently settled with his creditors, the assignee had no lien on the property for a debt due him, as his title ceased when the trust failed.-MORAN V. MCINERNEY, Cal., 61 Pac. Rep. 575.

7. ATTACHMENT-Levy-Equity of Redemption.-An attachment is leviable on an equity of redemption in lands.-BRITISH & AMERICAN MORTG. Co. v. NORTON, Ala., 28 South. Rep. 31.

8. BANK CHECK-Collection - Payment.-Where the payee of a check put it in the hands of a bank for collection, and the drawee bank, on receiving it by mail,

marked it "Paid," sent a draft to the collection bank for the amount, and surrendered the check to the drawer, after charging the item to his deposit account, the check was paid, as between the payee and drawer, though the draft was dishonored and the paying bank failed.-O'LEARY V. ABELES, Ark., 57 S. W. Rep. 791.

9. BANKRUPTCY-Jurisdiction of District Court over Suit.-Jurisdiction of civil actions at law and plenary sults in equity to determine title to and reduce to pos. session alleged assets of a bankrupt is not included in the clauses of § 2 of the bankruptcy act of 1898, which confer upon district courts of the United States power to bring in and substitute additional parties in proceedings in bankruptcy, to make orders, issue process and enter judgments necessary for the enforcement of the "provisions of this act" and "to cause the estates of bankrupts to be collected, reduced to money and distributed, and determine controversies in relation thereto, except as herein otherwise provided," since § 23 of the act is intended to define the jurisdiction of such courts over such suits.-BARDES V. FIRST NAT. BANK OF HAWARDEN, IOWA, U. S. S. C., 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1000.

10. BANKRUPTCY-Opposition to Discharge. To sus. tain specifications in opposition to a bankrupt's application for discharge, on the ground of his failure to keep proper books of account, it is not sufficient to show that the true state of his affairs could not be ascertained from the books as kept,but the evidence must fairly prove that his mode of keeping them was with a fraudulent intent to conceal his financial condition, and in contemplation of bankruptcy.—IN RE BRICE, U. S. D. C., S. D. (Iowa), 102 Fed. Rep. 114.

11. BANKRUPTCY-Preferences-Payment of Money.Payment of a debt in money is a transfer of property, within the meaning of Bankr. Act 1898, § 60a, providing that a debtor shall be deemed to have given a prefer. ence if, being insolvent, he has made a transfer of any of his property, and the effect of the enforcement of such transfer will be to enable one of his creditors to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than other creditors of the same class.-IN RE SLOAN, U. S. D. C., S. D. (Iowa), 102 Fed. Rep. 116.

12. BANKRUPTCY-Requiring Bankrupt to Surrender Property.-A court of bankruptcy has power and ju risdiction to make an order, after due hearing of the parties, requiring the bankrupt to pay or deliver to his trustee in bankruptcy a sum of money found to be in his possession or control, and constituting assets of his estate in bankruptcy, and which he has not surrendered or accounted for, and to enforce his obedi. ence to such order by commitment as for contempt.IN RE SCHLESINGER, U. S. C. C. of App., Second Circuit, 102 Fed. Rep. 117.

13. BANKRUPTCY-Summary Jurisdiction-Return of Property.-Goods in actual possession of a bankrupt at the time of his adjudication as such, and at time of the reference of the case to a referee, who directs them to be locked in a store, are in custody of the United States court, from which they cannot be taken upon any process from a State court.-WHITE V. SCHLOErb, U. S. S. C., 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1007.

14. BILLS AND NOTES-Delay in Presentation.-A bona fide holder of a check is under no obligation to the drawer to present it for payment within a reasonable time, and is not prejudiced by delay in doing so, except where the fund has been lost by failure of the bank.ANDRUS V. BRADLEY, U. s. C. C., E. D. (Penn.), 102 Fed. Rep. 54.

15. BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-Bond and Mortgage.-Where a bond and mortgage given by defendant K to plaintiff at the time of procuring a loan both provided for the payment of a stipulated sum per month as interest on the loan. K and his succes. sors in interest were entitled to credit against the principal only for payments of dues and premiums, and not to deductions for interest paid on the loan. The