rule of partial payments does not apply in such case.PEOPLE'S BUILDING LOAN & SAVINGS ASSN. V. KROEGER, Utah, 61 Pac. Rep. 559.

16. CARRIERS - Interstate Shipment-Liability for Appropriation of Goods.-Where goods were wrongfully delivered by a carrier to a steamship company instead of to the owner, and were carried to another place, the company, having notice of the ownership, had no lien on the goods for freight, and on selling them was lia. ble for conversion; for, though it was the duty of such company to receive goods tendered it for shipment by connecting carriers, it was not exempt from liability for goods shipped by one without authority.-LIEFERT V. GALVESTON, L. & H. RY. Co., Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 699.

17. CARRIERS-Passenger--Contract Limiting Liabil ity. A railroad company cannot relieve itself by any contract from its duty to exercise the greatest possible care and diligence to secure the safety of its passengers, and the fact that a passenger when injured was traveling on a free pass, by which he assumed all risk of accident or damage, whether occurring from negligence or otherwise, is no defense to an action to recover for the injury on the ground that it was caused by the negligence of the company or its employees.-FARMERS' LOAN & TRUST Co. v. B. & O. S. W. RY. Co., U. s. C. C., D. (Ind.), 102 Fed. Rep. 17.

18. CARRIERS - Passengers-Inspection.-A railroad company is bound to inspect its trains, but not to keep up a continuous inspection, or to know at each moment the condition of every part of a train.-PROUD V. PHILADELPHIA & R. R. Co., N. J., 46 Atl. Rep. 710.

19. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-Negligence.- Degree of Care.-A common carrier of passengers must use a high degree of care to protect them from dangers that foresight can anticipate. By "foresight" is meant, not foreknowledge absolute, nor that exactly such an accident as has happened was expected or apprehended, but, rather, that the characteristics of the accident are such that it can be classified among events that with. out due care are likely to occur, and that due care would prevent.-HANSEN V. NORTH JERSEY ST. Ry. Co., N. J., 46 Atl. Rep. 718.

20. CHATTEL MORTGAGE - Description of Indebtedness. The recital in a chattel mortgage that it is intended to secure all "indebtedness that I owe sald B," the mortgagee, is a sufficient description of a debt to support the mortgage.-HOYE V. BURFORD, Ark., 57 S. W. Rep. 795.

21. CONTRACTS-Parties.-A person employed by an ice dealer to deliver ice to certain of his customers, under an agreement that he shall receive half the profits as compensation, and who does not own any of the property used, is not a proper party to an action on a contract made by the employer for the purchase of ice, as such person is not a partner.-STONE V. WEST JERSEY ICE MFG. CO., N. J., 46 Atl. Rep. 696.

22. CORPORATIONS-Contract-Validity.-One claim. ing under a contract of a corporation, executed without its corporate seal by its president and secretary, inust show that they were clothed with general or special authority to make it, or had powers from which such authority might be inferred, or that their act was ratified by the board of directors.-FONTANA V. PACIFIC CAN CO., Cal., 61 Pac. Rep. 590.

23. COUNTIES-Supervisors Allowance of Claims.The county board of supervisors, being authorized to pass on claims against the county, in doing so acts in a judicial capacity, and injunction will not lie at the Instance of a taxpayer to prevent the allowance of a claim, or its payment when allowed.-MCBRIDE v. NEWLIN, Cal., 61 Pac. Rep. 577.

24. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Dying Declarations-Evidence in Reply-Threats.-That deceased, just after he was shot, used language indicating that he then feared that the shot would prove fatal, will not authorize the admission, as dying declarations, of statements made

five to seven hours later, when he seemed to be resting perfectly easy, and did not manifest any concern about himself; nor is their admission authorized by the fact that five or six hours later he had no hope of recovery.-STATE V. JAGGERS, S. Car., 36 S. E. Rep. 434.

25. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Homicide-Dying Declarations. The evidence examined, and held to be suffi cient to justify verdict of murder in first degree. An ante mortem statement as to the cause of death, made by the deceased soon after receiving an injury from which he died, made when death was apparently imminent, and while the deceased believed that he was about to die, is admissible in evidence as again-t the defendant on the charge of murdering the deceased, although deceased had not been informed by a physi cian that he was about to die.-STATE v. YEE WEE, Idaho, 61 Pac. Rep. 588.

26. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Homicide Quarrelsome Character of the Deceased.-Where the defend-nt and the deceased were engaged in a fight, and the defendant struck the fatal blow with a rock while the deceased was running away from him, the quarrelsome and vindictive character of deceased cannot be shown. - JACKSON V. COMMONWEALTH, Va., 36 S. E. Rep. 487. 27. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Homicide-Res Gestæ -Defendant, during a quarrel, started to attack his wife with a knife. His children then attacked him, one of them striking him with an ax. While resisting their attack, he killed his daughter. Immediately afterwards he went toward a neighbor's house, about 100 yards away and told the neighbor what had happened. Held, that such statements were admissible as res gesta.-HONEYcuit v. STATE, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 806. 28. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Manslaughter-Impression of Witness. In a prosecution for manslaughter, where an eyewitness details all of the acts, declarations, etc., of the deceased at the time of the homicide, it is not error to refuse to permit him to state the impression made on his mind by these demonstrations.-ROBINSON V. STATE, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 811.

29. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Murder-Reputation of Defendant. Where defendant was prosecuted for murder, evidence of his good reputation for peace and quietude was relevant.-HOUSE V. STATE, Tex., 57 8. W. Rep. 825.

30. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Rape-Age of Consent.Where one is prosecuted for assault with intent to commit rape on a girl under the age of consent, evi. dence that he did not intend to use force, or to accomplish the act without her consent, is immaterial, as legally she cannot consent, and the law resists for ner. -PEOPLE V. ROACH, Cal., 61 Pac. Rep. 574.

31. CRIMINAL LAW-Burglary-Variance.-Where the indictment alleges that the premises burglarized be. longed to a certain person, and that the goods therein were his property, and the proof shows that the fee to the store burglarized was in an incorporated company, that the person named in the indictment was its president, that the business was run by him, and that he was at the time of the burglary exercising the actual care and m-nagement of such store, there is no variance. -MCANALLY V. STATE, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 832. 32. CRIMINAL LAW -Embezzlement-Indictment.-An indictment charging that the accused, at a certain time and place, while agent of B, a private person, did then and there unlawfully and fraudulently embezzie, misapply, and convert to his own use, without consent of said B, certain money of said B, to-wit, $85, of the value of $85, which said money came into the posses. sion and was under the care of the accused by virtue of his agency, is good.-TEMPLETON V. STATE, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 831.

machine, and the proportion of times when one play ing the machine would win was less than the times when he would lose. Held, it was not error to charge the jury that such machine constituted a lottery.PRENDERGAST V. STATE, Tex., 57 8. W. Rep. 850.

34. CRIMINAL LAW-Handing Letter to Juror.-In the absence of anything to show prejudice, it will not be held error that, a letter addressed to a juror having been received by the clerk during the trial, the judge, without examining it or asking counsel if there was any objection, allowed the juror to receive it.-STATE V. WINE, S. Car., 36 S. E. Rep 439.

35. CRIMINAL LAW Homicide Self Defense.-Defendant and deceased and others met in a saloon, and deceased was urged to set up the drinks, and was shoved around roughly, and defendant mashed his hat down on his head. The parties met several times the next day, and at each meeting deceased protested about the treatment he had received the day before, and defendant each time apologized. At the last meeting deceased approached defendant, who drew his pistol, and retreated, bot deceased followed him, and was shot. Held, that an instruction that defendant conld not justify on the ground of self-defense if he had provoked the difficulty was not justified.-GRAYSON V. STATE, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 808.

36. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide-Threats.-An instruction limiting evidence of threats made by deceased, and communicated to accused, to their effect on the Intent of deceased at the time of the homicide, is er roneous; the proper rule being to consider the effect of the threats on the mind of accused.-SEBASTIAN V. STATE, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 820.

37. CRIMINAL LAW-Indictment-Theft.-An indictment for hog theft is not fatally defective because in the concluding part charging the accused with intent to deprive the owner of the value of the hog, etc., the name of the accused is erroneously given as the owner, where the rest of the indictment sufficiently avers the elements of the offense, and the clause in question might be eliminated as surplusage. BOLTON V. STATE, Tex., 57 8. W. Rep. 813.

38. CRIMINAL LAW-Indictment-Theft-Accessory.In a prosecution against a person as accessory to the crime of theft of cattle, the indictment, after setting out the offense of stealing by the principal, alleged that defendant, after the theft was committed and knowing of it, in order that the principal might evade arrest, gave aid to the principal. Held, that the indictment was sufficient in merely stating that the acces sory gave aid to the principal to evade an arrest, it not being necessary to set out the act or acts constituting such aid.-GANN V. STATE, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 837.

39. CRIMINAL LAW-Justifiable Shooting.-One who goes in search of another, believing him guilty of crim. inal intimacy with his wife, has no right to shoot him, though finding him holding his wife in his guilty embrace.-STATE V. CHILES, S. Car., 36 S. E. Rep. 496.

40. CRIMINAL LAW-Rape-Evidence of Conspiracy.Where, in a prosecution for rape, there is evidence tending to show a conspiracy between defendant and other persons to commit the crime, and evidence of acts of the other alleged conspirators to carry out their purpose in the absence of defendant, the jury should be instructed to disregard such testimony, if a conspiracy is not shown.-SEGREST V. STATE, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 845.

41. CRIMINAL LAW-Swindling.-Defendant, charged with obtaining money under false pretense, wrote from Cherokee county to the person swindled, in Houston county, to send him $500. The latter notified a bank in Cherokee county that he would honor defendant's draft for that amount. Defendant drew a draft, with exchange, and when it was presented the bank placed the money to his credit. Held, that the offense was consummated in Cherokee county, and the venue was improperly laid in Houston county.-DECHARD V. STATE, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 813.

42. CRIMINAL LAW-Trial by Jury of Eight.-Prosecu. tion by information instead of by indictment and trial of a felony, less than murder, by a jury of eight men, if otherwise properly conducted, is legal under the constitution and laws of this State.-STATE V. IMLAY, Utah, 61 Pac. Rep. 557.

43. CRIMINAL LIBEL Indictment-Variance.-Under an indictment for unlawful cohabitation with a woman named "May Hite," proof that defendant cohabited with a woman named "May Hyde" is such a variance between the indictment and proof as will entitle defendant to an acquittal.-STATE V. WILLIAMS, Ark., 57 S. W. Rep. 792.

44. DEED-Consideration-Recital.- While the recital of consideration in a deed is prima facie evidence of the amount thereof, it is not conclusive, and a differ ent consideration or amount may be shown by extraneous evidence.-MILLER V. LIVINGSTON, Utah, 61 Pac. Rep. 569.

45. DEEDS-Delivery.-Delivery of a deed by the grantor to an attesting witness for probate and record constitutes a sufficient delivery thereof, though made in the absence of the grantee and without his knowl edge.-TENNESSEE COAL, IRON & RAILROAD CO. v. WHEELER, Ala., 28 South. Rep. 38.

46. DEEDS-Intention-Estates.-Where a deed was to a daughter and the heirs of her body, in consideration of the grantor's love to the daughter, and the heirs, though living, were not named in the deed, but the grantor was to retain possession during his life, when the property was to be controlled by the daugh. ter, or, if she was deceased, by the guardian of the heirs, a fee was conveyed to the daughter; and a clause which attempted to restrict alienation by her was a nullity.-WHITE V. DEDMON, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 870.

47. EJECTMENT-Defenses-Sheriff's Deed.-A sheriff's deed of conveyance, duly acknowledged and proved, is by statute prima facie evidence of the truth of the recitals contained therein; but the truth of such recitals can be attacked by the defendants in possession, under a plea of general issue, in an action of ejectment by the purchaser at sheriff's sale against such defendants.-MEYERS V. CONOVER, N. J., 46 Atl. Rep. 709.

48. EQUITY-Relief from Judgment.-Equity will not grant a new trial in a case which has proceeded to judgment in a court of law, when the petition therefor shows that the plaintiff was negligent in making his defense in the court where the judgment was rendered. -BERRY V. BURGHARD, Ga., 36 S. E. Rep. 459.

49. EQUITY-Supplying Acknowledgment to Conveyance.-A bill for relief, because a conveyance given complainant by defendant was not acknowledged, and defendant refuses to acknowledge it, cannot be maintained, as there being a subscribing witness, and no allegation that proof of execution cannot be made by him, complainant may have adequate remedy without the suit.-VELIE V. BREEN, Miss., 28 South. Rep. 25.

50. EVIDENCE-Abandoned Pleading.-An allegation in a party's abandoned pleading is admissible to prove a material fact, when offered by his adversary.SOUTHERN PAC. Co. v. WELLINGTON, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 856.

51. EVIDENCE-Parol Evidence-Varying' Contract.Parol evidence is not admissible to control the statements of a written contract (notes and trust deed securing them) as to the amount that would be due thereunder.-O'NEAL V. MCLEOD, Miss., 28 South. Rep.

23.

52. EVIDENCE-Private Memoranda.-A memorandum made by a corporation's agent of the time an employee worked for it, and the compensation he was to receive, is not admissible in evidence without showing that the agent's memory was faulty respecting such statement, or that he knew it was true when he made it.-SUSEWIND V. LEVER, Oreg., 61 Pac. Rep. 644.

53. EXECUTION SALES-Redemption-Bankruptcy of Debtor.- Where a creditor, holding a judgment which constituted a valid legal lien on real estate of his debtor, caused the sa ne to be sold on execution and bid in the property, and, pending the period allowed by the State law for redemption, the debtor was adjudged bankrupt, but his trustee was not appointed until after the expiration of such period, and thereaf ter the sheriff made a deed of the property in question to the purchaser, held that the time for redemption was not enlarged by the intervening bankruptcy proceedings, and that the purchaser's title under the sheriff's deed was valid as against the trustee in bank. ruptcy. Stay of proceedings continued sufficient to give trustee opportunity to bring plenary suit to set aside fraudulent conveyance.-IN RE GOLDMAN, U. S. D. C., S. D. (N. Y.), 102 Fed. Rep. 122.

54. FEDERAL COURTS Conflict of Jurisdiction-Injunction-Interference with Proceedings in State Court -Constitutional Law.-An action having been brought for the recovery of a back assessment, and the taxpayer having appeared therein, he commenced an ac. tion in a federal court to enjoin the treasurer from proceeding in said action in the State court, on the ground that the statutes under which he acted were in conflict with the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, providing that "no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Held, that the bill must be dismissed, since the exercise of such power is expressly forbidden by Rev. St. U. S.-AULTMAN & TAYLOR Co. v. BRUMFIELD, U. S. C. C., N. D. (Ohio), 102 Fed. Rep.

7.

55. FEDERAL COURTS-Criminal Law-Conspiracy Accompanied by Murder.-A sentence to imprisonment for life for conspiracy accompanied with murder, in violation of U. s. Rev. St. §§ 5508, 5509, providing for such punishment as the laws of the State in which the offense is committed may impose, it is not in excess of the authority of a circuit court of the United States, although the verdict of the jury has not indicated the punishment as required by the State statutes in case of murder, since the act of congress of January 15, 1897, ch. 29, abolishes the death penalty in such cases, and provides for a sentence to imprisonment for life.-COLUMBUS WINCHESTER MOTES V. UNITED STATES, U. s. S. C.,20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 993.

56. GUARANTY Continuing Guarantee - Parol Evidence. In an action on a continuing guaranty, evidence as to an understanding between the parties that it was not continuous is inadmissible as varying the written contract.-SCHNEIDER-DAVIS Co. V. HART, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 903.

57. HOMESTEAD-Deed-Husband and Wife.-Under Code, § 3634, providing that real estate set apart as a homestead shall not be aliened by the householder, if a married man, except by the joint deed of himself and wife, a deed of the homestead by the husband alone is vold, and conveys nothing to the grantee.-VIRGINIA & TENNESSEE COAL & IRON Co. v. MCCLELLAND, Va., 36 S. E. Rep. 479.

59. INSURANCE

- Condition Precedent-Annuity.-A life insurance policy which stipulates for the payment of an annual premium by the assured, with a condition to be void in case of non-payment, is not an insurance from year to year, but the premium constitutes an annuity, the whole of which is the consideration for the entire assurance for life; the condition is a condition subsequent, making the policy void by non perform. ance, and the acceptance of a note for the annual premium is a waiver of the payment of the premium, and brings into operation the conditions in the policy referring to the note.-THUM V. WOLSTENHOLME, Utah, 61 Pac. Rep. 537.

60. INSURANCE-Agreement to Procure.-A declaration alleging an agreement by insurance agents to procure insurance, and procurement of insurance invalidated by a requirement of ownership of the ground on which the property insured was located, and ac ceptance thereof and payment of the premium thereon, induced by false representations of the agents that they had notified the insurer that the insured did not own such ground, and that the policy was full protection and insurance, is insufficient as the basis of an action against the agents on contract, since such allegations are not adapted to an action on contract, and show no consideration to the agents or irresponsibility of the principal, but state a tort.-MARTIN V. HOLMAN, N. J., 46 Atl. Rep. 723.

61. INSURANCE-Ownership of Property-Avoidance of Policy.-Wuen applicants for insurance informed the company's agent that they did not own part of the property, but held it on commission under an agree ment of agency, and the agent made out the policy in their name, designating them as owners, a stipulation that the policy would be void if the interest of insured was not truly stated therein was waived.-WESTCHESTER FIRE INS. Co. v. WAGNER, Tex., 57 8. W. Rep. 876.

62. JUDGMENTS-Collateral Attack.-Where the record in a cause removed from a State court to the federal court fails to show the facts on which the jurisdiction rests-as that plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different States-the judgment therein cannot for such reason be collaterally attacked by one who is a party to the suit, though it may be reversed upon a direct proceeding for that purpose.-HAUG V. GREAT NORTH. ERN RY. Co., U. s. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 102 Fed. Rep. 74.

63. MASTER AND SERVANT-Rules-Contributory Negligence. A railroad employee is not bound by the terms of a printed rule not requiring lookouts on trains backing in the yards, where it is shown that the offcers of the road required lookouts to be stationed on such trains in the yards, and such had long been the rule and practice in and about the yards.-GALVESTON, H. & S. A. RY. Co. v. COLLINS, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 884. 64. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Charter-Annexation of Territory.-Where a valid ordinance, having the effect to annex territory to the city, was passed, the fact that a subsequent ordinance proposing the annexation of the same territory was prohibited of final passage by a petition filled in the circuit court, as provided by statute, and that the final adoption of still another ordinance to the same effect is yet in question In another suit, does not affect the validity of the first ordinance; nor does the attempt to pass the additional ordinances operate as an abandonment of the territory annexed.-BYBEE V. SMITH, Ky., 57 8. W. Rep. 789.

65. NEGLIGENCE-Contributory Negligence.-Where a person permits a team to stand upon a public highway in close proximity to a railroad track, or is about to cross such track, he is bound to look and listen, in order to avoid an approaching train, and the happening of an accident.-SILCOCK V. RIO GRANDE W. RY. Co., Utah, 61 Pac. Rep. 565.

66. NEGLIGENCE-Exemplary Damages.-Under Code Ala. 1896, § 27, derived from an act entitled, “An act to prevent homicides," and providing that, in an action by a personal representative for negligently causing the death of his intestate, plaintiff may recover ́ ́such damages as the jury may assess," the damages recoverable by plaintiff in an action against a railroad company for causing the death of a passenger on one of its trains, by the falling of a bridge, are punitive and exemplary.-LOUISVILLE & N. R. Co. v. LANSFORD, U. S. C. C. of App., Fifth Circuit, 102 Fed. Rep. 62.

67. NEGLIGENCE-Street Railroads-Evidence.-In an action for damages for a personal injury received by plaintiff by reason of his horse becoming frightened at defendant's street cars, which were negligently allowed to stand on a bridge on a public highway, evi

dence that other horses had become frightened at defendant's cars standing at the same place where plaintiff's horse took fright is competent.-SAN ANTONIO EDISON Co. v. BEYER, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 851. 68. PARTNERSHIP-Death of Partner Possession of Firm Real Estate.-On the death of a partner, the right to possession of real estate owned by the firm vests in the survivor, and, on his death before the settlement of the partnership business, in his legal representa tives; and until the business of the partnership bas been settled up, and its debts paid, an administrator of the partner first deceased cannot maintain an action to recover possession of any portion of such real es tate.-CHURCHILL V. BUCK, U. 8. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 102 Fed. Rep. 38.

69. PARTNERSHIP Debt Due Firm-Accounting.Where an insolvent partner credited his wife on the partnership books with an amount she owed the firm for provisions furnished for use in her boarding house, she was a proper party defendant to a suit brought by another partner against her husband, after dissolu. tion, to compel an accounting of the partnership busi. ness, and to cancel the credit given her and re-estab lish her indebtedness to the firm, and her joinder was not subject to an objection of multifariousness.SCHLICHER V. VOGEL, N. J., 46 Atl. Rep. 726.

Judgments

70. PARTNERSHIP Payment by One Partner. Where one partner has paid judgments against the partnership, he is not entitled to subroga. tion to the security of the judgment, in the absence of an agreement of the partners creating the relation of principal and surety between them, since the partners are equally liable for partnership debts.-SANDS' ADMR. V. DURHAM, Va., 36 S. E. Rep. 472.

71. PLEADING-Amendment--New Cause of Action.Where the cause of action originally declared on was for damages to a shipment of sugar while in transit on defendant's railroad line, a supplemental petition alleging that injury was not caused as set forth in the former pleading, but was caused by neglect of defendant's servants in failing to load undamaged sugar from a cargo landed from a ship consigned to plaintiff as directed, is not an amendment of the original plead. ing, but presents a new cause of action.- MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. CO. OF TEXAS Vv. LEVY, Tex., 57 8. W. Rep. 866.

72. PLEADING-Fraud.-A defense of fraud and misrepresentation should allege knowledge on the part of plaintiff.-GEM CHEMICAL Co. v. YOUNGBLOOD, S. Car., 36 S. E. Rep. 437.

73. PLEDGES Priority of Equities.-Where the pledgee of an entire issue of bonds took the last ten of the bonds to secure a loan made at the time, with notice that plaintiff was entitled by contract with the pledgors to the proceeds of five of the bonds, the plaintiff has the prior equity as to five of the bonds, though the pledge was made pursuant to an agree ment, entered into prior to such notice, to advance money as needed, and pledge the bonds to secure the loan; and it was proper for the chancellor, having the whole matter before him, to adjudge the bonds to plaintiff, with their interest, instead of the proceeds.COLUMBIA FINANCE & TRUST Co. v. MERCER, Ky., 57 S. W. Rep. 787.

74. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Acts of Agent Binding on Principal. Where a duly-appointed agent of an insurance company employed a clerk, who was habitually permitted by the agent to solicit insurance, collect premiums, and deliver policies, such clerk, in these matters, was thus made by the agent so far the representative of the company that his delivery of a policy in the regular course of business had the same effect to bind the company as if it had been delivered by the agent himself.-HANOVER FIRE INS. Co. v. BRADFORD, U. S. C. C., W. D. (Penn.), 102 Fed. Rep. 45.

75. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Collection-Payment to Agent.-Agency to sell does not necessarily carry with it authority to collect.-WALTON GUANO Co. v.

MCCALL, Ga., 36 S. E. Rep. 469.

76. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Contract of EmploymentCommissions.-Under a contract appointing an agent to solocit applications for shares in a corporation, within stated territory, and to collect the monthly dues thereon, for the period of three years, for which service the agent is to receive 80 per cent. of the first month's dues collected, and 5 per cent. of the succeed. ing month's "dues collected," he cannot recover the stipulated commissions on dues which he might have collected if the contract had been continued after the three years, where there is no claim that the contract has been renewed, or that the agent is entitled to have it renewed, or that he has been illegally discharged, or any other breach committed by the corporation.CRUM V. MURRAY, U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 102 Fed. Rep. 92.

77. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT - Liability of Principal for Torts of Agent.-A principal, authorized to countersign and issue policies of an insurance company, can. not be held responsible for the act of his agent in forging his signature to a policy, and delivering the same without his consent, ratification, or knowledge, unless upon some ground of estoppel.-BRADFORD v. HANOVER FIRE INS. CO. OF CITY OF NEW YORK, U. S. C. C. of App., Third Circuit, 102 Fed. Rep. 48.

78. RAILROAD COMPANY-Fires-Negligence.-Where there was evidence that the fire which destroyed plaintiff's property was set by sparks from defendant's engine, an instruction that it must be found "that the escape of sparks was the result of negligence on the part of defendant in respect to the appliances used to prevent the escape of sparks" was erroneous, as excluding the right to recover because of negligence of defendant's servants in handling the engine.-SCOTT V. TEXAS & P. RY. Co., Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 801.

79. RAILROAD COMPANY Street Railroads-Injury to Child on Track.-The rule of duty which requires the ordinary traveler in crossing a street railway to use his powers of observation to discover approaching vehicles, and his judgment how and when to cross without collision, is also binding upon a child who is sui juris.-FITZHENRY V. CONSOL. TRACTION CO., N. J., 46 Atl. Rep. 698.

80. RAILROAD COMPANY Street Railroads Negli gence-Violation of Ordinances.-The violation of a city ordinance, requiring a motorman to keep a vigilant watch for persons on or moving toward the track, and on the first appearance of danger to stop the car in the shortest time possible, and prescribing a penalty for failure to comply therewith, will not authorize a recovery against the company for causing the death of a person on the track, without proof that such company had agreed to or contracted to be bound by such ordinance, since the city cannot by ordinance create a right of action between third persons, nor enlarge the common-law liability of citizens between themselves.-HOLWERSON V. ST. LOUIS & S. RY. Co., Mo., 57 S. W. Rep. 770.

81. REMOVAL OF CAUSES Jurisdiction Acquired by Federal Court.-An action in a State court against a railroad company to recover overcharges alleged to have been exacted from plaintiff in violation of the interstate commerce act is one in which the State court is without jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and a federal court cannot, therefore, acquire jurisdiction by removal.-AURACHER V. OMAHA & ST. L. RY. Co., U. 8. C. C., 8. D. (Iowa), 102 Fed. Rep. 1.

83. SET-OFF.-A set-off is a cause of action arising upon contract or ascertained by the decision of a court, and can only be pleaded in an action founded on contract. It must be independent of, and not connected with, the contract made the foundation of the cause of action in the petition, and can only be pleaded where there is mutuality of parties. The cause of action sought to be pleaded as a set-off must exist in favor of all the defendants against the plaintiff.— RICHARDSON V. PENNY, Okla., 61 Pac. Rep. 584.

84. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-Legislative Intent.Where the language of a particular provision of a statute is ambiguous, construction may be resorted to in order, if possible, to ascertain the true intention of the legislature; but, where there is no ambiguity, the language must be taken as the expression of the legis. lature's intention, unless other provisions of the stat ute clearly show that the language was used in a sense different from its natural and ordinary meaning.MILES V. WELLS, Utah, 61 Pac. Rep. 534.

85. TAXATION Exemption of Original Imported Packages.-Original packages of imported goods, which cannot be assessed for local taxation, consist of the boxes, cases, or bales in which the goods were shipped, and not the smaller packages therein contained, although these are the packages in which the goods are put up by the manufacturer; and when the packages in which the goods are shipped reach their destination for use or trade, and are opened and the separate packages therein exposed or offered for sale, these become subject to local taxation like other prop. erty in the State.-F. MAY & Co. v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, U. S. S. C., 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 976.

86. TAXATION-Paying Another's Taxes.-Where a county treasurer, without any previous request or subsequent promise of indemnity, voluntarily paid taxes on the land of another, he was not entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the State and county.REPASS V. MOORE, Va., 36 S. E. Rep. 474.

87. TAX SALE-Notice.-Under Mansf. Dig. § 5762, requiring the list of lands delinquent for non-payment of taxes to be published for a certain time between certain dates, with a notice of intent to sell them, and section 5763, requiring the clerk of the county court to record the list and notice of sale in his office before the sale, with a certificate as to the publication, the sale is void, in the absence of such record before the sale.LOGAN V. EASTERN ARKANSAS LAND CO., Ark., 57 S. W. Rep. 798.

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88. TRADE-MARK Unfair Competition - Unlawful Imitation. Where there are strong resemblances between the name or dress of the goods of defendant and complainant, for which no sufficient reason appears, the Inference is that they exist for the purpose of misleading; and where they are of such a character as to deceive ordinary purchasers, in the exercise of ordinary care, they are sufficient to establish unfair competition. The fact that the dissimilarities are such that, if called to the attention of a purchaser, or if he were given an opportunity for comparison, he would not be deceived, is not a defense.—l'ARIS MEDICINE CO. v. W. H. HILL Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 102 Fed. Rep. 148.

89. TRIAL-Motion for Nonsult.-A party moving for a nonsuit must, in his motion, specify particularly the points relied on for such nonsuit, and thereby call the attention of the court and the opposite party to the points of his objections.-WHITE V. RIO GRANDE W. Rr. Co., Utah, 61 Pac. Rep. 568.

90. TRIAL Separation of Witnesses-Rights of Parties.-A party to an action cannot be placed under the rule for the separation of witnesses, nor can the court prevent a party from taking the stand after he has heard the testimony of two of his own witnesses.COLBERT V. GARRETT, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 854.

91. TRUSTS-Evidence to Establish.-B, the president of a national bank, made a loan for his personal use

to be invested, as the lender understood, in a purely personal transaction of B. Held, that the fact that the money so borrowed by B was or might have been mingled with the money of the bank created no liabil ity on the part of the bank as trustee.-NETHERLANDS AMER. MORTG. BANK V. CONNOWAY, Idaho, 61 Pac. Rep. 590.

92. TRUSTS Jurisdiction in Equity.-Although the court of chancery does not possess the power to re move an executor from office or to devolve his duties as executor upon a receiver, yet, when the duties of an executor are intermingled with and inseparable from his duties as a trustee, the jurisdiction of a court of equity over trusts and trustees will extend, in a proper case, to restraining the person who is trustee from performing his functions as trustee, notwithstanding the fact that such restraint will incidentally prevent his performance of his functions as executor.-BENTLEY V. DIXON, N. J., 46 Atl. Rep. 690.

98. VENDOR And PurchasER-Knowledge of Agent.Knowledge of one, who buys land for his wife, of an outstanding equity, does not bind her, being acquired long before he became her agent.-PEARCE V. SMITH Ala., 28 South. Rep. 37.

94. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Misrepresentations.Where a sale of land is based on a mutual mistake as to the quantity of land in the tract, the purchaser may be relieved in equity, although the sale was in gross, and there was no covenant of warranty as to quantity. -WUEST V. MOEHRIG, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 866.

95. Vendor AND PURCHASER-Vendor's Lien-Limita tions.-Though an assignee of a vendor's lien note which is barred by limitations cannot defeat the plea of limitations in an action against the maker on the note alone, the original vendor may assign his superior legal title to the holder of the note, who, as assignee of the note and legal title, may recover the land in like manner, as the vendor could if he had retained the note.-JACKson v. BraDSHAW, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 878.

96. WAR REVENUE ACT-Stamp Taxes-Notary's Bond. -War Revenue Act June 13, 1893, declares that bonds for indemnifying any person, etc., as surety for the payment of money or the execution of official duties, and all other bonds, except such as are required in legal proceedings, shall pay a tax of 50 cents; and sec. tion provides that it is the intent of the act to exempt from the stamp taxes State, county, town, and other municipal corporations in the exercise only of functions strictly belonging to them in their ordinary governmental taxing, or municipal capacity. Held, that a notary public appointed by a State is a State of ficer employed in the exercise of functions belonging to it in its governmental capacity, and hence the bond required of such notary as part of his qualification for office is not subject to the revenue tax.-WARWICK V. BETTMAN, U. S. C. C., S. D. (Ohio), 102 Fed. Rep. 127.

97. WILLS-Devise of Community Property.-A will which describes the principal part of the estate of the testatrix to be the commuity property of herself and husband, and then devises and bequeathes all of her estate to her husband and minor child to share and share alike, gives to the child but one-half of the share of the testatrix in the community property, and of such other property as she owned in her own right.SUTTON V. HARVEY, Tex., 57 S. W. Rep. 879.

99. WITNESSES Claim against Decedent.-Code, § 1740, providing that a person shall not testify as a wit ness to establish his own claim or defense against the estate of a deceased person which originated during the lifetime of such deceased person, does not prohibit an administrator from testifying in favor of the estate of which he is administrator, in proceedings to prove a claim against the estate of another which accrued during the lifetime of the latter, though he be a distributee of the estate of which he is administrator.C CK V. ABERNATHY, Miss., 28 South. Rep. 18.