37. DEED - Reformation. Where the evidence showed that lands taken in plaintiff's name were pur. chased for defendant with her money, a deed from plaintiff conveying such lands to defendant will not be reformed on the ground that other lands were in. tended to be conveyed, since the lands mentioned in the deed already belonged to defendant.-HILTS V. HILTS, Oreg., 61 Pac. Rep. 855.

38. DEED OF TRUSTEE-Recitals.-A deed of trust to secure an indebtedness having provided that the reci. tations in any deed made by the trustee under the power of sale should be prima facie evidence of the truth thereof, recital in the deed of non-payment of the obligation is prima facie evidence thereof in equity. -ALLEN V. COURTNEY, Tex., 58 8. W. Rep. 200.

39. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION-Proof of Heirshipvidence. Waile it suff for a child to sustain his claim to legitimacy, to prove, in the absence of a certificate of birth, baptism, or other equivalent evidence, that he has been constantly considered as a child born during the marriage of which he claims to be an issue, that evidence is not conclusive. It may be met and completely rebutted by sufficient evidence showing that he is not the child of the marriage of which he claims to be the issue.-SUCCESSION OF O'NEIL, La., 28 South. Rep. 259.

40. DIVORCE-Desertion-Evidence.-Where, within two years preceding an action for divorce by a wife on the ground of desertion, the husband left the town where his wife was living, but continued to write to her for six months, inviting her to come and travel with him, desertion for the period of two years is not established.-PROUDLOVE V. PROUDLOVE, N. J., 46 Atl.

Rep. 951.

41. EVIDENCE Hearsay.-A letter between third parties, reciting statements said by the writer to have been made to him by defendant, is not admissible against the defendant to prove such statements, unless it is shown that he authorized or knew of the writing of the letter.-NEVADA Co. v. FARNSWORTH, U. s. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 102 Fed. Rep. 573.

42. FEDERAL COURTS-Habeas Corpus-Discharge of State Prisoners.-A federal court has, and should exercise, the power to discharge on a writ of habeas cor. pus a person held in confinement by State authorities for an act which involves no moral turpitude, and is only claimed to be unlawful because prohibited by a State statute, which, if construed to make such act an offense, is in violation of the constitution of the United States.-IN RE DAVENPORT, U. S. C. C., D. (Wash.), 102 Fed. Rep. 540.

43. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-Burden of ProofWhere an alleged fraudulent purchaser of a stock of goods brings replevin against an attaching creditor of the vendor, and a fraudulent intent to show in the vendor, the burden of proof is on the vendee to prove actual and adequate consideration for the purchase, and the mere production of a note or receipt from the vendor acknowledging indebtedness is insufficient.FOSTER V. HAGLIN, Ark., 58 S. W. Rep. 128.

44. GAMING-Stakeholder-Payment after Notice.It is the universal rule of this country that a stakeholder who pays over money bet upon an election, after notification not to do so, pays at his peril, and an action against him for the money can be main. tained by the party giving such notice.-PABST BREW. ING CO. V. LISTON, Minn., 83 N. W. Rep. 448.

45. GARNISHMENT-Abuse of Process.-A creditor will not be permitted to initiate a series of garnishments, and thus tie up in the hands of an employer separate amounts of money, which have been earned as wages by a laboring man until the 30 days prescribed in Gen.

St. 1894, § 5814, have expired, and then, by another proceeding in garnishment, appropriate these amounts to the payment of his debt. Such proceedings are a perversion of civil process, and cannot be sanctioned.-Rustad v. BISHOP, Minn., 88 N. W. Rep. 449.

46 GIFTS INTER VIVOS-Delivery to Trustee.-Where money is delivered to a third person to hold for a donee during the life of the donor, and to invest and pay over the interest to the donor for the support and maintenance of herself and the donee, and on the death of the donor to pay the same to the donee, the delivery is sufficient to complete the gift, which is not revoked by the subsequent death of the donor before the property has been actually delivered to the donee. -SMITH V. YOUNGBLOOD, Ark., 58 8 W. Rep. 42.

47. GUARDIAN AND WARD-Settlement-Non-Resident Ward. A minor 18 years of age, but emancipated by the law of her domicile, is entitled to a settlement with her guardian in Tennessee, and to the possession of her real and personal property located therein, since Shannon's Code, § 4318, providing for the delivery of a ward's property to her upon attaining the age of 21 years, does not apply to non-resident wards.-MEMPHIS TRUST Co. v. BLESSING, Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 115. 48. HABEAS CORPUS - State Courts Arrest under United States Commissioner's Warrant.-State courts have no authority to release on habeas corpus one ar. rested by a United States marshal within his district under a warrant issued by a United States commissioner therein, based on a copy of an indictment from a United States court in the Indian Territory.-Ex PARTE CHANCE, Tex., 58 S. W. Rep. 110.

49. HIGHWAY-Negligence-Injury to Pedestrian.An embankment along the middle of a street, made for a railroad constructed thereon, is not, as to the part occupied by the road, a substituted highway, so as to render the borough liable for injury to one who, walking along the tracks, falls into an opening in the embankment, though people were accustomed to use it for a footpath; the fact that use was not permissive being shown by the posting of notices along it that persons using it would be regarded as trespassers.KASEMAN V. BOROUGH OF SUNBURY, Penn., 46 Atl. Rep. 1032.

50. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Separate Estate-NotesBinding Separate Estate.-Since an intent to create a mortgage is essential to the creation of an equitable mortgage, the fact that a married woman, who signed notes with her husband, added, after her signature, the words, "for the payment of which I bind my sepa. rate estate," though it made such notes enforceable against her estate in equity; did not constitute them an equitable mortgage creating a lien on her separate property, entitling their holder to preference over holders of other notes enforceable only at law.WEST. NAT. BANK OF BALTIMORE V. UNION BANK OF MARYLAND, Md., 46 Atl. Rep. 960.

51. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Wife's Interest in Personal Property-Divorce.-Under Sand. & H. Dig. § 2517, providing that a wife who is granted a divorce from her husband "shall be entitled to one-third of the husband's personal property absolutely," a wife who has commenced an action for divorce against the husband has no such claim upon the latter's personal property before decree as will entitle her to enjoin the distribu. tion of one-third of the proceeds of such property, in the hands of the husband's trustee in bankruptcy.HAWK V. HAWK, U. S. D. C.'(Ark.), 102 Fed. Rep. 679.

52. INDICTMENT-Variance.-An indictment for killing "one S, whose Christian name is unknown," was not sustained by proof of the killing of D G.-RILEY V. STATE, Ark., 58 S. W. Rep. 39.

53. INSURANCE-Action on Policy-Notice.-There is a privity of interest between the insured and the one to whom he assigned the policy sufficient to enable them to join in a suit to have their rights recognized.

ELGUTTER V. MUTUAL RESERVE FUND LIFE ASSN., La. 28 South. Rep. 289.

54. INSURANCE-Assignment of Policy to Receiver.After a policy of fire insurance,providing that the same should be void in case of any change in the interest, title, or possession of the subject of the insurance, had been pledged to a bank as collateral security for a debt due from the insured, the latter was adjudged a bank. rupt, the property insured placed in the hands of a receiver, and the policy assigned to the receiver, with the consent of the insurance company. Thereupon the bank, which had paid the premium, presented its bill therefor to the receiver, who paid the same with. out notice that the policy had been pledged. Held, that the assignment of the policy to the receiver, with the consent of the company, operated as a new and substantive contract, by which the rights of the bank as pledgee were terminated, and upon a loss accruing the receiver was entitled ¡to the insurance as against the bank.-IN re Hamilton, U. S. D. C., W. D. (Ark.), 102 Fed. Rep. 683.

55. INSURANCE-Identity - Intent Evidence-In an action on a fire policy insuring tobacco and tobacco stems and packages, where one of the questions to be determined was whether tobacco destroyed was cov. ered by the insurance, declarations of the insured that it was not his intention to cover the tobacco destroyed by such insurance were properly admitted to identify the risk.-LEFTWICH V. ROYAL INS. CO. OF LIVERPOOL, Md., 46 Atl. Rep. 1010.

56. INSURANCE-Proofs of Loss-Waiver.-Where in. sured, in good faith, plainly intending to comply with the demand for additional proof of loss, sent the same within the required time, explaining why it is not more full, the insurer, by making no objection until trial, waives any right for stricter compliance with the terms of the policy.-CUMMINS V. GERMAN-AMERICAN INS. CO., Penn., 46 Atl. Rep. 902.

57. INSURANCE-Renewal of Policy.-A petition alleg. ing past insurance upon certain described premises in a sum named, and the renewal of said policy for the same amount, and upon the same terms, agreements, covenants, and stipulations as were contained in sald policy, for the further term of one year, is defective in not setting forth with sufficient fullness and clearness the provisions of the former policy, and which were to be inserted in the renewal policy.-MALLETTE V. BRITISH-AMERICAN ASSUr. Co. of TORONTO, CANADA, Md., 46 Atl. Rep. 1005.

58. INSURANCE POLICY-Consent to Arbitrate-Estoppel.-An insured, by consenting to arbitrate the amount of loss sustained by fire, in pursuance to the provisions of the policy, is not precluded in a suit upon the policy, from claiming and recovering as for a total loss, if the evidence sustains his claim. The provisions of section 3643, Rev. St., being founded upon public policy, the insured cannot be held to a waiver of them.-PENNSYLVANIA FIRE INS. Co. v. DRACKETT, Ohio, 57 N. E. Rep., 962.

59. JUDGMENT - Persons Bound Executors and Trustees. A judgment against defendants as administrators with the will annexed is not binding on one of the same persons in his capacity as a trustee under the will, or upon the beneficiaries of the trust, as to property which had been delivered to the trustees prior to the institution of the action against the administrators, where it is not shown that, as a matter of fact, the defense was made on behalf of the trust estate, at its expense and for its protection.-CARY V. ROOSEVELT, U. S. C. C. of App., Second Circuit, 102 Fed. Rep.

569.

60. LIFE INRURANCE—Action on Life Policy.-In an action by the beneficiary to recover upon a life insu rance policy, evidence as to the death of the insured examined, and held, that the trial court was justified in granting defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.-BAXTER V. COVENANT MUT. LIFE ASSN., Minn., 83 N. W. Rep. 459.

-

65. MANDAMUS Execution of Order of Appellate Court. To entitle one to a mandamus by the supreme court to compel the lower conrt, on remand, to try a particular issue only, it must appear that the order remanding the case directed the trial of that issue, and a mention in the opinion that the issue had not been passed upon is insufficient to justify it, where in the order of reversal no restriction is placed on the trial court.-TAYLOR V. JONES, Tex., 58 S. W. Rep. 47.

66. MASTER AND SERVANT - Discharge-Validity.— Plaintiff having been engaged for a year as clerk, the destruction by fire of the business house and stock of goods of the defendants, and the subsequent dissolution of the firm and its retirement from business, did not, in the absence of a reservation of the right of discharge for these reasons, absolve defendant from the obligation contracted with him to retain his services, at the salary stipulated, through the remainder of the year.-MADDEN V. JACOBS, La., 28 South. Rep. 225.

67. MASTER AND SERVANT-Employment for Year.-A written offer, made by an operative to a manufacturer, to perform work and make certain articles at the latter's factory at specified prices, contained the following stipulation: "In making this agreement or contract, I will want you to guaranty me $3,000 per year, a proportion of this amount to be paid me each pay day, and a settlement to be made at the end of each year, and, if I should make more than the above guaranty, the difference be paid me at the end of each year, when settlement is made." The offer was accepted as made. Held, the acceptance of the offer created a contract for a year.-KELLY V. CARTHAGE WHEEL CO., Ohio, 57 N. E. Rep. 984.

68. MASTER AND SERVANT-Injury to Employee-Neg. ligence. The movement of an engine and train, with out giving the customary signals of warning, such as ringing the bell or blowing the whistle, constitutes negligence sufficient to establish a liability against a railroad company when such omitted signals were the cause of injury.-HOOPER V. GREAT NORTHERN RY. Co., Minn., 83 N. W. Rep. 440.

70. MINING CONTRACT- Evidence.-No basis for recovery for not being allowed to perform a contract to mine coal is shown, the miner's claim being only for the coal that came into the breast as the result of his blasting, and it being admitted that part of it came as the result of a squeeze, and there being no evidence of what came in from his blasting.-KERRIGAN V. PARDEE, Penn., 16 Atl. Rep. 1030.

71. MONOPOLIES — Anti-Trust Law-Illegal Combina. tions. An association of manufacturers of shingles within a particular State formed for the purpose of securing concerted action between its members to prevent overproduction and establish uniform prices and grading, is not an illegal combination in restraint of Interstate or foreign commerce, within the meaning of the anti-trust law of 1890, or subject to federal con. trol; and the fact that through the action of the association the mills of its members were closed for a certain time, and the price of shingles was raised, but not to an extent alleged to be unreasonable or exorbitant, does not give a dealer in shingles for export a right of action against it or its members under such law.-GIBBS v. MCNEELEY, U. S. C. C., D. (Wash.), 102 Fed. Rep. 594.

72. MORTGAGES-Bill to Redeem.-A bill to redeem lands from a mortgage cannot be maintained by a legatee whose interest in the mortgaged premises is limited to the extent of one-tenth of the proceeds of the sale of the estate in remainder after expiration of a life estate and payment of the mortgage debt, as against the mortgagee, holding the legal estate, and also having precisely the same beneficial interest under the will as the plaintiff.-SNOOK V. ZENTMYER, Md., 46 Atl. Rep. 1008.

73. MORTGAGES Foreclosure Sale-Setting Aside.Where a tract of land was sold on foreclosure as a whole, after being offered in parcels, and the mortgagee was the only bidder, two former sales having been set aside for informality, the mortgagee being the highest bidder at each of them, and the mortgagee had repeatedly offered to release the land on payment of debt, interests and costs, and there was no such inadequacy of price as would justify an inference of bad faith, the sale will not be set aside because there was some evidence that the price was low.-CARROLL v. HUTTON, Md., 46 Atl. Rep. 967.

74. MORTGAGE-Subrogation Payment of Mortgage.Defendant, who had executed two mortgages on his land (one in 1884 in favor of M, and one in 1887 to G), applied to plaintiff for a loan; and plaintiff paid M's mortgage, under an agreement with defendant that he would secure a release of G's mortgage, and instructed the register of deeds not to discharge M's mortgage of record until defendant had secured such release. Defendant failed to secure the release from G and the register of deeds discharged M's mortgage by mistake. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to be subrogated to the rights of M.-BANK OF IPSWICH V. BROCK, S. Dak., 83 N. W. Rep. 436.

75. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Contracts for Water and Lights.-Contracts by the authorities of a munici. pality for water and lights to be furnished to the municipality and its inhabitants are not made in the exercise of the governmental powers of the municipalIty, but of its proprietary or business powers, and are governed by the rules applicable to contracts made by individuals or business corporations. Such a contract, when fairly made, without fraud or Imposition on the part of the other party, or misconduct or bad faith on the part of the officers acting on behalf of the municipality, and which was not unreasonable in its terms when made, cannot be repudiated by the municipality after the other party has expended money in the building of works in reliance thereon, and so long as such party complies with its provisions. --LITTLE FALLS ELECTRIC & WATER CO. v. CITY OF LITTLE FALLS, U. S. C. C., D. (Minn.), 102 Fed. Rep. 663.

76. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Electric LightingContracts.-A contract between a city, which is specially authorized by its charter to make provision for lighting the city, and an electric light company, whereby the latter agrees to furnish the city, for the term of three years, a given number of electric lights at a stated annual rental, not exceeding the amount the city is authorized to collect and appropriate for such purpose each year, and under which payment is to be made only on the performance of the service provided for, does not create an indebtedness, within the constitutional inhibition against the creation of a debt by a city without making provision for the assessment and collection of a sufficient sum to pay the interest, and the creation of a sinking fund for the payment of the principal.-DALLAS ELECTRIC Co. v. CITY OF DALLAS, Tex., 58 S. W. Rep. 153.

77. MUNICIPAL BONDS-Equity - Remedy at Law.Where a municipal corporation has issued bonds in excess of the constitutional limit, a holder of such bonds may maintain a suit in equity to determine the portion of the debt which is valid and enforceable, and to have such amount apportioned between the different bondholders.-EVERETT V. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. OF ROCK RAPIDS, U. S. C. C., N. L. (Iowa), 102 Fed. Rep. 529.

78. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-Ordinance-Validity.Regulation of Saloons-Unreasonableness.-A city ordinance providing that it shall be unlawful for the proprietor of any saloon or place where intoxicating liquors are sold and dispensed, his clerks, agents, or employees, to enter such saloon on Sunday for any purpose whatever, without first obtaining a written permission from the mayor or recorder of the town in writing, stating the length of time he may remain in the saloon, etc., is unreasonable and void.-MAYOR, ETC. OF NEWBERN V. MCCANN, Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 114. 79. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION Street-ObstructionRemoval.-A person or corporation taking possession of a public street, and so obstructing it as to deprive an abutting proprietor of access through such street to his property, may be condemned, at the suit of such proprietor, to remove the obstruction and to respond in damages, actual and exemplary.-WALKER V. VICKSBURG, S. & P. R. Co., La., 28 South. Rep. 324.

Contract

80. MUNICIPAL INDEBTEDNESS-Increase for Sewer. The debt of a city is not increased, within the prohibition of Con-t. art. 9, § 8, against its debts exceeding 7 per cent. of the assessed value of its taxable property, by a contract for a sewer which provides the contract price by an appropriation of money in the treasury, and assessments in good faith on the property benefited, though it afterwards determined that the assessments as to non-abutting property cannot be enforced.-ADDYSTON PIPE & STEEL Co. v. CITY OF CORRY, Penn., 46 Atl. Rep. 1035.

81. NEGLIGENCE-Proximate Cause.-Where an employee of a railroad, while attempting to fasten the door of a stock car into which horses have been driven, is injured by one of them rushing out and kicking him, the kicking is the proximate cause of the injury, though, but for a defective fastening, the door would have been secured in time to prevent the horse's escape.-SMITH V. TEXAS & P. Rr. Co., Tex., 58 S. W. Rep. 151.

82. NEGLIGENCE-Venue-Damages to Personalty.Action for damages to land and personalty from a single fire set by defendant, being brought in a county In which it may be maintained as to the personalty, may also be maintained as to the land.-WILSON V. PECOS & N. T. RY. Co., Tex., 58 S. W. Rep. 183. 83. NUISANCE Cemeteries-Injunction.-The main. tenance of a cemetery will not be enjoined on the ground of contamination of adjolning wells; it being a matter of public necessity, located outside the town, in a sparsely populated district, there being no other suitable place for it, except at a distance of several miles from town; it appearing that it will be many

years before it will be occupied by many bodies; no actual injury of the kind complained of being proved; and it being doubtful if such injury will ever occur, and there being ample remedy at law if it does occur. -WAHL V. METHODIST EPISCOPAL CEMETERY ASSN. OF WILLIAMSTOWN, Penn., 46 Atl. Rep. 913.

news.

84 PARTNERSHIP Newspaper-Chattel Mortgage.Where a partnership is formed to publish a paper, a note and chattel mortgage covering all the property of the firm, made by one partner without special authority from the other, are void, such acts not being within the implied authority of a partner in a non-trading partnership.-MCMANUS v. SMITH, Oreg., 61 Pac. Rep. 844.

85. POST OFFICE-Right to Use the Malls.-The right to use the mails is a statutory privilege, and not prop. erty in the constitutional sense, and hence an act of congress giving the postmaster general authority to determine whether a person has forfeited the right is not obnoxious to the constitution, inasmuch as it does not deprive him of his property without due process of law, or subject him to punishment for an offense.AMERICAN SCHOOL OF MAGNETIC HEALING V. MCANNULTY, U. S. C. C., W. D. (Mo.), 102 Fed. Rep. 565.

86. PREFERENCES-Bankruptcy.-An absolute con. veyance by an Insolvent to a judgment creditor, who is liable as indorser on notes of the grantor, does not create a trust or constitute an assignment for the benefit of creditors, so as to render it void if not filled within the time limited for assignments, though it is subject to the payment of fixed lens on the land, and to payment of the notes and of other debts of the grantor within three years.-MILLER V. SCHRIVER, Penn., 46 Atl. Rep. 926.

87. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Authority of Special Agent-Contracts.-A general manufacturer's agent heard that plaintiffs wanted to purchase some goods, and went to defendant, who was a dealer in such goods, to procure an order, and was quoted a price and conditions of sale. Held that, on making a contract of sale with plaintiff, he could not exceed the terms of his special directions, and plaintiff was bound to know the extent of his authority.—HARDWICK v. Kirwan, Md., 46 Atl. Rep. 987.

88. PROCESS, SERVICE OF-Courts-Suit Against Partnership.-Service upon the agent of a partnership, in an action brought against the partnership as such, under a State statute, does not give the court jurisdiction over the individual partners; nor can the court acquire jurisdiction to render judgment against a partner who is a non-resident of the State, unless by serv ice made upon him therein, or by his voluntary appearance.-RALYA MARKET CO. V. ARMOUR & CO., U. S. C. C., N.D. (Iowa), 102 Fed. Rep. 530.

89. PUBLIC LANDS-Powers of Congress.-The paramount control over the disposition of the public lands of the United States remains in congress, and the fact that a contest over the right of entry of such lands is pending before the land department, a creation of congress, and not of the constitution, does not deprive congress of such paramount control; and it may at any time, by an act passed for that purpose, withdraw such contest from the jurisdiction of the department, and itself determine the rights of the parties.-EMBLEN V. LINCOLN LAND CO., U. s. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 102 Fed. Rep. 559.

90. PUBLIC LANDS-Recitation in Certificate.-A recitation in a certificate by the secretary of war of the republic of Texas that the heirs of a certain person, who had fallen in the Alamo, were entitled to a certain amount of bounty land, was conclusive; and hence the heirs of one having the same name, who fought in the same war, but survived for several years thereafter, were not entitled to hold lands under such certificate. -DICK V. MALONE, Tex., 58 S. W. Rep. 168.

91. QUIETING TITLE-Parties.—In a suit to quiet title to a tract of land claimed by complainant under one title all persons claiming an interest in the land or

any part thereof adversely to such title may be joined as defendants, and it is not essential that they should claim through a common source of title.-STEMMLER v. MCNEILL, U. S. C. C., E. D. (N. Car.), 102 Fed. Rep.

660.

92. RAILROAD COMPANY-Assumption of Risk-Negli gence.-A person selecting, for his own convenience, a dangerous route to a city instead of a safer one, and in passing into a bridge or trestle (a place of danger, according to his own theory) with full knowledge of the dangers he might encounter from doing so, voluntarily takes upon himself risks, the results of which he cannot shift at will upon other parties.-PROVOST V. YAZOO & M. V. R. Co., La., 28 South. Rep. 305. 93. REAL ESTATE SALES Procuring Purchaser.Where a broker, claiming commission for procuring a purchaser of real estate, offered evidence that an offer had been unconditionally accepted over the telephone, which was denied by his principal, who offered evidence of acceptance by a certain letter conditioned on the conveyance being without warranty, it was not error to refuse an instruction that prior letters, some of which, and Indorsements thereon by such principal, referred to the telephone communication, did not constitute an unconditional acceptance of the offer, since such principal was not entitled to a judicial construction of such letters alone, without regard to the con. versation.-BEACH V. TRAVELERS' INS. Co., Conn., 46 Atl. Rep. 867.

94. REMOVAL OF CAUSES Non Residence Foreign Corporation.-The facts that the name of a corpora. tion indicates that it is a corporation of a particular State, and that it owns property, carries on buɛiness. and maintains an office in such State, do not overcome the presumption that it is a non-resident of such State, and entitled as such to remove a suit against it by a citizen of the State, where the plaintiff's pleadIngs show that it was incorporated in a foreign cown. try.-HOWARD V. GOLD REEFS OF GEORGIA, U. 8. C. C., N. D. (Ga.), 102 Fed. Rep. 657.

95. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-Federal Question-Pleading. The rule that a cause is not removable, as one arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, unless such fact appears from the plaintiff's pleading, applies only to cases in which the federal question is one inhering in the controversy itself, so that if raised by the defendant, and determined against him by the State court, he may remove it for review by appeal or writ of error to the supreme court; and such rule cannot be so extended as to permit a plaintiff to prevent the removal of a suit against a receiver of a federal court by omitting to state in his pleadings by what court defendant was appointed receiver.WINTERS V. DRAKE, U. S. C. C., N. D. (Ohio), 102 Fed. Rep. 545.

96. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-Jurisdiction-Presumption. -If the right of removal to a federal court does not appear in the record of the State court, it must be clearly shown in the petition for removal, or it will be presumed that it does not exist.-FIFE V. WHITTELL, U. S. C. C., N. D. (Cal ), 102 Fed. Rep. 537.

97. SALE-Breach of Warranty-Rescission.- Where, by the terms of a warranty given on the sale of personal property, a rescission of the contract is provided for in case of a breach of the warranty, and is condi tioned on certain specified acts to be done by the pur. chaser precedent to the right to rescind, a return of the property to the seller is ineffectual as a rescission unless such conditions be complied with.-AVERY PLANTER CO. y. PECK, Minn., 83 N. W. Rep. 455.

98. SUNDAY LAW Constitutional Law-Barbers.Pen. Code, art. 196, prohibiting Sunday labor, is within the police power of the State, and constitutional. Where no special circumstances exist, the work of a barber in shaving customers on Sunday is not such a work of necessity as is excepted from the operation of Pen. Code, art. 196, prohibiting Sunday labor.-Ex PARTE KENNEDY, Tex., 58 S. W. Rep. 129.

99. TAXATION-Exemptions-Fairness.-Under Const. art. 1, § 2, providing that "all laws should be made for the good of the whole; and the burdens of the State are to be fairly divided among its citizens,"-Pub. Laws, ch. 386, exempting the property of the Grosvenordale Company from taxation for 10 years from April 11, 1892, and chapter 387, exempting the property of the American Electrical Works from taxation for 10 years from March 22, 1893, are constitutional, since the provision of the constitution is directory, and is not a limitation on the legislative power of exemption; and the question of the fairness of the exemption is for the legislature, and not for the courts.-CRAFTS V. RAY, R. I., 46 Atl. Rep. 1043.

100. TELEGRAPH COMPANY Death Telegram-NonDelivery. Where a telegram was sent, announcing the death of plaintiff's son, followed by another to the operator asking prompt delivery of the first, and the operator forgot to deliver the message for four days, whereby plaintiff was prevented from attending the burial of his son, punitive damages are proper, in an action to recover for plaintiff's mental distress, on grounds of public policy.-WESTERN UNION TEL. Co. V. FRITH, Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 118.

101. TELEGRAPH COMPANY-Delay in TransmissionDamages. Where, through failure of defendant to deliver a message, plaintiff was prevented from being present at the death of his child, an instruction that if plaintiff and his wife, or either of them, suffered any sorrow therefor, the jury should award a just pecuniary compensation for the sorrow so suffered, was erroneous, since the distress occasioned the wife through the non-delivery of the message was too remote to constitute an element of damage.-WESTERN UNION TEL. Co. v. LOVETT, Tex., 58 S. W. Rep. 204.

102. TRESPASS-Unfenced Pasture-Herding of Animals. Where defendant caused his sheep to be herded on what he knew to be plaintiff's pasture, though the same was unfenced, an action will lie for the value of the grass destroyed by the sheep, notwithstanding Pol. Code, § 3258, providing that, if an animal break into any fenced inelosure, the owner of the animal shall be liable for damages sustained, since such statute, permitting recovery only where the land is fenced, applies to trespasses committed by animals running at large without the knowledge of the owner, and not to a case where one knowingly and willfully appropriates the use of another's land.-MONROE V. CANNON, Mont., 61 Pac. Rep. 863.

103. TRESPASS TO TRY TITLE-Taxation.-Where a judgment foreclosing a tax lien is not void on its face, it will protect a purchaser thereunder, though the proceedings anterior to judgment were irregular; and such judgment is conclusive, in a subsequent suit to try title to property purchased thereunder, of the question of the correctness of the assessment of taxes for which the property was sold.-HOUSSELS V. TAYLOR, Tex., 58 S. W. Rep. 190.

104. TRADE-MARK

Unfair Competition-Packages and Labels.-To entitle a manufacturer to protection in the exclusive use of the style of package and label adopted by him as to shape, colors, and general appearance, it must appear not only that he was the first to use such dress for his goods, but that its use by him has been general, continuous, and exclusive, so that it has become a distinguishing mark of his products. -ACTIENGESELLSCHAFT VEREINIGTE ULTRAMARINE FABRIKEN, VORMALS LEVERKUS, ZELTNER & CONSORTEN IN NURNBERG V. AMBERG, U. S. C. C., D. (N. J.), 102 Fed. Rep. 551.

105. TRUST-Declaration-Subject.-The subject of the trust is declared with sufficient definiteness in a writing, signed by E, in which he declares that he holds $2,000 of his daughter's money, that she is to receive interest thereon during her life, and that at her death the principal shall be paid to her children.-IN RE ESHBACH'S ESTATE, Penn., 46 Atl. Rep. 905.

106. TRUST-Resulting Trust - Evidence.-Claim of a wife that a farm, title to which was taken in her husband's name, was purchased for her by him, and that there was a trust resulting in her favor from her pay. ment of the purchase money, cannot be sustained on mere evidence that at the time of the purchase she loaned him money.-IN RE CORNMAN'S ESTATE, Penn., 46 Atl. Rep. 940.

107. TRUST AND TRUSTEES-Insolvent Trustee-Following Trust Funds.-When a trustee has received trust moneys, and thereafter dies insolvent, the claim of the cestui que trust cannot be preferred over the claims of the general creditors of the deceased, unless it appears that the trust moneys were used by the trustee in the purchase of property which he retained until his death, or were deposited by the trustee in his bank account, a balance of which remained undrawn at his death, or were otherwise traced to specific prop erty left by the deceased, in which cases the claim of the cestui que trust is not that of a creditor, but of an equitable owner of the trust fund or that into which they can be traced.-ELLICOTT V. KUHL, N. J., 46 Atl. Rep. 945.

108. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Estoppel-Purchase According to Plat.-Where a vendee buys lots or squares of ground according to a subdivision, he becomes committed to the streets forming part of the subdivision, and cannot be heard to dispute their existence.-LAFITTE V. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, La., 28 South. Rep. 327.

109. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Notice.-A vendee purchasing immovable property in an act of sale reciting, "with no warranty whatsoever of title," it, with other circumstances here shown, suffices to put him on inquiry as to the title he is acquiring.-BREAUXRENOUDET CYPRESS LUMBER Co. v. SHADEL, La., 28 South. Rep. 297.

110. WILL-Bequest in Trust-Uncertainty as to Beneficiaries. A bequest to a certain church, which gives the income thereof to be applied to the support of the pastor, is valid; the proofs showing the church to be an incorporated body, having a pastor as its principal directing agency.-PRETTYMAN V. BAKER, Md., 46 Atl. Rep. 1020.

111. WILLS-Devise in Trust.-Where testator devised the residue of his estate to his executors in trust for the benefit of G for life, with remainder for the benefit of his children, and, in case he should die without issue surviving, the remainder to go to A and B, their respective heirs and assigns, in equal shares, discharged of the trust, on the death of G without issue surviving the remainder vested in A and B in pos. session; and hence a surviving trustee had no power to sell the property to distribute the estate.-DANA V. SANBORN, N. H., 46 Atl. Rep. 1053.

112. WILL-Execution-Evidence.-Where the execu tion of a will is proved by a subscribing witness, who knows that such instrument was declared by testatrix to be her will, but, from haste and inattention to details, cannot state whether he saw her sign the same or acknowledge her signature thereto, the proper statutory formalities of execution may be presumed, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, or that would excite suspicion of fraud and concealment.- IN RE HENNES' ESTATE, Minn., 83 N. W. Rep. 439.

113. WILLS-Trusts-Authority of Trustee.-A trustee has no power, under a will authorizing him to mortgage real estate owned by testatrix at the time of her death, to mortgage real estate conveyed to him in trust, and paid for with trust rents and profits.-MABX V. CLISBY, Ala., 28 South. Rep. 388.

114. WILLS-Validity-Attestation.-Under Code, art. 93, § 310, requiring attestation of wills, it is essential to the validity of a will that the testator request the wit. nesses to sign it, though he need not expressly ask them to so sign; and such request may be sufficiently shown by his assent to the signing.-GROSS V. BURNESTON, Md., 46 Atl. Rep. 993.