laration, that the shooting was willful and malicious, is not objectionable as the mere statement of an opinion, without facts on which to base it, since there was tes timony which tended to show that there were facts within the knowledge of the deceased on which he might have based an opinion, and it was not necessary for him to state them.-STATE V. LEE, S. Car., 36 S. E. Rep. 707.

31. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE Homicide-Res Gestæ.Where the State's theory was that a homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing deceased of money which defendant knew he intended to draw from the bank, evidence as to the amount of deceased's deposit was admissible, as tending to prove the motive.-STATE V. LUCEY, Mont., 61 Pac. Rep. 394. 32. CRIMINAL LAW-Burden of Proof.-An instruction, in a criminal case, throwing upon the defendant the burden of proving the matters of defense to the satisfaction of the jury, is erroneous, and is not cured by a general instruction giving the law as to the burden of proof and a reasonable doubt.-STATE V. GRINSTEAD, Kan., 61 Pac. Rep. 975.

33. CRIMINAL LAW-Dead Bodies-Disposing of for Dissection. The unauthorized disposition and sale of a dead body of a human being for gain and profit is a common law misdemeanor of high grade, and malum in se; and an unsuccessful attempt to commit that offense is a misdemeanor indictable and punishable at common law, though there is no statute prohibiting such offense.-THOMPSON V. STATE, Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 213.

34. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide - Arrest Without War. rant. The court refused an instruction for the defendant to the effect that a sheriff and his deputies have no right to make an arrest of any person without lawful warrant, except the person has committed a felony, or is engaged at the time in a riot or unlawful assem. bly, or is about to commit a felony. Held, that the refusal was correct, because of the failure of the instruction to include the idea that the officer may ar rest without warrant for any misdemeanor tending to a breach of the peace, when committed in view of the officer making the arrest.-ROBERSON V. STATE, Fla., 28 South. Rep. 424.

35. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide-Instructions Defining Degree.-A charge given on the court's own motion, that the indictment was for murder in the first degree, and that the verdict should be either for murder in the first degree or acquittal, violates Code, § 3326, prohibit. ing a charge on the effect of the testimony unless requested to do so by one of the parties.-GAFFORD v. STATE, Ala., 28 South. Rep. 406.

36. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide-Quarrelsome Disposi. tion. Where defendant claimed that he shot the deceased in self-defense, evidence that the deceased, in a quarrel with defendant a few weeks prior to the homicide, armed himself with an ice pick, was incompetent to show that the deceased was a quarrelsome and dangerous person, since it was a specific act in no way connected with the res gesta.-STATE V. MIMS, Oreg., 61 Pac. Rep. 888.

37. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide-Witnesses.-Where, in a criminal case, the defendant made application to have certain convicts in the State prison brought to the place of trial to testify in his behalf, and the court granted the application as to part, and ordered the depositions of the others taken, defendant has no cause of complaint, since an order for the production of such witnesses does not issue as a matter of right. -PEOPLE V. PUTTMAN, Cal., 61 Pac. Rep. 961. 38. CRIMINAL LAW Information Verification.-A verification on information and belief to a complaint in a criminal case is not sufficient to authorize a court to put the defendant upon trial for the offense charged therein. Such complaint should be sworn to pos. itively, or the facts upon which the warrant should is. sue ought to be presented to the court by affidavit or by competent evidence.-MULKINS V. UNITED STATES,

Okla., 61 Pac. Rep. 925.

39. CRIMINAL LAW-Larceny Former Jeopardy.Where one is indicted for stealing property of W, and on trial it is proved that the property belonged to A,and under the direction of the court the jury renders a verdict of not guilty, defendant is not placed in jeopardy, so as to bar a prosecution under another indletment charging him with stealing the same property, belong. lag to A.-STATE V. COUNCIL, S. Car., 36 8. E. Rep. 662. 40. CRIMINAL LAW-Larceny-Possession.-The possession of stolen property, unexplained, is evidence of guilt. But where a reasonable explanation is given, and there is no conflict of evidence in regard thereto, and the witness is not impeached, the jury cannot arbitrarily ignore such evidence.-STATE V. SEYMOUR, Idaho, 61 Pac. Rep. 1033.

41. CRIMINAL LAW Rape-Indictment.-An indictment charging defendant that he did "carnally know and abuse" a female child under 16 years, without alleging the specific age of such child, is sufficient to allege a public offense under section 6521, Gen. St. 1894.STATE V. ERICKSON, Minn., 83 N. W. Rep. 512.

42. CRIMINAL LAW-Receiving Stolen Goods.-Where the indictment in a prosecution for receiving stolen goods laid the ownership thereof in a railway com. pany, proof that the company was engaged under a corporate name in carrying on the business of a public carrier was sufficient proof of its corporate existence to sustain a conviction.-STATE V. MI88IO, Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 216.

43. CRIMINAL LIBEL-Indictment - Defenses.-In an action for libel, where the words have the alleged slanderous meaning, not by their own extrinsic force, but by reason of the existence of some extraneous fact, this fact must be averred in traversable form, and it is not sufficient to plead such fact by way of innuendo only.-STATE V. ELLIOTT, Kan., 61 Pac. Rep. 981.

44. CRIMINAL LIBEL · Information Innuendo.Where, in all the counts of an information charging a criminal libel, matters explanatory of the publication, and necessary to be stated by way of inducement, are stated only by way of innuendo, and the offense is not complete from the publication itself, a motion to quash should have been sustained, since matters which should have been stated by way of inducement cannot be supplied by the innuendo.-STATE V. GRINSTEAD, Kan., 61 Pac. Rep. 976.

45. DAMAGES-Objections to Juror-Color.-A written objection by a juror to serving on a jury with another certain juror, on account of the color of the latter, although frivolous, unwarranted, and unworthy, forms no basis for an action at law for damages, especially where the objection was not accompanied by either abusive language or assault or defamation of character.-MCPHERSON V. MCCARRICK, Utah, 61 Pac. Rep.

1004.

46. DEED-Boundaries-Declarations.-Declarations of former owners in possession, whether dead or alive, and of a surveyor, are admissible to show corners of a grant.-MONTGOMERY V. LISCOMB, Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 306.

47. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION - Bastards.-Under Shannon's Code, § 4169, providing that where a woman dies intestate, leaving a natural born child,he shall take her estate by the general rules of descent and distri bution, equally with her other children; and section 4163, subsec. 2a, providing that, if intestate die without issue, his land shall be inherited by his brothers and sisters, and if any such brother and sister die in intestate's lifetime, leaving issue," such issue shall represent their deceased parent-an illegitimate child, the only son of his mother, who predeceased her sis. ter, who died intestate without issue, takes the share of the estate of his mother's sister which his mother would have taken had she survived her sister.-DEN. NIS V. DENNIS, Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 284.

48. EJECTMENT-Evidence-Judgment Roll.-Where, in ejectment, title was claimed under an execution sale on a judgment against one to whom a patent had issued, and who was shown to have been in possession until shortly before commencement of the action, it was error to exclude from the evidence the judgment roll showing such judgment, the execution, levy, sale, and sheriff's deed.-ROBINSON V. THORNTON, Cal., 61 Pac. Rep. 946.

49. EJECTMEMT-Improvements.-Where plaintiffs in such an action have been in possession of or enjoyed the rents, issues, and profits from lands of the defend. ant, which they had received in lieu of the lands involved in the suit, the latter has a right to plead such benefits derived by plaintiffs as a set-off to their claim for mesne profits against him.-MILLS V. GEER, Ga., 36 8. E. Rep. 673.

50. ELECTIONS Ballots-Intent of Voters.-The intention of a voter, under our election law, must control in counting his ballot; but such intention must be shown and indicated by markings on the official ballot substantially in the manner provided by such law, and in bona fide attempt at compliance therewith.TRUELSEN V. HUGO, Minn., 83 N. W. Rep. 500.

51. EVIDENCE - Personal Injury-Exhibit.-Plaintiff, as a witness, may not only exhibit, but move, his injured knee, to show the mature and extent of the injury, though by false and constrained movements he can exaggerate its injured condition, this not going to the competency, but the credibility, of the evidence.ARKANSAS RIVER PACKET Co. v. HOBBS, Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 276.

52. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-Chattel MortgagesMortgagor's Good Faith.-A chattel mortgage on a stock of merchandise and store fixtures given for the purchase price thereof provided that it should cover all future additions to the stock, and that the mort. gagor should keep up the stock at all times to its then present value; that until default he might retain pos. session of the property, and use and enjoy the same, but if he made any attempt to sell any part of it without the written consent of the mortgagee he was authorized to take possession of it. Held (1) That the mortgage did not expressly nor by necessary implica tion provide that the mortgagor might sell the mortgaged property as his own, without applying the proceeds to the payment of the mortgaged debt, and that it was not, as a matter of law, fraudulent as to creditors. (2) The evidence sustains the findings of the trial court that the mortgage was made in good faith, and without any intention to defraud.-DONAHUE V. CAMPBELL, Minn., 83 N. W. Rep. 469.

53. GUARANTY - Discharge of Guarantor.-Where a contract on which defendant was liable as a guarantor was modified with his written consent, it was not necessary that the modified instrument should contain formal words of guaranty, in order to continue defendant's liability as guarantor. - PACIFIC PRESS PUB. Co. v. LOOFBOUROW, Cal., 61 Pac. Rep. 944.

54. HIGHWAY-Obstructing-Damages-Injunction.The fact that, by defendant's obstruction of a public road, complainant is completely deprived of access to the only public road leading to her market town, constitutes such a peculiar and special damage to her as to enable her to maintain a bill to enjoin a continuance of the obstruction.-CABELL V. WILLIAMS, Ala., 28 South. Rep. 405.

55. HOMESTEAD-Mortgage Extension-Wife's Consent. The husband, without the consent of the wife, cannot, by contract with the mortgagee, extend the duration of a mortgage lien upon their homestead beyond its original term.-HARDMAN V. PORTSMOUTH SAV. BANK, Kan., 61 Pac. Rep. 984.

56. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Gift of Land-Reservation During Life.-An instrument executed by a husband, reciting a gift of land to the wife, to take effect after the husband's death, and reserving the right to sell or

dispose of it during his life, in which event the instrument is to be void, is a testamentary devise, and not a deed, and hence did not vest any present interest in the land in the wife, which would pass by her convey. ance during the life of the husband.-ELLIS V. PEARSON, Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 318.

57. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Wife's Liability for Contracts of Husband.-The obligation of a husband to pay a sum of money to the sureties on his bond as administrator of an estate in consideration of their su retyship and insurance premiums agreed to be paid by him for insurance upon his wife's property cannot be enforced against the separate property of the wife, where the acts of the husband were never rati fied by the wife, and the obligations were contracted without her knowledge or consent. - CHANDLER V. CROSSLAND, Ala., 28 South. Rep. 420.

58. INJUNCTION-Threatening Suits for Infringement of Patents. While the owner of a patent may lawfully warn others against infringement, and, by means of circulars or letters distributed among agents and cus. tomers of a manufacturer of goods claimed to infringe, give notice of his rights as he understands them, and of his intention to enforce them by suits, when done in good faith, the sending of such notices and circulars in bad faith, and without any intention of bringing the suits therein threatened, but solely for the purpose of destroying the business of such manufacturer, consti. tutes a fraudulent invasion of property rights, against which the party injured is entitled to relief in equity by injunction.-A. B. FARQUHAR CO. v. NATIONAL HARROW CO., U. 8. C. C. of App., Third Circuit, 102 Fed. Rep. 714.

59. INSURANCE-Right of Subrogation.-Where plaintiff held a fire policy issued by defendant, containing a clause by which plaintiff agreed to snbrogate defendant to all plaintiff's right to recover against others if defendant should pay a loss to plaintiff, and plaintiff recovered from a third party for a loss occasioned by its tort, in which recovery the loss on the property covered by the policy in suit, was not included, it is not necessary for defendant, in pleading the destruc tion of the right to subrogation as a defense to a suit on the policy, to allege payment or tender.-PACKHAM V. GERMAN FIRE INS. CO. OF BALTIMORE, Md., 46 Atl. Rep. 1066.

60. JUDGMENT-Matters Concluded.-An adverse de cree entered on a petition of intervention filed in a creditors' suit against an insolvent railroad company, and seeking to establish and enforce a landlord's lien against property of the company for the rental of terminal facilities under a lease, does not preclude the intervener from filing a second petition asking pay. ment, from a fund in court from the subsequent earnings of the road under the receivership, of rentals accruing under the lease within six months prior to the receivership.-MANHATTAN TRUST CO. v. SIOUX CITY & N. R. Co., U. S. C. C., N. D. (Iowa), 102 Fed. Rep. 710. 61. JUDGMENTS-Motion to Vacate-Fraud and Perjury.-A judgment recovered after trial to a jury, by an employee against a manufacturing corporation, for an injury alleged to have been caused by the incompetency of plaintiff's co-employees, will not be vacated on motion, after the expiration of the term at which it was rendered, on the ground that the judg. ment was obtained by means of a conspiracy between plaintiff and certain of his co-employees, to establish his case by testifying falsely to the incompetency of the employee who was the cause of the accident, where it is not shown that defendant has a meritorious defense, nor that the employee in question was not in fact incompetent.-MARYLAND STEEL CO. OF SPARROWS POINT V. MARNEY, Md., 46 Atl. Rep. 1077.

62. JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT-Setting Aside.-An affi. davit by defendant's attorney in support of a motion to vacate a judgment taken by default was sufficient, without defendant's signature, where defendant was absent from the State under the attorney's advice that

his case would not be reached for trial for several months.-MELDE V. REYNOLDS, Cal., 61 Pac. Rep. 932. 63. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Lease-Covenant for Im. provements.-A lease of ground made by an executor as trustee for the three minor devises, provided for the appraisement of all permanent and valuable improvements at the termination of the lease, and that the extent to which such improvements enhanced the value of the property should be allowed and paid to the lessee by the estate of the lessor. Held, that such covenant did not run with the land, so that the same could be enforced by an assignee of the lease against an assignee of the reversion, where it was optional with the lessee whether to improve the lot, and the Improvements were not made until after the execution of the lease.-CICALLA V. MILLER, Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 210.

61. LAW OF THE CASE-Judicial Notice-Decision of United States Supreme Court.-Where a State law as to a certain class of cases, has once been held by the Supreme Court of the United States to be in contravention of the constitution of the United States or ex post facto, a State court will, whenever thereafter a case of such class comes before it, take notice of the decision of the federal court, and of the question respecting which the decision was made. - STATE V. BATES, Utah, 61 Pac. Rep. 905.

Revocation.-An

65. LICENSE instrument which granted the right to enter upon premises at any time within five years, and to cut and remove therefrom all the standing pine, is a conveyance of an interest in the land, and not a license revocable at will.-BOL. LAND V. O'NEAL, Minn., 83 N. W. Rep. 471.

66. LIMITATIONS-New Promise.-where, after limitations had run against a claim, the debtor promised to pay it "when he became able," the statute began to run for the new period from the date of his becoming able, and not from the date of the new promise.SCOTT V. THORNTON, Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 236.

67. LIMITATIONS - Presumption of Possession-Adverse Possession.-Under section 2861, Rev. St. 1998, the presumption is that one holding the legal title had been possessed of the land within the time required by law, unless it appears that the property was held and possessed adversely to him for seven years.-FUNK V. ANDERSON, Utah, 61 Pac. Rep. 1006.

68. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-Advice of Magistrate.An instrction, in an action for malicious prosecution, that if defendant fairly and fully laid the facts before a justice of the peace, and honestly sought his advice, for the purpose of bringing what defendant supposed was a criminal to justice, he was not liable, is erroneous, in making the mere seeking of the justice's advice sufficient to relieve from liability, without requir ing the additional condition that the justice gave the advice sought.-MAULDIN V. BALL, Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 249.

69. MANDAMUS-Swamp Lands-Reclamation Funds.Since Pol. Code, § 3477, requiring the county treasurer to pay amounts due on reclamation of swamp land to the original purchaser or his assigns, contemplates payment only to the owner or assignee of the indebtedness, mandamus will not lie to compel such a payment to one who is not shown to be the assignee of the claim on the fund of an original purchaser who be came entitled thereto, though he claims as a successor in interest of such original purchaser, by virtue of a purchase of the land.-MILLER & LUX V. BATZ, Cal., 61 Pac. Rep. 935.

70. MARRIAGE PROMISE-Damages.-This is an action for breach of promise of marriage. The plaintiff testified that she was engaged to B, and at the solicitation of the defendant she broke her engagement and promised to marry him. The trial court instructed the jury to the effect that if the plaintiff broke her engagement with B at the solicitation of defendant, and on account of his promise to marry her, they might consider as an element of her damages her loss of the opportunity

to marry B. Held, error.-HAHN V. BETTINGEN, Minn., 83 N. W. Rep. 467.

71. MARRIED WOMAN-Liability for Debt.-Under Act April 30, 1897, making a married woman engaged in business liable for her debts incurred therein, her mere recognition, after passage of the act, of the existence of notes theretofore given by her, does not make her liable therefor, even if a subsequent promise to pay them would do so.-LEVIS-ZUKOSKI MERCANTILE CO. v. BOWERS, Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 287.

72. MASTER AND SERVANT-Action for Services-Defenses. In a suit by an employee against a railroad company for the balance of his wages, the company cannot legally defend by showing that the plaintiff had made a mistake whereby the company had suffered loss, which had been charged to an agent who was his superior, and under whom he was employed, and that in order to reimburse that agent it had stopped the wages of the plaintiff, such a course not being au. thorized by any rule of the company known to the employee, or agreed to by him.-GEORGIA R. Co. v. GOUEDY, Ga., 36 S. E. Rep. 691.

73. MASTER AND SERVANT-Contributory Negligence. -Code, § 3441, provides that, where the tracks of two railroads cross each other, engineers and conductors must stop their trains within 100 feet of the crossing, and not proceed until they know the way to be clear. Plaintiff's intestate, an engineer, brought his train into collision with that of defendant at a crossing, and was thereby killed. The night was dark; defendant's engine had no headlight, but a lantern instead; and the evidence was conflicting as to whether either train stopped within 100 feet of the crossing. Held, that plaintiff's intestate, by the exercise of extraordinary care, which the statute imposed on him, might have ascertained whether the track was clear, and, having failed to do so, was guilty of negligence contributory to his own death, and hence plaintiff could not recover therefor.-SOUTHERN RY. Co. v. BRYAN, Ala., 28 South. Rep. 415.

74. MASTER AND SERVANT-Defective Appliances - Injury to Servant.-An instruction that where a master allowed an independent contractor to erect appliances on his premises for the use of the contractor, and the master adopted and used such appliances himself, or acquiesced in their use by his servants while engaged in his work, he was responsible for his servants' safety as if he had erected the appliances himself, was proper, without submitting to the jury that such acquiescence must have been for such a period of time as would indicate an adoption by the master, since the word "acquiesced" was used by the court in the sense of "being satisfied with," and such acquiescence would amount to an adoption.-RINAKE V. VICTOR MFG. CO., S. Car., 36 S. E. Rep. 700.

75. MASTER AND SERVANT-Unsafe Place-Evidence. -Where plaintiff, while in defendant's employ, was knocked from the top of a freight car, which he was helping to switch to one of defendant's buildings, by being struck by a steam pipe crossing the side track and connecting two of the buildings, evidence that the steam pipe might, at small cost, and without injury to its efficiency, have been raised so as not to interfere with the defendant's employees riding on the top of its freight cars, was properly admitted.-RENNE v. UNITED STATES LEATHER Co., Wis., 83 N. W. Rep. 473.

76. MECHANIC'S LIEN-Enforcement.-The holder of a mechanic's lien for material furnished for the construction and erection of two buildings, the property of separate owners, but located upon adjoining real property, and erected as one structure, under an agreement between the contractor and the owners of each building, may enforce the lien against the separate property of each by showing the proportionate amount and value of the materials used in each building.-KINNEY V. MATHIAS, Minn., 83 N. W. Rep. 497.

77. MECHANIC'S LIEN-Priority-Prior Attachments.

Acts 1897, ch. 78, provided that employees of any cor. poration doing business in the State should have a lien on all the corporate property for the amount dua for services rendered during three months prior to a suit to enforce the same, which lien should be superior to all others, except liens to secure purchase money and liens created before the passage of the act. Plaintiffs claimed under the act, and defendants claimed under attachments for ordinary debts, levied a month prior to the commencement of plaintiff's suit. Held, that plaintiffs' lien was superior to that of defendants.-BUSHTON V. PERRY LUMBER CO., Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 269.

78. MORTGAGES-Foreclosure-Paramount Title.-In a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage where defendant claimed title to the property paramount to that of both mortgagor and mortgagee, she cannot set up such title in a cross complaint, and litigate it in the foreclosure proceedings. - MURRAY V. ETCHEPARE, Cal., 61 Pac. Rep. 930.

79. MORTGAGES-Notice of Sale-Publication.-Where a mortgage provided that, in case of foreclosure, notice of sale should be published at least three times before the sale in a paper published in the county, a notice of the sale published regularly for three weeks in a weekly paper in the county in all the copies of each issue except a few, which were to be sent to nonresident advertisers, was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the mortgage.- JOHNSON V. WOOD, Ala., 28 South. Rep. 454.

81. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Repairing of Streets -Negligence.-Rev. St. § 1582, giving a right of action against cities for injuries sustained "by reason of defects or mismanagement of anything under control of the corporation," is broad enough to include an action for injuries sustained by an employee of the city by reason of defendant's mismanagement of a steam roller while repairing its streets.-BARKSDALE V. CITY OF LAURENS, S. Car., 36 S. E. Rep. 661.

82. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Street Improvements. -Under St. 1891, p. 201, § 7, subd. 1, providing that the costs of grading streets shall be assessed against the lots fronting thereon, such assessment should be made against the lots fronting on both sides; and hence an assessment of the total cost of grading one side of a street against the lots fronting on that side was invalid.-SAN DIEGO INV. Co. v. SHAW, Cal., 61 Pac. Rep. 1082.

83. NEGLIGENCE-Defective Premises Evidence.Evidence of repairs subsequent to an accident is not admissible to show negligence in allowing the prem ises to be in the condition they were at the time of the accident.-ILLINOIS CENT. R. Co. v. WYATT, Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 308.

84. NEGLIGENCE-Injury to Wife-Damages.-A hus. band may, in an action for damages resulting from inJuries sustained by his wife by reason of the negli gence and carelessness of another, in some cases, recover for the loss of his own time in attendance and nursing his wife. The value of the husband's time, how. ever, while so engaged, is determinable with reference to its value as a nurse; but he cannot recover, in addi. tion, for the loss of his time, as such, its value in his ordinary occupation, nor for the reasonable value of his time which he may have lost from his business.WESTERN UNION TEL. Co. v. MORRIS, Kin., 61 Pac. Rep. 972.

85. NUISANCE-Maintenance.-An owner of land is

entitled to build stables thereon in the manner best suited to his business, and such stables, if conducted in a reasonably proper manner, do not constitute a nuisance for which damages can be recovered by adJoining property owners.-HARVEY V. CONSUMERS' ICE Co., Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 316.

86. PARTITION-Mistake Evidence. Where land which, on an amicable partition, fell to the share of a wife, was conveyed by the other heirs to the husband, a court of equity can entertain an action to correct the mistake, and partition the lands as property of the wife.-SCHALLINGER V. SELOVER, N. J., 46 Atl. Rep. 1058.

87. PUBLIC LANDS-Entry of Timber Claim-Applica tion.-Under 20 Stat. 89, §§ 2, 3, requiring the applicant for the purchase of timber lands to make affidavit that the land is unfit for cultivation and valuable chiefly for timber, the applicant must have personally exam. ined the land, so as to be able to make said affidavit from his personal knowledge.-HoovVER V. SALLING, U. S. C. C., W. D. (Wis.), 102 Fed. Rep. 716.

88. PUBLIC LANDS-Location-Ratification.-A loca. tion of land under a headright certificate by one of the owners thereof is not ratified by the others by their act of selling the certificate, where they did not know of the location.-KIRBY V. ESTELL, Tex., 58 S. W. Rep. 254.

89. PUBLIC OFFICERS Contracts. When public offi. cers or agents in good faith contract with parties having equal means of knowledge with themselves, they do not become personally liable, although they may have exceeded their authority.-FIRST NAT. BANK OF DETROIT V. BOARD OF CоMRS. OF BECKER AND BELTRAMI COUNTIES, Minn., 83 N. W. Rep. 468.

90. QUIETING TITLE-Bill-Sufficiency-Foreclosure. -That a bill in a suit to quiet title asked the annulment of a sheriff's deed executed on a sale of the property under mortgage foreclosure did not render it demurrable as improperly uniting two causes of action, since the annulment of the deed was only a remedy incidental to the enforcement of plaintiff's right to the property, and did not in itself constitute a cause of action.-BERONIO V. VENTURA COUNTY LUMBER CO., Cal., 61 Pac. Rep. 958.

91. QUIETING TITLE Limitations.-Since a deed made an exhibit and referred to in a complaint in equity controls the averments of the complaint in regard thereto, and the right of action on a sealed promise to pay a debt continues for 10 years, a complaint in equity, filed in 1897, to cancel a deed of trust which matured in 1888, alleging that it was barred by limitations, with a copy of the trust deed as an exhibit, did not show a good cause of action.-AMER. FREEHOLD LAND MORTG. CO. of London v. MCMANUS, Ark., 58 8. W. Rep. 250.

92. RAILROAD COMPANY - Injury to Animals-Negli. gence. Where an engineer could have seen an animal, by keeping a proper lookout, when it came on or in dangerous proximity to the track, and the train was being run at the speed of 25 miles an hour, rendering it impossible to control it so as to avoid injuring the animal, the railroad company was liable to the owner of the animal for the jury.-CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RY. Co. v. STARK, Ala., 28 South. Rep. 411.

93. RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES-Review of Proceedings by Courts.-The court of chancery will not review the decisions or proceedings of ecclesiastical judicatures in matters properly within their province under the laws and regulations of the church.-TRAVERS V. ABBEY, Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 247.

94. REMOVAL OF CAUSES — Amount in ControversyJurisdiction.-To an action to restrain the prosecution of a suit in a State court because of the removal to the federal court of a previous suit based upon the same cause of action, which was still pending, defendant answered that, while in the writ filed in the first action his demand was placed at $2,500, it was his intention to claim only $1,500; that he paid the writ tax required by

the laws of the State upon that sum only; and the first action was dismissed, and the second suit brought, because of a mistake in the form of the action. Held that, no declaration having been filed in the first ac. tion, the amount in controversy must be determined from defendant's answer herein, and, it appearing that this was but $1,500, the federal court was without jurisdiction thereof, and the same should be remanded to the State court, and the injunction restraining the second action dissolved.-WESTERN UNION TEL. Co. v. WHITE, U. 8. C. C., W. D. (Va.), 102 Fed. Rep. 705.

95. REMOVAL OF CAUSES - Foreign CorporationsResidence.-A railroad corporation, created under the laws of Virginia, which has complied with the requirements of Act March 19, 1896, providing that such for. eign corporation shall thereupon become a domestic corporation, with all the rights and liabilities thereof, is still a non-resident of South Carolina, within the act of congress authorizing the removal of causes from State to federal courts on the ground of non-residence, and hence is entitled to have a cause against it in a State court removed to the United States court.-WILSON V. SOUTHERN RY. CO., S. Car., 36 S. E. Rep. 701.

96. RES JUDICATA-Contest of Will.-Where a contest of a will was dismissed because not stating a cause of action, such dismissal did not deprive contestant of the right to maintain a subsequent contest based on other grounds.-RALEIGH V. DISTRICT Court of FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Mont., 61 Paç. Rep. 991.

97. RES JUDICATA - Estoppel-Right of Way.-A rall. road, by accepting the benefits of the deed of the owner of the fee of its right of way, in some directions extending and others narrowing its rights, is estopped to set up any claim to right of way under its charter inconsistent with the deed.-MOBILE & O. R. Co. v. DONOVAN, Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 309,

98. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE — Attorney and ClientContingent Fee Public Policy.-Defendant agreed in writing to pay an attorney a contingent fee of onethird of all community property he might secure in an action for divorce against her husband, or by reason of any compromise or settlement thereof. The attor. ney assigned the contract to plaintiff, who sued for specific performance. Held, that the contract was vold and unenforceable, as against public policy.NEWMAN V. FREITAS, Cal., 61 Pac. Rep. 907.

99. TAXATION-Void Tax Sale-Lien.-A purchaser of lands at a tax sale is entitled to a lien on such lands for the purchase price and taxes subsequently paid, though such sale be void.-STROTHER V. REILLY, Tenn., 58 8. W. Rep. 332.

100. TAX CERTIFICATE—Assignment.-A tax certificate, and a valid assignment thereof, where the assignee claims title under a tax deed, are essential and necessary to the validity of the deed, and to the authority of the taxing powers to devest the title of the former owner or those claiming through him.-WIL. SON V. WOOD, Okla., 61 Pac. Rep. 1045.

101. TAX DEED Recitals.-It is not competent for a tax-deed holder to introduce evidence to contradict the recitals of his tax deed. -HANENKRATT V. HAMIL, Okla., 61 Pac. Rep. 1050.

102. TRIAL-Special Issue Submission.-Where a jury is instructed by the court, of its own motion, to find special answers to certain questions bearing upon vital issues in the case, which questions are submitted, the court is not at liberty, without the consent of the parties, to withdraw or disregard such questions by accepting a general verdict without answers thereto.EISCHEN V. CHICAGO, ETC. RY. Co., Minn., 83 N. W. Rep. 490.

103. TRUST FUND-Life Estate-Pleading.-Where a bill to enjoin the payment of a trust fund to an administrator is broad enough to test the question of the final disposition of the fund, so that it can be sustained for that purpose, even though the fund were paid over temporarily to the administrator, a de

murrer to the bill on the ground that the fund stands In the name of the deceased, and that therefore the administrator is entitled to collect the same, is bad as not disposing of the whole case made by the bill.-RUSSELL V. STATE NAT. BANK, Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep.

245.

104. WATERS AND WATER COURSES-Artificial LakesShore Owners-Title.-The owners of land bordering on the shore of a meandered non-navigable or dried up lake own the bed of the lake in severalty. Their title extends to the center of the lake; the boundary lines of each abutting tract being fixed by extending, from the meander line on each side of the tract, lines con. verging to a point in the center of the lake.-SHELL V. MATTESON, Minn., 83 N. W. Rep. 491.

105. WATER RIGHTS-Limitation-Adverse Possession. -To bar the claim of a senior appropriator of water, by limitation or lapse of time, in favor of a junior ap. propriator, the latter must show continuous adverse possession and use in himself, accompanied by claim of title, and such possession and use as exclude the senior appropriator from the possession and use of such water.-Brossard v. MORGAN, Idaho, 61 Pac. Rep. 1031.

106. WILLS-Construction Executory Devise-Ex. ecutors.-Under a devise to certain persons named, and to the survivors of those dying without children, share and share alike, a deed by the several devisees will convey not only their present, but any after-acquired, interest in the lands devised, as survivors of the first devisees, unless a contrary intention appears, though one of the devisees be a married woman.— BRUCE V. GOODBAR, Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 282.

107. WILLS-Devise-Precatory Words.-Where testa. tor devised all his property, both real and personal, to his wife, with power to sell, lease, and manage the business without order of the court, and in a subsequent and independent paragraph stated that it was his desire that his wife, on her death should devise to bis relatives one-half of the property which she received under his will, the wife was entitled to the entire estate, free from any limitations or trust in favor of testator's relatives.-IN RE MARTI'S ESTATE, Cal., 61 Pac. Rep. 964.

108. WILL-Homestead.-While section 2829, Rev St. 1898, in terms gives absolutely property in the home. stead and exempt personalty to the surviving husband or wife, yet by other terms of the section this power is limited, and the husband may by will dispose of the estate in excess of the homestead limits.—IN RE LITTLE, Utah, 61 Pac. Rep. 899.

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109. WILLS-Intent of Testator.-A will made by a mother in favor of her dissolute son, gave her real estate in trust to her son S, for his use and benefit, after paying taxes and necessary repairs, withholding from him power to sell and convey, except at the option of the trustee, D, who was given power to sell when, in his judgment, he deemed it necessary and advisable; and in such event the conveyance to be a joint act between the trustee and the son. In case of the death of the son without issue, then all of said estate ''so remaining in trust" should be sold and divided between parties mentioned in other parts of the will. Held that, to give effect to the intent of the testatrix, the will should be read, "I give and devise to D, in trust for my son, for his use and benefit," and that the trustee, and not the son, was entitled to control the estate.-JOBE V. DILLARD, Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 324.

110. WILLS - Powers Execution Trust Deeds.Where a non-resident loan and trust company made a loan, and took a trust deed to secure it, before regis. tration of its charter where the transaction took place, such transaction was validated by the subsequent fling of an abstract of the company's charter at such place; and the company was entitled to recover the amount actually loaned, with six per cent. interest.— LAW GUARANTEE & TRUST Co. v. JONES, Tenn., 58 8. W. Rep. 219.