Y. 549; Gloucester Glue Co. v. Cement Co., 154 Mass. 92; Meyer v. Estes, 164 Mass. 457. In the following cases contracts relating to the sale of a business and its good will to another, with an agreement on the part of the vendor not to engage in the same business, sometimes unlimited as to territory, and limited as to time, or vice versa, have been held reasonable: Brown v. Railroad Co, 75 Hun, 355; Hulse v. Machine Co., 65 Fed. Rep. 864; Anthony v. Hitchcock, 71 Fed. Rep. 659; Meyer v. Estes, 164 Mass. 457; Tode v. Gross, 127 N. Y. 480; Banknote Co. v. Printing Co., 83 Hun, 593; Carter v. Alling, 43 Fed. Rep. 208; Billings v. Ames, 32 Mo. 265; Hoagland v. Segur, 38 N. J. Law, 230; Baumgarten v. Broadway, 77 N. Car. 8; Oakdale Mfg. Co. v. Garst, 18 R. I. 484; National Co. v. Hospital Co., 45 Minn. 272; Cowan v. Fairbrother, 118 N. Car. 406; Goodman v. Henderson, 58 Ga. 567; Eisel v. Hayes, 141 Ind. 41; Davie v. Brown, 98 Ky. 475; George v. Coal Co., 83 Tenn. 455. In the following cases the restrictions in the contract were held unreasonable: State v. Telephone Co., 36 Ohio St. 296; Berlin Works v. Perry, 71 Wis. 495; West Vir ginia Co. v. Pipe Line Co., 22 W. Va. 600; Western Assn. v. Starkey, 84 Mich. 76; Oregon Nav. Co. v. Winsor, 87 U. S. 64; Consumers Oil Co. v. Nunnemacher, 142 Ind. 560; Gamewell Tel. Co. v. Crane, 160 Mass. 50; Albright v. Teas, 37 N. J. Law, 171.

We now come to the most perplexing difficulty involved in the proper solution of this whole question, i. e., the distinction to be observed between mere contracts in restraint of trade and contracts which suppress competition and create a monopoly. It is true that in some cases agreements in restraint of trade and in restraint of competition may be so very similar as to be difficult of identification. But courts should be careful to base their decision on proper grounds in order to dispel all unnecessary confusion from a subject of such great importance. Freedom of contract on the one side and freedom of trade and competition on the other, and the relative importance of the one over the other, is the first consideration to be consulted in the settlement of all questions of this character, and one that is often lost sight of. There is no right of the citizen the enjoyment of which is more vital to the business interests of the community than the right of contract, and a proper public policy, it seems, would seek to preserve this right from all unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions, rather than to confine it within bounds so narrow and unyielding as to discourage enterprise and impede the healthy development of business and commerce along lines of its natural evolution. Freedom of contract, therefore, is of paramount importance upon which only two restrictions are necessary, first, that that it shall put no unreasonable restraint upon trade, and, second, that it shall work no material injury to the public. The doctrine of restraint of trade has just been discussed. The principles of this doctrine are well established and free from doubt. The sole test in deciding whether a contract is in unlawful restraint of trade is whether the restraint is reason. ably necessary to protect the business of the covenantee acquired under the contract. If it is, the contract can, under no circumstances, be considered in restraint of trade, and that question is absolutely determined. Under the second restriction, however, we have the doctrine of restraint of competition, a separate and distinct question, to be decided on grounds of public policy. Now a serious question arises: Is every contract that tends to restrain com. petition and create a monopoly ipso facto void; or

are there any conditions under which such a contract could be held valid? In other words, can the same principles now applied to the doctrine of restraint of trade be held also to apply to the doctrine of restraint of competition? Can a contract in restraint of competition ever be considered reasonable? In view of the history of contracts in restraint of trade which at first were held void as against public policy, and then void only if the restraint were general, but valid if partial and reasonable, and finally, whether general or partial, void only if unreasonable under the cir cumstances and terms of the contract, we apprehend that the true rule to be applied in the construction of contracts alleged to be in restraint of competition, a rule supported both by sound logic and a recognition of the changed con. ditions of modern business methods, that contracts in restraint of competition or which tend to create a monopoly are not ipso facto void as against public policy, but that such will be the presumption subject to be rebutted by showing that such restraint is reasonable and necessary to protect the contracting par ties from any disastrous consequences resulting from an unrestrained competition in that particular line of business, or that the restraint is the natural result of the enterprise of one existing firm in buying up the business and plants of its competitors without any intent between the parties to create a monopoly or that the creation of a monopoly in that line of business would not injure the public. Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N. Y. 519; Central R. Co. v. Cushman, 143 Mass. 353; Chappell v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157; Rafferty v. Gas Co., 37 N. Y. App. Div. 618; Anchor Co. v. Hawkes, 171 Mass. 101; Oakdale Mfg. Co. v. Garst, 18 R. I. 484; Gloucester Glue Co. v. Cement Co., 154 Mass. 92; Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522; Carter-Crume Co. v. Peurrung, 86 Fed. Rep. 439; Trenton Potteries Co. v. Olyphant (N. J.), 43 Atl. Rep. 723; Manchester R. Co. v. Railroad Co., 66 N. H. 100; Nordenfelt v. Ammunition Co., supra; Cowan v. Fairbrother, supra. In Trenton Potteries Co. v. Olyphant, supra, the court said: "While contracts to restrain competition may be repugnant to the public interest such a restraint may result from contracts which the courts are bound to enforce. A person engaged in any trade having the right to acquire property and to do with it what he chooses may lawfully buy the business of any of his competitors. His first purchase would at once diminish competition. If his capital was large enough to enable him to buy the business of all competitors the last purchase would completely exclude competition. In the ab sence of legislative restrictions upon the acquisition of such property courts could impose no limitation. They would be obliged to enforce such contracts notwithstanding the effect was to diminish or even exclude competition."

It must be clearly borne in mind that it is not the restraint of competition that is against public policy, but the tendency or intent of a contract to create a monopoly that will work injury to the public. If the purposes or natural result of an agreement is to cre ate a monopoly and thus control prices to the detri ment of the public, it is void as against public policy. Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 632;, Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666; Harding v. Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551; State v. Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700; Lufkin Rule Co. v. Fringeli, supra; Addyston Pipe Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211; Bagging Assn. v. Kock, 14 La. Ann. 161; Pacific Factor Co. v. Adler, 90 Cal. 110. In the last case cited the court gives an ex

ceedingly clear idea of the distinction to be made be tween contracts in restraint of competition which are void as against public policy, and those which are not: "While it is clear that public policy favors the utmost freedom of contract, yet agreements in restraint of competition that threaten the public good, entered into with the object of controlling the supply and thereby enhancing the price of articles of actual necessity, become a great menace to the best interests of the commonwealth, and therefore opposed to sound public policy. The agreements were not entered into for the purpose of creating capital nor for greater facilities in the conducting of their business, nor for the protection of those by reasonable restraint upon active competitors, but for the purpose of controlling and withholding the supply of bags, and thereby taking an unjust advantage of the farmer's necessity and disposing of the fruits of its unlawful labors at an unreasonable advance in price." All of these cases just cited involved combinations among tradesmen or manufacturers either in the form of a trust or by mutual agreement to maintain prices. A fortiori, contracts by which one for a consideration agrees to stop his business for a certain time in order to give his competitor a monopoly, and in which no transfer of the property of the covenantor to the cov enantee is implied, is absolutely void, not only because it creates a monopoly, but also because it falls within the doctrine of restraint of trade, the restriction being unreasonable and not necessary to protect the covenantee in the acquisition of any lawful rights obtained under the contract. American Co. v. Peoria Co., 65 Ill. App. 502; Fox Steel Co. v. Schoen, 77 Fed. Rep. 29. The construction put upon the various anti trust laws of the several States and of the United States is not to be confused with the rules of common law just stated. See the following cases: Greer v. Payne, 4 Kan. App. 153; State v. Insurance Co. (Mo.), 52 S. W. Rep. 595; United States v. Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 290.

HUMORS OF THE LAW.

A good story is told by one of the justices of the United States Supreme Court. He was trying to get into his gown and Mr. Justice-was assisting him. His hand in some manner got caught in the robe and the gown stuck. "Habg it!" he exclaimed. "The devil's in the thing." "Ob, no," said Justice"You haven't half got into it."

Judge (to prisoner who has been captured in a raid on a gambling house): "What is your occupation?" Prisoner: "I am a locksmith, your honor." Judge: "How did you happen to be found in a gambling house, and what were you doing when the police appeared?"

Prisoner: "I was making a bolt for the door."

A man who had never seen the inside of a courtroom until he was introduced as a witness in a case pending in one of the Scotch Courts, on being sworn, took a position with his back to the jury and began telling his story to the Judge.

The Judge, in a bland and courteous manner, said: "Address yourself to the jury, sir."

The man made a short pause, but notwithstanding what had been said to him, continued his narrative. The Judge was then more explicit, and said to him: "Speak to the jury, sir; the men sitting behind you on the benches."

The witness at once turned around, and making an awkward bow, said with perfect gravity: "Good morning, gentlemen."

1. ACTION BY INFANT.-Where an infant becomes possessed of a promissory note before maturity, such infant may prosecute an action for the recovery of the amount due thereon at any time prior to the expiration of one year from the date of the removal of the disability of infancy.-TINSLEY V. PITTS, Kan., 62 Pac. Rep. 536.

2. ADMINISTRATION Claims Services.-Where a niece of deceased became a member of his family dur ing her infancy, she cannot recover against his estate for her services, without proving an express promise on his part to pay her therefor.-IN RE DAILEY'S ESTATE, Wis., 83 N. W. Rep. 1111.

3. ADMINISTRATION Executors Powers.-Execu tors, unless expressly authorized by the will, have no power to bind the estate of their testator by a warranty deed, and no action can be maintained against them in their representative capacity for the breach of a contract to execute such a deed.-BAUERLE V. LONG, Ill., 58 N. E. Rep. 458.

4. ADVERSE POSSESSION-Title.-Under Hurd's Rev. St. 1897, p. 1048, ch. 83, § 6, providing that any person who has been in actual possession of real property under claim and color of title for seven years, and who has paid all taxes on such property during such time, shall acquire good title thereto to the extent of his paper title, a person who has remained in continuous possession of real estate under a deed thereto, and has paid the taxes thereon for seven years, acquires good title to the property.-KEPPEL V. DREIER, Ill., 58 N. E. Rep. 386.

5. ARBITRATION-Award.-An award of arbitrators must be final and certain, and so determine the mat. ters submitted that an action between the same parties in regard to it will not afterwards lie, or the award is void. Every reasonable intendment, however, will be made in favor of its finality and validity.-HOIT V. BERGER CRITTENDEN CO., Minn., 84 N. W. Rep. 48.

6. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-Compensation.-Under a contract of employment stipulating that, if no attor ney's fees were agreed on in advance of the rendition of the services, they were to be fixed by the client, the latter was entitled to fix the compensation in good

faith, and the attorney could recover no more.-TEN. NANT V. FAWCETT, Tex., 58 S. W. Rep. 824.

7. BANKRUPTCY-Exemptions-State Statute.-Under Sand. & H. Dig. §§ 4727-4729, providing that a debtor cannot claim an exemption in personal property in his possession as against a claim for its purchase price, and giving the seller the right to an attachment for the property in an action to recover the price, a debtor cannot avail himself of the bankruptcy law to defeat the execution of such an attachment after its issuance, by filing a voluntary petition on which he is adjudged a bankrupt, and in which he claims the prop. erty as exempt, as Bankr. Act 1898, having adopted the State laws as to exemptions, cannot be so adminis. tered as to enlarge the rights of debtors thereunder. In such case, while the property may be temporarily in the possession of the trustee, he has no title or ben. eficial interest therein, and the possession, in effect, remains in the bankrupt, within the meaning of the State statute, and the trustee will be directed to surrender it to the bankrupt, to be taken on the same process.-IN RE DURHAM, U. S. D. C., E. D. (Ark.), 104 Fed. Rep. 231.

8. BANKRUPTCY-Preferences.-Bankr. Act 1898, § 57g, providing that "the claims of creditors who have received preferences shall not be allowed unless such creditors shall surrender their preferences," extends to all claims of a creditor who has received a prefer. ence, and is not limited to the particular claim on account of which the preference was given or received. -IN RE TESLOW, U. S. D. C., D. (Minn.), 104 Fed. Rep. 229.

9. BANKRUPTCY Preferences - Payments on Ac count.-The fact that partial payments made by a bankrupt to a creditor on account, within four months prior to the filing of petition, in the usual course of business, and received by the creditor without knowl. edge of the debtor's insolvency, were made for the purpose of obtaining more goods on credit, and that the creditor extended such credit, does not take the case out of the established rule that such payments constituted preferences, which, under Bankr. Act 1898, § 57g, must be surrendered before the creditor's claim can be allowed against the bankrupt's estate.-In re ARNDT, U. S. D. C., E. D. (Wis.), 104 Fed. Rep. 234.

10. BANKRUPTCY ACT.-In an action by a trustee in bankruptcy to set aside a preferential payment and a fraudulent transfer of his property by the bankrupt, to which he was not made a party, Held: (1) That two causes of action are not improperly united; (2) that the bankrupt was not a necessary party to the action; (3) that the bankruptcy act of 1898 is constitutional, and that the State court had jurisdiction of the action. -FRENCH V. R. P. SMITH & SONS CO., Minn., 84 N. W. Rep. 44.

11. BANKS-Powers of Cashier.-The cashier of a bank has no authority, by virtue of his office, to bind the bank by a certification of his own individual check drawn thereon; and, as in this case he had neither real nor apparent authority, the certification was invalid. -GALE V. CHASE NAT. BANK, U. 8. C. C. of App., Second Circuit, 104 Fed. Rep. 214.

12. BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS-Amendment of Constitutions. Where there was no law of defendant lodge restricting the right of a member to designate a beneficiary in his benefit certificate at the time the certifi cate in suit was taken out, a subsequent amendment to defendant's constitution limiting persons who could be beneficiaries to certain relatives of the member, which would exclude plaintiff, would not be con. strued so as to affect a member's certificate which had been previously issued, in the absence of express words requiring such construction.-GRAND LODGE, A. O. U. W. v. STUMPF, Tex., 58 8. W. Rep. 840.

13. BENEVOLENT SOCIETY-Insurance.-Where a certificate in a brotherhood order names certain injuries as constituting total disabilities and provides that other claim for total disabilities shall be referred to

certain officers of the order, who shall decide whether the disability is such as to totally incapacitate a member, entitling him to the full amount of his certificate, the decision of such officers as to whether an injury sustained by a member totally disabled him is a con. dition precedent to his recovery in an action on the certificate.-EIGHMY V. BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY TRAINMEN, Iowa, 83 N. W. Rep. 1051.

14. BENEVOLENT SOCIETY-Membership-Restriction. -B and others organized a sick benefit society, and adopted a constitution which provided that members should not belong to any other sick benefit society. B signed an application reciting that he had read the constitution, and was willing to submit to it. At the time B joined the society he was a member of a mutual benefit association, and so continued till his death, but the officers of the society had no knowledge of such fact until after his death, when they offered to refund the dues paid by him. Held, that the constitution restricted the membership to those who did not belong to any other sick benefit society, and, since B must be deemed to have known of this provision, he was bound by it, and his contract of membership was void.-BRETZLAFF V. EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN ST. JOHN SICK BEN. Soc., Mich., 83 N. W. Rep. 1000. 15. BILLS AND NOTES Consideration. Where the answer alleged that there was no consideration for the assigned note sued on, a reply alleging that; the note was executed in consideration of another note, and for the purpose of enabling the payee to obtain money by the sale of the note sued on, was sufficient. -CONGLETON V. GARRARD, Ky., 58 S. W. Rep. 791.

-

16. BILLS AND NOTES-Consideration for Release.Where two of the three joint purchasers of an engine and gristmill turned over the engine and mill to the other purchaser, and he agreed to pay the balance due on the notes for the price, the seller ratifying the agreement, and promising to release the other oblig ors from further liability, the detriment to them by the surrender of the partnership property was a suffi cient consideration for the promise to release them.AKERS V. PHILLIPS, Ky., 58 S. W. Rep. 790.

17. BILLS AND NOTES-Contemporaneous Agreement. -Where the parties to a note agree at the time of mak. ing it that it shall be paid from the proceeds of a certain mill, and that, if there are no proceeds, the note shall be returned and destroyed, parol evidence of such agreement, and that there were no proceeds, is admissible in an action by an indorsee after maturity against the maker.-ROBErts v. Greig, Colo., 62 Pac. Rep. 574.

18. BILLS AND NOTES-Counterclaim.-In an action upon a promissory note, to which a counterclaim was pleaded, to the effect that the note was given in pur. suance of a parol agreement for the sale of certificates of bank stock by plaintiff to defendant, upon the condition that defendant might, at his option, resell them to plaintiff in consideration of the surrender of the note. Held, that parol testimony of such contract was admissible, and did not tend to change the terms of the note.-GERMANIA BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS V. OSBorne, Minn., 83 N. W. Rep. 1084.

19. BILLS AND NOTES-Transfer-Payment.- Defend ant in an action on a note alleged want of considera. tion, the including therein of usurious interest, payments to the payee before the transfer, and that the payee was not the bona fide owner thereof. There was evidence of payments, and of usurious interest being included in the note, and that the payee acted as agent of his daughter, the plaintiff, in purchasing this and other notes. Held, that defendant was entitled to a charge as to the effect of the agent's knowledge upon the rights of the principal if the jury found said agency existed, and a refusal to so charge was error. -RANFT V. BOLLES, Kan., 62 Pac. Rep. 537.

20. BROKERS-Principal and Agent.-Where a land owner instructs an agent, who is employed by the year at a specific salary, to look after certain lands, but

who has no general authority to sell the lands, to sell a portion thereof, the agent cannot make a contract with a broker for the sale thereof which will bind the principal to pay the broker for his services in effecting a sale.-WILLIAMS V. MOORE, Tex., 58 S. W. Rep. 953.

21. BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-Usury.-In an action by a borrowing member to recover usury paid, plaintiff is entitled to credit on his loan by all pay. ments made, including dues, fines, and interest, and is not chargeable with anything on account of expenses and losses, unless the answer of defendant shows affirmatively the total amount of expenses and losses, and the proportion that each share should bear.-SATURDAY NIGHT SAV. & LOAN ASSN. OF LEXINGTON V. MOORE, Ky., 58 8. W. Rep. 803.

22. CARRIERS - Injury to Employee Negligence.Where the conductor of a train, knowing an employee of the railroad to be aboard, permitted him to ride without demanding a pass or fare from him, in viola tion of the railroad's rules, such employee, riding openly, was not a trespasser, so as to exonerate the railroad from liability for injuries to him resulting from its negligence.-CHATTANOOGA RAPID TRANSIT Co. V. VENABLE, Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 861.

23. CHATTEL MORTGAGE — Validity-Resulting Trust. -Defendant executed an instrument selling and conveying to 8, in trust, all the goods, chattels, and effects in two lumber yards, for the purpose of securing certain specific debts, and providing that defendant should not remove any of the property without the consent of the trustee, but authorizing defendant to sell it in the usual course of business, and providing that, in case of default in the payments specified, the trustee should take possession of the property. Held, that the instrument constituted a valid chattel mortgage, and was not void as to creditors on the ground that it was a resulting trust or a common-law assign. ment.-BELDING HALL MFG. Co. v. SLAYTON, Mich., 83 N. W. Rep. 1001.

Redeliver Note.

25. CONTRACTS-Agreement to Where a note, under an agreement with the payee, is to be redelivered to the maker on demand on a certain contingency, the payee's failure on demand to redeliver it on the happening of the contingency is a breach of his contract, and entitles the maker to an action for damages in the amount of the note, though he has not been compelled to pay it to a third party, to whom it has been transferred.-LYLE v. MCCORMICK HARV. MACH. CO., Wis., 84 N. W. Rep. 18.

26. CONTRACT-Building Contract-Damages.-Where a contractor for the erection of a building, having dissolved his contract with the landowner, breaks his contract with a subcontractor, by ordering him to do nothing more, the latter's damages, which are the dif ference between what he was to receive under the contract and the cost of the work, are not to be dimin ished because he thereafter makes a contract to do the work for the landowner, on which he makes a profit.OLDS V. MAPES-REEVES CONST. Co., Mass., 58 N. E. Rep. 478.

27. CONTRACT-Combinations in Restraint of Trade.Where an owner, on the sale of a business and good will to certain firms, agrees not to re-enter such business within a specified time in a certain place, and it' is charged that such firms, being the only dealers in such business in such place, combined to buy such business and good will to prevent competition, and to control prices, such agreement, though valld at common law, is void, as within the anti-trust law (Rev. St. 1895, art. 5313), making contracts void where a combination of capital or skill of two or more persons is

formed to create or carry out restrictions in trade or to prevent competition in the sale or purchase of com. modities.-COMER V. BURTON-LINGO CO., Tex., 58 S. W. Rep. 969.

29. CONTRACr-Restraint of Trade.-One manufacturer agreed with another engaged in the same busi. ness, in consideration of $1 500, to cease manufactur ing certain articles for one year; the latter having the privilege of renewing the contract for four years The agreement was held void as against public policy.-CLARK V. NEEDHAM, Mich., 83 N. W. Rep.

more.

1027.

29. CONVERSION Ownership of Property.-In an action for conversion of grain, a finding that plaintiffs were the owners on a certain date, and between that date and a subsequent date, and while such grain was so the property of plaintiffs, it was converted, suffi. ciently shows that when the grain was converted plaintiffs were its owners. In an action for conversion of grain, its delivery by defendant to an agent is. not available as a defense, where he was notified of the termination of such agency, and forbidden to deliver it to him.-NEWLOVE V. POND, Cal., 62 Pac. Rep. 561.

80. CORPORATIONS-Directors Director's MeetingBy Laws. Where the by-laws of a corporation, adopted by virtue of Civ. Code, § 303, authorizing a corporation by its by-laws to provide for the time, place, and manner of calling and conducting its meetings, provided that the president or two directors might call special meetings of directors, and that no. tice should be given of each called meeting to each director one day before the meeting, and a special meeting was held, no notice having been given either of two directors, who were absent from the meeting, and the minutes of the meeting were not approved at any subsequent meeting of the board of directors, a mort. gage on the corporation's property executed by the directors at such meeting was invalid.-CURTIN V. SALMON RIVER HYDRAULIC GOLD MIN. & DITCH CO., Cal., 62 Pac. Rep. 552.

31 CORPORATIONS-l'ayment of Debt to Bank-Ultra Vires Contract.-A contract by the terms of which a national bank receives corporate stock of another corporation in payment of a debt owing to the bank such other corporation is not ultra vires as to the bank when, at the time of making the contract, such corpo ration is financially embarrassed, and unable to meet its commercial obligations as they mature. Such contracts is directly incidental to the proper exercise of the powers for which the bank was chartered.-TOURTELOT V. WHITHED, N. Dak., 84 N. W. Rep. 8.

32. CORPORATIONS-Requisites of De Facto Corpora tion. There cannot be a corporation de facto where such corporation could not exist de jure.-DAVIS V. STEVENS, U. S. D. C., D. (S. Dak.), 104 Fed. Rep. 235. 33. COUNTY COMMISSIONERS-Action Against.-An action can be maintained against a board of county commissioners upon a do nestic judgment against such board.-LOCKARD V. BOARD OF COM'RS. OF DECATUR COUNTY, Kan., 62 Pac. Rep. 357.

34. CRIMINAL LAW-Embezzlement.-Where defend. ant was indicted for embezzlement under Rev. St. p. 363 (Cr. Code, § 80), making it an offense for a town officer to convert to his own use property of the town, it was error to instruct that the statute of limitations began to run when defendant should have paid or turned over moneys to his successor, since the statute began to run against any embezzlement or conversion when it was committed, not when it was made manifest.-WEIMER V. PEOPLE, Ill., 58 N. E. Rep. 378.

35. CRIMINAL LAW-False Pretenses.-An indictment for obtaining a signature to a deed by false pretenses is bad, it not showing that the false pretenses had any connection with the signing and delivery of the deed. -SIMMONS V. PEOPLE, Ill., 58 N. E. Rep. 383.

36. CRIMINAL PRACTICE Burglary - Indictment.Where no information or indictment is filled against a defendant charged with the commission of a crime

during the time at which he is held to answer, his detention is unlawful, and he is entitled to be discharged.-LEISENBERG V. STATE, Neb., 24 N. W.

Rep. 6.

37. DAMAGES-Detention of Personal PropertyHighest Market Value.-Compensation is the basic rule for the measure of damages. In an action for special damages for the loss of a sale of personal property at the highest market value during its detention, it is competent for the defendant to prove that within 30 days after the property was returned to the plaintiff, while he still held it, and before the action was commenced, its market value was as high, and its sale as feasible, as during the detention.HOYT V. FULLER, U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 104 Fed. Rep. 192.

38. DEEDS-Conditions Subsequent.-A deed to the trustees of an academy, reciting that it was executed in consideration of the trustees having fixed on the land of the grantor "as a proper place for erecting the building of said academy, and as a permanent site for the same," did not impose a condition that the property should be perpetually used for school purposes. - FUQUAY'S HEIRS V. TRUSTEES OF HOPKINS ACADEMY, Ky., 58 S. W. Rep. 814.

39. DEEDS-Delivery.-O executed deeds conveying her real estate to her children, and, after retaining possession thereof for several months, she delivered them to D, an aged sister-in-law, who lived with her, with instructions to take care thereof, and after the death of O to deliver them to the person who should settle her estate. Afterwards O obtained the deeds, and placed them in a certain press, and informed D where she had placed them, and instructed her that, in case O got sick, to get the papers, and give them to the person who should settle her estate. Afterwards, when O got sick, she was informed by D, in response to an inquiry, that the latter had the papers, and she had replied, "All right." D did not know what the envelopes contained, though she knew who was to settle the estate, and after the death of O the deeds were delivered to the persons named as grantees. Held, that the deeds were void for the want of delivery.-Os. BORNE V. ESLINGER, Ind., 58 N. E. Rep. 439.

Execution

40. DEEDSDuress Setting Aside.Where a husband exchanges lands for which he has no title for other lands, and a title to the lands so acquired is taken in the name of his wife, who pays no consideration therefor, and on discovering the lack of title the opposite party tenders a reconveyance, and procures a conveyance of the lands from the wife, she cannot have such conveyance set aside for duress, since she was not injured thereby.-ROSTEIN V. PARK, Oreg., 62 Pac. Rep. 529.

41. ELECTIONS-Nominating Candidates-County Conventions. A county convention of a political party, called by the county central committee to select delegates to a State convention, and for no other purpose, cannot depose the chairman of such committee, and supersede him by a chairman of its own selection, where the custom of such party was to select such chairman at a convention called to nominate county officers. Hence a convention for nominating candi. dates for office, called by such central committee through its duly-elected chairman, though he had been deposed at such convention, was the authorized convention of such party.-STATE V. HATCH, Mont., 62 Pac. Rep. 591.

42. ELECTIONS-Political Parties.-As the courts have no power to interfere with the judgment of the highest tribunal of a political party in a matter involving party government, the decision of the State central committee of the Republican party that certain persons constituted the Republican executive committee of a particular county, and that a certain one of their number is the chairman of the committee, is final and conclusive.-DAVIS v. HAMBRICK, Ky., 58 8. W. Rep.

779.

43. EMINENT DOMAIN-Condemnation.-A petition for condemnation of certain land referred to a certain corner as "the northeasterly corner," and the owner, after receiving compensation, brought a bill to enjoin taking the land, on the ground that it was not that condemned, and introduced evidence showing that the corner described was "the most northerly corner." Held, that, though the description of the corner was not scientifically correct, the description as a whole showed that the petitioner's land was meant, as it could fit no other land, and hence the injunction will not lie to restrain the enforcement of the judg. ment of condemnation. --HUTT V. CITY OF CHICAGO, Ill., 58 N. E. Rep. 412.

44. ESTOPPEL- Interest in Land. - Complainant's father and mother purchased a life estate in land, and the grantor agreed that, if complainant and his brother should pay a certain sum,the land should go to them on the death of their parents. Complainant exe cuted a deed to his father and mother for his interest, which was delivered to his brother, but never recorded. This deed was executed in the presence of defendant, to whom complainant stated that he had deeded away his interest. Defendant afterwards purchased the land from complainant's father and mother on their representation that complainant had never paid anything on the land, and had conveyed his interest to them. Held, that complainant was estopped from asserting an interest in the land.-TUCKER V. PULLMAN, Tenn., 58 S. W. Rep. 873.

45. EVIDENCE - Conversion. A farmer engaged in raising and marketing wheat is presumed to know the value thereof, and may testify thereto without show. ing familiarity with the market.-LINDE V. GAFFKE, Minn., 84 N. W. Rep. 41.

46. EVIDENCE-Parol Evidence-Meaning of Words and Abbreviations.-Where goods taken on a writ of replevin are described in the writ by words and ab. breviations baving a well-understood meaning among those who deal in such goods, but are not in such com. mon use as to make them subjects of judicial notice, parol testimony is admissible to explain such meaning.-DAGES V. BRAKE, Mich., 83 N. W. Rep. 1039.

erty has been surrendered to the mortgagee to sell in satisfaction of the debt, it cannot be taken from his possession under execution against the mortgagor; he being a bailee with a beneficial interest.-NEWMAN V. MANTLE, Ky., 58 S. W. Rep. 783.

48. FRAUDS,STATUTE OF-Sales-Barter and Exchange. -The statute of frauds, requiring some part of goods purchased to be delivered or some part of the purchase money to be paid to render a sale valid, where no memorandum in writing is made, is applicable to a case of barter and exchange; each party in such case being both a buyer and a seller.-RAYMOND V. COLTON, U. S. C. C. of App., Second District, 104 Fed. Rep. 219.

49. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-Bill of Sale.-Where a judgment debtor executed to' plaintiff, a judgment creditor, a bill of sale, which was absolute on its face, for his stock of goods and book accounts, and it was agreed that the creditor should take charge of the business, with power to collect the bills receivable, but that, if the debtor should pay the debt, his prop. erty should be turned back to him, and the property was in fact left in his possession, and no invoice was taken of the stock or bills receivable, such sale was in fraud of creditors.-J. S. BROWN & BRO. MERCANTILE Co. v. ISRAEL, Colo., 62 Pac. Rep. 578.

50. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE-Bona Fide CreditorLien. A creditor who is aware that his debtor has conveyed his property to a third party for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, but who has no intent te aid him in his fraud, may, with his consent, procure from the fraudulent vendee payment of his just claim from the property fraudulently conveyed, or a lien