plaintiff might redeem.-MOONEY V. BYRNE, N. Y., N. E. Rep. 163.

57

80. MORTGAGES Extension Discharge.-Where a wife executed a mortgage on trust property in which she had a life estate with remainder to her children to secure her husband's antecedent debt, and after her death the husband procured an extension of time without his children's consent, such extension discharged the mortgage by operation of law, though no admin istrator of the wife's estate or guardian of the children had been appointed, and there was no one to pay the debt. FLEMING V. BARDEN, N. Car., 36 S. E. Rep. 17. 81. MORTGAGE-Foreclosure-Administrator De Bonis Non. Where an administrator loans money of the estate on mortgage security, and dies, and the mortgagor conveys the land to a grantee, who assumes and agrees to pay the debt, the mortgagor has such an equity against the grantee, to compel him to pay the mortgage, as will justify a decree for an unpaid balance against the grantee in a suit by an administrator de bonis non against both, though there be no such privity of contract between the administrator de bonis non and the grantee as would sustain such decree.-REDFEARN V. CRAIG, S. Car., 35 S. E. Rep. 1024.

82. MORTGAGES-Receivers. - Under Civ. Code Prac. § 299, providing that, "in an action by a mortgagee for the sale of mortgaged property, a receiver may be ap pointed, if it appear that the property is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured, or that the condition of the mortgage has not been performed, and that the property is probably insufficient to pay the mortgage debt," a junior mortgagee is entitled to subject the rents where a receiver is appointed upon his application, whether or not the appointment was declared to be for his benefit, though the action was brought by the senior mortgagee, and the land is insufficient to satisfy his debt.-NESBIT V. WOOD, Ky., 56 S. W. Rep. 714.

83. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Annexation-Liability for Injuries.-Laws 1894, ch. 356, § 4, providing that the city of B should not be liable for any debt, liability, or obligation of the town of F, which the act annexed to the city, incurred before annexation, but that the property in such town should remain liable, merely defines the area of taxation for such liabilities, and does not relieve the city from liability in a suit of one injured by the construction of a sewer by the town of F prior to the annexation.-HUFFMIRE V. CITY OF BROOKLYN, N. Y., 57 N. E. Rep. 176.

84. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-Corporations-Stock.The right of a city to purchase the stock of a corporation by virtue of authority of its ordinances and an act of the legislature, and to continue the existence of such corporation by placing part of the stock in the names of its officers, cannot be questioned in an action by the corporation to enforce a contract with a third party made prior to the purchase.-MONONGAHELA BRIDGE Co. v. PITTSBURGH & B. TRACTION Co., Penn., 46 Atl. Rep. 99.

85. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Loss by Fire-Liability of Municipality.-The power residing in a municipality to provide for a supply of water is, in its nature, legislative and governmental, and, if not exercised, and in consequence loss results to property owners by fires occurring, the municipality is not liable in damages.-PLANTERS' OIL MILL V. MONROE WATERWORKS & LIGHT CO., La., 27 South. Rep. 684.

86. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Ordinance-Trespass. -Rev. Ord. St. Louis, art. 17,188, § 981, provides that it shall be unlawful for any person without the consent of the owner or his agent to enter on any inclosed or improved real estate, lot, or parcel of ground in the city, or to deposit thereon or remove therefrom any substance, dirt, refuse, etc. Held, that under the ordinance one could not be held liable for a trespass committed within a building, since the provisions of the ordinance plainly showed that it applied to land, and not to buildings.-CITY OF ST. LOUIS V. BABCOCK, Mo., 56 S. W. Rep. 731.

87. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Ordinance-Unreasonable Interference with Individual Liberty.-A city or dinance declaring that it shall be unlawful for any woman to go in and out of a building where a saloon is kept for the sale of liquor, or "to frequent, loaf, or stand around said building within fifty feet thereof," and providing for the punishment of any saloon keeper who shall permit a violation of that provision of the ordinance, is void, as being an unreasonable interference with individual liberty.- GASTENAU V. COMMON. WEALTH, Ky., 56 S. W. Rep. 705.

88. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Ordinance-Vagrants. -Under Rev. Ord. St. Louis, § 1062, defining a vagrant as one "who shall be found trespassing on the private premises of others and not give a good account of themselves," one could not be fined as a vagrant because found trespassing on the private premises of another if able to give a good account of himself.CITY OF ST. LOUIS V. BABCOCK, Mo., 56 S. W. Rep. 732. 89. NEGLIGENCE-Rifle Club.-A rifle club is liable for injury to outside persons resulting from target prac tice on its premises.-SIMMONDS v. SOUTHERN RIFLE CLUB, La., 27 South. Rep. 656.

90. NEGLIGENCE OF MERCHANT-Permitting Floor to be Worn-Injury From Splinter.-The fact that a cus tomer, in walking along the floor of defendant's store. room, was injured by a splinter from the floor entering her foot through the shoe, is sufficient to authorize the submission to the jury of the question of defendant's negligence in permitting the floor to be in a dangerous condition.-RUSSELL V. STEWART DRY GOODS Co., Ky., 56 S. W. Rep. 707.

91 PARENT AND CHILD-Support of Stepchildren.Where the stepfather has charge of the family, and the mother's children are provided for by both father and mother, there is no presumption that such support is gratuitous on his part.-EIKEN V. EIKEN, Minn., 82 N. W Rep. 667.

92. PAYMENT-Part Payment-Estoppel.-Where C, indebted to P for $3,249.54, secured by mortgage, nego. tiated a loan from W, to be secured by mortgage on the same property, to repay, inter alia, the debt due P and W, gave C a check payable to P for $1,254.71, marked, "In full claims against C," and P took and used this, and gave a receipt, not in full, but on account, P, not having noticed the words, "In full," and having made no agreement to take part payment in full satisfaction, is not estopped to assert priority of its mortgage as against W for balance of its debt.GIRARD FIRE INS. Co. v. CANAN, Penn., 46 Atl. Rep. 115. 93. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY - Payment of Debt by Surety. Where a debtor pledged policies of life insur ance to secure several debts which he owed the pledgee, a surety who has paid one of the debts is not entitled to any part of the collateral security until all of the debts are paid, in the absence of an allegation that each of the debts was to receive its pro rata of the security.-WILLINGHAM V. OHIO VAL. BANKING & TRUST Co., Ky., 56 S. W. Rep. 706.

94. PROCESS-Corporations-Service.-Under Comp. Laws 1897, §§ 7056, 7066, permitting service of notice or process to be made on manufacturing corporations by serving the agent of the corporation having charge of its designated business office, a return on a summons which shows that the service was made on an agent, but does not state that it was the agent in charge of such office, does not confer jurisdiction on the justice. -TOLEDO ICE CO. V. MUNGER, Mich., 82 N. W. Rep. 663. 95. QUIETING TITLE Decree-Collateral Attack.Where the complaint, in an action to quiet title against à mortgagee, did not allege that the complainant was in possession of the mortgaged lands, or that they were vacant and unimproved, as required, but a decree was rendered in favor of the complainant, it will not be held invalid, for want of jurisdiction over the subject. matter when offered in evidence in a suit to foreclose such mortgage, as the court had jurisdiction to make such a decree, and an error therein could not be re.

viewed by a collateral attack.-FIGGE v. ROWLEN, Ill., 57 N. E. Rep. 195.

96. RAILROAD COMPANY-Bridges-"Public Road."Though a railroad be a highway, it is not a public road, in the sense that the general public have the legal right to pass at will along its right of way. A bridge built by a railroad corporation on its line of way, over a navigable stream, is not open to travel over by the general public, though it may have been constructed in such a manner as to admit of the same.-OLiff v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT, La., 27 South. Rep. 688.

97. RAILROAD COMPANY-Crossing-Contributory Neg. ligence.-A pedestrian on a highway, who, in broad daylight, is struck by a car just as he steps on the rail. road track crossing the highway, when the car was visible for a distance of 200 feet, from any point within 20 feet of the track, is barred from recovery by contributory negligence, though the track is a private siding.-Fox v. PENNSYLVANIA R. Co., Penn., 46 Atl. Rep. 106.

98. RAILROAD COMPANY-Farm Gates-Duty to Close. -It is the duty of the landowner for whose benefit and convenience gates are constructed and placed in a railroad right of way fence at a private farm crossing upon the land of such owner to keep such gates closed.SWANSON V. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. Co., Minn., 82 N. W. Rep. 670.

99. RAILROAD COMPANY-Street Railroads-Injury to Child. A charge of negligence against a street railroad company cannot be predicated on an unexplained accident to a child.-SMITH V. KANSAS CITY EL. Rr. Co., Kan., 60 Pac. Rep. 1059.

100. RELEASE-Validity-Fraud Rescission.-Where personal injuries have been suffered, for which a liability exists, and a release therefor has been fraudulently procured, an action for damages may be maintained without first obtaining a decrea to rescind or to cancel the release; and the plaintiff is not precluded from attacking a release so obtained, when it is set up as a defense, because he has not restored or tendered back the amount received by him at the time the release was obtained.-MISSOURI PAC. RY. Co. v. GOODHOLM, Kan., 60 Pac. Rep. 1066.

101. RES JUDICATA-Judgment.-A proposition assumed or decided by the court to be true, and which must be so assumed or decided in order to establish another proposition which expresses the conclusion of the court, is as effectually passed upon and settled in that court as the very matter directly decided.— BLAKE V. OHIO RIVER R. Co., W. Va., 35 S. E. Rep. 953. 102. SALE-Contract-Acceptance.-A written order, addressed to a party, and directing a shipment of goods, such order being "subject to approval at your office," is nothing more than a conditional offer to purchase. To become a valid enforceable contract, it must be approved or accepted by the party to whom it is addressed, and party signing the same must be notified of the approval or acceptance within a reasonable time.-REID V. NORTHWESTERN IMPLEMENT & WAGON CO., Minn., 82 N. W. Rep. 672.

103. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - Contract - Married Woman.-An oral contract by a married woman for the sale of her land cannot be specifically enforced under the doctrine of part performance.-ROSENOUR v. ROSENOUR, W. Va., 35 S. E. Rep. 918.

104. TAXATION-License-Bank Charter.-A provision in the charter of a bank exempting its "capital" from taxation does not cover an exemption from "license" taxation. The grant of a charter to a corpora tion, authorizing it to carry on a certain business during the term of its charter, does not import permission to do so without contributing to the support of the government in like manner with natural persons pur. suing the same business.-STATE V. CITIZENS' BANK OF LOUISIANA, La., 27 South. Rep. 709.

acquired by it under such sale to an individual, who thereafter perfects the title thereunder, the State can not impeach or impair such title by a resale of the lands for taxes due and unpaid for prior years.-STATE V. CAMP, Minn., 82 N. W. Rep. 645.

106 TRESPASS-Mesne Profits - Damages.-In an ac tion of trespass for mesne profits, if the defendant at the time of the inception of the cause of action had knowledge of the plaintiff's title, although he honestly believed that he held the superior legal title, thre measure of damages is not the actual receipts, but is the fair annual rental of the property, with legal inter. est, less the taxes paid by the defendant.-BODKIN V. ARNOLD, W. Va., 35 S. E. Rep. 980.

107. TRUSTEES-Ratification of Acts-Estoppel.-The beneficiaries under a will, having, when competent to do so, ratified the acts of the trustee and administrator in investing the funds outside the State, and in paying the principal to one to whom was bequeathed only the income for life, which principal was used for their as well as her support, are estopped to object to his account because of such acts of his.-IN RE ARMITAGE'S ESTATE, Penn., 46 Atl. Rep. 117.

108. TRUSTS-Receivers -Title to Assets.-A receiver of the property of a resident of the State of Illinois, appointed in a creditors' suit pending in that State, to whom all the property of the debtor, real, personal, and mixed, is transferred by order of the court, acquires thereby title, and the right to recover upon a debt due to the debtor from a resident of the State of Wisconsin. The situs of such debt is at the domicile of the creditor.-GILBERT V. HEWETSON, Minn., 82 N. W. Rep. 633.

109. USURY-Evidence-Payment of Commission to Agent.-Evidence of payment of a commission by a borrower to the agent of a money lender for his serv. ices in obtaining a loan from his principal, and upon which the agent becomes a surety and procures another to become surety, in order to obtain the loan which he is employed by the borrower to negotiate, is not sufficient to show the transaction usurious, where the effect of usury is the forfeiture of both principal and interest.-LEONHARD V. FLOOD, Ark., 56 S. W. Rep. 781.

110. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Sale of Land-Married Woman's Contract.-The executory contract of a married woman for the sale of land is unenforceable. Though an unenforceable executory contract of a married woman recited the payment of the price, the purchaser is not entitled to a lien on the land therefor, in the absence of competent proof that he made the pay. ment; the fact of payment being put in issue.-GraHAM V. GRAHAM, Ky., 56 8. W. Rep. 708.

113. WILL Charitable Institutions.-A bequest to a school of learning having an academic, collegiate, and theological department open to all of good moral character, there being no charge for instruction in theological department, and the institution being sup. ported largely by public and private charity, and devoting all its resources to increasing its benefit to the public, is a bequest to a charitable institution.-ALFRED UNIVERSITY V. HANCOCK, N. J., 46 Atl. Rep. 178.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., JULY 27, 1900.

An exchange calls attention to the recent decision, by the Supreme Court of Indiana, of Bruns v. Clausmier, as an illustration of acts performed by officers in charge of the apprehension of criminals, which, though in the main commendatory, are not official acts for which their sureties may be liable. In the case referred to it was held that a sheriff does not act officially in sending photographs of an accused person, with descriptions of such person, to various individuals and police departments, whereby the accused is held out to the world as a criminal, and that the sheriff and his sureties are not liable on his official bond for such acts, though the officer may be amenable to a libel suit. It was also held that if, in his discretion, a sheriff deem it necessary to the prevention of the escape of an accused person to take the prisoner's photograph, and to ascertain his height, weight, and other physical peculiarities, and his name, residence, place of birth, etc., he may do so, without incurring liability on his official bond therefor, his acts being without personal violence to the prisoner. The authorities are uniform that unless this discretion is abused through malice, wantonness, or a reckless disregard for, and a selfish indifference to, the common dictates of humanity, the officer is not liable. Firestone v. Rice, 71 Mich. 377, 38 N. W. Rep. 885, 15 Am. St. Rep. 266; Diers v. Mallon, 46 Neb. 121, 64 N. W. Rep. 722, 50 Am. St. Rep. 598. It is the duty of the said officer to search the person, and take from him all money or other articles that may be used as evidence against him at the trial. Rusher v. State, 94 Ga. 363, 21 S. E. Rep. 593, 47 Am. St. Rep. 175, and note on p. 180. And he may take from him any dangerous weapons, or anything else that said officer may, in his discretion, deem necessary to his own or the public safety, or for the safekeeping of the prisoner, and to prevent his escape; and such property, whether goods or money, he holds subject to the order of the court. Closson v. Morrison, 47 N. H. 482, 93 Am. Dec. 459; Commercial Exchange Bank v. McLeod, 65 Iowa, 665, 19 N. W.

Rep. 329, 22 N. W. Rep. 919, 54 Am. Rep. 36; Reifsnyder v. Lee, 44 Iowa, 101, 24 Am. Rep. 733; Holker v. Hennessy, 141 Mo. 527, 540, 42 S. W. Rep. 1090, 64 Am. St. Rep. 524, 532, and note p. 537, 39 L. R. A. 165; Gillett, Cr. Law (2d ed.), sec. 158. In Closson v. Morrison, supra, and Holker v. Hennessy, supra, it was held that said officer might not only take any deadly weapon he might find on the person, but also money or other articles of value found upon the person, though not connected with the crime for which he was arrested, and could not be used as evidence on the trial thereof, by means of which, if left in his possession, he might procure his escape, or obtain tools, implements or weapons with which to effect his escape.

The Supreme Court of the United States, in Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Clarke, has upheld the general policy as declared by the leading courts of this country of a liberal construction of the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. Reversing the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the supreme court decides that, where parties to a dispute deliberately agree upon a basis of settlement of all mutual demands, the strong presumption is that such settlement shall be regarded as a final wiping off of the slate. The position was taken that the rule that payment of a less sum in satisfaction of a larger sum is not binding for want of consideration only applies when the larger sum is liquidated, and when there is no consideration whatever for the surrender of a part of it, and that the rule itself is to be considered so far with disfavor as to be confined strictly to cases within it. It was held that the payment of a specified sum conceded to be due, by including certain items but excluding disputed items, on condition that the sum so paid shall be received in full satisfaction, will be sustained as an extinguishment of the whole sum, where the aggregate amount is in dispute. Chief Justice Fuller refers to Johnson v. Brannan, 5 Johns. 268, in which the ancient rule that where a liquidated sum is due the payment of a less sum in satisfaction thereof, though accepted as satisfaction, is not binding as such for want of consideration, is characterized as "that rigid and rather unreasonable rule of the old law." He also refers to the disap

proval of Mr. Justice Nelson of the principle of such rule in Kellogg v. Richards, 14 Wend. 116. Many other cases cited by the chief justice, including Brooks v. White, in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (? Metc. 283), favor the doctrine that the ancient rule is "not to be extended beyond its precise import; and whenever the technical reason for its application does not exist, the rule itself is not to be applied. Hence, judges have been disposed to take out of its application all those cases where there was any new consideration or any collateral benefit eceived by the payee, which might raise a technical legal consideration, although it was quite apparent that such consideration was far less than the amount of the sum due. The Civil Code of Califoraia provides: Part performance of an obligation, either before or after a breach thereof, when expressly ac cepted by the creditor in writing, in satisfaction, or rendered in pursuance of an agreement in writing, for that purpose, though without any new consideration, extinguishes the obligation. Several other State have adopted statutory provisions substantially in accord with that of California. They embody the common sense, and not in any sense immoral, spirit of the present day to effectuate agreements which were intended to be of complete accord and satisfaction, regardless of the technical form in which they are couched."

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

MASTER AND SERVANT-NEGLIGENCE-NEW APPLIANCES.-In Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Gray, decided by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, it appeared that the receiver of a railroad substituted a new and different switch for one formerly used in a switch yard. The new switch was a reasonably sate appliance and properly construc ed, but it operated in a different manner from the former one, and, under very probable conditions, was dangerous to those using it and not acquainted with its operation, but no regulations as to its use or other instructions were given the employees in the yard. Within two or three days after the switch was put in, a car was derailed in attempting to pass over it, and a yard foreman who was riding thereon was killed, under circumstances clearly indicating that, if he had known the manner in which the

switch was operated, the accident would not have occurred. It was held that the receiver was liable for having failed in his duty to give proper instructions. The court said in part:

"In the case of Railroad Co. v. Herbert, 116 U. S., at p. 648, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 593, 29 L. Ed. 758, in speaking of the correlative duties and rights of master and servant in regard to machinery, ap pliances, etc., the supreme court in one sentence epitomizes a phase of the subject in this language: His (the servant's) contract implies that in regard to these matters his employer will make adequate provision that no danger shall ensue to him.' Doubtless, the dangers alluded to were unnecessary or unknown dangers, but this statement from the court's opinton gives a clear idea of the master's duty in the case before us. The master should have taken adequate measures to make known the dangers which persons ignorant of the workings of the new switch might incur by its use.

Many other cases from the supreme court might be referred to illustrative of the general principles we are discussing, but we will only name that of Railway Co. v. Archibald, 170 U. S. 669, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 777, 42 L. Ed. 1188, and that of Railway Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377, 5 Sup. Ct. 184, 28 L. Ed. 787, where on page 382, 112 U. S.. page 186, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep., and page 790, 28 L. Ed., the court, after alluding to the arguments by which the doctrine that the servant assumes the known and ordinary risks of his employment are supported, said: But, however this may be, it is indispensable to the employer's exemption from liability to his servant for the consequences of risks thus incurred that he should himself be free from negligence. He must furnish the servant the means and appliances which the service requires for its efficient and safe performance, unless otherwise stipulated; and if he fail in that respect, and an injury result, he is as liable to the servant as he would be to a stranger. In other words, while claiming such exemption, he must not himself be guilty of contributory negligence.'

"In 1 Shear. & R. Neg. (5th Ed., sec. 202), the authors say: 'A master who employs servants in a dangerous and complicated business is personally bound to prescribe rules sufficient for its order and safe management, and to keep his servants informed of these rules, so far as may be needful for their guidance.'

"And they amplify the principles applicable to this case in section 203 in the following language: It is also the personal duty of the master, so far as he can, by the use of ordinary care, to avoid exposing his servants to extraordinary risks which they could not reasonably anticipate, although he is not bound to guaranty them against such risks, nor to guard against an accident which is not at all likely to happen. The master must, therefore, give warning to his servants of all perils to which they will be exposed, of which he is or ought to be aware, other than such as they

should, in the exercise of ordinary care, have forseen as necessarily incidental to the business in the matter and ordinary course of affairs, though more than this is not required of him. It makes no difference what is the nature of the peculiar peril, or whether it is or is not beyond the master's control. And it is not enough for the master to use care and pains to give such notice. He must see that it is actually given. If, therefore, he fails to give such warning, in terms sufficiently clear to call the attention of his servants to a peril of which he is or ought to be aware, he is liable to them for any injury which they suffer thereby without contributory negligence. Such notice must be timely; that is, given in sufficient time to enable the servant to profit by it. It is, therefore, the duty of the master to give adequate and timely warnings of changes in the situation involving new dangers.'

"The last proposition announced in the paragraph just quoted is supported by several cases, such as Railroad Co. v. Kerr, 148 Ill. 605, 35 N. E. Rep. 1117; Donahoe v. Railroad Co., 153 Mass. 356, 26 N. E. Rep. 868; Stephenson v. Ravenscroft, 25 Neb. 678, 41 N. W. Rep. 652; Milling Co. v. Sharp, 5 Colo. App. 321, 38 Pac. Rep. 850. Elliott, in his work on Railroads (vol. 3, secs. 1268, 1272, 1273), lays down the recognized general propositions in regard to the duty of the master to furnish safe appliances and safe places for the servant to work in, but we do not deem it necessary to cite other authorities.

"We conclude that while the railroad track in the yard at Somerset, and even the new switch itself, were in good physical condition, and while it is shown that the receiver used at least ordinary care to have them so, still that the existence of the latent dangers connected with the operation by ignorant persons of the new form of switch just put in must have been known to the receiver, and that such information must have been acquired by him when he was purchasing the switch and preparing to put it in use in the yard. At all events, that he must be charged with having such information we cannot doubt. If this is true, it follows that it was his duty to give notice of those dangers to Gray by explanation in some form, or by rules or regulations brought to his attention. There does not seem to have been anything of this kind done. If notice in any form of the exact facts had come to Gray before he went upon the train, his going would then have been at his own risk, and his not signaling the engineer to stop the train when he saw that the switch was open would then have been his own folly. Not to have endeavored to stop the train under such circumstances, and if he had known of the danger arising from the switch being open, would have been suicidal; but not to have made an effort to have the engineer stop, under the actual facts as disclosed by the evidence, shows the utter ignorance of Gray of the danger about which the master should have seen that he was accurately informed.

"The general and correct propositions of law that an employer does not insure the safety of his employee; that if the latter knows of risks, and voluntarily subjects himself to them, the master is not liable for the injury thereby incurred; and that, generally, all that is required of the master is to provide reasonably safe appliances for the use of his employees in their work, and reasonably safe places for them to work in-are in nowise questioned. The sole ground upon which we rest our judgment upon this case is that there was a latent and unapparent, but a very certain and material, danger to uninformed employees, accustomed to operating the other form of switch, in the use, without sufficient knowledge, of the new so-called 'automatic switch,' under the circumstances of this case, of which danger it was the duty of the receiver, who must have known of it, to give, in some way, clear and unmistakable information to his employees, including Gray. The failure of the receiver to do this by regulation, rule, notice, or otherwise, was such negligence upon his part as renders him liable for the injuries to Gray, who was evidently subjected to a great risk and hazard, the existence of which he did not suspect, but which could have been obviated very easily by notice to him from the better informed receiver."

BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION - SUSPENSION OF MEMBER-BY-LAWS.-In Supreme Tent, etc., v. Volkert, 57 N. E. Rep. 203, decided by the Appellate Court of Indiana, it appeared that the bylaws of a beneficial society, which were part of the contract of insurance between it and its members, provided that, if a member should engage in any occupation prohibited by the by-laws, among which was the sale of liquor, his certificate should become void from the date of his engaging in such occupation, without any action on the part of the officers of the society, and that the receipt of an assessment from such member after his engaging in a prohibited occupation should not be a waiver of the condition. It was held that where a member engaged in the sale of liquor, which fact was known to the local authority to whom he paid his dues, and the society retained and received the last assessment with notice of the fact that the member died while engaged in the sale of liquor, the society in an action on the certificate, was estopped from asserting that the certificate was forfeited, and that where the by-laws of a beneficial association, which were a part of the contract of insurance between the society and the member, provided that any member who should engage in the sale of liquor should, from the date of engaging in such occupation, stand suspended, and the society, on the death of a member, had knowledge that he was engaged in the sale of liquor at the time of his death, but sent blanks to the beneficiary for proofs of death, it was thereby estopped from asserting that the certificate was forfeited.