Imágenes de páginas

NEW YORK COMMERCIAL CO. V. FRANCIS, U.S.C.O. of App., Second Circuit, 101 Fed. Rep. 16.

78. PENAL BOND-Sum Certain-Interest in Excess.Where, id a suit on a penal bond in a sum certain, given to secure notes to that amount, defendants paid part of the notes before trial, and at trial it appeared that the balance due, without interest, exhausted the bond, it was error to render judgment for such bal. ance, with interest, as damages for non payment, since the penalty could not be enlarged.-PEOPLE'S Sav. BANK V. CAMPAU, Mich., 82 N. W. Rep. 803.

79. PHYSICIANS-Certificates.--The law governing the practice of medicine in this state, and authorizing the State board of health to issue certificates to physicians and surgeons, is a police measure. It was not in tended, by that act, to protect medical schools or med. ical practitioners from competition in business.-LIN. COLN MEDICAL COLLEGE OF COTNER UNIVERSITY V. POINTER, Neb., 82 N. W. Rep. 855.

80. PLEDGE-Assignment for Creditors - Preference. -An insolvent debtor may prefer one creditor to an. other by a pledge, where the transaction does not amount to an assignment for the benefit of creditors. -HARING V. HAMILTON, Wis., 82 N. W. Rep. 698.

81. QUIETING TITLE-Bill to Obtain Possession of Land.-A bill by the grantee of the purchaser of land at a mortgage sale, making a defendant of one who had not been a party to the foreclosure suit, but who was in possession of part of the premises, claiming title thereto by gift from the mortgagor, and adverse possession, praying that defendant's title be declared not valid and that complainant be put in possession, was, as to such defendant, a bill to quiet title and obtain possession of land without an ejectment suit, and hence would not lie under article 6, $ 27, of the constitution, guarantying trial by jury.-CHANDLER GRAFAM, Mich., 82 N. W. Rep. 814.

82. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Negligence-Fires.--In an action against a railroad company for damages from fire alleged to have been set by sparks from defend. ant's locomotive, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove, not only that the fire was caused by sparks from defendant's engine, but thut the emission of such sparks was due to defendant's negligence.-GARRETT V. SOUTHERN RY. CO., U.S. C. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 101 Fed. Rep. 102.

83. RAILROAD COMPANY-Negligence-Presumptions. --Proof that property has been destroyed by sparks emitted by a passing locomotive creates a presumption of negligence on the part of the railroad company or its employees, either in the construction or baddling of the locomotive or in failing to keep it in proper repair.-MCCULLEN V. CHICAGO, ETC. RY. CO., U. S. 0. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 101 Fed Rep. 66.

84. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Statute Requiring Pag. senger Traios to stop at County Seat.-Tbe requirement that all regular passenger trains must stop at county seats, which is inade by the Illinois act of March 21, 1874. $ 26, constitutes a direct burden upon interstate commerce in violation of the United States constitu. tion, so far, at least, as that statute requires through interstate passengers trains to stop at such stutions when adequate train service has been provided for local traffic.- CLEVELAND, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO & ST. Louis Ry. Co. v. PEOPLE OF TH - STATE OF ILLINOIS, U. S. S. C., 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 722.

85. RECEIVERS--Accounting - Estopped to Object.Creditors who stand by and make no objection while the property of their debtor, a corporation in the hands of receivers, is sold by the sheriff undur order of the court, and wbo acquiesce in the manner in which such sale is conducted, will not be heard, upon an opposi. tion to the receivers' final account, filed long after. wards, to complain that the sheriff did not conforin to the terms of the order, and sold in lots, wben heshould have sold in block.-IN RE SHEETS LUMBER CO., Lu., 27 South. Rep. 809.

86. REMOVAL OF CAUSES - Federal Question.-An ac. tion in a state court against the receiver of a rvilroad

to recover damages for a personal injury resulting from alleged negligence in the operation of the road is not removable, as a case arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, solely on the ground that the receiver was appointed by a federal court. The liability which is the subject-matter of the action is one arising under general law or State statute, and not dependent on the constitution or any law of the United States; and the appointment of the receiver was, moreover, made under general equity powers common to all courts of chancery.-GABLEMAN V. PEORIA, ETC. Ry. Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Seventh Cir cuit, 101 Fed. Rep. 1.

87. SALES-Fraudulent Representations-Rescission. -Where the buyer of goods, in making a statement of his assets and liabilities, falsely stated the amount of his liabilities to be less than they actually were, knowing that the seller had requested such statement as a basis for determining as to his credit, the seller, if he relied on the statement, on discovering such falsity, may rescind the sale, and recover the goods, though the buyer intended to pay for the goods, and did not intend to defraud the seller thereof.-MORRIS V. PosNER, Iowa, 82 N. W. Rep. 755.

88. SALES-Seller's Title – Ignorance of Purchaser.An importer bought cotton under an sgreement with plaintiffs, his bankers, whereby they honored drafts for payment, took bills of lading, and received from the importer a trust receipt for the cotton, and as it was sold the sale potes were transferred to tbem. Detendants, to whom a sale was made, promised to pay plaintiffs, to the importer's account, but afterwards payment was made, by agreement, in a different man. ner. Other similar transactions had taken place between defendants and the importer, and defendants had never been informed of the agreement between the importer and plaintiffs. Held, that defendants were not liable to plaintiffs for the cotton gold.BROWN V. WILLIAM CLARK CO., R. I., 46 Atl. Rep. 239.

89. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Evidence.-This action was brought to compel specific performance of a con. tract to sell land, whereby defendants, upon certain conditions,agreed to sell to plaintiffs the land described in the complaint. Upon a trial anew in this court, and upon consideration of the evidence and facts in the record, it appears that long prior to the commencement of this action the plaintiffs had transferred, each acting si parately and at different dates, all their right, title, and interest arising under the contract of puj. cbase and sale to these defendants; that such transfers were made knowingly and willingly, without fraud, and upon adequate consideration. Accordingly, held, that the plaintiff- are without quity, and have no standing in court upon wbich ac aim of specific performance can be predicated.-MAGSUSSON V. LIAWELL, N. Dak , 82 N. W. Rep. 743.

90. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE -Oral Contract – Statute of Frauds. - Where, in consideration of an oral contract for the renewal of a lease for three years, the lessee was to make certain improvements, and be sued for specific performance, claiming a part performance in having made the improvements, and his evidence did pot cleuly show the amount of labor and money tx pended, nor that the improvements were of permanent Value to the estate, nor that they were refrrable solely to the oral contract, and not to the requirements of the prior lease, a judgment for defendant entered on a motion for a nonsult was proper.-ANDERSON V. SCHNEIDER, Wasb., 60 Pac. Rep. 1125.

91. SUNDAY LAW-Illegal Sales.-Under St. 1895, ch. 434, $ 2, prohibiting business transactions on the Lord's Day, excepting the retail sale of drugs and medicines, where defendant, who carried on a drug business, sold cigars and tobacco on that day, defendant's evid nce that he stated to the purchaser when he asked for the articles that he would sell them as drug+ way properly excluded, as the evidence offered had no tendency to show that the sale was within the protec

[ocr errors]

tion of the statute.-COMMONWEALTH V. GOLDSMITH, Mass., 57 N. E. Rep. 212.

92. TAXATION Bills and Notes.-Non-negotiable notes representing loans in Louisiana made by the agent of a corporation doing business therein, when kept within the State by the agent, may be subjected to taxation by the law of the State in which they are held.--COMPTOIR NATIONAL D'ESCOMPTE DE PARIS V. BOARD OF ASSESSORS, La., 27 South. Rep. 801.

93. TAXATION -Grain in Elevators - Constitutional Law.-Chapter 5 of the Laws of 1899, which relates to the assessment and taxation of grain in elevators, warehouses, and grain houses, does not violate section 176 of the State constitution, wbich requires that "laws shall be passed taxing by uniform rule all property according to its true value in money.” Neither is such act obnoxious to subdivision 23 of section 69 of the constitution, which prohibits the legislature from passing local or special laws for the assessment or collection of taxes; nor to section 11 of the constitu. tion, which requires that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation,-and is a valid enactment.-MINNEAPOLIS & NORTHERN ELEVATOR CO. v. TRAILL CO., N. D., N. Dak., 82 N. W. Rep. 727.

94. TAXATION-State Board of Equalization-Powers. -The State board of equalization was empowered by Const. art. 12, $ 15, to "adjust and equalize the valuation of the taxable property among the several coun. ties of the State," which limits the rate of taxation to be imposed for such purposes. Held, that the State board of equalization was without power to increase apportionately the valuation of the property in the several counties of the State, and thereby increase the total.-STATE V. FORTUNE, Mont., 60 Pac. Rep. 1086.

95. TAXATION-War Revenue Tax-Stamp on Exprese Company's Receipt.-An express company is not for. bidden by the act of congress of June 13, 1898, known as the war revenue act, from adding to its rates an amount sufficient to cover the cost of the stamp re quired to be affixed to a receipt issued to the shipper, and thereby shifting the burden of the tax upon the shipper, if the rate as increased thereby is not unreasonable.-CRAWFORD V. HOBBELL, U. S. 8. C., 20 8. O. Rep. 701.

96. TAXES -Payment by Second Mortgagor.-Under Rev. St. 1898, $ 1158, providing that when one who has a lien on lands shall pay taxes on the same he shall have a further lien for the amount so paid, with inter. est, where a second mortgagee paid taxes, his lien was not paramount to that of the first mortgagee, but sim. ply additional to, and of the same nature as, that of his mortgage.-HILL V. BUFFINGTON, Wis., 82 N. W. Rep. 712.

97. TELEGRAPH COMPANY-Mental Suffering -- Complaint.-Where, in an action against a telegraph company for delay in delivering a message, by reason of which plaintiff was unable to reach his home during the sudden Illness of his wife and death of his child, the only element of damage alleged was mental suffering, the complaint was demurrable, since, being an action for tort, mental suffering, without other damage, is insufficient to sustain a cause of action.BLOUNT V, WESTERN UNION TEL. Co., Ala., 27 South. Rep. 779.

98. TRADE-MARKS - Iojunction. – The marking or weaving of the complainant's name on the selvedge or margin of silk manufactured by it is nothing more than a method of marking the manufacturer's name on his goods, and cannot be protected as a patented -process or trade mark, though complainant first introduced the method in this country.-STIRLING SILK MFG. 00. V. STERLING SILK Co., N. J., 46 Atl. Rep. 199.

99. USURY-What Law Guverns-Place of Payment.Pirties to a loan by a corporation of one State to a resident of another, to be paid to the borrower in bis own State, and secured by mortgage on real estate there situated, will be presumed to have contracted with reference to the laws of the State of the lender, where repayment of the principal of the debt is to be

there made; and the question whether the contract is usurious is to be determined by the law of that State, especially if, under such law, it is valid, while under the law of the State of the borrower It is invalid.HIERONYMUS V. NEW YORK NAT, BUILDING & LOAN ASSN., U.S. C. O., S. D. (Ala.), 101 Fed. Rep. 12.

100. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Vendor's Lien.- Where a busband and wife are joint owners by the entirety of property, and contract to exchange it for other prop. erty and a certain amount of cash, the wife, on the death of her husband, is entitled to maintain a bill to epforce a vendor's lien against the property conveyed by them, for the unpaid balance of the purchase price. -KULLING V. KOLLING, Mich., 82 N. W. Rep. 847.

101. WATERS-Irrigation-Fallure of Supply.-A canal company, having contracted to furnish rice farmers a suficient supply of water to irrigate their lands during the planting season, cannot be held liable for damages which resulted from an insuficient supply, if the same is attributable to the inadequacy of the fall of rain, from which source its canal was to be supplied.LANDERS V. GARLAND CANAL Co., La., 27 South. Rep. 727.

102. WILLS-Construction-Trust.-Testator gave the income from his estate to his wife for life, remainder to two children and a trustee, who should pay the income from his share to a third child, and, in case he should for seven years at any one continuous period lead a moral life, the trustee should convey to him the remainder of the trust fund. Held, that the trust created by the will was closed when the child had led a moral life for seven years, irrespective of whether the widow was living at the time or not.-ORDWAY V. GARDNER, W18., 82 N. W. Rep. 696.

103. WILL-Devise-Husband and wife.-Where testatrix devised a lite estate in common to her husband and children in a portion of her realty, subject to the payment of legacies out of the rents, the fact that the husband, who bad received no other bequest, adminis. tered her estate on fallure of her executors to prove the will, and received all the rents from the realty charged, showed no election to take under the will in lieu of his more valuable right of tenancy by the curt esy, and hence the land was subject, at his death, to payment of the legacies, though the husband had received sufficient rents to satisfy the same.-KERRIGAN V. CONELLY, N. J., 46 Atl. Rep. 227.

104. Wills-Election by Widow-Homestead.-Under Comp. Laws 1897, 88 8935, 8936, providing that when a widow shall be entitled to elect whether to take under the will or be endowed of the lands of her husband sbe shall be deemed to have elected to take under the will, unless within one year after the husband's death sbe sball commence proceedings for assigoment of dower, a widow, by failing to commence such proceedings within one year after her husband's death, and by peti. tioning the probate court to proceed under the will, and allow her a reasonable sum instead of ber dower, waives her right to dower.-KOSTER V. GELLEN, Mich., 82 N. W. Rep. 823.

105. WITNESS - Communication of Party with Dece. dent. Under a statute prohibiting the examination of a party to an action in regard to any personal transactions between such person and a person deceased at the time of the action, parties defendant in an action by an heir to quiet title to inberited' land, wbere the defense is made that the land was inherited by a bastard child of the decedent, will not be allowed to testify to transactions, conversations, and illicit relations with deceased.-MCCORKENDALE V. MCCORKENDALE, Iowa, 82 N. W. Rep. 754.

106. WITNESS-Credibility.--The testimony of a wit. ness whose reputation for truth and veracity in the neighborhood in which he resides 19 shown to be bad is not necessarily destroyed, but should be considered, and given such weight as, under all of the circumstan. ces, the jury believe it entitled to. It should be disregarded if the jury believe it entitled to no weight.HIGGINS V. WREN, Minn., 82 N. W. Rep. 859.


Central Law Journal. on some phases of it, the court held that a

de facto title is sufficient to authorize the lawful administration of an oath, and that a

commission regular on its face is unimpeachST. LOUIS, MO., AUGUST 3, 1900.

able. Some members of the court appear to

have followed the doctrine of Rex v. Verelst, Can a charge of perjury be predicated

supra, holding that an oath administered by upon an oath taken before a mere de facto

a person who never had any power to act, officer? It is a general rule of universal ap

and where there was an entire want of au

thority from the beginning—a mere intruder plication that the acts of an officer who

in fact-could not be made the basis of a comes into possession of an office under the forms of law and who assumes to act, are

prosecution for perjury. In such a case deemed to be legal and binding as to the something more must be shown than that a public, and all persons who bave any interest party has merely acted as an officer ; but it in the things done by him, and that the acts

is held that, where an appointment has been of a de facto judge cannot be collaterally at

made by the appointing authority, and the

officer bas the color of office, and tacked. It was claimed in the recent case of

blance of competent authority, he is to be State v. Williams before the Supreme Court

regarded as an officer de facto, and the matof Kansas that an exception to this rule is made in cases of perjury and some English

ter of subsequent disability, non-residence

or the like cannot be made the subject of incourts apparently support the view that per: jury cannot be assigned on an oath adminis- quiry in a perjury case. fered by an officer de facto. Rex v. Verelst,

The Kangas court following this rule in the 3 Camp. 432. Some of the courts of this

Williams case, says that "in this country the country bave followed the doctrine of the

de facto doctrine applies to the fullest exEnglish cases, examples of which are Bigger-tent, and we can think of no good reason staff v. Com., 11 Bush, 169; Muir v. State, why an exception should be made for the 8 Blackf. 154 ; Staight v. State, 39 Ohio St.

protection of those guilty of swearing falsely 496. The case last cited was again consid

when their testimony. may be made the basis

of a conclusive judgment in either civil or ered by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Gardner, 54 Obio St. 24, and the court

criminal proceedings.” there remarked that the person who administered the oath in that case had received no In a recent case before the United States appointment and had taken no oath, and as Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh he lacked color of title he could not be re Circuit-In re Jerome L. Taylor-a question garded as an officer de facto. Therefore the of interest concerning the United States Obio case cannot be regarded as an author- Bankruptcy Act arose. The Bankruptcy ity for the English view. In Bishop's New law provides that any natural person except a Criminal Law, $ 464, it is said that "the wage-earner or a person engaged chiefly in author submits that the English doctrine farming or the tillage of the soil dates from a period long since the revolu- may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt tion; that the judges propounding it did not upon default or an impartial trial. The think of the true reasoning applicable to the alleged bankrupt did not appear or answer, question; that so did not such American but the appellant who had obtained a lien judges as have followed it, and that the ac. upon this property, appeared and set up the curately considered law of perjury, while it fact in an answer. There was nothing in the requires a jurisdiction in the tribunal and petition to bring the alleged bankrupt within the like, punishes false swearing to a rele the terms of the statute. It did not allege vant matter before it whenever it holds the what the defendant's business or occupation parties bound by its judgment.” Citing was, and there was no allegation to show Haward v. Sexton, 1 Denio, 440; People v. that he did not come within the excepted Cook, 8 N. Y. 67. In Lambert v. People, classes. 76 N. Y. 220, this question was considered, "Farmers and wage-earners," says United and, while there was a division of opinion States Judge Bunn, in deciding the case,

“constitute a large majority of the people. | 122 ; Geo. M. West Co. v. Lea Bros. & Co., These are excepted from that portion of the 2 Am. Bank. Rep. 463." clause relating to involutary bankruptcy, and the petition should either have shown what the business of the defendant was, or that

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS. he did not come within the excepted classes. The answer set up this fact, the allegations of which, when the case was submitted on


Leeson, 75 N. E. Rep. 656, decided by the Suthe pleadings, without proofs taken, must

preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts it appeared and would have been taken as true bad not

that promoters of a corporation, subsequent to the court sustained the exceptions of the the creation thereof, and while they were the petitioners to the appellant's answer. The sole stockholders, voted to issue its corporate answer was a good and valid answer to the

stock to themselves in payment for services renpetition and the exceptions to it should not

dered in securing options of land, which they as

signed to the corporation. The stock so issued have been sustained by the court. The

equaled the estimated profits to be derived from statute expressly provides that creditors such options. Thereafter the promoters invited other than the original petitioners may file the public to subscribe to the stock, without disan answer and be heard in opposition to the

closing the facts as to such stock to the subprayer of the petition. If they can appear

scribers, or getting their consent to the payment

of such remuneration. It was held that they in the case and file an answer, then it follows

were guilty of a fraud, and the company can, that they can set up any facts which go to without returning the lands acquired under the defeat the proceeding.

options, maintain an action for the recovery of If the answer made by the appellant was

such stock, or damages for the loss thereof; that true, then it was not a case for involuntary

promoters of a corporation, who have incurred

expenses and paid out money in procuring opbankruptcy and should have been dismissed.

tions for the benefit of the prospective corpoIf Taylor was simply a fariner or chiefly a ration, are entitled to reimbursement therefor on farmer, and engaged in the tilling of the soil, creation of the corporation and that persons who there was no authority or jurisdiction under were promoters of a corporation, and who, while the law to force him into bankruptcy. The

they were the sole stockholders, procured the is.

suance to themselves of shares of the capital stock appellant might gain a rightful preference by

of the corporation in payment of secret profits obtaining judgments, as it did and issuing made by them from the sale of property owned executions, which, in the hands of the sheriff by them to the corporation, may be compelled to became a lien upon the defendant's property.

account for the shares so received, with dividends This being the case, and the appellant being

thereon received by them, or the proceeds of a the real party in interest it would be very

sale thereof by them, if sold, with interest from

the date of the sale, or for the fair market value strange if it could not set up the only plea

of the stock at the time of its issuance, or, if it which could avail to protect its property bad no market value at the time of issuance, for rights, so legally acquired. If the facts al the reason that the corporation was not yet leged in the answer were true it had a vested launched, then the value at the time a market

value may be found to have been established. right which could not be taken away by the default of the defendant in the bankruptcy

INTOXICATING LIQUOR-TRIAL-PERMITTING proceeding to appear and answer nor without

JURY TO TASTE.-In People v. Kioney, 83 N. W. due process of law and a hearing in court. Rep. 147, decided by the Supreme Court of These the appellant has not had. If the peti- Michigan, it was beld that where a bottle of cider - tioning creditors wish to contest the question

is admitted as evidence in a prosecution for selraised by the answer, there should have been

ling fermented liquor, it is not error to permit the

members of the jury to taste the contents, where a replication put in denying the allegations

the evidence tends to show that the cider is in the and a trial had before an adjudication was same condition as wben purchased. The court made. Simpson v. Ready, 12 M. & W. 740; said in part: Vavasour v. Ormrod, 6 B. & C. 430; Pot

"After Mahoney bad given his testimony, the ter's Dwarris on Stat. & Cons., 119; Maxwell

prosecution offered the bottle of cider in evidence.

Counsel for respondent objected to this offer on Land Grant Co. v. Lawson, 151 U. S. 586 ;

the ground that it was incompetent, irrelevant Leidigh Carriage Co. v. Stengel, 2 Am. Bank. and immaterial. The court said: "Unless the Rep. 383; Sturges v. Croninshield, 4 Wheat. evidence in this case shows that the contents of

this bottle is in the same condition it was on Oc rupt and shall pass to his said trustee, whose tober 5th, it would be of no value as evidence; duty it sball be to recover and reclaim the same but, if the evidence has any tendency to show by legal proceedings or otherwise for the benefit it in the same condition, it would be admissible.' of the creditors.' Section 70a of the act provides : It was received in evidence, and the court then "The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt, upon his said: “There is a tumbler, gentlemen, if you ppointment and qualification, * * * sball * * * want to taste of it—any of you.' Respondent's be vested by operation of law with the title of the counsel objected to these remarks of the court, bankrupt, as of the date he was adjudged a bankinstructing the jury that they might taste it. The rupt, * * * to all *** (5) property which prior argument of respondent's counsel here is that if to the filing of the petition he could by any the jury, by tasting it, smelling or drinking it, as means bave transferred or which might have they were ordered by the court, thereby acquired been levied upon and sold under judicial process knowledge or formed opinions of its properties as against bim: provided, that when any bankrupt to whether it was hard or fermented cider, those sball have any insurance policy which has a cash tasting or smelling it could not give evidence to surrender value payable to himself, his estate or their fellow-jurors without being sworn. There personal representatives, be may, within thirty is nothing in tbe record showing or tending to days after the cash surrender value has been how that any of the jurors smelled or drank of ascertained and stated to the trustee by the comit, nor is there any evidence that the bottle was pany issuing the same, pay or secure to the placed in their bands for examination. The trustee the sum ascertained and stated, and conrecord is entirely silent upon that subject; but, tinue to hold, own, and carry such policy free even if it had been handed them and they had from claims of the creditors participating in the tasted it, we think it would not have been distribution of his estate under the bankruptcy errur. The testimony of Mahoney, who put it in proceedings, otherwise the policy shall pass to the bottle, tended to show that it was in about the trustee as assets. Under the view we take the same condition as when sold by the re of the question presented for determination, it is spondent."

immaterial that the policies of insurance were

transferred by the bankrupt to his wife within BANKRUPTCY-ASSETS-LIFE INSURANCE.--In four months prior to the filing of his petition in Morris v. Dodd, decided by the Supreme Court bankruptcy. Upon the hearing, there was no of Georgia, it is held, reversing the lower court, evidence submitted for the trustee that either of tbat a policy of insurance on the life of a bank the policies had any casb surrender value, either rupt, though payable to his legal representa - at the time of the transfer or at the time of the tive, does not, if it have no cash surrender value, filing of the petition in bankruptcy, but there vest in the trustee as assets of the bankrupt's was much evidence in behalf of the defendants estate. Accordingly, where a husband. within four that the policies had no such value at either of months prior to the filing of his petition in bank the times indicated. If the policies, then, had ruptcy, transferred to his wife an insurance policy no cash surrender value, we are of the opinion on his life, which before such transfer was pay that they would not vest in the trustee, as asable to his legal representatives, it was erroneous, sets of the bankrupt's estate, even if no changes on the petition of the trustee, filed upon the death bad been made in them, and they bad, to the date of the bankrupt, pending the proceedings in bank of bis death, remained payable to his legal repruptcy, for the court to enjoin the widow from resentatives. The exact point was decided in Re collecting, and the insurance company from pay Buelow (D. C.), 98 Fed. Rep. 86, where it was ing to her, the amount due upon the policy; it held: 'A policy of insurance on the life of a bankappearing that it had no cash surrender value, rupt, wbich has no cash surrender value and no either when the transfer was made or the peti value for any purpose except the contingency of tion in bankruptcy was filed. The court says in its becoming valuable at the death of the bankrupt part:

if the premiums are kept paid, does not vest in the **Section 67e of the Bankrupt Act of 1898, trustee as assets of the estate;' and the court diprovides that all conveyances, transfers, as rected the trustee to deliver the policy to the pe. signments or incumbrances of his property, titioners, the bankrupt and his wife. District or any part thereof, male or given by a person Judge Sbiras, in Re Steele (D. C.), 98 Fed. Rep. adjudged a bankrupt under the provisions of 78, while holding that where a bankrupt held a this act subsequent to the passage of this act policy payable to himself, his heirs or legal repand within four months prior to the filing of resentatives, the surrender value thereof would the petition, with the intent and purpose on be part of the assets of bis estate in bankruptcy, his part to hinder, delay, or defraud bis very clearly intimated that this would not be so creditors or any of them, shall be null and if the policy had no cash surrender value. To avoid as against the creditors of such debtor, ex the same effect, see In re Lange (D. C.), 91 Fed. cept as to purchasers in good faith and for a Rep. 361. In the case of Ætna Nat. Bank v. United present fair consideration; and all property of States Life Ins. Co. (C.C.), 24 Fed. Rep. 770, it was the debtor conveyed,' etc., “shall * * * be and held that a bill in equity could be maintained by remain a part of the assets and estate of the bank creditors of a deceased debtor to reach premiums

« AnteriorContinuar »