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Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. (N. Y.) Right State Trust Co. v. Turner (Iowa) Corporation--Liabil.
ity of Stockholderg-Payment for Stock in Prop.
erty, R. D. 183.
Saunders v. City of Ft. Madison (Iowa) Municipal Cor-
gence-Personal Injuries-Master and Servant, R.
Strait v. State (Miss.) Criminal Law-Principal and
Accessory, ann. case, 50.
Shenkenberger v. State (Ind:) Criminal Law-Hom.
Thompson v. Taylor (N. J.) Copflict of Laws--Cover.
ture--Public Policy, ann, case, 111.
Traflet v. Empire Life Ins. Co. (N. J.) Judgment-Res
Judicata, R. D. 24.
| Trevett v. Prison Association (Va.) Charitable cor-
porations Liability for Torty - Pollution of
Streams, R. D), 301.
tional Sale-Validity-Immoral Use of Article Sold of Price-Election of Remedies, ann. case, 248.
Tuscaloosa Ice Mfg.Co. v. Williams (Ala.) ('ontract-
Court, Ed. 221.
Ward v. Ward (onio) Fraudulent Conveyance in Antic.
State v. III (N. Car ) Validity of Oity Ordinance Pro West Chicago Street Railway Co. v. Liderman (III.)
Question of ('ontributory Negligence on the Part of
bility on Oficial Bond for Acts Done “Colore Peril, Ed. 419.
Wingert v. Zeigler (Md.) Validity of Instruments Re.
quiring Revenue Stamps Which Have Not Been
State v. O'Donnell (Oreg.) Criminal Law-Larceny- Wood v. Allen (Iowa) Evidenca-Usage and Custom-
Sale-"Dry Goods," R. D. 3.
LIST OF LEADING ARTICLES IN VOLUME 51.
No. 1. Liability of Municipal Corporations for | No. 14. Validity of Judgments Rendered in a
Vegligence in the Exercise of Private or Mu- | Foregn State Without Personal Service or Sum-
nicipal Powers. By Eugene McQuillin, 5. mons. By W. C. Rodgers, 265.
No. 3. The Regulation of Trusts. By Darius
No. 16. Labor Organizations.--The Right to Con-
No. 4. Place of Contract. By Frederick H.
By Ilarry G. Kyle, 301.
No. 6. Real Estate Options. By Howard A.
No. 17. Proof of Marriage in Criminal Cases.
No. 6. The Legal Status of Foreign Corpora-
No. 18. Life of a Judgment of a Federal Court
No.7. Municipal Liability for Breach of Public
No. 19. The Law of Surface Water as Applica-
ble to Missouri and States Bounded by Large
of Private Property by a Front Foot or Area No. 25. Foreclosure in the Federal Courts. By
i Charles S. Lohingier, 478.
Central Law Journal.
could not have availed them had they then charged the plaintiff with the misdemeanor.”
ST. LOUIS, MO., JULY 6, 1900.
The legislature of Rhode Island recently enacted a statute having for its object the
suppression of what is known in commercial An exchange calls attention to a novel de circles as "trading stamps,” whereby it was cision of the New York Supreme Court with made unlawful for any person or corporation respect to the rights of citizens, particularly to sell, give, or distribute any stamp, coupon, with regard to their immunity from arrest by or other device which shall ențitle the purpolice officers, who are acting under no more chaser of property to demand or receive from definite authority or motive than that of sus any person or corporation other than the venpicion. The case is Snead v. Bonnoil. It dor, any article of merchandise other than appeared that while the plaintiff was emerg that actually sold to said purchaser, and for ing from a pawn shop with a bag filled with
any person or corporation other than the venjewelry and silverware, two policemen, one dor, to deliver to any person any article of of whom was the defendant, arrested him, mercbandise other than that actually sold saying in explanation of their conduct, that upon presentation of any such stamp, coupon they wished to ascertain what he had in the or other device; provided, however, that this bag. In reply he said that the property, as act shall not affect any existing contract. he could prove, belonged to bim. He was, The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in the nevertheless, taken to the station-house and case of State v.. Dalton, 46 Atl. Rep. 234,
When a search was made of his considered the validity of the act holding person it was found that he bad a loaded re that, whatever the powers of a legislature to volver. After having him remanded for prohibit the "trading stamps” system in twenty-four hours in order to find out whether proper cases may be, the statute under conthe charge of being a "suspicious person," sideration was so general in its terms as to wbich is a misdemeanor, could be sustained, amount to an infringement of constitutional the officers decided to change this charge to liberty. The court relies to a material exthe carrying of concealed weapons, which is tent upon the decision of the New York Court a felony. Although the appellate court, to of Appeals in People v. Gilson, 109 N. Y. wbich the case was carried, thought that the 389. In all cases of this character the turucircumstances might justify the belief that ing point is whether there is a lottery—that Mr. Snead was a suspicious person, he could is, an essential element of chance-or whether not be held on a charge different from the the additional benefit to a purchaser is in the one for which he had been arrested. "There nature of a “cbromo,” or gift. The Rhode can be no general right," it said, “to arrest Island court cites and analyzes a large number a citizen for an undisclosed offense. The of previous authorities bearing upon this genpolice officer cannot arrest a man for one eral question. The substance of the deciscause, and when that is exploded, justify for ion may be better understood by quoting the another. Such a doctrine would be an in- following from the opinion of the court: centive to the loosest practices on the part of “This inalienable right is trenched upon and police officers, and a dangerous extension of impaired whenever the legislature prohibits a their sufficiently great powers.” Again the man from carrying on his business in his own court said concerning the detention of Mr. way, provided, always, of course, that the Snead without bail: “Thus the officers business and the mode of carrying it on are utilized the felony charge to detain the not injurious to the public, and provided, plaintiff for at least twenty-four hours beyond also, that it is not a business which is affected the time he was entitled to his discharge upon with a public use or interest. Now, it was bail upon the misdemeanor charge. Beyond certainly within the constitutional right of the peradventure the police officer was liable for defendant in this case to sell tobaccomit be. every hour he detained the plaintiff after he ing presumed, of course, that he had ob. and his associate officer had secured the re tained the necessary authority to deal in that mand from the magistrate for a reason which article; and, as an inducement to people to
trade with him, it was also bis right to give the books and records of the corporation; that the to each purchaser of a certain quantity of to
right to inspect does not depend upon the motive bacco, either directly or through a third per
or purpose of the stockholder in demanding such
inspection, and a petition which shows that the son, some other designated article of value,
plaintiff is a stockholder, that he has requested by way of premium. The statute in question, the defendant to allow him to inspect the books however, steps in to prevent him from adopt and records of the corporation, and fix a reason. ing such a course to procure trade, and from able time for the same, which request has been it to secure an income and livelihood ; and he
refused, states a cause of action; and that as in
cident to such right is the right to have such inis thus restrained in the free enjoyment of his
spection by a proper agent, and to take copies faculties to which he is constitutionally en from such books and records. titled, unless such restraint is necessary for the common welfare, in one of the ways here
GARNISHMENT-SITUS OF DEBT.-In National tofore mentioned, and we cannot see that it is.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Wing, 60 Pac. Rep. 720, decided In other words, the statute says that A shall by the Supreme Court of Arizona, it appeared not sell to B a barrel of flour, and, in con that plaintiff, a resident of Arizona, sued in that nection with and as a part of the contract of
territory on an insurance policy; and defendant sale, give to B a coupon which will entitle
pleaded that, after receipt of plaintiff's proof of
loss, plaintiff had been sued in California by credhim to receive from C a pound of tea, a
itors there,-service being had by publication,pitcher, a lamp, a clock, a door mat, or some and that funds for the payment of plaintiff's claim other specified article of merchandise. If in the hands of defendant's general agent in Cala the act had prohibited the giving away of any ifornia were garnished, and thereafter, under the stamp or device in connection with the sale
garnishment proceedings, paid by defendant to
plaintiff's creditors. It was held that as defendof an article, which would entitle the holder
ant's debt to plaintiff would sustain an action in to receive, either directly from the vendor, or
rem against plaintiff, and as defendant had funds indirectly through another person, some in in California which plaintiff could have attached definite and undescribed article, the nature in an action on his policy in that State, the situs and value of which were unknown to the pur
of the debt was there, for the purpose of garnishchaser, there would then be introduced into
ment, and defendant's payment under the gar
nishment proceedings was a defense to plaintiff's the prohibited transaction enough of the ele
TRADE-NAMES — SURNAMES - Right TO USE ONE'S OWN NAME.—Two cases have recently been decided which illustrate the general doctrine that a person has the right to use his own name
in his own business; that one cannot make a tradeNOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.
mark of his name and so debar others having the
same name from using it, although it be in the MUNICIPAL CORPORATION - VALIDITY OF same business. In Harson v. Halkyard, .46 Atl. ORDINANCE UNREASONABLE INTERFERENCE Rep. 271, decided in the Supreme Court of Rbode WITH LIBERTY.-In Gastenan y. Commonwealth, Island, it appeared that the principal point of re56 S. W. Rep. 705, decided by the Court of Ap semblance between the signs, labels and adverpeals of Kentucky, it was held that a city ordi tisement of complainant and respondent was the nance declaring that it sball be unlawful for any prominence given to the name "Harson," which woman to go in and out of a building where a is the surname of complainant and one of the resaloon is kept for the sale of liquor, or "to fre spondents. It further appeared that there was quent, loaf or stand around said building within nothing in the respondent's advertisement, exfifty feet thereof,” and providing for the punish-cept the use of such name, which would deceive ment of any saloonkeeper who shall permit a vio- the public into buying the goods of respondents lation of that provision of the ordinance, is void, when they intended buying complainant’s goods. as being an unreasonable interference with indi- It was held that the respondents would not be envidual liberty.
joined from using such advertising matter, as the
respondent in question had the right to so use his CORPORATION-STOCKHOLDERS - INSPECTION own surname. In National Starch Mfg. Co. v. OF BOOKS — INJUNCTION.-It is held by the Su Duryea, 101 Fed. Rep. 117, decided by the United preme Court of Obio, in Cincinnati Volksblatt States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, Co. v. Hoffmeister, 56 N. E. Rep. 1033, that in it appeared that one Duryea was for many years junction is the proper form of remedy to enforce the president and a stockholder in the Glen Cove the right of a stockholder in a private corpora Manufacturing Company, which made and sold tion, given by section 3254, Rev. St., to inspect 'starch in packages having thereon the name
“Duryea's Starch,” in prominent letters, and also to show what is meant by the terms used, and a picture of the manufacturing buildings, and the does not contradict the express terms of the conname of the company. After the starch bad been tract. The court said in part: “Nor can it be sold for many years, and had become identified said that such a usage is unreasonable, contrary with the company, the latter sold its business, to law, or opposed to public policy. In Morningtrade-marks, and good will to another corpora star v. Cunningham, 110 Ind. 328, 11 N. E. Rep. tion, which continued the use of the package con 593, it is said: "Parties who are engaged in a taining the name and picture, with its own name particular trade or business, or persons acciisas manufacturer; Duryea agreeing not to go into
tomed to deal with those engaged in a particular the starch business for five years. At the expira business, may be presumed to have knowledge of tion of this time he furnished capital to his sons, the uniform course of such business. Its usage who formed a partnership with others, and pro may, therefore, in the absence of an agreement to cured other starch to be made for them, and sold the contrary, reasonably be supposed to have enit as "Starch Prepared by Duryea & Co.," but tered into and formed part of their contracts and used strikingly different labels and packages. understandings in relation to such business as orTheir starch was in fact prepared in accordance dinary incidents thereto. Railway Co. v. Johnswith directions given by them, or Duryea, Sr., ton, 75 Ala. 596, 51 Am. Rep. 489; Mooney y. Inwho subsequently purchased the assets of the surance Co., 138 Mass. 375, 52 Am. Rep. 277; firm, and continued the business. It was held Machine Co. v. Daggett, 135 Mass. 582; Fitzimthat this was a proper use by Duryea and his sons mops v. Academy, 81 Mo. 37; Cooper v. Kane, 19 of their own name, and could not be enjoined. Wend. 386; Kelton v. Taylor, 11 Lea, 264, 47 Am.
Rep. 284, 7 Cent. L. J. 383.”” EVIDENCE-USAGE AND CUSTOM-SALE—"Dry RECEIVER JUDGMENT AGAINST INSOLVENT. Goods.”—The Supreme Court of Iowa hold, in CORPORATION POWER TO REOPEN.-It is held Wood v. Allen, 82 N. W. Rep. 451, that it is error by the Supreme Court of Illinois, two of the memto exclude evidence that the term “dry goods," bers of the court dissenting, viz., the case of Peaused in a written contract, bears a meaning, ac body v. New England Waterworks Co., 56 N. E. cording to the usage of the locality, under which
Rep. 957, that the receiver of an insolvent corponotions, clothing, hats and caps are excluded, ration authorized by the corporation act to sue since such evidence does not contradict the terms and to do all things necessary to close up its afof the contract, but merely applies them to its fairs, as commanded by decree of court, occupies subject-matter; and the error is not cured by an such a relation that, for tbe protection of the corinstruction that "dry goods” means, in a com poration and its creditors, he may appear and mercial sense, such fabrics as are made by weav move to reopen judgments against it obtained by ing." The court calls attention to the fact that fraud and collusion, and be allowed to defend, if evidence has been admitted to explain the words their effect would be to diminish the estate which "fur,” Astor v. Insurance Co., 7 Cow. 202; should properly come to bim for distribution. "roots,” Coit v. Insurance Co., 7 Johns. 385; The court says in part: "barrels,” Miller v. Stevens, 100 Mass. 518; "C.
"The provisions of section 25 are not intended 0. D.,” Collender v. Dinsmore, 55 N. 'Y. 200; to limit the powers of a receiver appointed under “screened coal,” Manufacturing Co. v. McKee's the chancery practice, but to extend the powers Admr., 77 Pa. St. 170; “1,000 shingles," Soutier of the court in the matter of the causes which v. Kellerman, 18 Mo. 509; "thousand feet," Brown shall be deemed sufficient to authorize the apv. Brooks, 25 Pa. St. 210; "fancy goods and Yan pointment of a receiver, and the causes for which kee notion store," Barnum v. Insurance Co., 97 the affairs of a corporation may be closed up. A N. Y. 188; "product," Stewart v. Smith, 28 Ill. receiver is to be regarded as the representative, 397; "outstanding accounts," McCulsky v. Klos not only of the corporation, having power of asterman, 20 Oreg. 108, 25 Pac. Rep. 366, 10 L. R. serting its rights, taking its title and subject to its A. 785; "furniture and fixtures,” Brody v. Cbit liabilities, but occupies a still broader position, tenden, 106 Iowa, 524, 76 N. W. Rep. 1009; "top for he represents not only the corporation, but buggies with poles," Manufacturing Co. v. Ran also its creditors; and under his duties as the repdall, 62 Iowa, 245, 17 N. W. Rep. 507.
resentative of the latter class he is invested with In the recent case of Everett v. Indiana Paper | powers and may do acts that could not be done Co., 57 N. E. Rep. 28), decided by tbe Appellate by a mere representative of the corporation. It Court of Indiana, it was held that a contract for is said in Gluck & B. Rec. p. 177: "The receiver the delivery of 53,000 pounds paper, on the basis of an insolvent corporation, while, as a general of "37x48, 53 lbs. 500 sheets," is not so plain as to rule, he is to be regarded as the representative of the manner of weighing the paper that there the corporation, asserting its rights, taking its could be but one conclusion. It was, therefore, title, and subject to its liabilities, in one respect held that evidence of a custom or usage in the occupies a broader position, and represents not paper business, that an order for 53,000 paper, only the corporation, but also the creditors; and 637x48, 53 lbs. 500 sheets," means that the weight when, in any proceeding, he occupies exclusively of wrapping necessary to safely transport it is to the latter status, he may do, and under some cirbe included in the specified weight, is admissible cumstances must do, many things which, if his