sonality in the kingdom. Is it a fit thing that the judges in these most important matters should be appointed, not by the Crown, not by removeable and responsible officers of the Crown, but by the Archbishop of Canterbury and Bishop of London, who are neither removeable or responsible; who are not lawyers who are not statesmen-who ought to be no politicians-who are, indeed, priests of the highest order, but not, on that account, the most proper persons to appoint Judges of the highest order? So it is in the province of York, where the Judges are appointed by the Archbishop, so in all other Consistorial Courts, where the Judges are appointed by the Bishops of the respective dioceses in which they are situated.

Of the Establishment of Trial by Jury in India.

Ibid.

I should say, that a reform of the judicatures of India would be matter highly deserving the consideration of his Majesty's Government. I am at a loss to know, why there should be so rigorous an exclusion of jury trials from the native Courts of India. I know, and every one must know, who has taken the trouble to inquire, that the natives are eminently capable of applying their minds to the evisceration of truth in judicial inquiry; that they possess powers of discrimination, ready ingenuity, and sagacity in a very high degree; and that where they have been admitted so to use those powers, they have been found most useful and intelligent assistants in aiding the investigation of the judge. But I know, also, that your present mode of administering justice to those native subjects, is such as I can hardly speak of without shame. Look at your local Judges at their fitness for judicial functions. A young writer goes out to India, he is appointed a Judge, and he repairs to his station, to make money by distributing justice, if he can, but at all events to make money. In total ignorance of the manners, the customs, the prejudices, possibly of the language of those upon whose affairs and conduct he is to sit in judgment, and by whose testimony he is to pursue his inquiries, and, very possibly, equally uninformed of the laws he is to administer; he must needs be wholly dependent upon his Pundit for direction, both as to matter of fact and matter of law, and most probably becomes a blind passive tool in the hands of a designing minister.

Ibid.

Introduction of British Justice into India. Sagacity of a

Brahmin Juror.

The experiment of trial by jury, by which this serious evil may, in part, be remedied, has been already tried. The efforts made by a learned Judge of Ceylon, Sir Alexander Johnson, to introduce into that colony the British system of justice, manfully supported by the Government at home, have been attended with signal success. I

am acquainted with a particular case, indeed,-the details of it are too long to lay before the House,-but which showed the fitness of the natives to form part of a tribunal, notwithstanding the prevalence of strong prejudices in a particular instance among them, where the failure of the experiment might, therefore, have been apprehended. A Brahmin was put on his trial for murder, and a great feeling existed against him, possibly against his caste. Twelve of the jury were led away by this feeling, and by the very strong case which a subtle conspiracy had contrived against the prisoner, -when a young Brahmin, the thirteenth juror, examined the evidence with a dexterity and judgment that excited the greatest admiration, and from his knowledge of the habits and manners of the witnesses, together with extraordinary natural sagacity, succeeded in exposing the plot, and saving the innocent man.

Nothing could be better calculated to conciliate the minds of the natives, than allowing them to form part of the tribunals to which they are subject, and share in administering the laws under which they live. It would give them an understanding of the course of public justice, and of the law by which they are ruled; a fellow feeling with the Government which executes it; and an interest in supporting the system in whose powers they participate. The effect of such a proceeding would be, that in India, as in Ceylon, in the event of a rebellion, the great mass of people, instead of joining the revolters, would give all their support to the Government. This valuable, but not costly fruit of the wise policy pursued in that island, has already been gathered. In 1816, the same people, which twelve years before had risen against your dynasty, are found marshalled on your side, and helping you to crush rebellion. So will it be in the Peninsula, if you give your subjects a share in administering your laws, and an interest and a pride in supporting you. Should the day ever come, when disaffection may appeal to seventy millions, against a few thousand strangers, who have planted themselves upon the ruins of their ancient dynasties, you will find how much safer it is to have won their hearts, and universally cemented their attachment, by a common interest in your system, than to rely upon a hundred and fifty thousand Seapoy swords, of excellent temper, but in doubtful hands.

Ibid.

Lord Eldon's Rule for striking a Magistrate's Name off the

List.

It was laid down as a rule by the late Lord Chancellor Eldon, from which no consideration, his lordship used to say, should induce him to depart, that, however unfit a magistrate might be for his office, either from private misconduct or party feeling, he would never strike him off the list until he had been convicted of some offence by the verdict of a Court of Record. Upon this principle he always acted. No doubt his lordship felt that as the magistrates gave their services gratis, they ought to be protected; but still it is

a rule which opens the door to very serious mischief and injustice; and I myself could, if necessary, quote cases in which it has been most unfortunately persevered in.

Impropriety of making Clergymen Magistrates.

Ibid.

My

I have very great doubts as to the expediency of making clergymen magistrates. This is a course, which, whenever it can be done conveniently, I should certainly be glad to see changed, unless in counties where there are very few resident proprietors. opinion is, that a clerical magistrate, in uniting two very excellent and useful characters, pretty generally spoils both; that the combination produces what the alchymists call, a tertium quid, with very little indeed of the good qualities of either ingredient, and no little of the bad ones of both, together with new evils superinduced by the commixture. There is the activity of the magistrates in an excessive degree; over activity is a very high magisterial offence in my view, yet most of the magistrates distinguished for over activity are clergymen : joined to this, are found the local hatings, and likings, and, generally, somewhat narrow-minded opinions and prejudices, which are apt to attach to the character of the resident parish priest, one of the most valuable and respectable, if kept pure from political contamination. There are some lords-lieutenants, I know, who make it a rule never to appoint a clergyman to the magistracy; and I entirely agree in the policy of that course, because the education and pursuits of such gentlemen are seldom of a worldly nature, and therefore by no means qualifies them to discharge the duties of such an office; but, generally speaking, as the House must be aware, through the country, the practice is far otherwise. Again, some lords-lieutenants appoint men for their political opinions; some, for acting as partisans in local contests; some are so far influenced as to keep out all those who take a decided part against themselves in matters where all men should be free to act as their opinions dictate, and in the exercise of this patronage no responsibility whatever substantially exists.

The Privileges of a Magistrate.

Ibid.

In the first place, they have the privilege of granting or withholding licences. As we all know, it lies in the breast of two justices of the peace to give or to refuse this important privilege. It is in their absolute power to give a licence to one of the most unfit persons possible; and it is in their power to refuse a licence to one of the most fit persons possible. They may continue a licence to a person who has had it but a twelvemonth, and who, during that twelvemonth has made his house a nuisance to the whole neighbourhood; or they may take away a licence from a house to which it has been attached a whole century, and the enjoyment of which has not only been attended by no evil, but has been produc

tive of great public good; and all this, be it observed, they do even without ever the shadow of control. There is no rule more certain, than that a mandamus does not lie to compel justices either to grant or withhold a licence. I hardly ever remember moving for one; and I only once recollect a rule being granted-it was on the motion of my honourable and learned friend, the Solicitor General. But I know that great astonishment was expressed on the occasion; that every one asked what he could have stated, to make the court listen to the application; that all took for granted it would be discharged, as a matter of course; which it was accordingly, in less time than I have taken to relate the circumstance.

Ibid.

Irresponsibility of the Magistracy.

And what control is there over the conduct of the licensing magistrate? I shall be told that he may be proceeded against, either by a criminal information, or by impeachment. As to the latter, no man of common sense would think of impeaching a magistrate, any more than he would think now-a-days of impeaching a minister. Then, as to proceeding by criminal information ;-in the first place, it is necessary, in order even to obtain a rule, to produce affidavits that the magistrate has been influenced by wilful and corrupt motives: not merely affidavits of belief in those who swear, but of facts, proving him guilty of malversation in his office. Then suppose, as not unfrequently happens, a rule obtained on this ex-parte statement, the magistrate answers the charge on oath; he swears last, and may touch many points never anticipated by the other party, consequently not answered: and unless the alleged facts remain, upon the discussion, undeniable, and the guilt to be inferred from them seems as clear as the light of day, the rule is discharged with costs. The difficulty of proving corruption is rendered almost insuperable, because all the magistrate has to do, in order to defend himself from the consequences of granting or withholding a licence, is to adopt the short course, of saying nothing at the time-of keeping his own counsel-of abstaining from any statement of his reasons. Let him give no reason for his conduct, and no power on earth can touch him. He may grant a licence to a common brothel, or he may refuse a licence to one of the most respectable inns on the north road; let him withhold his reasons, and his conduct remains unquestionable, although the real motive by which he is actuated may be, that he is in the habit of using the one house, and that the landlord of the other will not suffer him to use it in the same way. Unless you can show that he has, himself stated his motives, or that there are circumstances so strong against him as amount to conviction, you are even prevented from instituting an inquiry on the subject. Thus absolute is the authority of the magistrate with regard to licensing.

The Judges of the land chosen from the professors of the law, after the labours of a life previously devoted to the acquirement

of knowledge calculated to fit them for their office, and clothed with attributes of supreme power over petty magistrates, are responsible for every word and act, and are subject to every species of revision and control. They are selected with the most anxious caution for every qualification of high character and of profound knowledge; and yet they are incapable of pronouncing a single decision, from which an appeal will not lie to some other tribunal immediately above them: while, from the decision of the country justices-taken from the community at hazard, or recommended by the habits least calculated to make them just-subject to no personal responsibility, because beyond or below the superintendence of public opinion, and irremovable, unless by a verdict for some indictable offence-from their decision there is no appeal; unless their misdeeds shall have been set forth in a case, submitted by their own free will, with their express permission, to the Court of King's Bench.

Ibid.

A singular Instance of the Influence of the Crown in defeating Justice.

There was a case in the Court of Exchequer, in which I acted as counsel for the defendant, and had to subject a Crown witness to a severe cross-examination; he exhibited strong indications of perjury, but the verdict went against me notwithstanding. My learned friend, Mr. Serjeant Jones (whose talents and professional skill entitle him to higher praise than any in my power to bestow), whether he profited by my experience or was more dexterous in dealing with the case, did honour to himself by succeeding in the next trial, when the same witness was examined; for the suspicion of perjury entertained before was now turned into certainty, and the party acquitted, A prosecution was now instituted against that man and others connected with him; eighteen indictments were found at the sessions, and the Crown at once removed the whole by certiorari into the Court of King's Bench. There they were all to be tried, and a former Attorney-General conducted the prosecution. On the first, Meade, the witness I have mentioned, was clearly convicted. The other seventeen were then to have been tried, and Mr. Serjeant Jones called them on, but the Crown had made them all special jury causes: a sufficient number of jurymen did not attend; my learned friend wanted to pray a tales, and the Crown refused a warrant. Thus an expense of ten thousand pounds was incurred, and a hundred witnesses from Yorkshire brought to London, all for nothing, except, after the vexation, trouble, and delay he had endured, to work the ruin of the prosecutor, who had been first harassed upon the testimony of the perjured witnesses. These poor Yorkshire farmers, whom the villain had so vexed, had no more money to spend in law; all the other prosecutions dropped. Meade obtained a rule for a new trial, but funds were wanting to meet him again, and he escaped; so that public justice was utterly frustrated,