242 U. S.

Opinion of the Court.

right claimed from it having been "specially set up and claimed" in the answer of the defendant.

The plaintiff recovered a judgment, which the Supreme Court affirmed.

This epitome of the action of the state court shows that the claim under the federal statute now made was not presented until after the plaintiff had rested in the second trial of the case after it had been to the Supreme Court, and after the defendant, upon the opening of this second trial, had amended its answer by adding a third defense, without mentioning or in any manner attempting to plead the federal claim. Even at this stage of the trial the assertion of the claim consisted only in a tender of testimony, without any application to amend the

answer.

To become the basis of a proceeding in error from this court to the Supreme Court of a State "a right, privilege or immunity" claimed under a statute of the United States must be "especially set up or claimed," and must be denied by the state court. Rev. Stats., § 709; Judicial Code, § 237. This means that the claim must be asserted at the proper time and in the proper manner by pleading, motion or other appropriate action under the state system of pleading and practice, Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. McGrew, 188 U. S. 291, 308, and upon the question whether or not such a claim has been so asserted the decision of the state court is binding upon this court, when it is clear, as it is in this case, that such decision is not rendered in a spirit of evasion for the purpose of defeating the claim of federal right. Central Vermont Railway Co. v. White, 238 U. S. 507; John, Guardian, v. Paullin, 231 U. S. 583; Erie R. R. Co. v. Purdy, 185 U. S. 148; Layton v. Missouri, 187 U. S. 356.

The plaintiff in error mistakenly argues that under recent decisions of this court it is not necessary to claim the benefits of the Federal Employers' Liability Act in a

Opinion of the Court.

242 U.S.

pleading in a state court in order to obtain a review here of a decision denying or refusing to consider such a claim. Reference to the decisions relied upon shows that the federal right was in terms claimed in the petition in Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Wulf, 226 U. S. 570, and Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Lindsay, 233 U. S. 42; and that in St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Hesterly, 228 U. S. 702, the decision proceeds upon the statement that, since the Supreme Court of the State held the federal question sufficiently raised and decided it, the objection that it was not saved was not open in this court. While it is true that the reports show that in St. Louis, San Francisco & Texas Ry. Co. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156, and in Toledo, St. Louis & Western R. R. Co. v. Slavin, 236 U. S. 454, the federal act was not specially referred to in the pleadings, yet they were in such form that the trial court, either without objection or over objection which the Supreme Court of the State refused to sustain, admitted testimony making it necessary to apply the federal act in deciding each case. This, of course, was equivalent to holding that the pleadings in the trial court were in a form to justify the introduction of testimony in support of the federal claim, under the system of practice and pleading prevailing in the courts of the two States in which the cases were decided. This brings these decisions clearly within the principle of the conclusion we are announcing in this case.

While it is true that a substantive federal right or defense duly asserted cannot be lessened or destroyed by a state rule of practice, yet the claim of the plaintiff in error to a federal right not having been asserted at a time and in a manner calling for the consideration of it by the state Supreme Court under its established system of practice and pleading, the refusal of the trial court and of the Supreme Court to admit the testimony tendered in support of such claim is not a denial of a federal right which

ப

this court can review, Baldwin v. Kansas, 129 U. S. 52, Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler County, 166 U. S. 648, and therefore, for want of jurisdiction, the writ of error is

Dismissed.

UNITED STATES v. AMERICAN-ASIATIC STEAMSHIP COMPANY ET AL.

UNITED STATES v. PRINCE LINE, LIMITED,
ET AL.

APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

Nos. 138, 169. Motions to reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss petitions without prejudice. Submitted December 4, 1916.-Decided January 22, 1917.

The agreements between British, German and American steamship companies which were assailed as contrary to the Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890, having necessarily been dissolved by the European War, and the questions raised by the bills having thereby become moot when the decrees of the court below were entered, the decrees are reversed and the cases remanded with directions to dismiss the bills without prejudice—as in United States v. Hamburg-American Co., 239 U. S. 466.

220 Fed. Rep. 230, reversed.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

The Solicitor General and Mr. Assistant to the Attorney General Todd for the United States, in support of the motions.

Memorandum opinion by MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE, by direction of the court.

The United States sued to restrain the carrying out of agreements between British, German and American steam

ship companies who were defendants, on the ground that they were in violation of the Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209. Overruling the contention that that act did not relate to contracts concerning ocean carriage, the court entered decrees against the United States in both cases dismissing the bills for want of equity on the ground that the assailed agreements were not in conflict with the Anti-Trust Act except as to a particular discrimination found to have been practiced in one of the cases which was provided against. 220 Fed. Rep. 230. At the time this action was taken by the court below, as the result of the European War, the assailed agreements had been dissolved and the questions raised by the bills were therefore purely moot, as directly decided to be the case as to a similar situation in United States v. HamburgAmerican Co., 239 U. S. 466.

Under these circumstances the request now made by the United States that the doctrine announced in the HamburgAmerican Case be applied to both of these cases and the relief afforded in that case be awarded, is well founded and must be granted. It follows, therefore, that the decrees below must be reversed and the cases be remanded to the court below with directions to dismiss the bills without prejudice to the right of the United States in the future to assail any actual contract or combination deemed to offend against the Anti-Trust Act.

And it is so ordered.

HALL, SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKS AND BANKING OF THE STATE OF OHIO v. GEIGERJONES COMPANY.1

HALL, SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKS AND BANKING OF THE STATE OF OHIO v. COULTRAP.

HALL, SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKS AND BANKING OF THE STATE OF OHIO ET AL. v. ROSE ET AL.

APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO.

Nos. 438, 439, 440. Argued October 16, 17, 1916.-Decided January 22, 1917.

The Ohio "Blue Sky Law," Supplement to Page & Adams' Ann. Gen. Code of Ohio, 1916, vol. 2, §§ 6373-1 to 6373-24, examined as to its constitutionality and upheld.

In the exercise of the power to prevent fraud and imposition, Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. v. Iowa, ante, 153, a State may forbid dealing in stocks and other securities within its borders without a license, and subject the business to executive supervision.

The liability of a business to regulation is not necessarily dependent upon its liability to be abolished under the police power. Under the so-called "Blue Sky Law" of Ohio, dealers within its provisions (including companies floating their own issues) are not licensed to sell stocks and other securities unless an executive officer designated is satisfied of the good business repute of the applicants and their agents, and licenses, when issued, may be revoked by him upon ascertaining that the licensees are of bad business reputė, have violated any provision of the act, or have engaged, or are about to engage, under favor of their licenses, in illegitimate business or fraudu

1 These cases, together with Caldwell et al. v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co. et al., post, 559, involving the "Blue Sky Law" of South Dakota, and Merrick et al. v. Halsey & Co. et al., post, 568, involving the "Blue Sky Law" of Michigan, have been styled for convenience "The Blue Sky Cases."