ute was not objectionable for that reason. It remains only to consider the contention that the provision of the statute commanding the destruction of teas not exported within six months after their final rejection was unconstitutional. . . . The duty to take such action was enjoined upon him (the importer), and, if he failed to exercise it, the collector was under the obligation, after the expiration of the time limit, to destroy the goods. That plaintiff in error had knowledge of the various steps taken with respect to the tea, including the final rejection by the board of general appraisers, is conceded. We think the provision of the statute complained of was not wanting in due process of law."

§ 60. Adams v. New York 12-Due process and the admission of evidence illegally obtained. Adams was convicted of the crime of having in his possession, knowingly, certain gambling paraphernalia used in the game commonly known as policy, in violation of § 344a of the Penal Code of the State of New York. The principal assignment of error was "that the court erred in holding that by the reception in evidence of the defendant's private papers seized in the raid of his premises, against his protest and without his consent, which had no relation whatsoever to the game policy, for the possession of papers used in connection with which said game he was convicted, his constitutional right to be secure in his person, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures was not violated, and that he was also thereby not compelled to be a witness against himself, in contravention of the 4th, and 5th, and 14th Articles of Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." The essence of that contention, was that a trial and conviction in an unconstitutional way is as violative of a defendant's constitutional rights as a trial and conviction under an unconstitutional law. Re Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176. In overruling that contention the Court said: "So far as

12-192 U. S. 585.

the case presents a Federal question, the court of appeals of the state of New York held (176 N. Y. 351) that the 4th and 5th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States do not contain limitations upon the power of the states, and proceeded to examine the case in the light of similar provisions in the Constitution and Bill of Rights of that state." Then, after saying: "We do not feel called upon to discuss the contention that the 14th Amendment has made the provisions of the 4th and 5th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, so far as they relate to the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures and protect them against being compelled to testify in a criminal case against themselves, privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States of which they may not be deprived by the action of the states," the Court held that "Evidence which is pertinent to the issue is admissible, although it may have been procured in an irregular, or even in an illegal manner." That conclusion was rested, in the main upon Com. v. Dana, 2 Met. 329, in which the Court said: "There is another conclusive answer to all these objections. Admitting that the lottery tickets and materials were illegally seized, still this is no legal objection to the admission of them in evidence. If the search warrant were illegal, or if the officer serving the warrant exceeded his authority the party on whose complaint the warrant issued, or the officer, would be responsible for the wrong done, but is no good reason for excluding the papers seized as evidence if they were pertinent to the issue, as they unquestionably were. When papers are offered in evidence the court can take no notice how they were obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully; nor would they form a collateral issue to determine that question. This point was decided in the cases of Legatt v. Tollervey, 14 East 302, and Jordon v. Lewis, 14 East 306, note, and we are entirely satisfied that the principle on which these cases were decided is sound and well established."

§ 61. Beavers v. Henkel 13-Indictment as evidence of probable cause. After Beavers had been indicted in the eastern district of New York, and a return of "not found" made to warrant of arrest, a complaint, supported by affidavit, was filed in the district court of the southern district, alleging the finding of the indictment, the issue of the warrant, the return "not found," and that Beavers was within the southern district of New York. After a warrant had been issued upon that complaint, and Beavers brought before a commissioner, a hearing was had, and upon the commissioner's report the district judge of the southern district signed an order of removal to the eastern. Before that order could be executed Beavers presented his petition for habeas corpus to the circuit court for the southern district, where the application for discharge was denied. An appeal from that order was taken to the Supreme Court, where, after a statement of the case, it was said: "This case turns upon the efficacy of an indictment in removal proceedings. The government offered no other evidence of petitioner's guilt. In the light of these considerations we pass to an inquiry into the special matters here presented. Article 5 of the Amendments to the Constitution provides: 'No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger.' While the indict

ment is prima facie evidence, it is urged that there are substantial reasons why it should not be regarded as conclusive. An investigation before the grand jury, it is said, is generally ex parte-although sometimes witnesses in behalf of the defendant are heard by it—and the conclusion of such ex parte inquiry ought not to preclude the defendant from every defense, even the one that he was never within the state or district in which the crime is charged to have been committed, or authorize the govern

13-194 U. S. 73.

ment to summarily arrest him wherever he may be found, transport him, perhaps, far away from his home, and subject him, among strangers, to the difficulties and expense of making his defense. It is unnecessary to definitely determine this question. It is sufficient for this case to decide, as we do, that the indictment is prima facie evidence of the existence of probable cause. This is not in conflict with the views expressed by this court in Greene v. Henkel, 183 U. S. 249. With reference to other questions we remark that, so far as respects technical objections, the sufficiency of the indictment is to be determined by the court in which it was found, and is not a matter of inquiry in removal proceedings (Greene v. Henkel, 183 U. S. 249); that the defendant has there no right to an investigation of the proceedings before the grand jury, or an inquiry concerning what testimony was presented to, or what witnesses were heard by, that body. In other words, he may not impeach an indictment by evidence tending to show that the grand jury did not have testimony before it sufficient to justify its action.'

§ 62. Public Clearing House v. Coyne 14-Due process as a limitation on power to regulate the mails. Appellant filed a bill in equity to enjoin the postmaster at Chicago from seizing and detaining his mail, stamping it "fraudulent," and returning it to the senders, and from denying to him the use of the registered-letter and money order systems, upon the ground that the statutes authorizing such conduct were unconstitutional, under the due process of law clause of the Federal constitution, because they direct "the Postmaster General, upon evidence satisfactory to him, and which do not provide for any trial, hearing, or inquiry of any kind, arbitrarily to seize the honest mail of any citizen of the United States as alleged in the bill, and to interdict and prohibit its receiving any mail, to destroy its business and its property and property rights, and to subject its papers and sealed

14-194 U. S. 497.

packets to unreasonable searches and seizures." In upholding the constitutionality of such statutes the Supreme Court said: "It is too late to argue that due process of law is denied whenever the disposition of property is affected by the order of an executive department. . . . That due process of law does not necessarily require the interference of the judicial power is laid down in many cases and by many eminent writers upon the subject to constitutional limitations. Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 18 How. 272; Bushnell v. Leland, 164 U. S. 684. . . . If the ordinary daily transactions of the departments, which involve an interference with private rights, were required to be submitted to the courts before action was finally taken, the result would entail practically a suspension of some of the most important functions of the government. Even in the recent case of the American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, the constitutionality of the law authorizing seizures of this kind by the Postmaster General was assumed, if not actually decided, the only reservation being that the person injured may apply to the courts for redress in case the Postmaster General has exceeded his authority, or his action is palpably wrong. So, too, in the recent case of Bates & G. Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, ante, p. 894, the law was also assumed to be constitutional, the only doubtful question being whether this court should accept the findings of the Postmaster General as to the classification of the mail matter as final under the circumstances of the case. Inasmuch as the action of the Postmaster in seizing letters and returning them to the writers is subject to revision by the judicial department of the government in cases where the postmaster has exceeded his authority under the statute (American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94), we think it within the power of Congress to intrust him with the power of seizing and detaining letters upon evidence satisfactory to himself, and that his action will not be reviewed by the court in