In Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680, the Court said: "The Legislature, in the exercise of its power of regulating fares and freights, may classify the railroads according to the amount of the business which they have done or appear likely to do. If the same rule is applied

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to all railroads of the same class, there is no violation of the constitutional provision securing to all the equal protection of the laws. It was proper, therefore, to provide in some way for an adaptation of the rates to the circumstances of the different roads; and the General Assembly, in the exercise of its legislative discretion, has seen fit to do this by a system of classification. Whether this was the best that could have been done is not for us to decide." In Louisville and N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503, it was held that the constitution and statutes of Kentucky giving to a railroad commission,-not a mere administrative body but a constitutional tribunal,-power to make exceptions in particular cases, after investigation, from the general prohibition of greater rates for shorter than for longer hauls, did not infringe the guaranty of due process contained in the Federal constitution. It is only necessary that the regulation in question shall operate uniformly on each class. Chicago R. Co. v. Iowa (4 U. S. 155). In harmony with that principle it was said in Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585,-in response to the contention "that the law of the state of New York (344b) which makes the possession by persons other than a public officer of papers or documents, being the record of chances or slips in what is commonly known as policy, or policy slips, or the possession of any paper, print, or writing commonly used in playing or promoting the game of policy, presumption of possession thereof knowingly, in violation of 344a, is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that it deprives a citizen of his liberty and property without due process of law,—" that "It is argued, lastly, that § 344b is unconstitutional because the possession of the policy tickets is presumptive evidence against all except public officers,

and it is urged that public officials, from the governor to notaries public, would thus be excluded from the terms of the law which apply to all non-official persons. This provision was evidently put into the statute for the purpose of excluding the presumption raised by possession where such tickets or slips are seized and are in the custody of officers of the law. This was the construction given to the act by the New York courts, and is the only one consistent with its purposes. The construction suggested would lead to a manifest absurdity, which has not received, and is not likely to receive judicial sanction." Thus it was settled that the constitutional principle requiring a regulation to operate uniformly on each class was not violated by a law providing that the possession of policy slips "by any person than a public officer' shall be prima facie evidence that the possessor has them knowingly, simply by reason of the exception of public officers, when it is plain that the exception applies only to such public officers as have acquired possession of such slips in the performance of their official duties.

Such then is the nature of the fundamental requisite of due process, so far as generality and equality of laws is concerned, which, with its inevitable exceptions, is an element inherent in due process in its American form. As such it existed long before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and is therefore something entirely separate and apart from the guaranty embodied in its provision that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

§ 135. Fundamental requisites of due process Jurisdiction. The system of law by analogy, generally known as international law, rests upon the postulate that territory and jurisdiction are co-extensive. As a general rule a sovereign state has jurisdiction over all persons and things within its territorial limits, and in some instances such jurisdiction over both extends beyond its limits and thus becomes exterritorial. Jurisdiction is in fact an

attribute inherent in sovereignty that follows it wherever it goes. As Chief Justice Marshall has expressed it: "The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself." The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch. 136. Or in the ampler phrase of Foelix "every state possesses the power of regulating the conditions on which real or personal property, within its territory, may be held or transmitted; and of determining the state and capacity of all persons therein, as well as the validity of the contracts and other acts which arise there, and the rights and obligations which result from them; and finally of prescribing the conditions on which suits at law may be commenced and carried on within its territory." Droit Int. Prive, 9. From this general right of control results the exclusive power of every state to fix by legislation the personal and civil status of its citizens and the status and condition of all real and personal property situated within its limits whether belonging to citizens or aliens. Under our Federal constitution the several states bear to each other the relations of independent sovereignties save so far as such sovereignty is modified by its provisions, notable among which are those which declare first that "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states;" second, that "full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state." In Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, the Court said: "The Act of May 26, 1790 (1 Stat. at L., 122), gives to a judgment rendered in any state such faith and credit as it had in the courts of the state where it was recovered. But this provision, though general in its terms, does not extend to judgment rendered against persons not amenable to the jurisdiction rendering the judgments. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165. And consequently notwithstanding the Act of Congress, whenever an action is brought in one state on a judgment recovered

in another, it is not enough to show it to be valid in the state where it was rendered; it must also appear that the defendant was either personally within the jurisdiction of the state, or had legal notice of the suit, and was in some way subject to its laws, so as to be bound to appear and contest the suit, or suffer judgment by default. In more general terms, the doctrine of this court, as well as the courts of many of the states, is that this Act of Congress was not designed to displace that principle of natural justice which requires a person to have notice of a suit before he can be conclusively bound by its result; nor those rules of public law which protect persons and property within one state from the exercise of jurisdiction over them by another."

As that decision was rendered in 1855, long before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Federal courts had then no right to consider whether or no due process of law was guaranteed in the proceedings culminating in judgments rendered in a state court against persons or property within its limits. In the leading case of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, decided in 1877, after conditions had been changed by the adoption of the amendment in question, the Court said: "Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the state resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court had no jurisdiction, do not constitute due process of law. Whatever difficulty may be experienced in giving to those terms a definition which will embrace every possible exertion of power affecting private rights, and exclude such as is forbidden, there can be no doubt of their meaning when applied to judicial proceedings. They then mean a course of legal proceedings according to those rules and principles which have been established in our system of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights. To give

such proceedings any validity there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution-that is, by the law of its creation-to pass upon the subject-matter of the suit; and if that involves merely a determination of the personal liability of the defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process within the state, or his voluntary appearance. To prevent any misapplication of the views expressed in this opinion, it is proper to observe that we do not mean to assert, by anything we have said, that a state may not authorize proceedings to determine the status of one of its citizens towards a non-resident, which would be binding within the state, though made without service of process or personal notice to the non-resident. The jurisdiction which every state possesses, to determine the civil status and capacities of all its inhabitants involves authority to prescribe the conditions on which proceedings affecting them may be commenced and carried on within its territory. Neither do we mean to assert that a state may not require a non-resident entering into a partnership or association within its limits, or making contracts enforceable there, to appoint an agent or representative in the state to receive service of process and notice in legal proceedings instituted with respect to such partnership, association, or contracts, or to designate a place where such service may be made and notice given, and provide, upon their failure, to make such appointment or to designate such place that service may be made upon a public officer designated for that purpose, or in some other prescribed way, and that judgments rendered upon such service may not be binding upon the non-residents both within and without the state. . . Nor do we doubt that a state, on creating corporations or other institutions for pecuniary or charitable purposes, may provide a mode in which their conduct may be investigated, their obligations enforced, or their charters revoked, which shall require other than personal service upon their officers or members. Parties becoming members of such corporations or institutions