"These conditions must be deemed valid and effectual by other states and by this court, provided they are not repugnant to the Constitutions or laws of the United States nor inconsistent with those rules of public law which secure the jurisdiction and authority of each state from encroachment, by all others, or that principle of natural justice which forbids condemnation without opportunity for defense. 18 How. 407; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 181. The state may therefore, impose as a condition upon which foreign corporation shall be permitted to do business within her limits, that it shall stipulate that, in any litigation arising out of its transactions in the state, it will accept as sufficient the service of process on its agents or persons specially designated; and the condition would be eminently fit and just. And such condition and stipulation may be implied as well as expressed. If a state permits a foreign corporation to do business within her limits, and at the same time provides that in suits against it for business there done, process shall be served upon its agents, the provision is to be deemed a condition of the permission; and corporations that subsequently do business in the state are to be deemed to assent to such condition as fully as though they had specially authorized their agents to receive service of process. Such condition must not, however, encroach upon that principle of natural justice which requires notice of a suit to a party before he can be bound by it. It must be reasonable, and the service provided for should be only upon such agents as may be properly denied representative of the foreign corporation. The decision we have already referred sustains these views." See Simon v. Southern Railway, 236 U. S. 115.

§ 141. Proceedings in rem. In the leading case of Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 279,-involving the validity of an act of Congress authorizing the confiscation of the property of rebels, in which the owner of the land seized appeared and filed an answer, stricken out by the trial

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court on the ground that it appeared from it that the owner was "within the Confederate lines and a rebel,—” the Supreme Court said: "The jurisdiction acquired by the seizure is not to pass upon the question of forfeiture absolutely, but to pass upon that question after opportunity has been afforded to its owner and parties interested to appear and be heard upon the charges. To this end, some notification of the proceedings, beyond that arising from the seizure, prescribing the time within which the appearance must be made, is essential. Such notification is usually given by monition, public proclamation, or publication in some other form. The manner of the notification is immaterial." In Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, it was held in a suit for the foreclosure of a lien upon land within the state that personal service on nonresidents, beyond the jurisdiction of the court, may be sufficient. The Court said: "Without undertaking to determine what is a reasonable notice to nonresidents, we are of opinion, under the circumstances of this case, and considering the distance between the place of service and the place of return, that five days was not a reasonable notice, or due process of law; that the judgment obtained upon such notice was not binding upon the defendant Roller, and constitutes no bar to the prosecution of this action." A creditor is not deprived of property without due process of law where debts to nonresident creditors are attached at the place of the debtor's residence. Rothschild v. Knight, 184 U. S. 334. A nonresident defendant, who has no property within the jurisdiction of the court, is not deprived of his property without due process of law by the garnishment of a resident debtor to reach a debt due him. King v. Cross, 175 U. S. 396. Because there was no publication, under the act of June 30, 1902, against unknown heirs or next of kin, until after the verdict, no suggestion being made at any time that there were no such persons, the court will not at the instance of the caveator set aside probate proceedings in the District of Columbia in which a verdict sustaining the will had been

rendered by a jury after a trial of the issues made up under a caveat. Lewis v. Luckett, 221 U. S. 554. In Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U. S. 346, Edward P. Ferry was appointed executor by the Ottawa probate court, qualified and entered upon his duties. In 1878 he removed to Utah, and becoming incompetent, was put under guardianship of two sons. The Court said: "Jurisdiction is power, and the power of the Michigan court was not affected by the insanity of Ferry. The authority of the state to remove him and to require his account to be settled at the same time remained, and therefore, subject to any restrictions that might be imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment, it was for the state to determine how he should be represented, and steps should be taken to protect his rights. As the jurisdiction extended only to the cause, and not to any independent proceeding for guardianship, the orders made necessary were orders in the cause." It is scarcely necessary to add here that in order to force all cases of valid service by construction or substitution within the class of proceedings in rem, the idea of the res has been extended to such intangible things as the probate of wills. and the grant of letters of administration. "The decree of the court admitting the will to probate is in the nature of a judgment in rem which establishes the will against all the world." Bonnemot v. Gill, 167 Mass. 338. In Cunnius v. Reading School Dist., 198 U. S. 458,—in which the grant of letters of administration was treated in effect as a proceeding in rem,-the court held that the notice fixing the period of a person's absence from his last domicil in the state was not so unreasonable as to render the statute in question repugnant to the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

§ 142. Divorce proceedings, strictly speaking, neither in rem nor in personam. An able text writer has said: "As preliminary to a discussion of the principles governing the effect of foreign divorce, it is necessary to

observe the important distinctions between judicial proceedings in personam and in rem. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment or decree of the court whose aid is invoked, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are criminal prosecutions, suits to compel a defendant to perform some specific act or actions to fasten a general pecuniary liability upon him. A proceeding in rem, on the other hand, is aimed not at the person of the defendant, but at his property or some other thing within the power and jurisdiction of the court. Most important consequences flow from the distinction between these modes of procedure. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal constitution provides that no state shall deprive any person, life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that is, without notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard in his own behalf. But the notice required under this constitutional provision is very different in the two modes of procedure. In proceedings in personam, no judgment or decree against a defendant is valid unless he has been personally served with notice of the action or suit within the territorial limits of the court's jurisdiction, or has voluntarily appeared. This much is always required, and in some instances even more. But in proceedings in rem, if the res be within the court's jurisdiction, due process of law does not demand that actual notice of the suit should be served upon the defendant personally. Even though he be a nonresident of the forum, the law presumes that he keeps in touch with his property, wherever it is situated, and that he will be straightway informed if any peril threatens it. Divorce causes being proceedings quasi in rem, it becomes important and necessary to determine what is the res, for the court's jurisdiction in proceeding in rem depends upon its jurisdiction of the res. It is generally admitted that the res is the marriage status, which includes the status of both consorts, the situs of the status of each being his or her

domicil. Strictly speaking, therefore, the jurisdiction of the status of the husband or wife belongs to the courts of his or her domicil, and to no other, because those courts alone have jurisdiction of the res. But in the case of marriage the status is double or correlative status. There can be no such thing as a husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband. Hence when a court assumes to pronounce a decree destroying the marriage status of one of the consorts, it must necessarily destroy so far as its decree has any effect at all, the status of the other consort also. If then the consorts are domiciled in different states, it is a matter of grave importance to ascertain how far the power of the courts of either of these domicils extends in dissolving the marital union." Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 184 sq.

Only with the foregoing principles clearly in view is it possible to understand and apply the decisions, not very numerous, in which the Supreme Court of the United States has expounded this abstruse subject of jurisdiction which, without exaggeration, may be said to embody the metaphysics of American law. In divorce cases the jurisdiction must depend upon the domicil of one or both of the parties, because every state claims, as a part of its sovereignty, the right to determine the status of its domiciled subjects or citizens. In Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175, the Court said: "No valid divorce from the bond of matrimony can be decreed on constructive service by the courts of a state in which neither party is domiciled." See also, Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U. S. 179; Winston v. Winston, 189 U. S. 507. The right of a state to determine the status of its domiciled citizens necessary involves the res, because "the res is the marriage status, which includes the status of both consorts, the situs of the status of each being his or her domicil." It is therefore certain, first, that where neither party has a bona fide domicil in the state wherein the decree of divorce is rendered (a question not dependent entirely on local law) the decree, not binding in any other state, is not