the national government, can not be hampered by the imposition of a state tax upon the privilege of transacting such commerce. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18; Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194; Atlantic & P. Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160; Allen v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 191 U. S. 171; Keprer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U. S. 585; Pullman Co. v. Knott, 235 U. S. 23; Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Sohmer, 235 U. S. 549; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610; Heyman v. Hays, 236 U. S. 178.

§ 150. State can only tax property within its jurisdiction. Due process of law is denied to the owner of property when it is taxed by a state in defiance of the rule which provides that its taxes, no matter what their form, may be levied only on property, persons, and business within its jurisdiction. When real property or tangible personal property is in question jurisdiction depends not upon the domicil of the owner but upon the actual situs of the thing to be taxed. In Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193, the Court said: "The jurisdiction to tax exists only in regard to persons and property or upon the business done within the state, and such jurisdiction can not be enlarged by reason of a statute which assumes to make a nonresident personally liable to pay a tax of the nature of the one in question. All subjects over which the sovereign power of the state extends are objects of taxation. Cooley's Taxation, 1st ed., pp. 3, 4; Borroughs, Taxation, sec. 6. The power of the state to tax extends to all objects within the sovereignty of the state. Per Mr. Justice Clifford, in Hamilton Mfg. Company v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632, 639. The power to tax is, however, limited to persons, property and business within the state, and it can not reach the person of a nonresident. Case of the State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 319. In Cooley's Taxation, 1st ed., p. 121, it is said that 'a state

can no more subject to its power a single person or a single article of property whose residence or legal situs is in another state than it can subject all the citizens or all the property of such other state to its power.'"' See Louisville, etc., Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385; Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341; Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194; Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Sohmer, 235 U. S. 549; Wright v. Central of Georgia Ry., 236 U. S. 674; Wilson Cypress Co. v. Del Poyo, 236 U. S. 635; Heyman v. Hays, 236 U. S. 178; Bothwell v. Bingham County, 237 U. S. 642; Equitable Life Society v. Pennsylvania, 238 U. S. 143.

§ 151. Taxation of corporate property situated in several states. In taxing corporations two things are to be considered; first, the four elements to be taxed-capital stock in the hands of the corporation; shares of the capital stock in the hands of the individual stockholders; corporate property; corporate franchises; (Tennessee v. Whiteworth, 117 U. S. 129) second, that when the corporation has property in more than one state each state in taxing its portion must exclude the value of the portions situated beyond its limits. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Atty. Gen., 125 U. S. 530; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18; Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490; Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341. In the case last cited-in which it was held that a domestic corporation was deprived of its property without due process of law by an appraisement of its capital stock, which included the value of coal mined by it within the state, but situated in other states, where it was awaiting sale when the appraisement was made-the Court said: "It is plain that in the case at bar the coal had lost its situs in Pennsylvania by being transported from that state to foreign states for the purposes of sale, with no intention that it should ever return to its state of origin. It was, therefore, as much outside the jurisdiction of the

state of Pennsylvania to tax it as was the Indiana franchise in the case just cited, and it has been taxed just as directly and specifically under the facts stated in this case as was the Indiana franchise taxed in Kentucky by the valuation of the Kentucky franchise, which value was increased by the value of the franchise created by Indiana.” See also, Pullman Co. v. Knott, 235 U. S. 23. In Wright v. Louis. and Nash. R. R., 236 U. S. 690, the Court said: "The railroads not being domiciled in Georgia are not taxable there for stock and bonds of other companies merely appearing to be owned by them." In Equitable Life Society v. Pennsylvania, 238 U. S. 143, it was held that as a state has the right to tax life insurance companies upon business done within the state, measuring the tax upon the premiums on policies of residents of the state, such companies are not deprived of their property without due process of law because, in estimating the amount of premiums, those paid by the residents of foreign insurance companies outside of the state are included. The Court said: "The only question concerns the mode of measuring the tax. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 162, 163. As to that a certain latitude must be allowed. It is obvious that many incidents of the contract are likely to be attended to in Pennsylvania, such as payment of dividends when received in cash, sending an adjuster into the state in case of dispute, or making proof of death. See Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 611; Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Meyer, 197 U. S. 407, 415."

§ 151a. Due process not denied by state statute imposing annual franchise tax on a consolidated railway corporation. In Kansas City M. & B. R. Co. v. Stiles, 242 U. S. 111, it was held that neither the due process, commerce, or equal protection of the laws clauses of the Federal constitution were violated by an Alabama statute imposing the annual franchise tax exacted from domestic corporations upon a consolidated railway corporation ex

isting by virtue of the consolidation under concurrent acts of the states of Alabama, Mississippi and Tennessee, of three independent and distinct railroad corporations created by and formerly operating solely within the respective states named, and in measuring such tax by the entire capital stock of the consolidated corporation, instead of measuring it by the amount of capital employed in the state, as is done in the case of foreign corporations, where the consolidating statute expressly provided that the consolidated corporation shall be subject in all respects to the laws of the state as a domestic corporation. The Court said: "The Alabama supreme court has held that the railroad company is a corporation organized under the laws of that state, and, as such, subject to the franchise tax imposed by that section of the statute.

When the companies comprised in this consolidation sought to avail themselves of the laws of Alabama, they were asking a privilege and right which, subject to the limitations of the Federal Constitution, was within the authority of the state. This principle was succinctly stated in Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U. S. 436, 442. . This doctrine has been affirmed since. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677, 703, and previous cases in this court therein cited; Interstate Consol. Street R. Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U. S. 79, 84. The railroads comprising this consolidation entered upon it with the Ala bama statute before them and under its conditions, and, subject to constitutional objections as to its enforcement, they can not be heard to complain of the terms under which they voluntarily invoked and received the grant of corporate existence from the state of Alabama."

§ 152. Taxation of tangible personal property. Until it passes beyond its limits and becomes subject to federal regulation as an export or as having actually entered into commerce between the states, the state possesses the power to tax all tangible personal property within its jurisdiction. When in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419,

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the question arose whether a state could limit the right of Congress to regulate foreign commerce by requiring the importer of foreign articles to take out a license from the state before being permitted to sell a bale or package so imported, the Court said: "There is no difference in the effect between a power to prohibit the sale of an article, and the power to prohibit its introduction into the country. It is sufficient for the present to say, generally that when the importer has so acted upon the thing imported that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the county, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive character as an import, and has become subject to the taxing power of the state." While remaining in the original package "a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on imports to escape the prohibition in the Constitution." In Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, the Court said: "But no definite rule has been adopted with regard to the point of time at which the taxing power of the state ceases as to goods exported to a foreign country or to another state. What we have already said, however, in relation to the products of a state intended for exportation to another state will indicate the view which seems to us the sound one on that subject, namely: that such goods do not cease to be part of the general mass of the property in the state, subject, as such, to its jurisdiction and to taxation in the usual way until they have been shipped or entered with a common carrier for transportation to another state or have been started upon such transportation in a continuous route or journey." When such property thus transported reaches its destination it mingles with the general mass of property of the state into which it is received and there becomes subject to taxation. Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622; Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 577. In American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70-in which it was held that where refrigerator cars are employed as vehicles of transportation in the interchange of interstate commerce, the state may tax the average number of such cars used by railroads within the state,