period of employment, he is in no different situation from that which is necessarily incident to term contracts in general. For constitutional freedom of contract does not mean that a party is to be as free after making a contract as before; he is not free to break it without accountability."

§ 209. Due process not denied by the so-called Ohio "run-of-mine" or "anti-screen" law. In Rail and River Coal Co. v. Yaple, 236 U. S. 338, it was held that the Ohio "run-of-mine" or "anti-screen" law,-requiring the payment to coal miners, whose compensation is fixed on the basis of ton or other weight, according to the total of all the coal contained in the mine car in which it has been removed from the mine, provided that no greater percentage of dirt and impurities shall be contained therein than that ascertained to be unavoidable by the state Industrial Commission, whose orders are subject to review; and provided that nothing therein contained shall diminish the right of a miner and his employer to agree upon deductions by the scheme known as docking, on account of such impurities,-does not impair the freedom of contract secured by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court said: "The objection that the law is unconstitutional as unduly abridging the freedom of contract in prescribing the particular method of compensation to be paid by employers to miners for the production of coal was made in the case of McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, in which this court sustained a law of the state of Arkansas, requiring coal mined to be paid for according to the run-of-mine system according to its weight when brought out of the mine in cars. In that case the constitutional objections founded upon the right of contract which are made here were considered and disposed of. This court has so often affirmed the right of the state, in the exercise of its police power, to place reasonable restraints like that here involved, upon the freedom of contract, that we need only refer to

some of the cases in passing. Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, and cases therein cited and reviewed."

§ 210. Due process not denied by ordinance prohibiting brick yards in certain portions of a city. In Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U. S. 394, the plaintiff in error, who had been convicted of a misdemeanor for the violation of an ordinance of the City of Los Angeles, which makes it unlawful for any person to establish or operate a brick yard, or brick kiln, or any establishment, factory or place for the manufacture or burning of brick within described limits in the city, claimed that such ordinance did not state a public offense, and that it was in violation of the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that, without a violation of that clause, the police power might be exerted under proper conditions to declare, under particular circumstances and in particular localities, specified businesses, such as brick making, which are not nuisances per se, to be nuisances in fact and law.

§ 211. Due process not denied by police statute requiring hotel keepers to give notice to guests in case of fire. In Miller v. Strahl, 239 U. S. 426, it was held that a state may prescribe the duties of hotel keepers in regard to taking precautions against fire and to giving notice to fulfill the obligations imposed on such business; that rules of conduct must necessarily be expressed in general terms and depend upon varying circumstances; that a police statute requiring hotel keepers to give notice to guests in case of fire is not lacking in due process of law because it does not prescribe fixed rules of conduct. Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, followed, and International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199, distinguished. The Court said: "It is entirely aside from the questions in the case and the requirements of the statute to consider the dismays and perils of an extreme situation, and what

then might be expected of courage or excused to timidity. It was one of the purposes of the statute to preclude such extremity."

§ 211a. Due process not denied by ordinance subjecting business of private detective to police supervision. In Lehon v. Atlanta, 242 U. S. 53, the Court said that the contention of the plaintiff in error, "in its most general form, is that the ordinances abolish the occupation of private detective by the requirement of application for a permit to the police commission of the city, the approval of the chief of police, oath of office, and to work under police supervision. These requirements, it is insisted, offend the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The contention makes a Federal question, and, as we are not disposed to consider it frivolous, a motion to dismiss which is made will be denied. The extent of the police power of the state has been too recently explained to need further enunciation. The present case is easily within its principle. It would be very commonplace to say that the exercise of the police is one of the necessary activities of government, and all that pertains to it may be subjected to regulation and surveillance as a precaution against perversion. The Atlanta ordinances do no more.

§ 212. Due process not denied by legislation declaring the emission of dense smoke in cities a nuisance. In Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U. S. 486, the Court said: "The protection of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment is invoked. It is insisted that the ordinance is void because its standard of efficiency requires the remodeling of practically all furnaces which were in existence at the time of its adoption; it forbids remodeling or substituted equipment without a prescribed license; it forbids new construction without such license; it fails to specify

approved equipment, and instead delegates first to the inspector, and, second, to the smoke abatement commission, the unregulated discretion to arbitrarily prescribe the requirements in each case, without reference to any other as to the required character of smoke prevention device, thus making the right of complainants and their class to own and operate such furnaces subject to the pleasure of the inspector and commission." It was held that a state, in the exercise of its police power, may by direct legislation or through authorized municipalities, declare the emission of dense smoke in cities or populous neighborhoods a nuisance and restrain it; and regulations to that effect, if not arbitrary, are not unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment even though they effect the use of property or subject the owner to expense in complying with their terms.

§ 213. Due process not denied by statute requiring full switching crews on railroads exceeding one hundred miles in length. In St. L. and Iron Mt. Ry. v. Arkansas, 240 U. S. 518, it was held that a statute of the state of Arkansas, requiring full switching crews on railroads exceeding one hundred miles in length, is not unconstitutional as depriving the owning company of its property without due process of law. The Court said: "In the case of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Ry. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453, a statute of Arkansas was considered which required freight trains to be equipped with crews consisting of an engineer, a foreman, a conductor, and three brakemen, 'regardless of any modern equipment or automatic couplings and air brakes.' . . . The statute did not apply to railroads whose line or lines did not exceed fifty miles in length, nor to any railroad, regardless of length of its line, where the freight train should consist of less than twenty-five cars. The statute was sustained on the authority of prior cases against charges of conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment and the commerce

clause of the Constitution. We need not cite the cases relied on or repeat the argument of the court."

§ 214. Due process not denied by statute imposing license taxes on the privilege of using profit sharing coupons and trading stamps. In Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S. 369, it was held that a statute of the state of Washington of 1913, imposing license taxes on the privilege of using profit sharing coupons and trading stamps, is in its essential particulars similar to the statute of Florida sustained in Rast v. Van Deman and Lewis, 240 U. S. 342; that such statute was properly enacted in the exercise of the police power of the state in regard to matters subject to regulation, and that it is not unconstitutional under the Federal Constitution as interfering with or burdening interstate commerce, impairing the obligation of contracts, denying equal protection of the law, or depriving merchants of their property without due process of law. The Court said: "Discrimination aside, the power to enact the legislation we need not discuss, but may refer to the opinion in Rast v. Van Deman and Lewis. Of course, it is in the exercise of the police power of the state. We will not here define it or its limitations. As was said by Mr. Justice Brown, in Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518,524, citing Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368: 'The police power is not subject to any definite limitations, but is coextensive with the necessities of the case and the safeguard of the public interests.' In the view that the license is prohibitive we may concur, and concede that such is the effect given it by the Supreme Court of the state in State v. Pitney, 80 Wash. 699, one of the cases submitted with this one. And we think it was competent for the state to give it that effect."

§ 215. Due process not denied by the fixing of certain absolute liabilities. In St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Matthews, 165 U. S. 1,-a case in which the validity of a statute of