plied in reference to rights accruing under a variety of statutes when affected by a subsequent change of the law. Pacific Mail S. S. Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450; Miller v. Union Mill Co., 45 Wash. 199; Grey v. Mobile Trade Co., 55 Ala. 388; Stephens v. Marshall, 3 Pinney (Wis.) 203; Gorman v. McArdle, 67 Hun 484, 22 N. Y. Supp. 479; Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 202; Creighton v. Pragg, 21 Cal. 115; State Trust Co. v. Kansas City P. & G. R. Co., 115 Fed. 367."

§ 249. Initial cost of spur track for public use may be imposed upon a single industry. In Union Lime Co. v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 233 U. S. 211, it was held that the condemnation of the land needed for the extension of a railroad spur track ordered by a state railroad commission, although such extension be made for the present benefit of a single industry that is to bear the initial cost, is not a taking of private property protected by due process, where the state courts declare the use to be a public use, on the ground that, subject to the subsequent equitable division of initial cost, such spur track is an integral of the railroad system and, as such, at the service of the public. The Court said: "It was said by this Court in Hairston v. Danville & W. R. Co., 208 U. S. 598, 608: The uses for which the track was desired are not the less public because the motive which declared its location over this particular land was to reach a private industry, or because the proprietors of that industry contributed in any way to the cost. There is a clear distinction betwen spurs which are owned and operated by a common carrier as a part of a system and under its public obligation and merely private sidings. See De Camp v. Hibernia Underground R. Co., 47 N. J. L. 43; Chicago, B. & N. R. Co. v. Porter, 43 Minn. 527; Ulmer v. Lime Rock R. Co., 98 Me. 579; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Petty, 57 Ark. 359; Dietrich v. Murdock, 42 Mo. 279; Bedford Quarries R. Co. v. Chicago, I. and L. R. Co., 175 Ind. 303." See in connection with this case,

Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Michigan R. Commission, 231 U. S. 457; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minneapolis, 232 U. S. 430.

§ 250. Due process denied by exaction of double liability for failure to pay damages within a certain time. In Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Kennedy, 232 U. S. 628, it was held that there was a taking of private property without due process through a state law imposing a double liability on a railroad company failing to pay, within sixty days, a claim for damage caused by fire set by a locomotive, except where the owner recovers a less sum as damages than the amount of any tender by such company, in which case the latter is to recover its costs. The court rested its decision upon Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Polt, 232 U. S. 165, in which it was said: "No doubt the states have a large latitude in the policy that they will pursue and enforce, but the rudiments of fair play required by the Fourteenth Amendment are wanting when a defendant is required to guess what a jury will find, or pay double if that body sees fit to add 1 cent to the amount that was tendered, although the tender was obviously futile because of an excessive demand. The case is covered by St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Wynne, 224 U. S. 354."

§ 251. When double liability and an attorney's fee may be exacted without denial of due process. In Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Anderson, 233 U. S. 325, it was held that due process was not denied by the imposition under state law of double liability and an attorney's fee upon a railroad company refusing to pay for the killing of live stock by one of its trains within thirty days after the owner's demand, when the justice of the demand is fully established in the suit resulting from the refusal to pay. The Court said: "In Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Polt, 232 U. S. 165, a statute of South Dakota was passed upon which makes a railroad liable for double damages if,

within sixty days after demand, it does not pay the damages actually sustained for property destroyed by fire communicated from its locomotive engine. The plaintiff in the case got a verdict for less than he demanded, but for more than the railroad offered. Judgment for double the amount of the verdict was entered and sustained by the supreme court of the state. It was reversed by this court, the ruling of the Wynne case, supra, being applied. We said: 'The case is not like those in which a moderate penalty is imposed for failure to satisfy a demand found to be just. Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., supra [226 U. S. 217].' It is contended, however, that the statute having been declared unconstitutional as applied to one state of facts that properly raises the question, it is void for all purposes. The contention is based on the assumption that we decided the statute in the Wynne case to be unconstitutional; but the ground of the decision was, as we have seen, that the statute was there applied to a case where the plaintiff in the action had recovered less than he demanded before the suit. We decline to extend our opinion to cases where the amount of the judgment corresponded to the demand; in other words, declined to pronounce the act entirely unconstitutional." See also, Missouri, K. and T. R. Co. v. Harris, 234 U. S. 412, in which it was held that due process was not denied by a Texas law allowing a reasonable attorney's fee, not exceeding $20 to the successful plaintiff in a litigation in which such attorney is actually employed upon a claim not exceeding $200, against "any person or corporation doing business in this state, for personal service rendered, or for labor done, or for material furnished, or for overcharges on freight or express, or for any claim for lost or damaged freight, or for stock killed or injured by such person or corporation, its agent or employees," where the claim is not paid in thirty days after demand, and the recovery is for the full amount claimed.

§ 252. Due process not denied by state law prohibiting killing of wild bird or animal by unnaturalized foreignborn resident. In Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, it was held that there was no deprivation of property without due process of law by a state statute prohibiting the killing by an unnaturalized foreign-born resident of any wild bird or animal, except in defense of person or property; and "to that end" making it unlawful for any such person to own or be possessed of a rifle or shotgun. The Court said: "Under the Fourteenth Amendment the objection is twofold: unjustly depriving the alien of property, and discrimination against such aliens as a class. But the former really depends upon the latter, since it hardly can be disputed that if the lawful object, the protection of wild life (Greer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519), warrants the discrimination, the means adopted for making it effective also might be adopted. The possession of rifles and shotguns is not necessary for other purposes not within the statute. The prohibition does not extend to weapons such as pistols that may be supposed to be needed occasionally for self defense. So far, the case is within the principle of Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133. See further, New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U. S. 31; Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192. The discrimination undoubtedly presents a more difficult question. But we start with the general consideration that a state may classify with reference to the evil to be prevented, and that if the class discriminated against is, or reasonably might be considered to define those from whom the evil mainly is to be feared, it properly may be picked out." The conclusion reached on that branch of the subject is this: "The question therefore narrows itself to whether this court can say that the legislature of Pennsylvania was not warranted in assuming as its premise for the law that resident unnaturalized aliens were the peculiar source of the evil that it desired to prevent. Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U. S. 26, 29."

§ 253. When state tax imposed upon gross earnings of railroads is not confiscatory. In Ohio and W. R. Co. v. Dittey, 232 U. S. 576, it was held that a state tax can not be said to be confiscatory, as rendering railway franchises valueless, merely because the present earnings of the railroad are not adequate to pay more than can be derived from high grade investments, readily available on the market, or may not even be adequate to defray operating expenses. The Court said: "The tax is, however, in substance as well as in form, an excise or privilege tax. Its reasonableness, unless some Federal right be violated, is within the discretion of the state legislature. We have seen that the classification adopted can not be deemed illusory; that is, there is no apparent violation of the equality provisions of the state Constitution or of the 'equal protection' clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, although railroad and pipe line companies are required to pay at the rate of 4 per cent of the annual intrastate earnings, while other public-service corporations pay a less percentage. It is, of course, entirely settled that a state can not, consistently with the Federal control of interstate commerce, lay such taxes, either upon property rights or upon franchises or privileges, as in effect to burden such commerce. But the line is not always easily drawn, as recent cases sufficiently show. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 225, 229; United States Exp. Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335, 344; Williams v. Talladega, 226 U. S. 404, 416; Baltic Min. Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U. S. 68. The present act does not on its face manifest a purpose to interfere with interstate commerce, and we are unable to accept the historical facts alluded to as sufficient evidence of a sinister purpose, such as would justify this court in striking down the law."

§ 254. Due process not denied by prohibiting removal of assets from safe deposit companies under certain conditions. In National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U. S. 58, it was held that such a company was not de