the extent of forbidding or regulating every contract which is reasonably calculated to injuriously affect the public interests. Undoubtedly the United States is a government of limited and delegated powers, but in respect to those powers which have been expressly delegated, the power to regulate commerce between the states being one of them, the power is absolute, except as limited by other provisions of the Constitution itself. Having the express power to make rules for the conduct of commerce among the states, the range of Congressional discretion as to the regulation best adapted to remedy a practice found inefficient or hurtful is a wide one. The rule is adapted to secure the rights of the shipper by securing unity of transportation with unity of responsibility. The regulation is one which also facilitates the remedy of one who sustains a loss, by localizing the responsible carrier. But it is said that the act violates the Fifth Amendment by taking the property of the initial carrier to pay the debt of an independent connecting carrier whose negligence may have been the sole cause of the loss. But this contention results from a surface reading of the act, and misses the true basis upon which it rests. The liability of the receiving carrier which results in such a case is that of a principal for the negligence of his own agents. The conclusion we reach in respect to the validity of the amendment has the support of some well-considered cases. Among them we cite: Smeltzer v. St. Louis and S. F. R. Co., 158 Fed. 649; Pittsburg, C., C. and St. Louis Railroad Company v. Mitchell, 175 Ind. 196; Louisville and N. R. Co. v. Scott, 133 Ky. 724." See also, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, in which it was held that by the provisions of the act of June 29, 1906, 86, rendering unenforceable a prior contract, valid when made, by which an interstate carrier agreed to issue annual passes for life in consideration of a release of a claim for damage,-was not taking away the freedom of contract which the Constitution guarantees.

§ 274. Freedom of contract not infringed by amendment of Iowa Code defining liability of railway corporations for injuries. In Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, it was held that the amending of certain provisions of the code of Iowa,-defining the liability of railway corporations for injuries resulting from negligence and mismanagement in the operation of their railways, so that a railroad company when sued on such liability is precluded from making the defense that a recovery is barred by the acceptance of benefits under a contract of membership in its relief department,—did not infringe the freedom of contract guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court said: "The first ground of attack is that the statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment by reason of the restraint it lays upon liberty of contract. This section of the Code of Iowa (§ 2071), as originally enacted, imposed liability upon railroad corporations for injuries to employees, although caused by the negligence or mismanagement of fellow servants. And it was held by this court that it was clearly written the competency of the legislature to prescribe this measure of responsibility. Minneapolis and St. L. R. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U. S. 210, following Missouri P. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205. The statute in its original form also provided that no contract which restricts such liability shall be legal or binding.' Subsequent to this enactment, the railroad company established its relief department, and the question was raised in the state court as to the legality of the provision then incorporated in the contract of membership, by which, in case of suit for damages, the payment of benefits was to be suspended until the suit should be discontinued, and the acceptance of benefits was to operate as a full discharge. The two principal contentions against it were, first, that it was against public policy, and second, that it was a violation of the statute. Both were overruled, and with reference to the statute, it was held that the contract of membership did not fall within the prohibition, for the reason that it did

not restrict liability but put the employee to his election. Donald v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 93 Iowa 284; Maine v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 109 Iowa 260. The legislature then amended the section by providing expressly that a contract of this sort and the acceptance of benefits should not defeat the enforcement of the liability the statute defined. . . . The policy of the amendatory act was the same as that of the original statute. Its provision that contracts of insurance relief, benefit or indemnity, and the acceptance of such benefits, should not defeat recovery under the statute, was incidental to the regulation it was intended to enforce. Assuming the right of enforcement, the authority to enact this inhibition can not be denied."

§ 275. Freedom of contract not interfered with by needful state regulation of boards of trade. In House v. Mayes, 219 U. S. 270, it was held that constitutional freedom of contract was not impaired by the regulation of the business of boards of trade, organized to enforce as between its members a high standard of business dealings, by such means, neither arbitrary or unreasonable, as the state may deem necessary to protect its people against such unfair practices as are likely to occur. The Court said: "That it is with the state to devise the means to be employed to such ends, taking care always that the means devised do not go beyond the necessities of the case, have some real or substantial relation to the objects to be accomplished, and are not inconsistent with its own constitution or of the Constitution of the United States. The Supreme Court of Missouri well observed that the object of the statute was to prevent the enforcement of a rule of a board of trade, under the ordinary operation of which unfair and fraudulent practices occur, or would most probably occur, in the sale of grain and the other commodities named. Such regulations do not, in any true sense, interfere with that 'liberty of contract' which the individual members of the

board of trade are undoubtedly entitled, under the Constitution to enjoy, without unnecessary interference from government." See also, Broadnax v. Missouri, 219 U. S. 285, in which it was likewise held that there was no unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract by a state statute, providing that the keeping of a place where grains, provisions, and other commodities and corporate stocks and bonds are bought and sold, but not paid for and delivered at the time, and where no complete record of the transactions, including a minute of the time of delivery, is made in a book kept for the purpose, and no memorandum of the sale, properly stamped, is given the purchaser, is a criminal offense.

§ 276. No unwarranted interference with freedom of contract in Section 5 of Employers' Liability act, 1908. In Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1 (Second Employers' Liability Cases) it was held that there is no unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment by the fifth section of the employers' liability act, of April 22, 1908, which puts the stamp of nullity upon any contract, rule, regulation, or device the purpose of intent of which is to enable the carrier to exempt itself from the liability created therein. The Court said: "But of this it suffices to say, in view of our recent decisions in Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, and Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612, that if Congress possesses the power to impose that liability which we here hold that it does, it also possesses the power to insure its efficacy by prohibiting any contract, rule, regulation, or device in evasion of it. Coming to the question of classification, it is true that the liability which the act creates is imposed only on interstate carriers by railroad, although there are other interstate carriers, and is imposed for the benefit of all employees of such carriers by railroads who are employed

in interstate commerce, although some are not subjected to the peculiar hazards incident to the operation of trains, or to hazards that differ from those to which other employees in such commerce, not within the act, are exposed. But it does not follow that this classification is violative of the 'due process of law' clause of the Fifth Amendment. Even if it be assured that that clause is equivalent to the 'equal protection of the laws' clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is the most that can be claimed for it here, it does not take from Congress the power to classify nor does it condemn exertions of that power merely because they occasion some inequalities. On the contrary, it admits of the exercise of a wide discretion in classifying according to general, rather than minute, distinctions, and condemns what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61. Tested by these standards, this classification is not objectionable."

§ 277. Freedom of contract not interfered with by ordinance fixing the size of loaves of bread. In Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578, it was held that the freedom of contract guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment was not interfered with by reason of the existence of a considerable demand in the city of Chicago for loaves of bread of sizes other than those fixed by an ordinance of that city forbidding the sale of other than standard sizes. The Court said: "It is further urged that this ordinance interferes with the freedom of contract guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, for it is said that there is a demand for loaves of bread of sizes other than those fixed in the ordinance, which demand exists among many people and also among contractors whose business requires special sizes to be made for them. This court has had frequent occasion to declare that there is no absolute freedom of contract. The exercise of the police power fixing weights and measures and standard sizes must