§ 372. Discrimination in license tax. The Montana statute exempting steam laundries and women engaged in the laundry business, where not more than two women. are employed, from the license tax imposed upon the laundry business, does not deny the equal protection of the laws to a man operating a hand laundry. A state does not deny the equal protection of the laws merely by adjusting its revenue laws and taxing system in such a way as to favor certain industries or forms of industry. It may make discriminations, if founded on distinctions which cannot be pronounced unreasonable and purely arbitrary. If a state sees fit to encourage steam laundries and discourage hand laundries, that is its own affair. And if, again, it finds a ground of distinction in sex, that is not without precedent. If Montana deems it advisable to put a lighter burden upon women than upon men with regard to an employment commonly regarded as more appropriate for the former, the Fourteenth Amendment does not interfere by creating a fictitious equality where there is a real difference. The particular points at which that difference shall be emphasized by legislation are largely in the power of the state. Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59. § 373. Grading municipal license fees for theaters. Grading a municipal license fee for theaters according to the price asked for the highest priced seats other than box seats, rather than according to revenue, is not so palpably arbitrary as to offend against the guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment of the equal protection of the laws. A classification based on the distinction the theater itself makes is not artificial, and must have some relation to the success and ultimate profit of the business. There is natural relation between the price of admission and revenue, some advantage, certainly, that determines the choice. The distinction obtains in every large city of the country. The reason for it must therefore be substantial; and if it be so universal in the practice of the busi Due Process-41 ness, it would seem not unreasonable if it be adopted as the basis of governmental action. If the action of government have such a basis it cannot be declared to be so palpably arbitrary as to be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. This is the test of its validity. To be able to find fault with a law is not to demonstrate its invalidity. It may seem unjust and oppressive, yet be free from judicial interference. The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations,— illogical, it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not always discernible; the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of judgment are not subject to judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercises which can be declared void under the Fourteenth Amendment; and such judgment cannot be pronounced of the ordinance in controversy. Metropolis Theater Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61. § 374. Taxation of deposits in national banks. The tax imposed under a Vermont statute upon interestbearing deposits in national banks does not deny the equal protection of the laws to depositors in such banks, because depositors in state banking institutions are exempted from taxation on their deposits up to $2,000, such institutions paying a franchise tax upon the average amount of deposits after deducting deposits in excess of $2,000, upon which the depositors are taxable locally, nor because of the exemptions which such statute makes in favor of municipalities, corporations organized solely for charitable, educational, or religious purposes, and various corporations otherwise taxed, nor because persons whose deposits do not bear interest in excess of 2 per cent per annum are also exempted. In exercising its authority to tax property within its jurisdiction, the state is not limited to one method. It has a broad range of discretion in classifying subjects of taxation and in employing different methods for different sorts of property. The Federal statute does not prescribe a rule with respect to the taxation of depositors' credits on national banks. State taxation of such property must not be unjustly discriminatory, and the statute in question is not open to that objection. The exemptions in the statute in favor of municipalities and certain corporations of a quasipublic character it was manifestly within the power of the state to allow. Similarly, with respect to persons whose deposits did not bear interest exceeding 2 per cent per annum, the legislature took this method of recognizing a practical difference between deposit accounts of the ordinary commercial sort and those which partook, generally speaking, of the character of savings accounts. It cannot be said that the classification adopted was purely arbitrary or beyond the power of the state. Clement National Bank v. Vermont, 231 U. S. 120. § 375. Taxation of mineral rights. The assessment for taxing purposes of mineral rights where they have been separately conveyed and are owned by persons other than the owners of the surface estates, without any corresponding deduction from the assessments against the surface owners, does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, as discriminating against the owners of the mineral rights so assessed, where it does not appear that mineral rights known to exist were consciously relieved from taxation if they belonged to the owners of the surface. Usually real estate is taxed as a unit; but as different elements of the land are capable of being severed and separately owned, the statute may authorize a separate assessment against the owners of the severed parts. Accordingly, if the title has been severed, land may be taxed to one, timber to another, or land to one and coal to another. The state court held that such was the law of Texas, in view of the general language of the statute defining real estate as including not only the land itself, but the buildings on the land and the minerals under the land. There was therefore nothing discriminatory in taxing the owner of the mineral right that which had been sold to him, and separately assessing the owner of the surface with what remained. If the latter was overassessed it affords no defense to the owner of the mineral rights. Downman v. Texas, 231 U. S. 353. § 376. Taxation of savings banks. Requiring savings banks to include in the computation of their assets for taxation notes secured by mortgages upon Minnesota real estate upon which the registration tax has been paid, as is done by Minnesota Laws, 1907, chap. 328, which at the same time relieves mortgages upon such real estate when otherwise owned from all taxation except the registration tax cannot be deemed to contravene the equal protection of the law's clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in view of the privileges respecting taxation enjoyed by savings banks under Minnesota Laws, 1905, chap. 839, accorded to no other person or corporation subject to taxation. If there is no unconstitutional discrimination against savings banks it is unnecessary to inquire whether the act discriminates against other banks and trust companies. There were reasonable grounds for the discrimination so far as savings banks were concerned, and therefore the plaintiff in error had not been deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Farmers & M. Savings Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U. S. 516. § 377. Discrimination against oleomargarine in license tax. A license tax of 1 cent per pound sold for carrying on the business of selling oleomargarine does not deny the equal protection of the laws because it puts oleomargarine in a class by itself, and discriminates between it and butter, although the tax is pronounced or assumed by the state to be a revenue measure. Apart from interference with commerce among the states, a state may restrict the manufacture of oleomargarine in a way in which it does not hamper that of butter. It may even prohibit the manufacture altogether. It may express and carry out its policy as well in a revenue as in a police law. See McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 62, 63. Hammond Packing Co. v. Montana, 233 U. S. 331. § 378. Excise tax imposed on gross earnings of railway companies. Railway companies doing business in Ohio are not arbitrarily discriminated against, contrary to the uniformity and equality provisions of the state constitution, of the equal protection of the law's clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, by 102 Ohio Laws, 224, because it does not include all other public utilities carrying on business within the state, or because those public utilities which it does include are not all taxed at the same rate. It cannot be said that this classification rests upon no reasonable and sufficient basis of distinction. River & W. R. Co. v. Dittey, 232 U. S. 576. Ohio § 379. Discrimination in license tax. The Alabama statute exempting merchants selling sewing machines at their regularly established places of business from the license or occupation tax imposed by the state upon the business of selling or delivering sewing machines, does not deny the equal protection of the laws, as making an arbitrary discrimination. It was objected to the statute that there is no sufficient ground for a distinction, with respect to taxing the occupation, between the business of selling sewing machines from a regularly established store, and the business of selling them from a delivery wagon. But there is an evident difference, in the mode of doing business, between the local tradesman and the itinerant dealer, and the court was unable to say that the distinction made between them for purposes of taxation was arbitrarily made. In such matters the states necessarily enjoy a wide range of discretion, and it would require a clear case to justify the courts in striking down a law that is uniformly applicable to all persons pursuing a given occupation, on the ground that persons engaged |