in other occupations more or less like it ought to be similarly taxed. This is not such a case. Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U. S. 304. Singer Sewing § 380. State taxation of memberships in an incorporated chamber of commerce. State taxation of memberships in an incorporated chamber of commerce is not repugnant to the Federal Constitution as double taxation because the property of the corporation has been fully taxed, since such memberships are property, distinct from the assets of the corporation. The taxation of memberships in an incorporated chamber of commerce does not deny the members the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, because of the exemption from taxation of such organizations as the "Associated Press, lodges, fraternal orders, churches, etc." Rogers v. Hennepin County, 239 U. S. 621. § 381. Assessment for public improvements. A municipal ordinance that, in creating the taxing district under which, under the city charter, three-fourths of the cost of paving a street is to be assessed according to area, established a boundary line that, after running for some distance on a line not 100 feet back from the street, jumped to nearly 500 feet when it encountered an undivided tract, and that on the opposite side of the street was 150 or 240 feet away, violates the U. S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, where such differences were not based upon any consideration of difference in benefits conferred, but were established mechanically, in obedience to the criteria that the charter directed to be applied. The ordinance following the orders of the charter is bad upon its face as distributing a local tax in grossly unequal proportions, not because of special considerations applicable to the parcels taxed, but in blind obedience to a rule that requires the result. And it cannot be said that the ordinance as a whole may be regarded as an individual exception under a rule that promises justice in all ordinary cases. Gast Realty & Investment Company v. Schneider Granite Company, 240 U. S. 55, Ditto, 240 U. S. 60. § 382. Trading stamps and premium coupons, discriminations against not in violation of equal protection clause. There is such a difference between the selling of goods accompanied by coupons, profit-sharing certificates, or other evidences of indebtedness or liability redeemable in premiums, and the selling of goods without such inducements to purchasers, that the imposition upon the former business of an additional license tax for each place in each and every county in which said business is conducted, as is done by Florida laws, does not offend against the equal protection of the law's clause. The difference between a business where coupons are used, even regarding their use as a means of advertising, and a business where they are not used, is pronounced. A distinction in legislation is not arbitrary, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, and the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. It makes no difference that the facts may be disputed or their effect opposed by argument and opinion of serious strength. It is not within the competency of the courts to arbitrate in such contrariety. The legislature "may make discriminations if founded on distinctions that we cannot pronounce, unreasonable and purely arbitrary." Qoung Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59, 62. The penalties of $1,000 fine, or six months' imprisonment, prescribed by the Florida law, for violation of its provisions against the sale without payment of the specified license fee, of merchandise accompanied by coupons, profit-sharing certificates, or other evidences of indebtedness, or other liability redeemable in premiums, are not so severe as to intimidate against a contest of the validity of such statute, and thus deny the equal protection of the laws. Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342. The imposition under the law of the state of Washington, of an annual license tax of $6,000 upon merchants using stamps, tickets or coupons redeemable in cash or merchandise, is not repugnant to the equal protection clause of the Constitution, as an attempted arbitrary classification, whether such stamps are prepared or redeemed by the merchant issuing them or by a third party with whom the merchant has a contract for their use. The classification in this case was sustained, as in numerous other cases cited, because within the power of the legislature over the subject-matter, and it being the conception of the legislature that the regulation and restriction were in the interest of the public welfare. Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S. 369. Pitney v. Washington, 240 U. S. 387. § 382a. State taxation of consolidated railway company. The state of Alabama, in imposing the annual franchise tax exacted from domestic corporations upon a consolidated railway corporation existing by virtue of the consolidation under concurrent acts of the states of Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama, of three independent and distinct railroad corporations, created by, and formerly operated solely within the respective states named, and in measuring such tax by the entire capital stock of the consolidated corporation instead of measuring it by the amount of capital employed in the state, as is done in the case of foreign corporations, violated neither the due process, commerce, or equal protection clauses of the Federal Constitution, where the Alabama consolidation statute expressly provided that the consolidated corporation shall in all respects be subject to the laws of the state as a domestic corporation. The railroads comprising this consolidation entered upon it with the Alabama statute before them and under its conditions, and, subject to constitutional objections as to its enforcement, they cannot be heard to complain of the terms under which they voluntarily invoked and received the grant of corporate existence from the state of Alabama. The company is not deprived of the equal protection of the laws. The state imposes the franchise tax equally upon all of its corporations, consolidated or otherwise. The fact that a wholly intrastate corporation may own no property outside of the state, while the consolidated company does, presents no case of arbitrary classification. In both cases the franchise tax is based upon a percentage of the capital stock. There is no denial of equal protection of the laws because a state may impose a different rate of taxation upon a foreign corporation for the privilege of doing business within the state than it applies to its own corporations upon the franchise which the state grants in creating them. Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co. v. Stiles, 242 U. S. 111. CHAPTER XIX CONTROL OF RAILROADS §383. Legislative control over railroad fare and rates. The right of the state to regulate railroads, except so far as such regulation would interfere with commerce between the states and with foreign countries, has not been impaired by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because they are public service corporations they are subject to legislative control and the amendment does not prohibit the states from singling out railroad corporations for the purpose of imposing on them rules and regulations not applied to other corporations or to individuals. The Illinois statute of 1874 to establish reasonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of freight and passengers on the different railroads of the state is not void as being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or to that of the state. The statute divides the railroads of the state into classes, according to business, and establishes a maximum of rates for each of the classes. It operates uniformly on each class, and this is all the Constitution requires. The Supreme Court of the state in the case of McAunich v. R. R. Co., 20 Iowa 343, in speaking of legislation as to classes, said: "These laws are general and uniform, not because they operate upon every person in the state, for they do not, but because every person who is brought within the relation and circumstances provided for is affected by the law. They are general and uniform in their operation upon all persons in the like situation, and the fact of their being general and uniform is not affected by the number of persons within the scope of their operation." This act does not grant to any rail |