road company privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, do not equally belong to every other railroad company. Whenever a company comes into any class, it has all the "privileges and immunities" that have been granted by the statute to any other company in that class. It is very clear that a uniform rate of charges for all railroad companies in the state might operate unjustly upon some. It was proper, therefore, to provide in some way for an adaptation of the rates to the circumstances of the different roads; and the General Assembly, in the exercise of its legislative discretion, has seen fit to do this by a system of classification. "Whether this was the best that could have been done," said the Supreme Court, "is not for us to decide. Our province is only to determine whether it could be done at all, and under any circumstances. If it could, the legislature must decide for itself, subject to no control from us, whether the common good requires that it should be done." Chicago, B. and Q. R. R. Co. v. Cutts, 94 U. S. 155, 183.

§ 384. City ordinance as to railroad. A municipal ordinance prohibiting the use of the engines of a railroad company on a certain street in said city, does not impair the vested rights of the company under its charter, nor deprive the company of its property without due process of law, nor deny the company the equal protection of the laws. Because this company is alone named in the ordinance, the ordinance is not special only, and, therefore, invalid where no other person or corporation has the right to run locomotives on said street. On this account, the ordinance, while apparently limited in its operation, is in effect general, as it applies to all who can do what is prohibited. Other railroad companies may occupy other streets and use locomotives there; but other streets may not be situated like Broad Street, neither may there be the same reasons why steam transportation should be excluded from them. All laws should be general in their operation, but all places within the same city do not

necessarily require the same local regulation. While locomotives may with very great propriety be excluded from one street, or even from one part of a street, it would be sometimes unreasonable to exclude them from all. It is the special duty of the city authorities to make the necessary discrimination in this particular. Richmond, F. and P. R. R. Co. v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 521.

§ 385. Valuation and taxation of railroad property. Under the constitution of Kentucky there is nothing to forbid the classification of property for purposes of taxation, and the valuation of different classes by different methods. Railroad property, owing to its inherent nature, may form a separate class, for purposes of valuation and taxation. If the mode of valuation is due process of law, its difference in some details from the mode of valuing other descriptions and classes of property does not operate as a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The discrimination against railroad companies and their property, which is the subject of complaint as being unjust and unconstitutional, arises from the fact that, in the legislation of Kentucky on the subject, railroad property, though called real estate, is classed by itself as distinct from other real estate, such as farms and city lots, and subjected to different means and methods for ascertaining their value for purposes of taxation, and differing as well from those applied to the property of corporations chartered for other purposes such as bridge, mining, street railway, manufacturing, gas, and water companies. These latter report to the auditor the total cash value of their property, and pay into the treasury as a tax, upon each one hundred dollars of its value, a sum equal to the tax collected upon the same value of real estate; and their reports and valuations are treated as complete and perfect assessments, not subject to revision by any board or court, and conclusive upon the taxing officers. The constitution of Kentucky does not require taxes to be levied by a uniform method, upon all descriptions of prop

erty. It is a matter of legislative discretion, and there is nothing to forbid the classification of property for purposes of taxation and the valuation of different classes by different methods. The rule of equality only requires that the law shall operate equally and uniformly upon all persons in similar circumstances. The right to classify railroad property as a separate class for purposes of taxation grows out of the inherent nature of the property and the discretion vested by the constitution of the state in its legislature, and necessarily involves the right, on its part, to devise and carry into effect a distinct scheme, with different tribunals, in the proceeding to value it. The mode of valuing railroad property for taxation under this statute is due process of law, and that being the case, the details in which it differs from the mode of valuing other descriptions and classes of property cannot be considered as a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Cincinnati, N. O. and T. P. R. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 115 U. S. 321.

§ 386. Liability to employee for negligence of fellow servant under Iowa statute. While an employee of a railroad company was engaged in the removal of a lamp bracket from a car, standing upon a side track, he was thrown from a ladder, and injured by a car and locomotive being run upon a side track, through the opening of a switch. He recovered judgment for $15,000. Upon the trial and upon a writ of error in the Supreme Court of the United States it was insisted by the railroad company that the employee was guilty of negligence which contributed to his injury, in not observing the approaching engine and car, and that the statute of Iowa permitting a recovery in such a case was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, which provides that no state shall "deny to any person, within its jurisdiction, the equal protection of the laws," and that the railroad company was not guilty of negligence. The defendant in error insisted that the switchman, the fire

man upon the engine, and the engineer were all guilty of negligence. These questions were presented by exceptions to certain instructions given and refused, and the Supreme Court being equally divided upon the questions, the judgment below stood affirmed. Chicago and Northwestern R. Co. v. McLaughlin, 119 U. S. 566.

§ 387. Liabilities of railroad companies to employees. The law of Kansas making a railroad company liable to an employee for the negligence or mismanagement of other employees or agents of the same company is not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it deprives the company of its property without due process of law and denies to it the equal protection of the laws. Legislation which is special in its character is not obnoxious to the last clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, if all persons subject to it are treated alike, under similar circumstances and conditions, in respect both of the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. The objection that the law deprives railroad companies of the equal protection of the laws seems to rest upon the theory that legislation which is special in its character is necessarily within the constitutional inhibition; but nothing can be further from the fact. The greater part of all legislation is special, either in the objects sought to be attained by it or in the extent of its application. When legislation applies to particular bodies or associations, imposing upon them additional liabilities, it is not open to the objection that it denies to them the equal protection of the laws, if all persons brought under its influence are treated alike under the same conditions. The hazardous business of operating a railway would seem to call for special legislation with respect to railroad corporations, having for its object the protection of their employees as well as the safety of the public. The business of other corporations is not subject to similar dangers to their employees, and no objections, therefore, can be made to the legislation on the ground of its making an

unjust discrimination. It meets a particular necessity, and all railroad corporations are, without distinction, made subject to the same liabilities. Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U. S. 210.

§ 388. Liability of railroad company for omission to fence its road. A law which provides that a railway corporation which neglects to pay for stock injured or killed for want of a fence on the side of its road shall be liable for double the value of the stock killed or of the damages, is not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The equal protection clause does undoubtedly prohibit discriminating and partial legislation by any state in favor of particular persons as against others in like condition. Equality of protec tion implies not merely equal accessibility to the courts for the prevention or redress of wrongs and the enforcement of rights, but equal exemption with others in like condition from charges and liabilities of every kind. But this clause does not limit, nor was it designed to limit, the subjects upon which the police power of the state may be exerted. The state can now, as before, prescribe regulations for the health, good order and safety of society, and adopt such measures as will advance its interests and prosperity. To accomplish this end special legislation must be resorted to in numerous cases, providing against accidents, disease and danger in the varied forms in which they may come. The nature and extent of such legislation will necessarily depend upon the judgment of the legislature as to the security needed by society. When the calling, profession or business of parties is unattended with danger to others, little legislation will be necessary respecting it. Thus, in the purchase and sale of most articles of general use, persons must be left to exercise their own good sense and judgment, but when the calling or profession or business is attended with danger, or requires a certain degree of scientific knowl