Fourteenth Amendment forbidding a state to deprive any person of property without due process of law, or to deny any person the equal protection of the laws. A state law or regulations made thereunder, establishing rates for transportation by railroads that will deprive the carrier of just compensation, is repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment as depriving the carrier of his property without due process of law, and denying to it the equal protection of the laws. The Nebraska law of 1893, to regulate railroads, classifying freights, fixing rates, etc., is repugnant to the United States Constitution and void as prohibiting railroads in that state from receiving reasonable and just compensation, and depriving them of property without due process of law and of the equal protection of the laws. By the Fourteenth Amendment it is provided that no state shall deprive any person of property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. What amounts to deprivation of property without due process of law, or what is a denial of the equal protection of the laws, is often difficult to determine, especially where the question relates to the property of a quasipublic corporation and the extent to which it may be subjected to public control. The Supreme Court has said that while a state has power to fix the charges by railroad companies for the transportation of persons and property within its own jurisdiction, unless restrained by valid contract, or unless what is done amounts to a regulation of foreign or interstate commerce, such power is not without limit. It cannot do that which in law amounts to a taking of private property for public use without just compensation or without due process of law. In Chicago, M. & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 458, it was said: "If the company is deprived of the power of charging reasonable rates for the use of its property, and such deprivation takes place in the absence of an investigation by judicial machinery, it is deprived of the lawful use of its property, and thus, in substance

and effect, of the property itself, without due process of law and in violation of the Constitution of the United States; and in so far as it is thus deprived, while other persons are permitted to receive reasonable profits upon their invested capital, the company is deprived of the equal protection of the laws." Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466.

§ 399. State act as to railroad companies paying their employees. The Arkansas act of 1889 requiring railroad companies to pay their employees when discharged their unpaid wages then earned, without deduction, or that such wages should continue at the same rate until paid, not to exceed sixty days, does not deny to such companies the equal protection of the laws. The plaintiff in error was an Arkansas corporation and the statute was upheld as a valid exercise of the power to amend charters reserved under the state constitution. In respect to the provision that the unpaid wages then earned at the contract rate were to become due and payable on the cessation of the employment, "without abatement or deduction," the Court held that that did not "require the corporation to pay the employee all the wages to which he would have been entitled had he fully performed his contract up to the time of his discharge, notwithstanding he had failed to do so, and had damaged the corporation thereby," but it meant "that the unpaid wages earned at the contract rate at the time of the discharge shall be paid without discount on account of the payment thereof before the time they were payable according to the terms of the contract of employment." It was contended that as to railroads organized prior to its passage the act was void because in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Corporations are the creations of the state, endowed with such faculties as the state bestows and subject to such conditions as the state imposes, and if the power to modify their charters is reserved, that reservation is a part of the contract, and no change within the

legitimate exercise of the power can be said to impair its obligation; and as this amendment rested on reasons deduced from the peculiar character of the business of the corporations affected and the public nature of their functions, and applied to all alike, the equal protection of the laws was not denied. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Paul, 173 U. S. 404.

§ 400. Fires set by railroad locomotives. The equal protection of the laws, which is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, does not forbid classification. The fact of inequality produced by classification does not determine its constitutionality. The Kansas statute which provides that in an action against a railroad company for damages by fire caused by operating the railroad, the plaintiff need only establish the fact that the fire complained of was caused by operating the railroad and the amount of his damages, and that such proof shall be prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the railroad, and that the plaintiff, if he recover, shall also be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee,—is not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment as denying the equal protection of the laws to such company, and is valid. The purpose of the statute is not to compel the payment of debts, but to secure the utmost care on the part of railroad companies to prevent the escape of fire from their moving trains. This case is distinguished from Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 140, where a somewhat similar statute was held invalid. The power of classification has been upheld whenever such classification proceeds upon any difference which has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be accomplished. It is a maxim of constitutional law that a legislature is presumed to have acted within constitutional limits, upon full knowledge of the facts, and with the purpose of promoting the interests of the people as a whole, and courts will not lightly hold that an act duly passed by the legislature was one in the enactment

On the other

of which it had transcended its power. hand, it is also true that the equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution forbids the legislature to select a person, natural or artificial, and impose upon him or it burdens and liabilities which are not cast upon others similarly situated. It cannot pick out one individual, or one corporation, and enact that whenever he or it is sued the judgment shall be for double damages, or subject to an attorney fee in favor of the plaintiff, when no other individual or corporation is subjected to the same rule. Neither can it make a classification of individuals or corporations which is purely arbitrary, and impose upon such class special burdens and liabilities. Even where the selection is not obviously unreasonable and arbitrary, if the discrimination is based upon matters which have no relation to the object sought to be accomplished, the same conclusion of unconstitutionality is affirmed. The objection that this legislation is special and unequal cannot be sustained. The dangerous element employed and the hazards to persons and property arising from the running of trains and the operation of railroads, justify such a law. The fact that all persons and corporations brought under its influence are subjected to the same duties and liabilities disposes of the objections raised. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96.

§ 401. Statute changing fellow servant rule in case of railroad employees. A statute making a railroad company liable to an employe injured by the negligent act of a fellow servant is not unconstitutional as a denial to such corporation of the equal protection of the laws, since there are peculiar hazards in the operation of a railroad. The state supreme court held the act valid as to railroad corporations, whether or not it might be sustained as to other corporations. Considering the act as applying to railroad corporations only, it cannot be regarded as in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment. This was an

Indiana statute and it was upheld by virtue of prior decisions of the Supreme Court sustaining similar statutes in Kansas, Ohio and Iowa. See cases cited. Tullis v. Lake Erie & Western R. Co., 175 U. S. 348.

§ 402. Exceptions to ordinance regulating speed of trains by city. The exception of a dummy railroad operated by steam, or of an electric railroad, from an ordinance limiting the speed of railroads within a city, does not make an arbitrary and unreasonable classification in denial of the equal protection of the laws. It is contended that the ordinance is in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment in that it denies the equal protection of the laws. The contention could not be sustained if there were nothing in the record beyond the mere words of the ordinance, because it is obvious on a moment's reflection that the tracks of different railroads may traverse the limits of a city under circumstances so essentially dissimilar as to justify separate regulations. One may pass through crowded and much traveled streets, while others may pass through remote sections of the city where there is little danger. One track may be fenced and another may not. Under those circumstances a difference of regulation as to the matter of speed would be perfectly legitimate, and the classification could not be considered arbitrary or unreasonable. All that is necessary to uphold the ordinance is that there is a difference, and that existing it is for the city council to determine whether separate regulations should be applied between the two. Given the fact of a difference, it is a part of the legislative power to determine what difference there shall be in the prescribed regulations. Erb v. Morasch, 177 U. S. 684.

§ 403. Assessment of railroad property for omitted taxes. Railroad companies are not denied the equal protection of the laws by Florida laws requiring the comptroller to assess the taxes for 1879, 1880 and 1881 upon such railroad property as had escaped taxation for such