becoming a party to the cause. Under any other interpretation the Fourteenth Amendment would be given a scope not contemplated by its framers or by the people, nor justified by its language. The court held that the statute, so far as it subordinates the claims of private business corporations not within the jurisdiction of the state of Tennessee (although such private corporations may be creditors of a corporation doing business in the state under the authority of that statute), to the claims against the latter corporation of creditors residing in Tennessee, is not a denial of the "equal protection of the laws" secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to persons within the jurisdiction of the state, however unjust such a regulation may be deemed. Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239.

§ 446. Right to attach nonresident's property. A territorial statute permitting attachment against a nonresident without a bond, while requiring the bond for attachment against a resident does not constitute a denial to the nonresident of the equal protection of the laws or of due process of law. The elementary proposition is not denied that for the purposes of the remedy by attachment, the legislative authority of a state or territory may classify residents in one class and nonresidents in another, but it is insisted that where nonresidents "are not capable of separate identification from residents by any facts or circumstances other than that they are nonresidents-that is, when the fact of nonresidence is their only distinguishing feature-that laws of a state or terri tory cannot treat them to their prejudice upon that fact as a basis of classification." When the exception, thus stated, is put in juxtaposition with the concession that there is such a difference between the residents of a state or territory and nonresidents as to justify their being placed into distinct classes for the purpose of the process of attachment, it becomes at once clear that the exception to the rule, which the argument attempts to make, is

but a denial, by indirection, of the legislative power to classify which it is avowed the exception does not question. The argument in substance is that where a bond is required as a prerequisite to the issue of an attachment against a resident, an unlawful discrimination is produced by permitting process of attachment against a nonresident without giving a like bond. But the difference between exacting a bond in the one case and not in the other is nothing like as great as that which arises from allowing process of attachment against a nonresident and not permitting such process against a resident in any case. That the distinction between a resident and a nonresident is so broad as to authorize a classification, in accordance with the suggestion just made, is conceded, and if it were not, is obvious. The power to grant the remedy in the one case and to deny it in the other, of necessity embraces the right to impose upon the one a condition not required in the other. Central Loan & Trust Co. v. Campbell Commission Co., 173 U. S. 84.

§ 447. Discrimination against nonresident creditors of foreign corporations. A preference in favor of resident creditors of a foreign corporation over a nonresident mortgagee whose mortgage is not registered when their debts are created, when such preference is not given them over a resident mortgagee, constitutes an illegal discrimination against the nonresident. The fact that there are no resident mortgagees in a particular case does not make the question of discrimination between nonresident and resident by a statute a merely abstract or moot question, so as to preclude a decision against the validity of the statute, if it makes a discrimination against nonresident mortgagees with respect to sharing in the distribution of the assets of an insolvent foreign corporation. A nonresident mortgagee is not within the jurisdiction of the state merely because he has a mortgage on property therein, so as to be deprived of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Four

teenth Amendment by denying him the right to participate on terms of equality in the distribution of the assets of an insolvent foreign corporation. The contest was between creditors of a Virginia corporation doing business at the time of its insolvency in the state of Tennessee, who are nonresidents of the state, both those who are unsecured, as well as those who are secured by mortgages upon the property of the company in that state, and creditors of the company who are residents of the state. A nonresident unsecured creditor has the right to share in the distribution of the assets of the insolvent foreign corporation upon the same level as like creditors of the company who are residents of the state of Tennessee, and the decree below denied him that right in violation of the guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. Sully v. American National Bank, 178 U. S. 289.

§ 448. Taxation of nonresident stockholders. No unconstitutional discrimination against nonresident stockholders in domestic corporations is made by the Connecticut public act providing for the assessment of such stock at its market value, with no deduction on account of real estate held by the corporation, although provision for such deduction in assessing resident stockholders is made by a statute of the state, since nonresident stockholders pay no local taxes, but simply contribute so much to the general expenses of the state, while the resident stockholders pay no tax to the state, but only to the municipality in which they reside. The stock of the nonresident stockholder is assessed at its market value, without any deduction on account of real estate held by the corporation. The stock of the resident stockholder is assessed at its market value, less the proportionate value of all real estate held by the corporation upon which it has already paid a tax. As thus stated there would appear to be a wrongful discrimination, and that the nonresident stockholder was subjected to a larger burden of taxation than the resident stockholder, by reason of the

direct command of the statute to include the real estate in the valuation in the one case and to exclude it in the other. But this apparent discrimination against the nonresident disappears when the system of taxation prevailing in Connecticut is considered. The state dealing with the question of the taxation of the shares of stock in a local corporation, found two classes; one, shares held by residents, and the other, those held by nonresidents. It was believed that a resident in a city or town, enjoying all the benefits of local government, should be taxed for the expenses of that government upon all the property he possessed, whether that property consisted in part or in whole of shares of stock. On the other hand, the nonresident, enjoying little or none of the benefits of local government, was exempted from taxation on account of the expenses of such local government. At the same time it was not right that he should escape all contributions to the support of the state which created and protected the corporation and the property of all its stockholders, and so a tax was cast upon the nonresident for the expenses of the state. The resident is not called upon to pay any of the expenses of the state, but only his proportional share of those of the municipality. The nonresident is called upon to pay no share of the expenses of the municipality, but only to contribute to the support of the state. The legislature aimed to apportion fairly the burden of taxes between the resident and the nonresident stockholder. It is enough that the state has secured a reasonably fair distribution of burdens, and that no intentional discrimination has been made against nonresidents. The Supreme Court has frequently held that mere inequality in the results of a state tax is not sufficient to invalidate it. Absolute equality in taxation can never be attained. Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Connecticut, 185 U. S. 364.

§ 449. Taxation of stock of foreign railroads. The equal protection of the laws is not denied by the pro

visions of the Alabama statute for the taxation of railroad stock, because of the exemption of stock in domestic railroads and in others that list substantially all their property for taxation. The argument for the plaintiff in error is that if foreign stock is treated for purposes of taxation as present by fiction in the domicil, it must be treated as present also for purposes of protection; that the tax is a tax on values, and that net values of similar articles must be treated alike. It would seem more logical to go further and deny the right to tax on fiction at all, and therefore deny the right to tax foreign stocks. The argument does not go to that extent, and, limited as it is, the proposition that the plaintiff in error is denied the equal protection of the laws is wholly without force. A state may tax stock in some domestic corporations and leave stock in others untaxed on the ground that it taxes the property and franchises of the latter to an amount that imposes indirectly a proportional burden on the stock. When it comes to corporations formed and having their property and business elsewhere, the state must tax the stock held within the state if it is to tax anything, assuming the right to tax stock in foreign corporations to be conceded. If it does tax that stock it may take into account that the property and franchise of the corporation are untaxed, on the same ground that it might do the same thing with a domestic corporation. The real grievance in a case like this is that, more than probably, they are taxed elsewhere. With that the state of Alabama is not concerned. No doubt it would be a great advantage to the country and to the individual states if principles of taxation could be agreed upon which did not conflict with each other, and a common scheme could be adopted by which taxation of substantially the same property in two jurisdictions could be avoided. But the Constitution. of the United States does not go so far. If property is untaxed by the laws of the state of Alabama then for the purposes of its laws the property is not taxed at all. Stock, the property of the plaintiff in error, is taxed