the government. Evils must be met as they arise and according to the manner in which they arise. The right remedy may not always be apparent. Any interference, indeed, may be asserted to be evil, may result in evil. Exact wisdom and nice adaptation of remedies are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment, nor the crudeness nor the impolicy nor even the injustice of state laws redressed by it. Legislation which regulates business may well make distinctions depend upon the degrees of evil without being arbitrary or unreasonable. Legislatures have the constitutional power to make unwise classifications. The legislature of North Dakota may have met the evils which exist as best it could, and there is a strong presumption that it did. It would be limiting the power of the state too much to say that a judgment exercised under such circumstances must be condemned as denying the equal protection of the laws. Heath & Milligan Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338.

§ 464. Classification of coal mines by number of men employed. The Arkansas statute exempting coal mines not employing ten or more men from its operation, under which miners employed at quantity rates are prevented from contracting for wages upon the basis of screened coal instead of the weight of the coal as originally produced in the mine, does not render such statute invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment as denying the equal protection of the laws. This case is closely analogous to one that was before the Supreme Court in the case of Consolidated Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U. S. 203, wherein an inspection law of the state was argued to be clearly unconstitutional by reason of its limitation to mines where more than five men are employed at any one time, and in that case, as in this, it was contended that the classification was arbitrary and unreasonable,—that there was no just reason for the discrimination. The court held that was a species of classification which the legislature is at liberty to adopt; provided it be not

wholly arbitrary or unreasonable, and that there was clearly reasonable foundation for the discrimination exercised. So in this case, there is no attempt at unjust or unreasonable discrimination. The law is alike applicable to all mines in the state employing more than ten men under ground. It may be presumed to practically regulate the industry when conducted on any considerable scale. It cannot be said there was no reason for exempting from its provisions mines so small as to be in the experimental or formative state, and affecting but few men, and not requiring regulation in the interest of the public health, safety, or welfare. The law is not so palpably in violation of the constitutional rights involved as to require a reversal of the judgment of the supreme court of the state, which affirmed its validity. McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539.

§ 465. Classification between corporations and individuals—Compulsory production of testimony. The possible invalidity as to individuals of the provisions of the Arkansas statute penalizing the doing of business within the state by members of a trust or combination to control prices, does not render such provisions invalid as to corporations, as denying the equal protection of the laws. The remedy given by the Arkansas anti-trust act to secure the attendance of witnesses before a commission, and the production of books and papers in a proceeding under that act, does not deny the equal protection of the laws because it applies only to books and papers outside the state, or because, properly construed, it may be confined to corporations and joint stock associations, and not extended to individuals. The interpretation which the court below gave to the statute was that it did not purport to forbid or affix penalties to acts done beyond the state, but that it simply forbade a corporation from continuing to do business within the state after it had done, either within or outside of the state, the acts complained of. As the state possessed the plenary power to exclude a

foreign corporation from doing business within its borders, it follows that, if the state exerted such unquestioned power from a consideration of acts done in another jurisdiction, the motive for the exertion of the lawful power did not operate to destroy the right to call the power into play. This being true, it follows that, as the power of the state to prevent a foreign corporation from continuing to do business is but the correlative of its authority to prevent such corporation from coming into the state, unless, by the act of admission, some contract right in favor of the corporation arose, it follows that the prohibition is against continuing to do business in the state because of acts done beyond the state was none the less a valid exertion of power as to a subject within the jurisdiction of the state. While the acts done out of the state may have been the originating cause for refusing admission to come into the state, or to revoke such permission previously given, that fact is immaterial in this inquiry, since the power and not the motive is the test to be resorted to for the purpose of determining the constitutionality of the legislative action. Although it be conceded that the provisions of the statute cannot, consistently with constitutional limitations, be applied to individuals, such concession would not cause the act to amount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The difference between the extent of the power which the state may exert over the doing of business within the state by an individual and that which it can exercise as to corporations furnishes a distinction authorizing a classification between the two. The contention that the section of the statute requiring the production of books and papers outside of the state denies the equal protection of the laws is not open, since it has been conclusively settled that, without denying the equal protection of the laws, regulations may be based upon the fact that persons or property dealt with are not within the territorial jurisdiction of the regulating authority. Even if, as contended, the remedy given by the act for the production of

books and papers and the examination of witnesses is confined to corporations and joint stock companies, and does not extend to individuals, that fact is not a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The wider scope of the power which the state possesses over corporations and joint stock associations in and of itself affords a ground for the classification adopted. It rests upon the visitorial power which the state has the right to exercise over a corporation subject to its control. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322.

§ 466. Discrimination in building regulations. The Massachusetts statutes do not deny the equal protection of the laws to an owner of property in the residential section of Boston by the discrimination or classification made between the commercial and residential sections of that city by limiting the height of buildings in the commercial district to 125 feet, and in the residential district to from 80 to 100 feet. The statutes have been passed under the exercise of the so-called police power, and they must have some fair tendency to accomplish, or aid in the accomplishment of, some purpose for which the legislature may use the power. If the statutes are not of that kind, then their passage cannot be justified under that power. If the means employed, pursuant to the statute, have no real, substantial relation to a public object which government can accomplish, if the statutes are arbitrary and unreasonable, and beyond the necessities of the case, the courts will declare their invalidity. In delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Peckham said: "This court, in cases of this kind, feels the greatest reluctance in interfering with the well-considered judgments of the courts of a state whose people are to be affected by the operation of the law. The highest court of the state in which statutes of the kind under consideration are passed is more familiar with the particular causes which led to their passage (although they may be of a public nature) and with the general situation surrounding the

subject-matter of the legislation than this court can possibly be. We do not, of course, intend to say that, under such circumstances the judgment of the state court upon the question will be regarded as conclusive, but simply that it is entitled to the very greatest respect, and will only be interfered with, in cases of this kind, where the decision is, in our judgment, plainly wrong. In this case the supreme judicial court of the state holds the legislation valid, and that there is a fair reason for the discrimination between the height of buildings in the residential as compared with the commercial districts. That court has also held that regulations in regard to the height of buildings, and in regard to their mode of construction in cities, made by legislative enactments for the safety, comfort, or convenience of the people, and for the benefit of property owners generally, are valid. We concur in that view, assuming, of course, that the height and conditions provided for can be plainly seen to be not unreasonable or inappropriate." Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91.

§ 467. Registration of physicians. The Maryland code providing for the registration of physicians, exempting those physicians who were then practicing in the state, and had so practiced prior to January 1, 1908, and could prove by affidavit that within one year of said date they had treated at least twelve persons in their professional capacity, is not such an unreasonable and arbitrary classification as renders the statute invalid, as denying the equal protection of the laws, but is within the discretion vested in the legislature in exercising the police power. Resident physicians or assistant physicians at hospitals, and students on hospital or dispensary duty or in the office of physicians, physicians and surgeons from other states, or residing on the borders of a neighboring state, Army and Navy surgeons, chiropodists, midwives, and masseurs, could be exempted from the provisions of that article for the registration of