of smallpox, can anyone confidently assert that the means employed by the state to that end have no real or substantial relation to the protection of the public health and the public safety. Such an assertion would not be consistent with the experience of this and other countries whose authorities have dealt with the disease of smallpox. And the principle of vaccination as a means to prevent the spread of smallpox has been enforced in many states by statutes making vaccination a condition of their right to enter or remain in public schools. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11.

§ 512. Municipal ordinance against visiting barricaded gambling rooms. Discrimination against Chinese persons in the administration of a municipal ordinance making it unlawful either to exhibit gambling implements in a barred or barricaded house or room or to visit such a house or room where gambling instruments are exhibited is not sufficiently shown to enable the Supreme Court of the United States to declare such ordinance void, as denying the equal protection of the laws, in reviewing the refusal of a state court to grant habeas corpus to one convicted of a violation of the ordinance, by a stipulation between the parties, recited in the order discharging the writ, that the facts are as set forth in the petition, where such petition merely avers that the ordinance is enforced 'solely and exclusively against persons of the Chinese race, and not otherwise," and contains no allegation that the conditions and practices against which the ordinance is directed do not exist exclusively among the Chinese, or that there are other offenders, as to whom it is not enforced. There is a misunderstanding among counsel as to what was intended by the stipulation. Counsel for defendant in error contends it was not intended to admit a discrimination in the administration of the law, but to submit the case on such facts as would test and cause a review of Re Ah Cheung, 136 Cal. 678, 69 Pac. 492. This seems to be supported by the order of the court taken as

a whole. The case at bar is concerned with gambling, to suppress which is recognized as a proper exercise of governmental authority, and one which would have no incentive in race or class prejudice or administration in race or class discrimination. The case does not come within the ruling in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 373. No latitude of intention should be indulged in a case like this. There should be certainty to every intent. The law is attacked on the ground that it is made discriminatory by the manner of its administration. This is a matter of proof, and the proof is not satisfactory. Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U. S. 500.

§ 513. Municipal regulation of milk business. Singling out the milk business in the city of New York as a proper subject for regulation does not deny the equal protection of the laws, where all milk dealers in the city are equally affected by such regulation. It is primarily for the state to select the kinds of business which shall be the subject of regulation, and if the business affected is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of a different kind. New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U. S. 552.

§ 514. Laws to prevent dealing in futures. The North Carolina statute enacted to prevent dealing in futures, which makes an exemption in favor of those engaged in the business of manufacturing or wholesale merchandising, does not make that act void, as repugnant to the equal protection of the law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, where the section in question is interpreted by the highest state court simply as a declaration that the courts shall not so construe the act as to prevent persons thus engaged from buying and selling for future delivery the necessary commodities required in their ordinary business, and not as relieving them from the operation of the provisions of the 1st section of that act prohibiting

the carrying on of a "bucket shop" business, or from the prohibitions of the state law concerning the making of gambling contracts for future delivery. The alleged repugnancy of the law to the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is sought to be sustained upon two grounds: first, because those engaged in manufacturing or wholesale merchandising are permitted to commit without offense acts which the law makes criminal when done by any other person; and secondly, because, even if the section does not effect such a result, it nevertheless operates to produce an unlawful inequality, since it creates a prima facie presumption of guilt from the proof of certain acts as against all persons but those engaged in manufacturing and wholesale merchandising. As to the first proposition the state supreme court expressly held the statute did not create such discrimination. The statute does not prevent all purchases or sales for future delivery, but only such dealings as are in the nature of gambling or wagering contracts. As to the second proposition, it is not open on this record. The state courts held that a state might under the police power, without violating the Fourteenth Amendment, create presumptions of guilt as to some classes of persons which would not be applicable to the same acts when done by other classes. The defendant was indicted for carrying on a "bucket shop" business. The legislature had unquestionable power to make such business indictable. If part of the law were void, because not applying to all purchases upon "margin," this would in no wise invalidate that part of the statute which forbids carrying on the business of running a "bucket shop." Gatewood v. North Carolina, 203 U. S. 531.

§ 515. Restrictions on sheep grazing. The Idaho statute under which damages may be recovered from one who permits his sheep to graze on the public domain within two miles of a dwelling house, is not an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination against the sheep industry,

prohibited by the guaranty in the Fourteenth Amendment of the equal protection of the laws. The police power of the state is not confined to the suppression of what is offensive, disorderly or unsanitary. It extends to so dealing with the conditions which exist in the state as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of its people. The statute complained of was a deliberate enactment, made necessary by and addressed to the conditions which existed. It was not the purpose or effect of the statute to make discriminations between sheep owners and owners of other kinds of stock, but to secure equality of enjoyment and use of the public domain to settlers and cattle owners with sheep owners. To hold the statute unconstitutional would, it was said, make of the lands of the state "one immense sheep pasture." It is a matter of common observation and experience that sheep eat the herbage closer to the ground than cattle or horses do, and their hoofs being sharp, they devastate and kill the growing vegetation wherever they graze for any considerable time. The industry of raising cattle in the state had been largely destroyed by large bands of sheep. Cattle will not graze nor thrive upon lands where sheep are grazed to any great extent. The conditions which existed in the state vindicate the statute from the accusation of being an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination against the sheep industry. Bacon v. Waller, 204 U. S. 311.

§ 516. Regulating admission to places of public amusement. The lessee in possession of a race course is not denied the equal protection of the laws by a state statute under which it is compelled to recognize its own tickets of admission in the hands of persons who are not, at the time, under the influence of liquor, or boisterous in conduct, or of lewd and immoral character, where the statute is applicable alike to all persons, corporations, or associations conducting places of public amusement or entertainment. The contention that the statute is unconstitu

tional as denying to the defendant the equal protection of the laws is without merit, for the statute is applicable alike to all. The statute is only a regulation of places of public entertainment and amusement upon terms of equal and exact justice to everyone holding a ticket. It is only a regulation, as applied to the plaintiff in error, compelling it to perform its own contract as evidenced by tickets of admission and sold to parties wishing to attend its race course. . . . It is neither an arbitrary exertion of the state's inherited or governmental power, nor a violation of any right secured by the Constitution of the United States. Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359.

§ 517. State protection of the national flag. The exception in favor of newspapers, periodicals, books, pamphlets, etc., on which shall be printed representations of the national flag, disconnected from any advertising, which is made by Nebraska act of July 3, 1903, prohibiting the use of representations of the national flag for advertising articles of merchandise, does not make such statute repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, as denying the equal protection of the laws. These exceptions, it is insisted, make an arbitrary classification of persons, which, in legal effect, denies to one class the equal protection of the laws. It is well settled

that, when prescribing a rule of conduct for persons or corporations, a state may, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, make a classification among its people based "upon some reasonable ground,-some difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification, and is not a mere arbitrary selection." No one can be said to have the right, secured by the Constitution, to use the country's flag merely for purposes of advertising articles of merchandise. If everyone was entitled to use it for such purposes, then, perhaps, the state could not discriminate among those who so used it. It is for the state to say how far it would go by way of