similar nature. Twenty states, as well as the Federal government in the District of Columbia, have similar statutes, some with more stringent provisions, and all aimed at the suppression of an evil that is thus shown to be almost universal. As the statute makes a classification based upon a reasonable distinction, and one which has been generally applied in the exertion of the police power over the subject, there is no foundation for the proposition that the result of the enforcement of the statute will be to deny the equal protection of the laws. Lemieux v. Young, 211 U. S. 489.

§ 522. Prohibiting drumming on carriers' premises. The Arkansas act could single out hotels, lodging houses, eating houses, bath houses, physicians, masseurs, surgeons, or other medical practitioners, as the business and professions to which should be made applicable the provisions of the statute forbidding the drumming or solicitation of business or patronage on railway trains and premises of common carriers, without making such statute invalid, as denying the equal protection of the laws to the business and professions mentioned. The state supreme court in passing on the case said: "The legislature, in framing this statute, met a condition which existed, and not an imaginary or improbable one. The class of drummers or solicitors mentioned in the act are doubtless the only ones who ply their vocation to any extent on railroad trains. It is rare that the commercial drummer finds opportunity to meet customers and solicit trade on trains, therefore the lawmakers deemed it unnecessary to legislate against an occasional act of that kind." Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 79.

§ 523. Regulating sale of explosives. The exception in favor of existing contracts, contained in the Kansas statute making it criminal to sell or deliver black powder for use in any coal mines in the state except in original sealed packages containing 121⁄2 pounds of powder, does not

make such statute repugnant to the Federal Constitution, as denying the equal protection of the laws. The purpose of the statute is to provide for the safety of coal mining operations, and if it may be said that whatever danger can come from packages of powder will come from them regardless of the date of the contract under which they may be delivered, there are nevertheless other considerations to be taken into account. The statute is criminal. A retrospective operation of it was to be avoided, might, indeed, be illegal At any rate, it was a matter properly to be considered by the legislature in distinguishing between contracts made before the passage of the law and those made after its passage. The former might not be numerous, their evil would be temporary; and certainly legislation which makes acts criminal which are done after they are forbidden, and assigns no penalties to acts done in pursuance of obligations legally incurred, is not arbitrary classification, and a classification which is not arbitrary is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. Williams v. Walsh, 222 U. S. 415.

§ 524. Prohibiting billiard or pool rooms. A municipal ordinance prohibiting the keeping of billiard or pool tables for hire or public use does not deny the equal protection of the laws because hotel keepers are permitted to maintain a billiard or pool room in which their regular and registered guests may play. Ordinances prohibiting the keeping of billiard halls have many times been sustained by the courts. If there is no reasonable basis for making a distinction, as is here done, between hotels with twenty-five rooms, and those with twenty-four rooms or less, the plaintiff in error was not in a position to complain, because not being the owner of a hotel of the smaller sort, he did not suffer from the alleged discrimination. Murphy v. California, 225 U. S. 623.

§ 525. Regulation of junk dealers. A New York statute does not deny to junk dealers the equal protection of

the laws, which law as construed by the highest court of the state, makes it a criminal offense for a dealer in or collector of junk, metals, or secondhand materials, to buy or receive any stolen wire, cable, copper, lead, solder, iron or brass used by or belonging to a railroad, telephone, telegraph, gas, or electric light company, without making diligent inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining whether the person selling or delivering it has a legal right to do so. The argument that the classification in this case is arbitrary, because placing junk dealers in a class by themselves, needs no answer beyond a reference to the well-known fact, alluded to by the New York court of appeals in its opinion, that junk dealers provide an important market for stolen merchandise of the kinds mentioned, and that because of their experience they are peculiarly fitted to detect whether property offered is stolen. The state court said as follows: "The legislature is presumed to have been familiar with current history and the decisions of the courts, which show that property of a certain kind, such as copper, brass, iron, etc., is frequently stolen from railroad, telegraph, and similar corporations, which cannot adequately protect it because it is scattered through the country along extensive lines of transportation or communication, and which is exposed to view and caption by the evil-minded, who find their best market in the shops of certain junk dealers." This expression is sufficient defense to any criticism based upon alleged illogical and arbitrary distinctions against junk dealers. Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 260.

§ 526. Requiring connection with sewer system. An ordinance adopted under legislative authority by an inland town containing less than 6,000 inhabitants, by which the owners of property abutting upon any street along which sewer mains had been laid were required to install water closets in their houses, and connect the same with the main sewer pipe within thirty days of the pas

sage of the ordinance, under penalty of fine and imprisonment for noncompliance, is a valid exercise of the police power, and does not, although affording no notice or opportunity to be heard, deny either due process of law or the equal protection of the laws. It is the commonest exercise of the police power of a state or city to provide for a system of sewers, and to compel property owners to connect therewith. And this duty may be enforced by criminal penalties. It may be that an arbitrary exercise of the power could be restrained, but it would have to be palpably so to justify a court with interfering with so salutary a power and one so necessary to the public health. Hutchinson v. Valdosta, 227 U. S. 303.

§ 527. Milk ordinance requiring tuberculin test for dairy cattle. Milk drawn from cows outside the city is not unconstitutionally discriminated against by a municipal ordinance prohibiting its shipment into the city unless the cows shall first have been subjected to the tuberculin test and an official certificate of their freedom from tuberculosis or other contagious diseases filed with the health officer, while the regulations relative to cows within the city forbid the sale of milk from sick or diseased cows, and contemplate inspection by the health officer, and the application by him of any known test to determine whether the animal inspected is afflicted with tuberculosis, and the removal by him of any diseased animal to a place where it will not spread infection. Inspection and care, therefore, can be applied to the animals within the city, and also to the milk drawn from such animals. It cannot be applied to animals kept outside of the city. It could only be applied to the milk drawn from such animals, which would be practically impossible. This is a sufficient basis for separate legislation relating to milk shipped into the city. The different situations of the animals require different regulations. The requirements are not unreasonable; they are properly adaptive to the conditions. They are not dis

criminatory; they have proper relation to the purpose to be accomplished. That purpose and the necessity for it cannot be questioned in the court of last resort. Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U. S. 572.

§ 528. Guarding open shafts. The Illinois statute requiring the inclosure by a substantial barrier of shafts or openings in the floors of a building in the course of construction through which is operated an elevator or hoist for the purpose of lifting materials to be used in such construction, does not deny the equal protection of the laws because the act does not require other unenclosed openings in the buildings or outside hoists to be guarded, nor because it distinguishes in § 6 between buildings in cities and buildings in villages, and makes a distinction in §§ 2 and 3 between houses used exclusively for private residences and other structures as to the strength of the supports for joists. It was contended that danger was the test, and the classification of the statute, not having relation to its purpose, was arbitrary. There may be degrees of danger and a difference in degree may justify classification. The question is one for the legislature to decide, informed, no doubt, by experience, of conditions, and fortified by presumptions of legality, and confirmed, besides, by the opinion of the supreme court of the state. The legislation cannot be judged by abstract or theoretical comparisons. It must be presumed that it was induced by actual experience. The legislative judgment even if disputable or crude is not subject to judicial review. The crudities or even injustice of state laws are not redressed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The law may not be the best that can be drawn, and might have been more complete if it had gone further, but plaintiff in error is not discriminated against. All in its situation are treated alike. What the statute enjoins, it enjoins not only of plaintiff in error, but of all similarly situated. What it does not enjoin, plaintiff in error cannot complain of. The distinction made by other sections