Court has jurisdiction of appeals in like cases from the circuit courts of the remaining counties of the state. This adjustment of appellate jurisdiction is not forbidden by anything contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. The last restriction, as to the equal protection of the laws, is not violated by any diversity in the jurisdiction of the several courts as to subject-matter, amount or finality of decision, if all persons within the territorial limits of their respective jurisdictions have an equal right, in like cases and under like circumstances, to resort to them for redress. It means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place or 'under like circumstances. The Fourteenth Amendment does not profess to secure to all persons in the United States the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies. Each state prescribes its own modes of judicial proceeding. If diversities of laws and judicial proceedings may exist in the several states without violating the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no valid. reason why there may not be such diversities in different parts of the same state. Bowman v. Lewis. 101 U. S. 22.

§ 548. Tax titles. The grantee in a tax deed cannot claim to have been denied due process of law or the equal protection of the laws by the Michigan statute requiring the giving of notice to the original owners in order to cut off the right of redemption, on the theory that, by the proceedings under the tax laws, the state acquired an absolute title, which it conveyed by the tax deed, and that the statute operated to devest such title and transfer it to another, where the highest state court holds that, whatever title the state held, it sold only an interest which was subject to redemption. It is contended that, by the proceedings under the tax laws, the state acquired the absolute title to the lands, and conveyed that title to plaintiff in error, and that the aim of the statute is to devest such title and transfer it to another; and therefore it is further

contended that property is taken without due process of law, and that the laws are unequal in their operation. If the title was taken subject to redemption, it cannot be said to be devested without due process of law if redemption was exercised according to law. And how redemption should be exercised, and how it could be cut off depended upon the provisions of the statute; and therefore the best answer to the assumption of the plaintiff in error, that he acquired an indefeasible title, is the answer given by the supreme court of the state, whose province it is to pronounce the meaning of the statutes of the state without question by the Supreme Court of the United States. That court said, that whatever the title which the state held, it sold an interest in the lands which were liable to be devested. Rusch v. Duncan Land & Mining Co., 211 U.S. 526.

§ 549. Number of peremptory challenges in criminal cases. The Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit legislation which is limited in the objects to which it is directed, or by the territory within which it is to operate. It merely requires that all persons subjected to such legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed. The power of the legislature of a state to prescribe the number of peremptory challenges in criminal cases is limited only by the necessity of having an impartial jury. The number of such challenges is a matter of legislative discretion, and may vary according to the condition of different communities and the difficulties in each of securing intelligent and impartial jurors. The accused is entitled to an impartial jury, and if such a jury is obtained from those who remain, his constitutional right is maintained. The provision of the revised statutes of Missouri allowing the state, in capital cases, fifteen peremptory challenges in cities of over 100,000 inhabitants, instead of eight as in other parts of the state, is a valid exercise of legislative discretion. To prescribe

whatever will tend to secure the impartiality of jurors in criminal cases is not only within the competency of the legislature, but is among its highest duties. Such impartiality requires not only freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against the prosecution. Between him and the state the scales are to be evenly held. Experience has shown that one of the most effective means to free the jury box from men unfit to be there is the exercise of the peremptory challenge. The number of such challenges must necessarily depend upon the discretion of the legislature and is limited only by the necessity of having an impartial jury. In the large cities there is such a mixed population; there is such a tendency of the criminal classes to resort to them, and such an unfortunate disposition on the part of business men to escape from jury duty, that it requires special care on the part of the government to secure there competent and impartial jurors. To that end it may be a wise proceeding on the part of the legislature to enlarge the number of peremptory challenges in criminal cases tried in those cities. The accused cannot complain if he is still tried by an impartial jury. He can demand nothing more. Allowing the state 15 peremptory challenges in capital cases tried in cities containing a population of over 100,000 inhabitants is simply providing against the difficulty of securing, in such cases, an impartial jury in cities of that size, which does not exist in other portions of the state. So far from defeating, it may furnish the necessary means of giving that equal protection of the laws to all persons, which the amendment declares shall not be denied to any one within its jurisdiction. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68.

§ 550. Laws operating on all alike. By the Fourteenth Amendment the powers of states in dealing with crime within their borders are not limited, except that no state can deprive particular persons, or classes of persons, of equal and impartial justice under the law. Mr. Chief

Justice Fuller, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "We find nothing special, partial or arbitrary or in violation of fundamental principles in the criminal laws of the state of Texas involved, and we perceive no ground for holding that the proceedings complained of, which were had in the ordinary administration of those laws, amounted to a denial by the state of due process of law to these parties, or of some right secured to them by the Constitution of the United States. Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462.

§ 551. Error in charge to jury. A substantial error in the charge to the jury in a criminal case in a state court does not deprive the prisoner of the equal protection of the laws or of due process or abridge his immunities, within the Fourteenth Amendment. A writ of error to review the judgment of the highest tribunal of a state cannot be maintained in the absence of a federal question giving jurisdiction. It was not within the province of the Supreme Court to pass upon any of the questions sought to be presented, as they fall entirely within the scope of the exercise of the powers of the state. Davis v. Texas, 139 U. S. 651.

§ 552. Refusal to amend record in criminal case. The refusal of the supreme court of Illinois to amend the record in a criminal case so as to show that the accused was not present in person or by counsel in that court, at the time it affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and 'fixed the day for carrying that judgment into execution, was not a denial to him of the equal protection of the laws. The law of Illinois as declared by its highest court, that amendments of the record of a court, in derogation of its final judgment, are not permitted after the term at which the judgment was rendered, is applicable to all persons within the jurisdiction of the state, and its enforcement against the plaintiff in error is not a denial to him by the state of the equal protection of the laws.

The supreme court of Illinois held that under the practice in that state a motion to amend a final judgment, in derogation of that judgment, made at a term subsequent to that at which final judgment was rendered, and after the case had passed beyond the power of the state court to stay, by its order, the execution of the judgment, clearly comes too late. Had the plaintiffs in error and their counsel been actually present in court when the judgment of affirmance was entered, the law allowed them to then say or do nothing which by any possibility could have benefited plaintiffs in error. They were, after judgment was entered, entitled only to move for a rehearing, and this could only be done on printed petition; but thirty days were allowed in which to prepare it. No right secured to the plaintiff in error by the Constitution of the United States, was violated by the refusal of the supreme court of Illinois to allow the proposed amendment of its record. The Supreme Court of the United States takes, as is its duty, the law of Illinois to be as declared by its highest court, that amendments of the record of a court, in derogation of its final judgment, are not permitted in that state after the expiration of the term at which the judgment was rendered. That law is applicable to all persons within the jurisdiction of the state, and its enforcement against the plaintiff in error cannot, therefore, be said to be a denial to him by the state of the equal protection of the laws. Fielden v. State of Illinois, 143 U. S. 452.

§ 553. Power of state to make classifications. Because to the ordinary taxpayer there is allowed not merely one hearing before the county officials, but also a right of appeal with a second hearing before the state board, while only the one hearing before the latter board is given to railroad companies in respect to their property, the latter are not therefore denied the equal protection of the laws. The power of a state to make classifications in judicial or administrative proceedings carries with it the right to