gross profits of the sale of tickets by the United Theatre Ticket Company for the month of September, 1918, amounted to $3,624.60, the expenses charged against those profits amounted to $3,582.75, so that the net earnings amounted to only $41.85. While the net earnings in some months were much larger, and the brokers enjoyed a fair return upon their investments, nevertheless, when one considers the possibility of a total loss in other months, the nature of their service and the comparatively small net return to them, it is urged that an arbitrary limitation of a charge of fifty cents above the price charged by the theatre is unreasonable.

The defendants refused to procure licenses because they claim that the price-fixing provision of the ordinance interfered with their right to carry on a lawful business, that a license would be of no benefit or advantage to them because it could be revoked for selling tickets in violation of this provision; that such violation is made the only ground of revocation and no appeal can be taken by the licensee; that when a license is once revoked the licensee is not thereafter entitled to a renewal, and that all of these unreasonable and arbitrary restrictions constitute a deprivation of their constitutional rights to earn their livelihood and to hold and enjoy their property.

The price-fixing provision of the enactment is now challenged by the defendants as void under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and under section 6, article 1 of our State Constitution, which guarantee all persons against deprivation of their liberty and property without due process of law. It is unnecessary to define the terms "liberty," "property and "due process of law." These terms "have been so often judicially defined that there can be no misunderstanding as to their meaning." Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, and the cases cited therein.

The price-fixing ordinance is not without precedent, but wherever an attempt has been made by legislation to fix the price of theatre tickets, such legislation has been declared to be

repugnant to the Constitution, either upon the ground that the legislation could not be sustained within the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of the public welfare, or because the business of conducting a theatre, even if clothed with a public interest, was not within the purview of the doctrine laid down in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, or upon both such grounds. People v. Steele & Altschul, 231 Ill. 340; 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 361; Ex Parte Quarg, 5 id. 183; City of Chicago v. Powers, 231 Ill. 560.

In People v. Steele & Altschul, supra, the defendant Steele, a manager of a theatre, was convicted of selling a theatre ticket not having printed thereon the words: "This ticket cannot be sold for more than the price printed hereon" and the defendant Altschul was convicted of selling a ticket at a price in excess of the advertised or printed rate therefor, which acts constitute a misdeameanor under the laws of the State of Illinois.

The Supreme Court of that state held such legislation unconstitutional, upon the ground that it interfered with the liberty and property of a citizen.

Inasmuch as the views of that court affect the ultimate decision to be arrived at in the instant cases, I deem it important. and necessary to quote at length from this opinion.

In these cases, Mr. Justice Dunn said: "The legislature has the same authority over the theatre business as over any other lawful private business, and no more. Besides the requirement of a license, it may interfere with and regulate the business to the extent that the public health, safety, morality, comfort, and general welfare require. This is the exercise of the police power which this court has said may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society. Town of Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co., 70 Ill. 191; City of Chicago v. Gunning System, 214 Ill. 628. In Toledo, Wabash & W. R. Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37, it was

held that, if the law prohibits that which is harmless in itself, or requires that to be done which does not tend to promote the health, comfort, safety or welfare of society, it will in such case be an unauthorized exercise of power, and it will be the duty of the courts to declare such legislation void. In Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, it was said (p. 110): The police power of the state is that power which enables it to promote the health, comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is very broad and farreaching, but is not without its limitations. Legislative acts passed in pursuance of it must not be in conflict with the constitution and must have some relation to the ends sought to be accomplished, that is to say, to the comfort, welfare, or safety of society. Where the ostensible object of an enactment is to secure the public comfort, welfare, or safety, it must appear to be adapted to that end. It cannot invade the rights of person and property under the guise of a mere police regulation when it is not such in fact; and, where such an act takes away the property of a citizen or interferes with his personal liberty, it is the province of the courts to determine whether it is really an appropriate measure for the promotion of the comfort, safety and welfare of society.'

"While the legislature may determine when the exigency exists for the exercise of the police power, it is for the courts to determine what are the subjects for the exercise of this power, and it is necessary that the act should have some reasonable relation to the subjects of such power. The court must be able to see that the act tends in some degree to the prevention of offenses or the preservation of the public health, morals, safety or welfare. It must be apparent that such end is the one actually intended, and that there is some connection between the provisions of the law and such purpose.

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"The statute prohibits the sale of a theatre ticket at a price above the printed rate and prohibits the establishing of an agency for such sale. There is nothing immoral in the sale of theatre tickets at an advance over the price at the box-office.

Such sale is not injurious to the public welfare and does not affect the public health, morals, safety, comfort or good order. It does not injure the buyer or the proprietor of the theatre. The buyer purchases voluntarily. He is under no compulsion. If the conducting of a theatre is a mere private business, there is no reason why the proprietor may not sell the tickets when and where, at what prices, and on what terms, he chooses. It is insisted, however, that the operation of a theatre is a business affected with a public interest, and therefore is subject to control by the legislature. It is a well-established doctrine that where the owner of property has devoted it to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in such use, and must to the extent of that interest submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, so long as such use is maintained. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; Inter-Ocean Co. v. Associated Press, 184 Ill. 438; New York & Chicago Grain & Stock Exchange v. Board of Trade, 127 Ill. 153. The fact that a license is required does not make the business a public employment. The cases where a business has been regarded as affected with a public interest have been cases where the person or corporation engaged in the business was acting under a franchise or cases affecting trade and commerce, where either there has been a virtual monopoly of means of transportation or methods of commerce (Munn v. Illinois, supra), or where, from the nature of the business, in its regular course, the person carrying it on was necessarily intrusted with the property or money of his customer (Hawthorn v. People, 109 Ill. 302; Meadowcroft v. People, 163 Ill. 56; Lasher v. People, 183 Ill. 226); or where the business has been conducted in such a manner that the public and all persons dealing in the products concerned have adapted their business to the methods used, so that such methods have become necessary to the safe and successful transaction of business. New York & Chicago Grain & Stock Exchange v. Board of Trade, supra, and Inter-Ocean Co. v. Associated Press, supra.

"In Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294, where it was claimed that the business of mining for coal was affected with a public use, and subject, therefore, to regulation by law, the court said (p. 303): 'It cannot be claimed that mining for coal was by the common law affected with a public use and therefore specially regulated by law, like the business of innkeepers, common carriers, millers, etc., and in our opinion it is not, like the business of public warehousing, within the principle controlling such classes of business. The public are not compelled to resort to mine owners any more than they are compelled to resort to the owners of wood or turf, or even to the owners of grain, domestic animals, or to those owning any of the other ordinary necessaries or conveniences of life which form a part of the commerce of the country.'

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"The act prohibits a sale of a ticket by the manager of a theatre without the requirement on its face that it shall not be re-sold at an advance, it prohibits the sale of a ticket at an advance, and it prohibits the keeping of a place for such sale. If the manager finds it profitable to have tickets on sale at different places, he may not sell at the regular price to brokers who maintain offices at such places and get their expenses and profits out of the advance in price on their re-sale of the tickets. The broker's business is prohibited, because it has been made unlawful to make a profit. The public is no better nor worse off in health, morals, security or welfare. These are arbitrary and unreasonable interferences with the rights of the individuals concerned. The business of the broker in theatre tickets is no more immoral or injurious to the public welfare than that of the broker in grain or provisions. If he does not make the price satisfactory to intending purchasers they are under no compulsion to buy. They have no right to buy at any price except that fixed by the holder of the ticket. The manager may fix the price arbitrarily, and may raise or lower it at his will. Having advertised a performance, he is not bound to give it, and, having advertised a price, he is