not reach the whole of it. 19 R. C. L. "Constitutional Law," § 121; Ashley v. Three Justices of Superior Court, 228 Mass. 63, 81; Commonwealth v. Slocum, 230 id. 180, 191; Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45, 55, the court quoting from Loeb v. Columbia Township Trustees, 179 id. 472, 490; Brazee v. Michigan, 241 id. 340, 344.

On this phase of the case it is appropriate to quote the oftrepeated words of Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations: "If a statute attempts to accomplish two or more objects, and it is void as to one, it may still be in every respect complete and valid as to the other. But if its purpose is to accomplish a single object only, and some of its provisions. are void, the whole must fail unless sufficient remains to effect the object without the aid of the invalid portion. And if they are so mutually connected with and dependent on each other, as conditions, considerations, or compensations for each other, as to warrant the belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them." Pp. 178,

179.

The question, therefore, arises what was the true and underlying purpose which persuaded the board of aldermen to enact section 11a? Was it the suggestion that this enactment was necessary in order to prevent the ticket speculator from exacting extortionate prices from the public, or was it enacted for the purpose of licensing the ticket speculator?

A brief history of the ordinances upon this subject will clearly reveal that the latter purpose was not the inducement, but that the former was.

For many years prior to January 15, 1909, a ticket speculator, selling tickets on the streets, was required to pay a license fee of fifty dollars, and any person engaged in that business without procuring a license therefor was subject to a penalty

of not less than two dollars and not more than twenty-five dollars for each offense. On December 1, 1908, the board of aldermen repealed the ordinance relating to ticket speculators and the repeal was approved by the mayor on December 15, 1908, and went into effect thirty days thereafter, namely, on January 15, 1909. People v. Marks, supra. On February 16, 1911, the mayor approved of an ordinance passed by the board of aldermen prohibiting any person from conducting the business of a ticket speculator upon any street, and any person convicted of a violation of this provision was punishable by a fine of not more than ten dollars or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten days, or by both such fine and imprisonment. From January 15, 1909, up to December 28, 1918, on which latter date section 11a, supra, went into effect, the business of å ticket speculator in the city of New York was conducted without any license.

While prior to January 15, 1909, a ticket speculator, selling tickets on the streets, was required to pay a license fee of fifty dollars, a careful examination of the ordinances discloses that at no time until the passage of the new ordinance on December 28, 1918, was he required to pay a license fee for conducting his business in an office, agency or other place.

When we consider that the licensing feature of the ordinance was not passed to correct the abuses incident to selling tickets on the streets because a salutary ordinance already prevented the ticket speculator from doing so; that for ten years the ticket speculator was permitted to do business without a license; that a speculator selling tickets on the streets was only required to pay a nominal license fee of fifty dollars yearly; that the ticket speculator who conducted an office, agency or other place was never required to procure a license; and, that now, for the first time, he is called upon to pay a license fee, it becomes clear that the controlling reason for enacting section 11a was to limit. the price at which a ticket broker may sell a ticket, and that the licensing feature of this section was only secondary to the

main purpose of the plan of the board of aldermen to limit the price which could be charged by the ticket broker.

That this was the primary purpose for the enactment of section 11a of the ordinance is further made clear because a violation of the price-fixing provision by the licensee may result in the revocation of the license and subject the offender to fine and imprisonment.

No other ground for revocation of the license provided for is recognized than for a violation of the price-fixing provision contained in section 11a. Of what avail would be a license if it is at once revocable for a violation of a prohibition which constitutes a deprivation of a constitutional right?

There is no provision in the ordinance to punish any ticket speculator who deceives any purchaser of a ticket by misstating or misrepresenting what is secured to the purchaser by the ticket sold as was the case under section 350 of the ordinance as it existed in 1908. People v. Marks, supra.

Furthermore, the main object of section 11a of the ordinance and the method by which that object is sought to be attained are so inter-related that it cannot reasonably be presumed that it was intended that the licensing feature should survive the nullification of the real object, namely, the price-fixing provision which called section 11a of the ordinance in its entirety into existence. A license that is to be terminable for the sole reason that the licensee receives for the tickets sold by him a sum in excess of that permitted by the section cannot be said to subserve any other purpose than that of giving effect to the limitation of the right to dispose of theatre tickets at a price greater than that specified in that section of the ordinance.

From what has been said the conclusion must necessarily follow that the two provisions of section 11a of the ordinance are so connected with and dependent upon each other as to warrant the belief that the board of aldermen intended them as a whole, and that if both provisions could not be carried into effect, the board of aldermen would not have passed the licensing

provision independently, and inasmuch as the price-fixing provision is unconstitutional, and the licensing provision depends upon it for its enforcement, this provision being connected with the invalid part of the ordinance must fall with it. Or, to state it in another way, "Where the void matter is so blended with the good that they cannot be separated, or where the court can judicially see that the Legislature only intended the statute to be enforced in its entirety, and that by rejecting part the general purpose of the statute would be defeated, the court, if compelled to defeat the main purpose of the statute, will not strive to save any part." (Lawton v. Steele, 119 N. Y. 226, 241.)

The principles herein enunciated are supported by the following authorities: Hauser v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co. (152 App. Div. 91, affd., 206 N. Y. 455); Rathbone v. Wirth (150 id. 459, 477, 479); Jones v. Jones (104 id. 234, 235); Matter of Metz v. Maddox (189 id. 460, 472); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (158 U. S. 601, 635); Employers' Liability Cases (207 id. 463, 501); Matter of Sherrill v. O'Brien (188 N. Y. 185); Brooks v. Hydorn (76 Mich. 273); Darby v. City of Wilmington (76 N. C. 133); Robert v. San Francisco Police Court (148 Cal. 131); People v. Olsen (204 Ill. 494); Griffin v. State (119 id. 520); Albright v. Sussex County Lake & Park Commission (71 N. J. L. 309); City of Chicago v. Gunning System (114 Ill. App. 377, affd., 214 Ill. 628); Wiesenthal v. Atlantic City (73 N. J. L. 245); City of Jacksonville v. Ledwith (26 Fla. 163).

In Hauser v. North British & Mercantile Insurance Co. (supra), the court said: "The question then arises whether the invalid provision may be rejected, and the rest of the act saved. We would have no difficulty on that head if, instead of requiring the statement in the application for a certificate, the provision had simply been that a person obtaining such a certificate should make that his principal business. In that case the invalid provision could be stricken from the act. But

the requirement that the statement shall be made in the application necessarily implies that the superintendent of insurance shall not issue a certificate except upon an application containing the said statements. The act then provides in effect that a license must be obtained and that the superintendent shall not issue it except upon a statement that the applicant is engaged or intends to engage principally in the insurance business or in that business in connection with a real estate brokerage business. As that restriction is thus imposed upon the issuance of a certificate, it seems to us to be a necessary part of the scheme requiring a certificate at all. For how are we able to say whether the Legislature would have required a license without imposing that condition upon its issuance? Indeed, subdivision d' is the only condition imposed, the other statements required in the application being merely descriptive of the applicant. While it is suggested that the superintendent of insurance should have ignored the invalid provision, and that he might be compelled by mandamus to issue a certificate to the plaintiff, that argument loses sight of the fact that the Legislature authorized him to issue a certificate only upon an application containing the said statement. It would hardly do to say that an administrative officer, acting upon the authority of the Legislature, should ignore the only condition imposed upon his action on the theory that the Legislature had no power to impose the condition, although but for it the authority itself might not have been conferred.” In Rathbone v. Wirth (supra), the court said: 'It is argued, however, that the objectionable clauses can be stricken out, as null and void, and that the statute may remain valid to the extent of conferring power on the common council to appoint police commissioners. I do not see how that may be done, within any correct or salutary application of a rule which is frequently resorted to, to uphold the acts of the legislative department of government. It is only applicable where not only that which is vicious in the law is so distinct as to permit

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