The tax must pertain to the district taxed; if it does not, the legislature must be held to have assumed an authority not conferred in the general grant of the legislative power, and it is therefore unconstitutional and void. Cooley, Taxn. 141; Durach's Appeal, 62 Pa. 491; McCormack v. Patchin, 53 Mo. 33, 14 Am. Rep. 440; Crane v. West Chicago Park Comrs. 153 Ill. 348, 26 L. R. A. 311, 38 N. E. 943; Smith v. Sherry, 50 Wis. 210, 6 N. W. 561; Wells v. Weston, 22 Mo. 384. The legislature cannot pass conclusive rules of evidence, so as to make the showing by one party to a controversy, whether the public or a private citizen, conclusive of the truth of the facts shown. Cooley, Taxn. p. 298; Zeigler v. South & N. R. Co. 58 Ala. 594; Lothrop v. Stedman, | 42 Conn. 583. the municipality to fix, an arbitrary basis for an assessment to be imposed upon the property without regard to benefits; and any law which requires or permits the municipal authorities to assess the whole or any specified part of the cost of an improvement upon property in a district, without giving to the taxpayer the right to contest the amount of his benefits, deprives the taxpayer of his property without due process of law. 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 761; Elliott, Roads & Streets, 392; Hare, Am. Const. Law,310, 312, 315; Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 43 L. ed. 443, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 187; Dexter v. Boston, 176 Mass. 247, 57 N. E. 379; Hutcheson v. Storrie, 92 Tex. 685, 45 L. R. A. 289, 51 N. W. 848; Adams v. Shelbyville, 154 Ind. 467, 49 L. R. A. 797, 57 N. E. 114; Ramsey County v. Robert P. Lewis Co. (Minn.) 85 N. W. The legislature cannot arbitrarily fix the 207; State v. Pillsbury (Minn.) 85 N. W. valuation of property for assessment, or de-175; Ulman v. Baltimore, 72 Md. 587, 11 L. termine the amount of tax to be levied, or K. A. 224, 20 Atl. 141, 21 Atl. 709; State, the amount of a special assessment to be lev- Baldwin, Prosecutor, v. Fuller, 39 N. J. L. ied upon a district for a local improvement. 576; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; St. John Cooley, Taxn. 410; Harris, Am. Const. v. East St. Louis, 50 Ill. 92; Seely v. PittsLaw, 315; San Mateo County v. Southern P. burgh, 82 Pa. 360, 22 Am. Rep. 760; 2 Dill. R. Co. 7 Sawy. 517, 8 Sawy. 238, 13 Fed. Mun. Corp. § 762; Graham v. Conger, 85 Ky. 722; Peay v. Little Rock, 32 Ark. 31; De- 582, 4 S. W. 327; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. troit v. Judge of Recorder's Ct. 112 Mich. 183, 30 Am. Rep. 289; Greeley v. People, 60 588, 42 L. R. A. 638, 71 N. W. 149; Re Un-Ill. 19; Zoeller v. Kellogg, 4 Mo. App. 163. ion College, 125 N. Y. 308, 29 N. E. 460; State v. Pillsbury (Minn.) 85 N. W. 175; Brady v. King, 53 Cal. 44; Johnson v. Milwaukee, 40 Wis. 315. The proceedings to ascertain and fix the amount of benefits in any particular instance involve an inquiry into facts that cannot be duly ascertained without the production of witnesses and the consideration of their testimony, as well as the consideration of all the facts and circumstances surrounding each improvement. This is a judicial act, and transcends the legislative province, which is to lay down rules, and not to determine what persons or things are within their scope. Dill. Mun. Corp. 802a; Hare, Am. Const. Law, 312; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 399, 38 L. ed. 1024, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; SinkingFund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, sub nom. Union P. R. Co. v. United States, 25 L. ed. 496; Larson v. Dickey, 39 Neb. 463, 58 N. W. 167; Norfolk City v. Ellis, 26 Gratt. 242; Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 376; Brown v. Keener, 74 N. C. 714; Tyson v. Halifax Twp. School Directors, 51 Pa. 9. The prohibition contained in the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property with out due process of law," is a limitation upon the powers of the legislature in taxation as well as in all other respects. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. 8. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581; Ban Mateo County v. Southern P. R. Co. 7 Sawy. 517, 8 Sawy. 238, 13 Fed. 722; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 7 L. ed. 542; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Mon. 330. The legislature cannot fix, or authorize The principles established in the decision of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 43 L. ed. 443, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 187, have been applied to assessments for paving under statutes requiring the assessment to be made by the front foot, similar to the one in the case at bar, in the following cases in the circuit courts of the United States. Fay v. Springfield, 94 Fed. 409; Charles v. Marion, 100 Fed. 538; Lyon v. Tonawan da, 98 Fed. 361; Cowley v. Spokane, 99 Fed. 840; Bidwell v. Huff, 103 Fed. 362. The charter does not provide the taxpayer with sufficient notice of hearing to constitute due process of law. Hutcheson v. Storrie, 92 Tex. 685, 45 L. R. A. 289, 31 S. W. 848; Charles v. Warren, 100 Fed. 538. The legislature, in adopting the front-foot rule for the making of these assessments, adopted an arbitrary basis for determining the amount of benefits, without exercising any judgment whatever upon that question. Ramsey County v. Robert P. Lewis Co (Minn.) 85 N. W. 207. The defendant in error was not a petitioner for the improvement, and his silence or delay in objecting to the proceedings cannot in any way prejudice his rights. Cooley, Const. Lim. 224; Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. 8. 425, 30 L. ed. 178, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1121; Columbus v. Agler, 44 Ohio St. 486, 8 N. E. 302; Wyandotte County Conrs. v. Kansas City, Ft. 8. & M. R. Co. 5 Kan. App. 43, 47 Pac. 326. Where the basis of an assessment is ille gal, as in this case, it is not necessary, as a condition of granting relief to complainant, to tender any sum as representing what might be the excess of cost over any benefits accruing to the property. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 43 L. ed. 443, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 187; Hayes v. Douglas County, 92 Wis. 429, 31 L. R. A. 213, 65 N. W. 482; Solomon v. Oscoda Twp. 77 Mich. 365, 43 N. W. 990; Auditor General v. Prescott, 94 Mich. 190, 53 N. W. 1058. [399] *Mr. Justice Shiras delivered the opinion of the court: This was the case of a bill in equity filed in the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Michigan by Ralzemond A. Parker, a citizen of the state of Michigan, against the city of Detroit and certain officers of said city, seeking to set aside certain assessments and tax sales of complainant's land for the paving of Woodward and Blaine avenues in the city of Detroit. The paving in question was done in pursuance of certain statutes of the state of Michigan, constituting the charter of the city of Detroit, and of ordinances of the common council of said city. There was no allegation or proof that, in [400] the proceedings which resulted in the making of the improvements and in assessing complainant's lots for a portion of the costs thereof, there had been any disregard of the provisions of the statutes and ordinances, or that complainant's property had been charged differently from that of the other lot owners. Nor was it alleged that the portion or share of the cost of making the improvements assessed against complainant's property in point of fact exceeded the benefits accruing to each property by reason of such paving. The only foundation of the bill was the allegation that "the said statutes and ordinances providing for the paving and grading of streets are in violation of the rights of the complainant under the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in that they do not provide for any hearing or review of assessments at which the property owner can show that his property was not benefited to the amount of such assessments, but that the same shall be made arbitrarily according to the foot front." The case was thus disposed of by the learned judge in the circuit court: "It is the claim of complainant that the charter, in the provisions mentioned (that the entire cost of the street improvements, except for street and alley crossings, etc., | sessments per foot front, on the ground that the ruling in Baker v. Norwood must be confined to the facts of that case and have o application to an assessment for paving. With all respect for that learned tribunal, I am constrained under the cases cited to a [401] different opinion of the decision, and to follow the Supreme Court of the United States upon the construction of the 14th Amenument of the Federal Constitution." Accordingly a decree was entered in accordance with the prayer of the bill, and a perpetual injunction was issued. Parker v. Detroit, 103 Fed. Rep. 357. This court has recently decided, in the case of Cass Farm Co. v. Detroit, affirming a judgment of the supreme court of Michigan, that "it was not the intention of the 14th Amendment to subvert the systems of the states pertaining to general and special taxation; that that Amendment legitimately operates to extend to the citizens and residents of the states the same protection against arbitrary state legislation affecting life, liberty, and property, as is afforded by the 5th Amendment against similar legislation by Congress; and that the Federal courts ought not to interfere when what is complained of is the enforcement of the settled laws of the state, applicable to all persons in like circumstances and conditions, but only when there is some abuse of law, amounting to confiscation of property or deprivation of personal rights, as was instanced in the case of Norwood v. Baker." 181 U. S. 396, ante, 914, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 645. Like conclusions were reached, after a full consideration of the authorities, in French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 181 U. S. 324. ante, 879, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625, and in Wight v. Davidson, 181 U. S. 371, ante, 900, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 616. The decree of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court with directions to dismiss the bill of complaint. v. Detroit, 181 U. S. 396, ante, 914, 21 Sup. For dissenting opinion see Cass Farm Co. Ct. Rep. 645. *JAMES L. WORMLEY, Plff. in Err.,[402] v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. shall be assessed against the abutting prop- ANNA P. HOOVER ALLEN and Others, erty by the fronting measurement, without any regard to the special benefits received by the property or the relation to the cost of the improvement), is in conflict with the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and is null and void; that such legislation constitutes taking of property without just compensation, and is a denial of equal protection of the law. The case of the village of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 43 L. ed. 443, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 187, is the foundation for this position, and seems fully to sanction it. The supreme court of Michigan has declined to depart from its decisions sustaining the constitu Piffs. in Err., v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (See & C. Reporter's ed. 402.) Constitutional law assessments for im provements. Submitted [Nos. 101 and 102.] November 12, 1900. Decided District of Columbia to review decisions N ERROR to the Court of Appeals of the tionality f like statutes providing for as-sustaining assessments. Affirmed. 181 U. S. U. S., Book 45. 58 921 See same cases below, 15 App. D. C. 58, 70. Mr. D. W. Baker submitted for plaintiff in error. Messrs. John C. Gittings and Malcolm Hufty were with him on the brief: Special assessments are void and unconstitutional where made without any regard to the benefit conferred on the property. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 43 L. ed. 443, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 187; Charles v. Marion, 100 Fed. 538; Lyon v. Tonawanda, 98 Fed. 361. The legislature has no power to assess property for a local improvement without giving the property owners an opportunity to be heard on the question whether the improvement for which the assessment is levied is a benefit to the property. Hutcheson v. Storrie, 92 Tex. 685, 45 L. R. A. 289, 51 S. W. 848; Sears v. Boston Street Comrs. 173 Mass. 350, 53 N. E. 876; Detroit v. Judge of Recorder's Ct. 112 Mich. 588, 42 L.. R. A. 638, 71 N. W. 149; Loeb v. Columbia Twp. 91 Fed. 37; Walsh v. Barron, 61 Ohio St. 15, 55 N. E. 164. Messrs. Andrew B. Duvall and Clar ence A. Brandenburg submitted for defendant in error: While it is true that the act of Congress did not in terms expressly provide for notice to the owners of property to be assessed, it is not invalid for that reason. Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30, 37 L. ed. 637, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 750; Allman v. District of Columbia, 3 App. D. C. 24; Lyman v. Plummer, 75 Iowa, 353, 39 N. W. 527. The legislature has the right to determine the amount of taxes to be raised, the property to be assessed and upon which they are to be apportioned, and the rule of apportionment. | L. ed. 616; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345, 31 L. ed. 763, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 921; Walslon v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578, 32 L. ed. 544, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192; Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 41 L. ed. 369, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 56. The right to pass a reassessment law has been repeatedly exercised in various jurisdic tions, and the validity thereof repeatedly sustained. Welty, Assessments, 383; Tifft v. Buffalo, 82 N. Y. 204; Thomson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327, 18 L. ed. 177; O'Brien v. Baltimore County Comrs. 51 Md. 24; People er rel. Albany & S. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 35 N. Y. 552; Howell v. Buffalo, 37 N. Y. 267; Re Van Antwerp, 56 N. Y. 261; Howard Sav. Inst. v. Newark, 52 N. J. L. 1, 18 Atl. 672; Tuttle v. Polk, 84 Iowa, 12, 50 N. W. 38; Dean v. Borchsenius, 30 Wis. 247; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345, 31 L. ed. 763, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 921. *PER CURIAM: And now, April 29, 1901, the judgments in the foregoing cases are aflirmed, with costs, on the authority of Parsons v. Dis trict of Columbia, 170 U. S. 45, 42 L. ed. 943, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 521, and French v. Barbcr Asphalt Paving Co. 181 U. S. 324, ante, 879, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625. For dissenting opinion, see Cass Farm Co. Ct. Rep. 645. v. Detroit, 181 U. S. 396, ante, 914, 21 Sup. JOHN L. SHUMATE, Plff. in Err., v. AUGUST HEMAN. (See 8. C. Reporter's ed. 402, 403.) Constitutional law-assessment for improve ments. This case is determined by the decision French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Company, 181 U. S. 324, antc, 879, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625. [No. 550.] Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345, 31 L. ed. 763, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 921; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U. S. 702, 28 L. ed. 570, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 663; Cooley, Taxn. 447; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 584, 42 ed. 286, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 966; Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578, 32 L. ed. 544, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, 35 L. ed. 419, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 825; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Decatur, 147 U. S. 190, 37 L. ed. 132, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293; Paulsen v. Argued February 25, 26, 27, 1901. Decided Portland, 149 U. S. 30, 37 L. ed. 637, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 750; Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Brad ley, 164 U. S. 112, 41 L. ed. 369, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 56; Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U. S. 304, 42 L. ed. 1047, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617; 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. § 752. This court has sustained the validity of laws enacted by Congress, authorizing similar assessments for the same kind of work in the District of Columbia. Willard v. Presbury, 14 Wall. 676, 20 L. ed. 719; Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U. S. 687, 24 L. ed. 1098. Had this court in Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 43 L. ed. 443, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 187, regarded the assessment in that case as falling under the head of taxation, even though somewhat in excess of the actual benefit to the property assessed, it would not have interfered. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 April 29, 1901. State of Missouri to review a decision affirming a judgment enforcing payment of ■ special tax bill for construction of a sewer. Affirmed. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the See same case below, sub nom. Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 534, 57 S. W. 559. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. G. B. Webster argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Hiram J. Grover and Hamilton Grover, filed a brief for plaintif in error: There can be no valid tax without a valid assessment. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Apperson, 97 Mo. 306, 10 S. W. 478; State ex rel. Wyatt NOTE. On assessment of the cost of the con struction of sewers-see notes to Re Kingman (Mass.) 12 L. R. A. 417; and Proprietors of Cemetery v. Cambridge (Mass.) 4 L. R. A. 836. (408 v. Wabash R. Co. 114 Mo. 1, 21 S. W. 26;, v. Shelbyville, 154 Ind. 467, 49 L. R. A. 797, The assessment must be made in the manner provided by the statute which authorized the taxation, and a departure in any material part is fatal. Blackwell, Tax Titles, 2d ed. 255; Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. § 769; Lyon v. Alley, 130 U. S. 177, 32 L. ed. 899, 9 Sup. Ot. Rep. 480; Marx v. Hanthorn, 148 U. S. 172, 37 L. ed. 410, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 508; Campbell County Judge v. Taylor, 8 Bush, 206; Westfall v. Preston, 49 Ñ. Y. 353; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Apperson, 97 Mo. 306, 10 S. W. 478. This is especially true of special assessments for local improvements. 2 Desty, Taxn. p. 1331; Cooley, Taxn. 2d ed. p. 659; Re Cameron, 50 N. Y. 502; Sharp v. Speir, 4 Hill, 76; Warren v. Grand Haven, 30 Mich. 24; Covington v. Casey, 3 Bush, 698; St. Louis v. Ranken, 96 Mo. 497, 9 S. W. 910. The decision and opinion of this court in Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 43 L. ed. 443, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 187, was binding on the supreme court, and it was error on the part of the court to decline to follow it. U. S. Const. art. 6, § 2; Black v. Lusk, 69 Ill. 70; Lebanon Bank v. Mangan, 28 Pa. 452; Cabunne v. Lindell, 12 Mo. 189. Messrs. Robert E. Collins and David Goldsmith argued the cause, and, with Mr. H. P. Rodgers, filed a brief for defendant in | error: An assessment for the construction of sewers is similar to one for the construction of sidewalks. Protestant Orphan Asylum's Appeal, 111 Pa. 135, 3 Atl. 217; Smith v. Kingston, 120 Pa. 363, 14 Atl. 170; Cooley, Taxn. 2d ed. p. 590. Restrictions upon the legislative or municipal power of assessments for street improvements proper do not apply to assessments for the construction of sidewalks. Where a board is required to make the as- James v. Pine Bluff, 49 Ark. 202, 4 S. W. sessment, that duty cannot be performed by 760; Wilson v. Philippi, 39 W. Va. 82, 19 S. an individual meniber or an employee. E. 553; State, Agens, Prosecutor, v. Newark, Metcalf v. Messenger, 46 Barb. 325; Mid-37 N. J. L. 423, 18 Am. Rep. 729; Macon v. dletown v. Berlin, 18 Conn. 197; People v. Hagar, 49 Cal. 229; Oteri v. Parker, 42 La. Ann. 374, 7 So. 570; Belfast Sav. Bank v. Kennebec Land & Lumber Co. 73 Me. 404. These liens are creations of law, and to establish them every step prescribed by law must be taken. Proceedings for the enforcement of such liens are in invitum and must be strictly construed. Leach v. Cargill, 60 Mo. 316; Kiley v. Oppenheimer, 55 Mo. 374; Church v. People ex rel. Kochersperger, 179 Ill. 205, 53 N. E. 554; Stockton v. Whitmore, 50 Cal. 554. Patty, 57 Miss. 406, 34 Am. Rep. 451; Sands v. Richmond, 31 Gratt. 571, 31 Am. Rep. 742; Palmer v. Way, 6 Colo. 106. An assessment of the cost of sewers against property in the sewer district, made according to area, and not based upon value, benefits, or improvements, is valid. Keese v. Denver, 10 Colo. 112, 15 Pac. 825; Pueblo v. Robinson, 12 Colo. 593, 21 Pac. 899. Wherever the frontage rule of assessment has come into question in other states its validity has been sustained. Any assessment of special taxes under a Speer v. Athens, 85 Ga. 49, 9 L. R. A. 402, law which does not afford the property own- 11 S. E. 802; Fort Wayne v. Cody, 48 Ind. er an opportunity to be heard on the ques- 197; Meggett v. Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 326, 51 tion of benefits and the fairness of the appor-N. W. 566; White v. People ex rel. Bloomtionment of the tax, and does not empowerington, 94 Ill. 604; Rolph v. Fargo, 7 N. D. the municipal authorities to consider this 640, 42 L. R. A. 646, 76 N. W. 242; English question in fixing the assessment, is a nulli- | v. Williams, 2 Marv. (Del.) 63, 37 Atl. 158; ty; and any law which excludes from the assessment of such taxes the question of corresponding benefits is unconstitutional and void. Northern Indiana R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio St. 159; Cleveland v. Tripp, 13 R. I. 50; Whiting v. Townsend, 57 Cal. 519; Daily v. Suope, 47 Miss. 367; Parker v. Challiss, 9 Kan. 155; State ex rel. Stateler v. Reis, 38 Minn. 371, 38 N. W. 97; Preston v. Rudd, 84 Ky. 154; Davis v. Lynchburg, 84 Va. 870, 6 S. E. 230; Parkersburg v. Tavenner, 42 W. Va. 489, 26 S. E. 179; AL len v. Drew, 44 Vt. 174; Kalamazoo v. Francoise, 115 Mich. 554, 73 N. W. 801; Moberly v. Hogan, 131 Mo. 19, 32 S. W. 1014; People ex rel. Griffin v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 55 Am. Dec. 266; Spencer v. Merchant, 100 N. Y. 585, 3 N. E. 682; McKeesport Boro, use of McKeesport City, v. Busch, 166 Pa. 46, 31 Atl. 49; Warren v. Henly, 31 Iowa, 31. 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. pp. 932, 936; Asberry v. Roanoke, 91 Va. 562, 42 L. R. A. 636. 22 S. E. 360; Detroit v. Judge of Rccorder's Ct. 112 Mich. 588, 42 L. R. A. 638, 71 N. W. 149; Weed v. Boston, 172 Mass. 28, 42 L. R. A. 642, 51 N. E. 204; Violett v. Alexandria, 92 Va. 561, 31 L. R. A. 382, 23 S. E. 909; Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 146, 3 Am. Rep. 615; State, Agens, Prosecutor, v. Newark, 37 N. J. L. 415, 18 Am. Rep. 729; Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 43 L. ed. 443, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 187; Hutcheson v. Storrie, 92 Tex. 685, 45 L. R. A. 289, 51 S. W. 848; Fay v. Springfield, 94 Fed. 409; Charles v. Marion, 98 Fed. 166; Cowley v. Spokane, 99 Fed. 840; Lyon v. Tonawanda, 98 Fed. 361; Walsh v. Barron, 61 Ohio St. Willard v. Presbury, 14 Wall. 676, 20 L. 15, 55 N. E. 164; Parker v. Detroit, 103 Fed. ed. 719; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345, 357; Bidwell v. Huff, 103 Fed. 362; Adams | 31 L. ed. 763, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 921; Walston The conclusiveness and validity of fixed legislative assessments are maintained by the prior decisions of this court. Err., v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578, 32 L. ed. 544, 9 Sup. *THOMAS F. FARRELL et al., Plffs. in[404) Ct. Rep. 192; Parsons v. District of Columbia, 170 U. S. 45, 42 L. ed. 943, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 521. A citizen is not entitled to notice where there is no hearing, and there is none when a local assessment is made, pursuant to legislative prescription, according to frontage or area. Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. ed. 569, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 663; Parsons v. District of Columbia, 170 U. S. 54, 42 L. ed. 947, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 521; Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U. S. 311, 42 L. ed. 1049, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617. v. WEST CHICAGO PARK COMMISSION ERS. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 404.) Constitutional law assessments for im provements. This case is determined by the decision rendered [No. 201.] Irrespective of this rule, a sufficient hear- Argued March 18, 19, 1901. Decided April ing and notice are provided for. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. ed. 569, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 663; St. Louis v. Richeson, 76 Mo. 470; Saxton Nat. Bank v. Carswell, 126 Mo. 436, 29 S. W. 279. [403] *Mr. Justice Shiras delivered the opinion of the court: 29, 1901. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois to review a decision sustaining assessments for the improvement of an avenue or boulevard. Affirmed. See same case below, 182 Ill. 250, 55 N. E. The facts are stated in the opinion. ror: institution of a new assessment for the pur- This was a suit brought in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis by August Heman to enforce payment of a special tax bill issued in his favor by that city for the construction of a sewer in what is called Euclid avenue sewer district. The plaintiff recovered a judgment, and the defendants, who were owners of property assessed for the cost of making said sewer, appealed to the supreme court of Missouri, where the judgv. inent of the trial court was affirmed, the case being reported as Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 534, 57 S. W. 559, and after such affirmance the defendant brought the case to this court by writ of error. The only question which is open to our consideration upon this record is the contention of the plaintiff in error that the provisions of the charter of the city of St. Louis, the ordinances of the municipal assembly, the contract with the defendant in error, made thereunder, and the assessment against the property of the plaintiff in error for the cost of the construction of said sewer, were null, void, and of no effect for the reason that they were repugnant to the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, as construed and applied in the case of Norwood v. Baker, 172 Ú. S. 269, 43 L. ed. 443, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 187. This contention has been considered and determined, under a similar state of facts, by this court, in the recent case of French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. in error to the supreme court of the state of Missour (181 U. S. 324, ante, 879, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625), and upon the authority of that case the judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri is affirmed. For dissenting opinion, see Cass Farm Co. v. Detroit, 181 U. S. 396, ante, 914, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 645. Lyon v. Tonawanda, 98 Fed. 361; Norwood Under the established laws of Illinois no Carlyle v. Clinton County, 140 Ill. 512, 30 Under the Constitution and laws of Illi- Kuchner v. Freeport, 143 Ill. 92, 17 L. R. The ordinance of March 28, 1893, which was the only ordinance preceding the con struction of the improvement, was wholly void as to its provision for a special 'assessment or special tax. Culver v. People ex rel. Kochersperger, 161 Ill. 89, 43 N. E. 812; Farrell v. West Chicago, 162 Ill. 280, 44 N. E. 527; White v. West Chicago, 164 Ill. 196, 45 N. E. 495; People ex rel. Kochersperger v. Eggers, 164 Ill. 515, 45 N. E. 1074; Steenberg v. People ex rel. Kochersperger, 164 Ill. 478, 45 N. E. 970; People ex rel. Kochersperger v. Mark |