expedition, will be severely felt on our frontiers, as there is no doubt but that the Indians will, in their turn, (being flushed with victory,) invade our settlements, and exercise all their horrid murder upon the inhabitants thereof, whenever the weather will permit them to travel. Then is it not better to support us where we are, be the expense what it may, than to oblige such a number of your brave citizens, who have so long supported, and still continues to support, a dangerous frontier, (although thousands of their relatives in the flesh, have, in the prosecution thereof, fallen a sacrifice to savage inventions,) to quit the country, after all they have done and suffered, when you know that a frontier must be supported somewhere."

This memorial caused the Legislature of Virginia to authorize the Governor of that State to make any defensive operations necessary for the temporary defense of the frontiers, until the General Government could adopt and carry out measures to suppress the hostile Indians. The Governor at once called upon the military commanding officers in the western counties of Virginia, to raise, by the first of March, 1791, several small companies of rangers for this purpose. At the same time Charles Scott was appointed Brigadier-General of the militia of the district of Kentucky, with authority to raise two hundred and twenty-six volunteers, to protect the most exposed portions of that district.

A full report of the proceedings of the Legislature of Virginia in relation to the exposed condition and defense of the frontiers of that State, was transmitted to Congress, and upon consideration of the same, the General Government constituted a local Board of War for the district of Kentucky, composed of Brigadier-General Scott, Henry Innis, John Brown, Benjamin Logan and Isaac Shelby. On the ninth of March, 1791, General Henry Knox, Secretary of War, sent a letter of instructions to Brigadier-General Scott, recominending an expedition of mounted men, not exceeding seven hundred and fifty, against the Wea towns on the river Wabash. He recommended that this force be raised and conducted to the Indian villages of the Wabash, where, by rapid incursions the towns could be destroyed and many prisoners taken.

Pursuant to these instructions, Brigadier-General Scott, ou the twenty-third of May, 1791, crossed the Ohio, with about eight hundred mounted men, and cmmenced his march for the Wabash, which he reached on the first of June. Many of the Indians, having discovered his prcach, fled, but he suc ceeded in destroying all the villages around Ouiatenon, together with several Kickapoo towns, killing thirty-two warriors and taking fifty-eight prisoners. He released a few of the most infirm prisoners, giving them a "talk," which they carried to the towns farther up the Wabash, and which the wretched condition of his horses prevented him from reaching.

On the third of March, 1791, Congress provided for raising and equipping a regiment for the protection of the frontiers, and Governor St. Clair was invested with the chief command of about three thousand troops, to be raised and employed against the hostile Indians in the territory over which his administration extended. He was instructed by the Secretary of War to march to the Miami village, and to establish strong and permanent military post at that place. He was also directed to establish, during his advance, such posts of communication with Fort Washington, along the Ohio, as, in his judgment might be required.

The post at the Miami village was intended to keep the savages in that vicinity in check, so as to prevent future hostilities, and it was the wish of the Secretary of War that it should be garrisoned not only strong enough for the defense of the place, but so as to afford, at all times, a detachment of five or six hundred men, either to chastise any of the Wabash or other hostile Indians, or to capture convoys of the enemy's provisions. In his letter to Governor St. Clair, he urged that "the establishment of said post is considered as an important object of the campaign, and is to take place in all events. In case of a previous treaty, the Indians are to be conciliated upon this point if possible; and it is presumed good arguments may be offered to induce their acquiescence. Having commenced your march upon the main expedition, and the Indians continuing hostile, you will use every possible exertion to make them feel the effects of your superiority;

and, after having arrived at the Miami village, and put your works in a defensible state, you will seek the enemy with the whole of your remaining force, and endeavor, by all possible means, to strike them with great severity. In order to avoid future wars, it might be proper to make the Wabash and

thence over to the Maumee, and down the same to its mouth, at lake Erie, the boundary between the people of the United States and the Indians, (excepting so far as the same should relate to the Wyandots and Delawares,) on the supposition of their continuing faithful to the treaties. But if they should

join in the war against the United States, and your army be victorious, the said tribes ought to be removed without the boundary mentioned."

On the twenty-fifth of June, 1791, Governor St. Clair, previous to marching a strong force to the Miami town, as directed by the War Department, authorized Brigadier-General Wil

kinson to conduct a second expedition, not exceeding five hundred mounted men, against the Indian villages on the Wabash. Pursuant to these instructions, Wilkinson mustered his forces, and was ready to march on the twentieth of July, with five hundred and twenty-five mounted volunteers, well armed, and provided with thirty days' provisions. With this

force he reached the Ke-na-pa-com-a-qua village, on the northern bank of the Eel river, about six miles from a point where that river joins the Wabash, on the seventh of August, and succeeded in killing six warriors and taking thirty-four prisoners, before they could escape. This town, which was scattered along Eel river for a distance of three miles, was totally destroyed.

Wilkinson encamped on the ruins of the town that night, and on the following day he commenced his march for the Kickapoo town on the prairie, which he was unable to reach owing to the impassable condition of the route which he adopted, and the failing condition of his horses. He estimated the results of the expedition, in his official report, as follows: "I have destroyed the chief town of the Ouiatenon nation, and have made prisoners of the sons and sisters of the king. I have burned a respectable Kickapoo village, and cut down at least four hundred and thirty acres of corn, chiefly in the milk."

THE

CHAPTER VIII.

ST. OLAIR AND WAYNE'S EXPEDITIONS.

HE three expeditions under Harmer, Scott and Wilkinson resulted in great damage to the Indians, but by no means subdued them. They regarded the policy of the United States as calculated to exterminate them from the land, and, goaded on by the English of Detroit, the enemies of the Americans,

they were excited to desperation. At this time the government of Great Britain still supported garrisons at Niagara, Detroit and Michilimackinac, notwithstanding it was declared by the second article of the definite treaty of peace of 1788, that the king of Great Britain would, "with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction or carrying away