The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational ContractingFree Press, 1987 - 450 páginas This sequel to Markets and Hierarchies develops and extends Williamson's innovative use of transaction cost economics as an approach to studying economic organization by applying it to work and labour as well as to the corporation itself. In addition, Williamson explores its growing implications for public policy, including its potential influence on antitrust and merger guidelines, labour policy, and SEC and public utility regulations. |
Contenido
PROLOGUE | 1 |
Efficient Governance | 2 |
Uncertainty | 3 |
Derechos de autor | |
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Otras ediciones - Ver todas
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting Oliver E. Williamson Vista de fragmentos - 1985 |
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting Oliver E. Williamson Vista de fragmentos - 1985 |
Términos y frases comunes
adaptations agreement Alchian alternative antitrust arbitration argument assessment asset specificity Assume attributes bargaining benefits bilateral bounded rationality buyer capital CATV ceteris paribus Chandler Chapter Coase comparative institutional competition complex condition contract renewal interval corporation decision described developed differences discussed distribution economic organization economies of scale effect efficiency efforts employees ex ante ex post exchange favor firm forward integration franchise bidding golden parachute governance structures hazards hierarchy high-powered incentives hostage human asset industry innovation Inside Contracting interest internal organization investments issues kind labor M-form manufacturers merger microanalytic modes monopoly natural monopoly needs neoclassical node nomic observed operating opportunism organizational ownership parties posed presumably price discrimination private ordering problems purpose technology realized reference relation relevant respects responsible result safeguards Schwinn specific assets strategic supplier supply stage theory tion trading transaction cost economics transaction-specific uncertainty vertical integration Williamson workers