duties as an employe of the city of Grand Rapids. At the inception of this cause, the parties, desiring to avoid the expense and delay of arbitration, entered into a stipulation whereby they waived the action of arbitrators. The stipulation contained the following: "That the arbitration of the matters in difference between the parties hereto, provided for in said Workmen's Compensation Law, be and the same is hereby waived, and the decision of said matters is hereby submitted to the Industrial Accident Board, sitting as a full board, the same as if this cause had proceeded to arbitration under said law and the decision on arbitration therein had been appealed from and said cause thereby brought before the full board on appeal from such decision. It is further stipulated and agreed that the decision of said board in this cause pursuant to this stipulation, and based upon the facts set forth herein, shall be valid and binding, and shall have the same validity, force, and effect as if said cause had proceeded in arbitration in due course, and was brought before the full board on appeal duly taken from the decision of an arbitration committee therein." The stipulation showed the amount earned was $19.50 a week of which he contributed to his mother $12.00 a week. This stipulation was signed on the 5th day of March, 1914. After the signing of it and before action was taken by the Industrial Accident Board, the father of the deceased, whom the mother had divorced, attempted to prevent the mother from obtaining any benefit under the Compensation law, and filed with the Industrial Accident Board objections to her claim, insisting she was not dependent upon her son. The return of the Accident Board contains the following: "That a petition was filed in said cause by Cornelius Vereeke, the former husband of the applicant, Kate Vereeke, claiming for reasons set forth in said petition that the applicant, Kate Vereeke, was not entitled to receive or recover any compensation in said cause; that said cause came on to be heard before the Board on due notice to all the parties, said hearing being held at the office of the Industrial Accident Board on the 22d day of April, 1914, and that said Cornelius Vereeke did not appear at said hearing and did not offer or file any proofs tending to support his said petition; that on said hearing in said cause, said applicant, Kate Vereeke, was sworn as a witness in her behalf." After counsel for Mrs. Vereeke concluded his examination of her the following occurred: "Mr. Reaves: Q. What other income did you have, Mrs. Vereeke, besides the $12.00 Dave gave you? "A. John, my little boy, just commenced to work about a year ago next June, he ain't very strong, so he just got little odds and ends working in five-cent shows and like that. He went to school and worked after school in the Vaudette; he was usher there. "Mr. Reaves: Q. That was all the income you had? "A. John wasn't getting very much in the Vaudette, I got a little from him, and I had an old man there, I got some from him, too. "Q. The old man boarded there? No further explanation was made of her relations with her father or her son John. The Accident Board made an order allowing Mrs. Vereeke six dollars a week for three hundred weeks, and a present payment of $124. Mrs. Vereeke seeks a review of this order claiming: "First: Assuming that the Board had the right to go outside of the stipulated facts, there was nothing in the evidence that could justify the decision of the Board. "Second: The parties having agreed upon the facts, the statute delegated no authority to the Board to disregard the agreement. "Third: The Board having authorized a stipulation, and the parties having stipulated, the agreement should be treated the same as a case made or a stipulation of facts by the parties in the case." A great many authorities are cited to show that the Industrial Accident Board was bound by the stipulation. We think it clear, however, that the purpose of the stipulation was to avoid the necessity of a hearing before arbitrators, and to get the direct action of the Industrial Accident Board. Section 5, pt. 3, of Act No. 10, Public Acts, Extra Session, 1912, (2 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 3973), reads: "If the employer, or the insurance company carrying such risk, or Commissioner of Insurance, as the case may be, and the injured employe reach an agreement in regard to compensation under this act, a memorandum of such agreement shall be filed with the Industrial Accident Board, and, if approved by it, shall be deemed final and binding upon the parties thereto. Such agreements shall be approved by said board only when the terms conform to the provisions of this act." Section 11 provides what shall be done if a claim for review is filed. It is apparent from the record that when the diyorced husband denied the right of the claimant to an order for support growing out of the death of her son, that claimant and her counsel proceeded upon the theory that a hearing before the Industrial Accident Board should be had. It was not then urged that the parties were bound by the stipulation but without objection the hearing was entered upon. It is not necessary to intimate what the situation would have been if the claimant had relied upon the stipulation, nor what the effect would have been if she had explained more in detail her relations with her father and her son John. She did not do either of these things. The order of the Industrial Board is affirmed. SUPREME COURT. LILLIAN BAYNE, VS. Claimant and Appellee, RIVERSIDE STORAGE & CARTAGE COMPANY, MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CAUSE OF DEATH. ACT-EVIDENCE Opinion evidence of two physicians that pneumonia did not result from injuries which decedent received in the course of his employment, and which were followed by his decease, contradicted by plaintiff's experts who gave a contrary opinion, held, not to justify the court in reversing the finding of the industrial accident board awarding compensation. Certiorari by the Riverside Storage & Cartage Company and Standard Accident Insurance Company to the Industrial Accident Board to review a finding of the board awarding compensation to Lillian Bayne for the death of her husband, Harry Bayne. Submitted April 29, 1914. Affirmed July 24, 1914. Keena, Lightner & Oxtoby, for appellants. OSTRANDER, J. Claimant's intestate, an employee of the Riverside Storage & Cartage Company, died September 9, 1913; the cause of death being pneumonia. Whether the pneumonia was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of decedent's employment was a question of fact, presented first to a board of arbitration and afterwards to the commission, both of which bodies answered it in the affirmative. Claimant's decedent was apparently a strong and well man and was employed in the labor of lifting and moving household furniture and other objects. He quit work the morn ing of August 27, 1913, after lifting, at apparent disadvantage, a heavy article, complaining that in lifting it he had hurt his back. He went to bed, and the next day a physician was called. In five days he became delirious. On September 6th Dr. Stockwell was called and had him removed to the hospital, where he died. Dr. Stockwell testified that when he examined the man on September 6th he displayed symptoms of pneu monia of two or three days' duration, his vitality was lowered, his condition debilitated, and he was delirious. Both claimant and respondent were of opinion that a connection between the injury and the death could be established only by the opinions of men having extra knowledge of the subject, and therefore physicians, other than the one who attended deceased, were called and their opinions taken. Conduct of the deceased prior to the alleged injury was laid before them, appearing that he had danced on a boat on the evening of August 24, 1913, had become heated, and complained of being chilled; that on August 25th and 26th he had worked as usual, making no complaints, had lifted and carried a heavy object in the afternoon of August 26th, and had complained that in setting it down he "must have kinked his back," and he said, on the morning of August 27th, that the jar of the wagon hurt his back when it crossed the street car track. Dr. Stockwell and Dr. Hitchcock testified there was no connection between the alleged injury and the pneumonia. Other physicians were of a contrary opinion, asserting the pneumonia to be directly caused by the injury. The case put by the plaintiff in certiorari, namely, that the employer is not liable to his employee for the consequences of disease superinduced by a physical condition, the result of the labors of the employment, is not the case before us. There is before us opinion evidence, disputed it is true, that the direct cause of the pneumonia was the hurt or strain of the back suffered by deceased August 27th. We do not understand it to be contended that, if the injury directly caused the cause of death, the employer would not be liable. Assuming that the court would have the right to brush aside wholly improbable expert testimony or correct the commission for not doing so, we do not feel warranted in |