but it was shown by Haberstoh himself that he saw nothing of any accident, and obtained his information from Charles Ruskei, the boy who worked in the shop afternoons, who himself saw nothing, but heard deceased state how he hurt his hand.

Coming directly to this line of testimony as applied to workmen's compensation cases, it is said in Boyd on Workmen's Compensation, p. 1123:

"The statements made by an injured man as to his bodily or mental feelings are admissible, but those made as to the cause of his illness are not to be received in evidence. The rule applies to statements made by a deceased workman to a fellow workman as to the cause of his injury."

And more fully in Bradbury on Workmen's Compensation, p. 403, as follows:

"The statement made by an employee in the absence of his employer, by a deceased man, as to his bodily or mental feelings are admissible in evidence, but those made as to the cause of his illness are not admissible in evidence and where there is no other evidence of an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment than statements made by a deceased employee in the absence of his employer, an award cannot be sustained."

In Gilbey v. Railway Co., 3 B. W. C. C. 135, where a workman at a meat market on arriving home told his wife that he had broken his rib when trying to save some meat from slipping into the dirt, the court said:

"To hold such statements ought to be admitted as evidence of the origin of the facts deposed is, I think, impossible. Such a contention is contrary to all authority."

This rule is emphasized to the extent of even holding admis sion of such evidence reversible error in Smith vs. Hardman & Holden, Ltd., 6 B. W. C. C. 719, because the mind of the trial court might have been "colored by his admitting statements which are inadmissible as evidence."

We do not think, however, that under the language used in our workmen's compensation act the decisions of its adminis

trative board must be in all cases reversed under the rule of presumptive prejudice, because of error in the admission of incompetent testimony, when in the absence of fraud, there appears in the record a legal basis for its findings, which are made "conclusive" by statute when said board acts within the scope of its authority.

As a part of the plan for a practical administration of this law, section 17 of part 3 requires each employer who elects to come under the provisions of said act to keep a record of injuries "received by his employees in the course of their employment," and within ten days after an accident resulting in personal injury to report the same in writing to the industrial accident board, on blanks printed for that purpose.

The first knowledge which came to the board of this accident is contained in the report of appellant, made by an admitted agent. It is dated January 9, 1913, and marked "First Report of Accident." It states, amongst other things, that on December 26, 1912, Reck, a baker by trade, was injured; the "cause and manner of accident" being that he "was throwing wood in furnace and a nail run in left hand inflicting a deep gash." This report was made three days before Reck's death, and indicates that the employer, or his representatives, had full notice of the injury, with ample opportunity to inves tigate while Reck was alive, and all sources of information were both fresh and available. A second report, after Reck's death, made on January 15, 1913, giving the same date of the accident, etc., states of its "cause and manner:"

"The injured was throwing wood in the fire and a nail scratched his left hand. He worked for two or three days after the accident, when the hand became infected, and he was sent to the hospital. After the hand had started to heal nicely he contracted bronchopneumonia, which disease caused his death January 13, 1913."

We think that such reports from the employer, where all sources of information are at his command when the reports are made, and he has had ample opportunity to satisfy himself of the facts can properly be taken as an admission, and, at

least, as prima facie evidence that such accident and injury occurred as reported.

No evidence was offered to impeach the reports or to show that the accident occurred otherwise than as stated in them. Eliminating from consideration the hearsay testimony erroneously admitted, which could not affect either way the legal significance of such reports, the record furnishes legal support for the findings of fact made. Consequently such findings are to be recognized as conclusive under the statute. The decision of said industrial accident board is therefore affirmed.

Act No. 10, Extra Session 1912, providing compensation for injuries to employees, or for their death in the course of their employment (2 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 3939 et seq.), is in derogation of the common law and should be strictly construed, although it is a remedial statute and creates a right against one who would not otherwise be liable.

2. SAME AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION.

Where a servant has worked in his employment for practically the whole year preceding his injury, his average annual earnings are known or ascertainable and the average weekly wages are to be determined by finding one fifty-second of the annual earnings.

3. SAME-TERM OF EMPLOYMENT.

If the workman has not been employed during substantially the entire year, but his daily wage or salary is fixed, or known, his average earnings as a basis of compensation will be 300 times the daily wage or salary. In case his employment has been limited in term, or there is insufficient data from which to determine his annual earnings, they are to be determined by taking 300 times his daily wage or salary, or the daily wage of similar workmen in like employment.

4. SAME IRREGULAR EMPLOYMENT.

Decedent worked in a coal mine in the Saginaw valley. The employment was not continuous, but operations were carried on for an average of 211 days in a year. Payment was fixed by contract on the basis of the number of tons produced, and the amount that each miner received depended on the coal which was sent up on his number. During the year which preceded the death of deceased, the mine in which he was employed was operated 148 days, and he received $507.45. While the mine was not in operation, he worked as a cement block layer for another employer, earning nearly the same amount of wages. Held, that the first three classes mentioned under section 11 of the compensation act were intended to include workmen who were employed during substantially the whole year prior to the accident, and that it would not be reasonable or fair to apply such methods of compensation to the case of deceased, and that the average annual earnings should be computed on the basis of the average for the preceding eight years, as provided by the fourth classification under this section of the law.

Certiorari to the industrial accident board. Submitted Novomber 5, 1913. Decided October 2, 1914. Rehearing denied January 29, 1915.

Anna Andrejwski presented her claim for compensation for the death of her husband, Joseph Andrejwski, against the Wolverine Coal Company. From the order entered awarding compensation, contestant brings certiorari. Reduced and judgment entered.

George M. Humphrey (Humphrey. Grant & Humphrey, of counsel), for appellant.

Coumans & Gaffney, for appellee.

MCALVAY, C. J. This case is brought to this court by the appellant upon a writ of certiorari to review the decision and order of the industrial accident board in affirming an award theretofore made in said cause by the arbitration committee therein. There appears to be but little dispute upon the material facts in the case.

Joseph Andrejwski, deceased, was claimant's husband, employed by appellant in its mine No. 2. On November 18, 1912, in the course of his employment, he came to his death by an accident, which occurred without fault of either party. At this time both the employer and employed had voluntarily made their election to come under and be governed by the employers' liability and workmen's compensation act, being Act No. 10 of the Public Acts of Michigan, Extra Session, 1912. (2 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 3939 et seq.) Claimant is the sole dependent of deceased entitled to such compensation as may be granted under said act. Deceased had worked as a minor continuously in this mine for ten years before this accident, during all of the time the mine was being worked. This is a coal mine operated by appellant, and is located near Bay City in the Saginaw valley district. This is the principal coal mining district in this State, and includes the operation, under similar conditions, of a number of companies and mines. The mine in question and the other mines in this district do not run continuously during the entire year; some entirely suspend operations for several months during the summer, and others do not operate during a portion of each month, in a measure caused by the fact that operations are controlled by the sales of the product, which depend entirely upon orders. Operations also depend upon weather conditions.

The record shows that no mine in the district runs or has ever run 300 days in the year. It also appears from the operations of these mines for the years 1909 to 1912, inclusive, that the coal mining industry in this district has been carried on on the average for only 211 days in each year.

The miners are paid on contract by the ton and work on numbers. The amount paid depends on the amount each miner