Which request the Board refused, for the reason that the finding of law made by it, and set forth in the return, is sufficiently definite.

Counsel for appellant state that there are but two general questions presented in the case:

1. Did the Board err in setting aside the settlement agreement of January 26, 1914?

2. Was the award based on a percentage loss of the right hand?

(1) Upon the first point counsel rely principally upon section 5 of Part 2 of the Act. They concede that such an agreement as the statute contemplates, may be set aside for fraud, mistake or undue influence. In our opinion the statute contemplates an agreement and settlement made without contingency or condition; and not one based upon a possible or probable event that may render it inoperative. An agreement and settlement based on the strength of such a condition or contingency is not such as the statute contemplates. Here, according to the testimony of the adjuster Pocklington, the settlement was based upon the understanding that if claimant's hand got worse so that he should lose the usefulness of the hand, the Board would see that he got paid for it.

The testimony of the claimant and his wife went much further, and was to the effect that if the hand and fingers did not get better, he could put the matter before the Board, and that the agreement would not be binding, or final.

It does not meet the question to say that Mr. Pocklington did not intend to act fraudulently. The material question is, what was the effect of what he said?

Ordinarily one cannot successfully ask for affirmative relief on the bare ground that he was either ignorant of the law, or mistaken as to what it prescribed. But it is now well settled that this rule is not invariably to be applied. In many cases where injustice would be done by its enforcement, this has been avoided by declaring that a mistake as to the existence of certain particular rights, though caused by an erroneous

idea as to the legal effect of an instrument, or as to the duties or obligations created by an agreement, was really a mistake of fact, and not strictly one of law, and so did not constitute an insuperable bar to relief.

Reggio v. Warren, 207 Mass., 525, as reported in Vol. 20 A. & E. Ann. Cases, 1244, and cases cited in note.

The rule is that a release may be rescinded for a mutual mistake of law. Kirchner v. New Home Sewing Mach. Co., 135 N. Y., 189.

Whether placed upon the ground of constructive fraud, or mistake of fact as well as of law, the law forbids that a party, who, with full knowledge of the ignorance of the other contracting party, has not only encouraged that ignorance, but has knowingly deceived and led that other into a mistaken conception of his legal rights, should shield himself behind the doctrine that a mere mistake of law affords no ground for relief.

We think that placing its action upon either ground, the Board did not err in acting, notwithstanding the so-called settlement agreement.

(2) The remaining assignments of error may be considered together.

It should be stated that the order of the Board was made before the opinion of this court in Hirschkorn v. Fiege Desk Co., 150 N. W., 851, was rendered. That case has been fol lowed by Cline v. Studebaker Corporation, 135 N. W., 519.

Those cases hold that as the Act (Section 10 Part 2) under the schedule of specific indemnity provides compensation only for the loss of an eye, an award cannot be arrived at upon a basis of a partial loss of the same.

We think that this principle, and the reasoning of the cases apply as well in the case of an injury to a hand as to an eye. Although there is no special finding upon the point, it is evident from the language used by the Board that it made its

allowance under the schedule of fixed liabilities contained in the above cited section, instead of under the first clause of that section, which is as follows:

"While the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is partial, the employer shall pay, or cause to be paid as hereinafter provided, to the injured employe a weekly compensation equal to onehalf the difference between his average weekly wages before the injury, and the average weekly wages which he is able to earn thereafter, but not more than ten dollars a week; and in no case shall the period covered by such compensation be greater than three hundred weeks from the date of injury."

It was our first impression that the amount awarded was no greater than could have been given, by the evidence, under the clause above quoted, and that appellant had not been injured in the amount of the award. A more careful examination of the evidence leads us to doubt the correctness of that impression.

Under the practice as stated in Andrejwski v. Wolverine Coal Co., 182 Mich. 298, and Finn v. Detroit, Mt. C. & M. City Ry., 155 N. W., 721; 22 Det. L. N., 1204, the order of the said Industrial Accident Board is therefore reversed, and the case hereby remanded for such further hearing therein before said Board, as the parties may desire.

BARNYARD INFECTION-EVIDENCE-SUFFICIENCY OF.

Applicant claimed that the disease from which he suffered was contracted by infection caused by contact with and caring for sick horses of his employer and that it was an injury by accident within the meaning of the law.

HELD: Evidence insufficient to establish the claim.

Opinion by the Board:

Applicant claims compensation for disability resulting from what is termed barnyard infection which he claims was caused by contact with and caring for sick horses of his em ployer, the respondent in this case. It is claimed that the infection is a germ disease and that its communication to applicant from the horse constituted a personal injury by accident within the meaning of the Law. We have given very careful consideration to the case, and while convinced that a disease contracted by infection from the lodgment of germs or bacilli in the system constitutes an industrial accident, we are not convinced that the proofs will sustain the claim here made. The evidence shows that the first horse was taken sick on April 7th and two other horses became sick within the next 30 days. Bevans took care of the horses, administered medicine with a syringe and later, in the month of June, experienced a swelling in the throat. On August 3rd he consulted Dr. Colver who treated him, operated on the throat and later, December 3rd, took him to Ann Arbor for examination by Dr. Canfield. He was operated on by Dr. Canfield at Ann Arbor on December 9th, and returned home January 9th. Bevans says in his tes

timony that his disease was just the same as the horses had, so far as he could observe. The medical testimony is given by Dr. Mix, the veterinary who treated the horses, and Dr. Colver. Dr. Mix had no knowledge of the disease Bevans suffered from or of its nature. Dr. Canfield was not called as a witness. Dr. Colver testified that he did not know what Mr. Bevans' disease was or from what germ he was suffering. His testimony when fully examined does not make a reasonable showing in support of the claim that Bevans contracted the disease from the horse by accidental communication of the germ while caring for the horse or administering medicine. In the absence of evidence tending to prove that Bevans contracted this disease from the horse by showing the substantial identity of the germ and disease, there is no substantial basis for awarding compensation. Dr. Colver was not present at the operation performed by Dr. Canfield. The only evidence as to what Dr. Canfield found is the hearsay evidence of Dr. Colver as to what was said by Dr. Canfield.

We are convinced that the proofs do not fairly establish the claim and that no compensation can be awarded.