familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, then it arises 'out of the employment. But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause, and which comes from a hazard to which the workman would have been equally exposed, apart from the employment. The causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood. It must be incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of master and servant. It need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.

Being clearly of the opinion that the record warrants the conclusion that at the time of the injury the deceased was within the ambit of his employment, we also think that it is a justifiable conclusion that the accident can be fairly traced to his employment as a contributing and proximate cause. It is true that in going from one place to another, as was his duty, he naturally was compelled to assume risks not in anywise connected with the trimming, planting, and treating of shade trees. But his employment extended further than this and necessarily obliged him in the discharge of his duties to go from place to place, and in so doing to assume the risks of traffic upon the streets. Where employes are compelled during the course of their employment to travel about the streets it does not seem to us to be unreasonable to say that the danger of being struck by street-cars, automobiles, and traffic of every description should be taken account of.

We think it must be said that the very nature of the occupation of the deceased itself exposed him to the unusual risk and danger of an accident of this nature, and believe that the instant case is readily distinguishable from Hopkins v. Sugar Co., supra, where this court said that:

"No direct causal relation is claimed in the particular that the nature of the business of manufacturing sugar in itself exposes its employes to unusual risk or danger of accident of this nature."

It appears that in that case the deceased at the time of the accident had finished his duties of the day and had re

turned safely to his home city, Saginaw, and was injured because of slipping on the ice while passing on foot along a highway. In this case the deceased received his injury during the hours of employment while actively engaged in performing work for his master in accordance with duties imposed upon him by his employment. See Beaudry v. Watkins, 23 D. L. N. 378.

We are of the opinion that the order and award of the Industrial Accident Board should be and is hereby affirmed.

LOGGING INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.

Applicant's husband, Ephriam Tuttle, was killed while hauling logs for respondent lumber company from the skidway to the mill. He was to be paid $2.00 per thousand for hauling the logs. The hauling was along a private road built and maintained by the lumber company, and his was one of a number of teams engaged in the work. The contract did not provide that he should haul any particular logs or any specific amount, and the manner of doing the work and the control was practically the same as the men and teams employed by the company in this work by the day or month.

HELD: 1. That deceased was not an independent contractor, but an employe of the company.

Certiorari to the Industrial Accident Board.

Proceeding by Sarah Tuttle against the Embury-Martin Lumber Company under the Workmen's Compensation Act for compensation for the death of her husband. Compensation was awarded by the Industrial Accident Board, and respondents bring certiorari. Affirmed.

James F. Shepherd, of Cheboygan, Attorney for applicant. Adams, Crews, Bobb & Wescott, Attorneys for respondents.

STONE, C. J. The question involved in this case is whether Ephriam Tuttle, the deceased husband of Sarah Tuttle, the applicant, was an independent contractor, or an employe within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Industrial Accident Board found that his relation was that of employe, and from that finding the respondents have brought the case here by certiorari.

Ephriam Tuttle, for whose death applicant claims compensation, was engaged in hauling logs for Embury-Martin Lumber Company, near Cheboygan, on January 8, 1915, and met his death by being thrown from a load of logs while he was driving the team drawing the load between the skidway, where the logs were loaded, and the mill, where they were to be delivered. Tuttle was working for the company under the following agreement, as testified to, on direct examination, by E. L. Slade, woods superintendent of the company:

"Mr. Tuttle came to the office in the afternoon-I can't tell you the date it was in the neighborhood of ten days or two weeks before this accident occurred-and wanted to haul logs, and he wanted to know how we were hiring and I told him. I told him we had all the teams by the month that we could use, on account of our barn roomour barn was full and was hired ahead. He said he could stay at home and haul by the thousand, and I hired him to haul by the thousand, at two dollars a thousand, and we were to furnish the sleighs, and there was a certain pair of sleighs that the company had that he had hauled on the winter before, that had a short tongue, that he wished to use, and he came to town and brought those sleighs back

with him. He used those sleighs one day, on the Monday before * Later in the week Mr. Tuttle called me up by phone. He fixed our telephone line the wind blew it down, blew a tree across it or something. Anyway, he fixed the line up voluntarily; he done it of his own accord, but he received his pay for it from the office; I guess he got some tobacco and things that the clerk gave him for his services. I guess he was coming over to the office on purpose to see about hauling."

Q. "What was the conversation over the telephone?"

A. "He wanted to know if he could start hauling again, and I told him yes, to start on in the morning."

A. "That was the evening of the 7th."

Q. "Was that all that was said over the phone?"

A. "That is all I remember being said. It was a very short conversation."

Q. "Now, when hauling was done for you by the thousand feet, was it done on any particular days?"

A. "No, it was any day they are a mind to come after a load."

Q. "Or with any regularity at all?"

A. "No, they were loaded in turn as they came."

Q. "Were there any specifications made on a man's haul on any particular day?"

Q. "Did you determine-did the Embury-Martin Lumber Company or anybody in its behalf determine the size of his loads?"

A. "No sir."

Q. "Who did?"

A. "He did himself."

Q. "Does the Embury-Martin Lumber Company determine the size of the loads hauled by your employes?"

A. "It is simply up to the foreman and condition of his roads." Q. "Do you give does the Embury-Martin Lumber Company or any of its employes give persons who are hauling by the thousand feet any directions as to how they shall haul-as to the manner of their hauling-as to how rapidly they shall haul, or anything at all?" A. "One trip a day. We haul from that job one trip a day." Q. "You mean that is all you can haul?"

A. "That is all you can haul-one trip a day."

Q. "But you don't have any requirements by which they haul one trip a day?"

A. "No sir."

Q. "Or any particular number of trips?"

A. "No sir."

Q. "You simply tell them to haul from the skidway?"

Q. "These people who haul by the thousand feet handle the logs at that end to where they are hauling, did they?"

A. "Yes sir."

Q. "They come and go where they please and haul such loads as they please?"

A. "Yes sir."

Q. "When are they paid?"

A.

Q.

"They are paid whenever they call for their money at the office." "At any time?"

A. "The load is scaled there and they are given a slip or scale sheet and they can get their money then or let it stand for a week. They can have it any night after it is scaled."

Q. "That is the practice is it?"

A. "That is the practice."

Upon cross-examination the following testimony was given by this witness:

Q. "Did you employ Mr. Tuttle to haul any particular number of thousand feet?"

A. "No sir."

Q. "Did you hire him to haul any designated lot of logs, I mean, outside of the general mass that you had out there?"

A. "No sir."

Q. "He didn't agree that he would haul one hundred thousand or fifty thousand, or any particular quantity?"

A.

"No sir; we didn't let any jobs of any kind in that way."

Q. "Whose employes load the sleighs?"

A.

"Embury-Martin Lumber Company's."

Q. "What would he, Mr. Tuttle, be doing-I am taking him as one hauling by the thousand-what would he be doing as the logs were loading?"

A. "We load the sleighs with a jammer and they use the team on the cable at the jammer."

MR. KENNEDY: "Whose team do you use?"

A. "The team we are loading-whosever team is on the sleigh."

Q. "Did you use Mr. Tuttle's when he was there?"

A. "Yes sir."

MR. SHEPHERD: "So that Mr. Tuttle would be busy while the sleigh was loading, then?"

A. "Yes, his team would be busy, and he would be busy, yes. The team they place on the sleighs-their own, yes."

Q. "He would be handling the team?"