ment was made with him because he was doing the glazing on the building, it might have been made by the principal contractor with any other person who happened to be in the vicinity and who could conveniently do the work at such times as the loads of glass arrived at the building. It seems clear that the applicant was the employe of the principal contractor for the work in question, and that he is entitled to compensation for the injury unless the employment was casual within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law.

It should be noted that this work was being done by Sidney Dyer individually, and not by the firm of Dyer & Ross. It was billed as an individual account with Mr. Dyer and paid as such. The date of the contract for the glazing work was November 19, 1914; the injury occurred on December 10, 1914; and it appears from the evidence that the work was not finished until the latter part of March. It also appears that the work to be done was periodic in its nature, that is, from time to time as the loads of glass arrived at the building. The building was a large one and the time during which this work would have continued had it not been for the accident, would extend over a number of months. While it is true it was not steady work, or work that consumed a larger portion of his time, yet it recurred at intervals with the progress of the work and would have continued until the job was finished. Under these facts we think that the employment was not casual.

SANFORD HINDMAN,

Applicant,

VS.

ACME UNIVERSAL JOINT MANUFACTURING

COMPANY,

and

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSURANCE

CORPORATION, LTD.,

Respondents.

CYANIDE POISONING OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND NOT AN ACCIDENT. Applicant was employed at a forge in the plant of respondent where cyanide was used on red hot steel, causing it to vaporize and be inhaled. After following this work for some time, he was taken violently ill as a result of the inhalation of such gases and is now totally disabled. Respondents filed petition to be relieved from paying further compensation on the ground that applicant was not suffering from an accident but from an occupational disease.

HELD: That the disability resulting from the inhalation of cyanide fumes was not caused by a sudden occurrence, but by a gradual process, and was an occupational disease and not an accident.

Opinion by the Board:

In this cause a petition was filed by respondents asking to be relieved from making further payments of compensation for several reasons, among them being that the disability of the applicant came from an occupational disease and not from an accident. Applicant was employed at a forge in the plant of the Acme Universal Joint Mfg. Company where cyanide was used on the red-hot steel, causing it to vaporize and be inhaled. He continued at this work from June until September, 1912, when he was taken violently ill and has since been in a state of total disability. It seems clear that the disabil

ity was caused not by a sudden occurrence but by a gradual process through which the cyanide poison was absorbed into the system, making it an occupational disease instead of an accident. It having been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Adams vs. Acme White Lead & Color Works, 21 Detroit Legal News Page 824, that such injuries are not covered by the Law in its present form, it follows that the petitioners are entitled to be relieved from making further payments of compensation, except that they shall make the payments up to the time of the filing of their petition for relief, August 31, 1914.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS SUBJECT TO WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWWHICH SUPERSEDES CHARTER PROVISIONS.

Applicant's decedent was employed by the City of Detroit as a garbage wagon driver, and while engaged in his duties he received injuries which resulted in his death. Applicant was refused compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the following reasons:

1.

Because she did not comply with provisions of the Charter of the City of Detroit in filing a claim against the city in the manner provided by its charter.

2. The Charter of the City of Detroit, being a local act, is not affected by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law. 3. The Act, so far as it is mandatory upon municipal corporations, is unconstitutional.

4. By accepting a settlement of five hundred dollars, applicant should be barred from further prosecuting her claim.

HELD: 1. That the provisions of the Charter of the City of Detroit relative to filing claims against the city are superseded by the Workmen's Compensation Act which is especially made applicable to every city within the State.

2. Sections 7 and 8, Part I, Workmen's Compensation Law, expressly make that law applicable to every city in the state.

3. The Constitution does not prevent the Legislature from imposing upon municipalities the duty of paying compensation to workmen injured while in their employ, such duty being imposed by a general law.

4. Inasmuch as the settlement made with the applicant was made without reference to the Workmen's Compensation Act, such settlement would not become binding until approved by the Industrial Accident Board, but the amount will be treated as equitably applying upon the compensation to which she was entitled under the Act.

Opinion by the Board:

William Marshall, the husband of the applicant was employed by the city of Detroit through its Department of Public Works, and on December 17, 1912, he was severely injured by the slipping of a chain which threw him from the garbage car on which he was working. On March 30, 1913, he died. It is claimed that his death resulted from his said injury, and at the arbitration of the case testimony was introduced tending to support this claim. At such hearing an award was made in favor of the applicant for compensation at the rate of $7.50 per week for 300 weeks, less $87.84 received from respondent by Mr. Marshall prior to his death and the sum of $500.00 paid the applicant by respondent after the death. An appeal was taken from this award to the full Board for review. The case has been fully argued and briefed by the parties, the principal contention on the part of the respondent being based upon the legal questions raised. Competent evidence was offered in support of the applicant's claim that the accident was the cause of the death of William Marshall on March 30, 1913, and in the opinion of the Board fairly established such claim.

The contention is made by respondent that applicant's claim is barred because she did not comply with the provisions of the Charter of the City of Detroit in filing a claim against the city under such Charter provisions, and it is argued in support of this contention that the Charter of the City of Detroit, being a local act, is not modified or affected with reference to the above requirement by the Workmen's Compensation Law, which is a general act. The rule of construction is well settled that a general act will not be construed as affecting a local act except in cases where it does so expressly or by necessary implication. However, the provisions of Sections 7 and 8 of Part I of the Workmen's Compensation Law expressly make that Law applicable to every city within the state, which necessarily means that it is applicable to the city of Detroit. The language of the statute will bear no other construction. The Compensation Act specifies the notices that are required and the time and manner of making claim, and in this respect must be held to supersede the provisions of the Charter of the City of Detroit.

It is contended that the act is unconstitutional because it is mandatory as to cities and other municipalities, it being elective as to private corporations and persons. Whatever may be said as to the constitutional rights of private corporations and persons, it seems clear that cities stand on a very different basis. Under the general rule of law laid down in the books, cities are mere creatures of the Legislature possessing only the rights and powers expressly granted in their charters, subject to modification or repeal at any time. While the Constitution of 1909 confers upon the cities of Michigan extensive powers of local self-government, it does not affect the power of the Legislature over cities when exercised through a general law designed to promote the public welfare. In the opinion of the Board it was clearly competent for the Legislature to impose upon municipalities the duty of paying compensation to workmen injured in their service, or to the dependents of such workmen in case of death.

It is urged that applicant should be barred from prosecut