words "and on" show that they were accidentally located. This leaves a plain right to test the intention of Congress by experimentally locating them elsewhere. Relocating them, therefore, in some part of the paragraph before the proviso assessing the duty of 14 cents per pound on manufactures from wire, the whole has an orderly reading; and it would then naturally be conceded that the position of the United States at bar was correct. The particular expression in question was undoubtedly brought from paragraph 148 of the customs act of 1890. (Act Oct. 1, 1890, c. 1244, § 1, Schedule C, 26 Stat. 577). This paragraph commences with imposing a duty upon wire made of iron or steel, thus generally like the opening portion of paragraph 127 in issue here. Then later, in paragraph 148, come these words: "There shall be paid on iron or steel wire coated with zinc or tin, or any other metal, one-half of one cent per pound in addition to the rate imposed on the wire of which it is made." This is exactly the phraseology, mutatis mutandis, found in issue here, the words "there shall be paid" being omitted. This mutilation, and the consequent dislocation to which we have referred, establishing our proposition of coming in by an amendment, justify the experimental relocation which we have suggested. The act of 1890 contains no specific duty on articles manufactured from wire in the form found in paragraph 137 of the present statute; but it guards against the manufactured article paying less than the duty imposed upon the wire from which it is manufactured, or which forms a component part of chief value. Under that act the duty on traps like those imported in this case was assessed under the more general provisions of the law; and we are told that it was assessed accordingly at 45 per cent. ad valorem, which was probably sufficient to promote the purpose of Congress, which had in view in this legislation the protection of our industries. However, we have the rule for the interpretation of these statutes of 1890 and 1897, already stated, that they are to be regarded as intended for the protection of domestic industries; and, in that light, and, in accordance with the customary methods, we should expect an additional duty for each marked stage in advance which involves any considerable amount of labor. One of these stages would be the making of the plain wire; the second, the coating; the third, the manufacture of the specific article from the coated wire; and we would be entitled to assume that the phraseology should be relocated so as to carry out the general purpose of this class of legislation. After all, the natural interpretation of the statute is that wire is wire whether coated or not, and that, when Congress declares that articles manufactured from iron or steel wire shall pay the rate of duty "imposed upon the wire used in the manufacture of such articles," besides some special additional duty, it intends to take wire in the form in which it is manufactured, whether coated or uncoated, so that the basis is what wire uncoated pays if wire not coated is used, or what wire coated pays if wire coated is used. Independently of the considerations which we will now state, this is the interpretation which, we think, belongs to this paragraph; but we cannot overlook the ruling of the Treasury of September 7, 1900, to which we have already re ferred, and the unbroken, continuous practice from that time until the present importations were made in the autumn of 1905, which practice was in accordance with the present contention of the importer. We gave attention to the rule of construction growing out of settled practices of executive departments, a class which seems to have peculiarly just application to customs statutes, in United States v. Proctor, 145 Fed. 126, 132, 76 C. C. A. 96, by an opinion passed down on January 25, 1906. There the circumstances were such that there was no question about its application, and we referred to it in that case only in a general way, and only to some leading authorities. The case at bar, however, is closer, so that we need give the law in this particular a somewhat fuller exposition. By its decision of April 20, 1900, which was within three years from the time the act of 1897 went into effect, the Treasury ruled, as we have shown, in accordance with the present position of the United States. On further consideration, however, in September, 1900, the Department positively ruled in favor of the position taken before us by the importer; and the practice ever since has been in accordance with that revised ruling. Notwithstanding the Department first ruled as it did in April, it cannot be fairly said that the departmental practice has not been uniform; because the prompt revision of the ruling which the Department speedily found to be erroneous can hardly be regarded as creating the lack of such uniformity as the Supreme Court said in United States v. Healey, 160 U. S. 136, 145, 16 Sup. 247, 40 L. Ed. 369, is necessary in order to justify the application of the particular rule we are considering. It can hardly be said that, because at an early day the Treasury made a ruling which it immediately after corrected as erroneous, following ever since a practice in accordance with the correction, this amounts to a lack of uniformity in the proper sense of the expression. Of course, the length of time over which the practice of the Department extended in this case is shorter than that which has usually accompanied the application of this special rule in the various cases reported; yet, in United States v. Alabama Railroad Company, 142 U. S. 615, 621, 12 Sup. Ct. 306, 35 L. Ed. 1134, the continuance of the practice was only a short time longer than in the case at bar. Nevertheless it was regarded as sufficient to justify the adoption by the court of the practical construction given there by the Postmaster General. The rule seems to be always applied where the statute is really doubtful, and where, also, the departmental construction was practically contemporaneous with its enactment, and continued a considerable length of time, with uniformity. The various elements named in this statement give way, more or less, according to all the circumstances of the case; so that, on the whole, the court may derive assistance from the construction given by the executive officers, though all these elements are not present to their full extent. It is often said in general terms as follows: "The construction given to the statute by those charged with the duty of executing it is always entitled to the most respectful consideration, and ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons." United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760, 763, 24 L. Ed. 588. Such expressions as this show that the rule is not a stiff one, and that, as we have said, it has regard to all the circumstances. As to what is a sufficient doubt, Mr. Justice Miller, speaking in behalf of the court in Peabody v. Stark, 16 Wall. 240, 243, 21 L. Ed. 311, says: "In the absence of a clear conviction on the part of the members of the court on either side of the proposition in which all can freely unite, we incline to adopt the uniform ruling of the office of the Internal Revenue Commissioner." Returning again to United States v. Alabama Railroad Company, supra, at page 621 of 142 U. S., at page 308 of 12 Sup. Ct., 35 L. Ed. 1134, the opinion observes that the court will "look with disfavor upon any sudden change whereby parties who have contracted with the government upon the faith of such construction may be prejudiced." This has particular application to importers who purchase goods abroad, expecting to market them at home, on the faith of a continuous practice of the Treasury in administering the statutes. This was peculiarly illustrated in United States v. Proctor, supra, where it was shown that the contemplated change on the part of the United States relative to the rate of duty there involved would have resulted in a practical confiscation of importations, which the importer was justified by the preceding practice in assuming would yield a reasonable business profit. In the same direction the opinion passed down in behalf of the court in United States v. Finnell, 185 U. S. 236, 244, 22 Sup. Ct. 633, 636, 46 L. Ed. 890, said that, if a construction acted upon by accounting officers for many years should be overthrown, "we apprehend that much confusion might arise." This was followed by a repetition of what we have already cited from United States v. Alabama Railroad Co., that "the action during many years of the department charged with the execution of the statute should be respected, and not overruled except for cogent reasons." Of course, we cannot hold that the United States is estopped by the conduct of its executive officers in the technical sense of that expression; but we are reminded in United States v. Finnell, just cited, at page 144 of 185 U. S., at page 636 of 22 Sup. Ct., 46 L. Ed. 890, that Congress can enact legislation to change any existing practice if it deems that course conducive to public interests. We are also reminded by what we have quoted from United States v. Alabama Railroad Company, at page 621 of 142 U. S., at page 308 of 12 Sup. Ct., 35 L. Ed. 1134, that the equities are such that, under all the circumstances, we should apply the particular rule of construction which we are discussing. Therefore we hold that the duty to be imposed is as now maintained by the importer-that is, the duty as assessed less two-tenths of one cent per pound, leaving a duty of 2 cents per pound plus 14 cents per pound-in accordance with paragraph 137 of the customs act of 1897. The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court, with directions for further proceedings in accordance with our opinion passed down this day. ACME FOOD CO. et al. v. MEIER. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. `April 13, 1907.) No. 1,626. 1. BANKRUPTCY-ACTS OF BANKRUPTCY-SOLVENCY. Solvency at the time of the filing of a petition in involuntary bankruptcy is important as a defense only when the act of bankruptcy charged is the conveyance, transfer, or concealment of property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, under Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, § 3 (1), c. 541, 30 Stat. 546 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3422]. If the act of bankruptcy charged is the giving or permitting of a preference under subdivisions 2 or 3, insolvency must have existed at the time of the preference and solvency or insolvency at the time of the filing of the petition can only have a reflex importance as evidence. 2. SAME-SOLVENCY-VALUE OF PROPERTY CONVEyed. Where conveyances of property by an alleged bankrupt are charged as acts of bankruptcy, under both subdivisions 1 and 2 of section 3, Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat 546 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3422], as made with intent to defraud and also as preferences, the value of the property thus conveyed is not to be computed in determining the question of solvency at the time of the filing of the petition as a defense under the first subdivision, but, if the, conveyances are found not to have been fraudulent, the value of such property is to be considered in determining the question of solvency or insolvency when the conveyances were made under subdivision 2. 3. SAME-FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE EVIDENCE. Bona fide conveyances intended only to secure indebtedness or to secure the grantees as sureties of the grantor do not constitute acts of bankruptcy under Bankruptcy Act July 1, 1898, § 3 (1), c. 541, 30 Stat. 546 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3422], and where such conveyances, made by warranty deed, are charged as fraudulent under said subdivision, and also as preferences under subdivision 2, it is competent for the defendant to show by parol that they were given merely as security both for the purpose of showing the absence of a fraudulent intent, and also that the value of the property may be considered on the question of insolvency in determining whether or not the conveyances were preferential; and it is immaterial that the issues are tried to a jury. 4. APPEAL AND ERROR-ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR-VIOLATION OF RULES. An assignment of error, which, in violation of the rules of the court, includes different parts of a charge to the jury, cannot, after being held not well taken as to one part, be sustained as to another. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 3, Appeal and Error, §§ 3034, 3035.] In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan. This was a petition by plaintiffs in error to have the defendant in error adjudicated a bankrupt. The averments of the petition were, in substance, that the defendant, Charles H. Meier, is insolvent, and that within four months next preceding the date of this petition he had committed an act of bankruptcy. (1) By conveying on December 30, 1904, by warranty deed to one Mary Losh an interest in a parcel of land described as in the township of Chesterfield, county of Macomb, Mich. (2) By conveying by warranty deed of November 29, 1904, another interest in land to John Losh situated in same township and county. (3) By conveying on November 29, 1904, by warranty deed to William D. Parker two village lots in New Baltimore, Macomb, county, Mich. With reference to these conveyances it is alleged that each was made "with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors," and that the said Meier by executing same "did transfer, while insolvent, a portion of his property to one of his creditors with intent to prefer such creditor over his other creditors, and for the purpose of defrauding your petitioners of their just claims." (4) A further act of bankruptcy is charged, in that the defendant on November 22, 1904, did execute a mortgage to the Citizens' Savings Bank for $1,000 on a certain interest in land in the same county of Macomb. This is not charged to have been for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, but that it was made when insolvent and with intent to prefer the bank over his other creditors. (5) There is then added an omnibus charge "of different and other unjust transfers and payments to other creditors which constitute preferences, but of the nature and times of which said transfers and preferences your petitioners are not aware." He answered by denying insolvency as charged in the petition, and also denied that any of the conveyances described constituted an act of bankruptcy as charged. He denied that the debts claimed to be due to the petitioners were valid subsisting claims, and gave their origin with particularity. The answer concluded by a demand for a jury to "try the commission of the alleged acts of bankruptcy and the fact of insolvency" and "to try the questions of fact as to the various fraudulent acts and doings of the said petitioners, and any and all matters contained in said petition and in this plea and answer. The petitioners joined issue and a jury was sworn, who, upon all the evidence, returned a general verdict of not guilty. Thereupon the court denied an adjudication of bankruptcy, and dismissed the petition. A bill of exceptions was allowed and errors assigned, and this writ sued out. A. H. Covert and J. J. Jackson, for plaintiff in error. Before LURTON, SEVERENS, and RICHARDS, Circuit Judges. LURTON, Circuit Judge, after making the foregoing statement of the case, delivered the opinion of the court. 1. There was no evidence tending to support the alleged preference by the mortgage to the Citizens' Savings Bank. That mortgage was made for. a present consideration and in good faith, and no question has been made by counsel here as to that transaction. 2. Neither is it insisted that the conveyance to Mrs. Mary Losh was either fraudulent or a preference. Counsel before the jury substantially conceded this. Neither is it contended that the conveyance to William D. Parker was a preference. Meier owed nothing to Parker, and the conveyance to him was to protect him as surety upon certain loans which Meier desired to make. 3. One of the issues submitted to the jury was as to whether the petitioners were creditors of Meier. There was evidence tending to show that the larger part of the debt claimed by them originated in the sale of territorial rights for the sale of "Acme Food." The defense was that the food was a humbug, and the contract of sale obtained through fraud and misrepresentation. Meier seems to have been ignorant and credulous, and claimed strenuously that he did not know he was giving notes or entering into any arrangement other than a mere agency. Against this defense there was much positive evidence sustaining the good faith of the contract and the value of the "Acme Food." While the general finding may have. been upon the ground that petitioners had not shown a good and |