Statement of the Case.

is void upon its face: but the record contained no exception to such instructions.

Mr. W. A. Henderson and Mr. Leon Jourolomon for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. W. P. Washburn and Mr. Jerome Templeton for defendant in error.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE: Errors are assigned to certain portions of the charge to the jury in this case, but no exceptions were preserved thereto, and no question otherwise raised for our consideration. The judgment is, therefore,

Affirmed.

POSTAL TELEGRAPH CABLE COMPANY v. BALTI

MORE.

ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND.

No. 828. Submitted January 21, 1895.

- Decided January 28, 1895.

St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 92, affirmed and applied to this case.

THIS was an action at law, brought by the city of Baltimore, defendant in error, against The Postal Telegraph Cable Company, plaintiff in error, a corporation created under the laws of the State of New York, in the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City, a court of original common law jurisdiction, to recover the sum of $1018.00, with interest from the 15th day of June, 1893, the same being an annual rental fee for the use of the streets of Baltimore, of $2.00 per pole, for 509 telegraph poles, which were owned by the plaintiff in error, and located in and occupying a portion of the public streets of Baltimore. The rental fee was the amount prescribed by Ordinance No. 86 of 1893, to be paid by all companies which

Syllabus.

owned and had located in the streets of Baltimore similar poles and similarly used. Judgment below in plaintiff's favor, which judgment was sustained by the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland. A writ of error being sued out to the latter judgment, the defendant in error moved to dismiss or affirm it on the ground, among others, that "the ordinance in question was based on and passed after the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States was delivered in St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 92 and 149 U. S. 465, and upon the strength of that case the defendant in error relied in the Court of Appeals of Maryland, and now relies in this court."

Mr. Thomas G. Hayes and Mr. William S. Bryan, Jr., for the motion.

Mr. George H. Bates opposing.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE: The judgment is affirmed upon the authority of St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 92.

In re CHAPMAN, Petitioner.

ORIGINAL.

No number. Submitted January 22, 1895. Decided February 4, 1895.

C., being summoned before a committee of the Senate of the United States and questioned there as to certain transactions, declined to answer the questions upon the grounds that they related to his private business, and that they were not authorized by the resolution appointing the committee. He was thereupon indicted in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia under the provisions in Rev. Stat. §§ 102, 103, 104. He demurred to the indictment, and, the demurrer being overruled, an appeal was taken to the District Court of Appeals, where the indictment was sustained as valid, and the case remanded. He then applied to this court for permission to file a petition for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus. Held,

Statement of the Case.

(1) That the orderly administration of justice will be better subserved by declining to exercise appellate jurisdiction in the mode desired until the conclusion of the proceedings;

(2) That if the judgment goes against the petitioner and a writ of error lies, that is his proper and better remedy;

(3) That if a writ of error does not lie, and the Supreme Court of the District is without jurisdiction, the petitioner may then apply for a writ of habeas corpus.

It is a judicious and salutary general rule not to interfere with proceedings pending in the Courts of the District of Columbia, or in the Circuit Courts of the United States, in advance of their final determination.

THIS was an application by Elverton R. Chapman for leave to file a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner represented that he was unlawfully restrained of his liberty by the United States marshal for the District of Columbia, and stated: That on June 29, 1894, an indictment was returned against petitioner in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding a criminal term, based upon section 102 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, upon which he voluntarily surrendered himself into the custody of the court, July 2, 1894, and entered into a recognizance for his appearance as he might thereunto be required, and thereupon petitioner filed a demurrer to the indictment; that October 1, 1894, another indictment was found against petitioner under said section, which indictment was returned as a substitute for and in lieu of the former indictment, and a certified copy whereof was annexed to the petition.

The indictment averred that Chapman was summoned and appeared as a witness before a special committee of the Senate of the United States in relation to a matter of inquiry before said committee, and that he refused to answer questions pertinent to the matter of inquiry referred to such committee.

The petition then alleged that petitioner, on October 11, 1894, filed his demurrer to the last named indictment, together with a note appended thereto stating the grounds of the demurrer; that November 17, 1894, the demurrer was overruled and petitioner required to appear and plead; that afterwards the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia allowed an appeal from the order of the Supreme Court overruling the

Statement of the Case.

demurrer, and on December 14, 1894, the matter was duly submitted to the Court of Appeals and taken under advisement; that on January 7, 1895, the Court of Appeals gave judgment, affirming the order of the Supreme Court overruling the demurrer and requiring petitioner to plead to the indictment, and the cause was remanded by the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court to be proceeded in, and is now duly pending in, the last named court.

The petition further stated that, on January 18, 1895, petitioner was surrendered upon his recognizance and committed to the custody of the United States marshal for the District of Columbia, and petitioner charged that his detention was unlawful because in violation of the laws and Constitution of the United States and for want of jurisdiction in the court to make the order of imprisonment.

It was averred that the questions and each of them set forth in the indictment, and which petitioner declined to answer, were questions in regard to the lawful private business of petitioner which he was not bound to answer, and was protected from answering by provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States; and were questions not authorized by the resolution of the Senate upon which the investigating committee rested its authority; that the conditions under which the questions were asked were not such as authorized the committee to make search into the private affairs of petitioner, nor were they such as authorized or permitted the Senate to demand or compel answers to questions which would disclose the private business of petitioner; that the refusal of petitioner to answer the questions was not a misdemeanor within the true intent and meaning of section 102 of the Revised Statutes; that that section was unconstitutional and void in that it attempted to transfer the power to punish acts constituting contempt of the Houses of Congress, respectively, to the exclusive jurisdiction of the criminal court of the District of Columbia; that if the section was not designed to transfer such jurisdiction to the criminal court, but was designed to add to the power of both Houses to punish for contempt, the power and jurisdiction in the criminal court to

Statement of the Case.

punish the same acts as misdemeanors, then the section was void because in contravention of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution; that sections 102 and 103 of the Revised Statutes were to be taken together as parts of a single and indivisible scheme, and the provisions of section 102 could not be enforced in disregard of the provisions of section 103 consistently with the intention of Congress, and if section 103 was not capable of being executed because unconstitutional, then section 102 could not be executed; that section 103 was unconstitutional because compelling involuntary answers to questions put by committees of either House of Congress, although the witness might decline to answer on the ground that his testimony or his production of papers might tend to disgrace him or otherwise render him infamous; and that upon these and other grounds petitioner's imprisonment was without any authority of law and in excess of the jurisdiction of the court. Sections 102, 103, and 104 of the Revised Statutes are as follows:

"SEC. 102. Every person who, having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress, to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any committee of either House of Congress, wilfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars nor less than one hundred dollars, and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months.

"SEC. 103. No witness is privileged to refuse to testify to any fact, or to produce any paper, respecting which he shall be examined by either House of Congress, or by any committee of either House, upon the ground that his testimony to such fact or his production of such paper may tend to disgrace him or otherwise render him infamous.

"SEC. 104. Whenever a witness summoned as mentioned in section one hundred and two fails to testify, and the facts are reported to either House, the President of the Senate or