Opinion of the Court. and shall make such order as to costs as shall be just." 18 Stat. 470, 472. And since "on every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then of the court from which the record comes, this question the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise suggested, and without respect to the relation of the parties to it." Mansfield, Coldwater &c. Railway v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382. If plaintiff had brought his suit in the state court against Tenney or Lay alone in respect of the particular parcel of land claimed by either, and, on proper petition, the defendant had removed the case to the Circuit Court, where it had thereupon gone to decree against him, he could not have procured a reversal on the ground of want of jurisdiction of the Circuit Court unless the record had disclosed that Connell was an indispensable party and Equity rule 47 inapplicable, in which case this court might have reversed the decree and directed a dismissal of the suit. As remarked in Louisville and Nashville Railroad v. Ide, 114 U. S. 52, 56: "Separate answers by the several defendants sued on joint causes of action may present different questions for determination, but they do not necessarily divide the suit into separate controversies. A defendant has no right to say that an action shall be several which a plaintiff elects to make joint. Smith v. Rines, 2 Sumner, 348. A separate defence may defeat a joint recovery, but it cannot deprive a plaintiff of his right to prosecute his own suit to final determination in his own way. The cause of action is the subject-matter of the controversy, and that is for all the purposes of the suit whatever the plaintiff declares it to be in his pleadings." But where a plaintiff has brought suit against a sole defendant, and others, intervening, claim several interests in the subjectmatter, involving separate defences as to such interests, separable controversies might be held to exist as to them, although the developments in the after progress of the case might show they were not such. Plaintiff brought his suit seeking relief as against Connell Opinion of the Court. alone. Tenney and Lay intervened, claiming to be owners of distinct portions of the tract, and removed the suit on the ground that the controversy as to each of them was separable, and, according to Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 205; Brooks v. Clark, 119 U. S. 502, 512, the whole case was removed, the record here adding that the removal as to Connell was "by consent of parties." It is now said there was no separable controversy because the controversy indicated could not be fully determined as between Tenney and Lay, or either of them, and the plaintiff without the presence of Connell. This, however, if so, did not appear at the time of the removal, and whether it did afterwards in such wise that it became the duty of the Circuit Court to remand the cause because not really and substantially involving a dispute or controversy not properly within its jurisdiction, is determinable on other considerations. Appellants do not deny that the petition for removal was presented in good faith, and, although it left much to be desired in the way of fulness and accuracy, it set up a separable controversy, which might have involved the defence of bona fide purchase for value without notice, and apparently could have been fully determined as between them and the plaintiff, even in respect of the proceedings on execution, in the absence of Connell, who cannot be allowed to say that his claim to the remaining portion of the land would have been legally affected by such determination. The question before us is, therefore, whether it appeared on the hearing that no such separable controversy really and substantially existed, and that the Circuit Court erred in not remanding the case. The cause was heard upon the merits. The record does not purport to contain all the evidence, and most of the depositions and the exhibits are omitted in printing by designation of appellant under rule 10. There is evidence tending to show that Connell conveyed some twenty acres to Lay at or about the time. of a settlement between them, but the deeds to Lay and to Tenney do not appear. Whether as matter of fact Tenney and Lay were purchasers pendente lite, or the controversy as to them was not separable, is not so disclosed as to compel the Opinion of the Court. reversal of the decree at the instance of appellants, and in spite of the position they occupied to the contrary. It is suggested that the principles in relation to separable controversies were not so well understood in 1887 as at this date, and except for that appellants would not have attempted to remove the cause; but the petition, though imperfect, was sufficient to accomplish the result of forcing appellee into the Circuit Court, and we find ourselves at liberty to decline to deprive him of his decree on the ground that the cause was not rightfully transferred. Decree affirmed. PALMER v. CORNING. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK No. 137. Argued January 8, 9, 1895. - Decided March 4, 1895. The improvement in sewer gratings patented to Henry W. Clapp by letters patent No. 134,978, dated January 21, 1873, involved no invention. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Edwin H. Risley for appellant. Mr. George T. Spencer for appellee. MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court. The sole question in this case is whether the appliance to which the plaintiff in error claims the rights of a patentee under the grant of letters patent No. 134,978, bearing date January 21, 1873, issued to his assignor, involves invention, or is simply a manifestation of mechanical skill. There is no doubt that in this, as in all similar cases, the letters patent are prima facie evidence that the device was patentable. Still, we are always required, with this presumption in mind, to examine the question of invention vel non upon its merits in each particular case. In the present instance the letters patent state the device to be an "improvement in gratings for sewer inlets," and describe it as follows: Opinion of the Court. "My improvement consists in the employment of a device to elevate the grating above the opening which it covers a short distance, so that it will not become obstructed by small sticks, straws, leaves, and other small rubbish not large enough to clog the sewer or drain with which it may be connected, and at the same time will stop all matter large enough to do injury in said drain. "My improvement may be attached to any form of grating, round or square; and consists of a cast-iron ring made to fit the collar which surrounds the opening to hold the grate in place, marked a in the drawing, in which I set the cast or wrought-iron pins, marked b in the drawing, to which the grating is firmly attached, and by means of which the grating may be elevated one to two inches, more or less, as may be desirable. These pins may be of wrought iron fitted to holes drilled in the grate and ring; or the grate, ring, and pins for elevating the grate may be cast all in one piece; or wroughtiron pins may be cast into the ring and grate when they are cast. "The whole grating and ring may be taken out as desired, as easily as if they were not furnished with the supporting ring; and my improvement may be used with a wood or iron collar, as may be desired. 'By thus elevating the grate a space is left, through which leaves, straws, small sticks will pass freely, and the grate will be kept clear for the passage of water. "I claim "The grating for sewer openings herein described, consisting of the ring a, supporting-pins b, and elevated grating, substantially as specified." It thus appears that the whole subject-matter which is covered consists of a grate elevated above the top of the catch-basin of a sewer and resting on a ring or support placed below the top of the basin by means of pins which thus lift up the grating, between which pins are left spaces allowing the water to pass through, under the grating, the result of so elevating the grate being, it is claimed, to keep the openings on the grating proper and the openings below free from the Opinion of the Court. A debris which would otherwise accumulate thereon or against the same. There is no pretence that the claim covers a grate of any particular style of manufacture or any particular shape; in fact, it is expressly stated that the grate may be made either round or square, and that the pins may be of wrought iron, fitted to holes drilled in the grate or ring, or the grate, rings and pins for elevating the grate may be cast all in one piece, or wrought-iron pins may be cast into the ring and grate when they are cast. Viewed separately, the elements of this device certainly involve no invention. grate over a sewer is one of the simplest of mechanical devices. The mere use of a ring of iron on which to rest such a grating is obviously nothing more than a mechanical arrangement, which involves no element of invention; and the same is the case with the use of pins or legs for the purpose of holding up a sewer grate. And it is equally clear that the leaving of open spaces between the pins and the elevating of the grate above the ring, thereby giving greater facility for the flow of water, is invention in no sense of the word. But although no one of these elements of the contrivance involves invention, it is insisted that, taken all together, they constitute a "combination," and that it is this combination which is covered by the letters patent. If a combination of unpatentable elements, as such, produces new and useful results, there can be no doubt that the combination. is patentable. But there are certain conditions constituting the essential nature of a combination under the patent law, which we think are not met in this case. The law upon this subject this court has often stated: "It must be conceded that a new combination, if it produces new and useful results, is patentable, though all the constituents of the combination were well known and in common use before the combination was made. But the results must be a product of the combination, and not a mere aggregate of several results, each the complete product of one of the combined elements. Combined results are not necessarily a novel result, nor are they an old result obtained in a new and improved manner. Merely bringing old devices into juxtapo |