Opinion of the Court. depending solely upon the elbows of the rods to operate the wing. There is no conflict here with the principle laid down by this court in Knapp v. Morss, 150 U. S. 221, 227, and Wollensak v. Sargent, 151 U. S. 227, that the end or purpose sought to be accomplished by a device is not the subject of a patent, but only the new and useful means for obtaining that end, since the end or purpose to be accomplished in this case was not the moving of the wing, but the more perfect operation of the rods; and the means used to accomplish it was a subdivision of the power exerted by the keys, and the application of a portion of it directly to the wing itself. The fallacy of defendant's argument in this connection lies in the assumption that the object to be accomplished was the moving of the wing, whereas this was only a means for the ultimate purpose, viz., the more satisfactory operation of the rods. Indeed, this use of the connecting mechanism can hardly be termed analogous to such as similar mechanisms had been previously used for; but even if it were, the results are so important, and the ingenuity displayed to bring them about is such that we are not disposed to deny the patentees the merit of invention. The combination described in the first claim was clearly new. The cases cited by defendant upon the subject of double use are not applicable; such, for instance, as Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 37, in which a claim for preserving fish and other articles in a closed chamber by means of a freezing mixture, was held to have been anticipated by a similar patent for preserving bodies, and also by the ordinary ice-cream freezer; Pennsylvania Railroad v. Locomotive Truck Company, 110 U. S. 490, in which a patent for employing a certain truck for locomotive engines was held to be invalid in view of the employment of a similar truck for railroad cars; Aron v. Manhattan Railroad Co., 132 U. S. 84, wherein a patent for simultaneously opening two gates at the end of two adjoining passenger coaches was held invalid in view of previous patents for opening a single gate, and devices to open and close apertures at a distance from the operator Wollensak v. Sargent, 151 U. S. 221, wherein a patent for opening and Opinion of the Court. closing a transom over a door by means of a vertical rod was held to have been anticipated by a patent for opening and closing a series of passenger car ventilators or transoms by a horizontal rod; Blake v. San Francisco, 113 U. S. 679, wherein the adaptation of an automatic valve, previously known and in use to a steam fire engine, was held not to involve invention; and St. Germain v. Brunswick, 135 U. S. 227, wherein a revolving rack for billiard cues was held to be anticipated by such revolving contrivances as dining-tables and bottle castors. In all these cases the prior uses were such obviously analogous ones that there could be no doubt of the invalidity of the patent. In the defendant's machine the sliding bar of the Campbell and Pottin patents is substituted for the pivoted wing of the Russell and the Ritty and Birch patents, but, as before observed, they were well-known equivalents for each other, and the mechanism by which they had theretofore been operated was also well known. They were apparently subject to certain defects in their operation, which impaired their efficiency, and required the use of an independent means to secure the release of the first rod before the second one was raised into place. Whether this were done by the simultaneous action of the elbow of the rod and that of the connecting mechanism upon the wing, as in the Ritty and Birch patent, or by the prior action of such mechanism, as in defendant's device, is immaterial, so long as such action is independent of the action of the rods themselves. We have already stated how this was accomplished by the Ritty and Birch patent. Defendant also employed a universal bar operated by each key, corresponding with the bar K of plaintiff's patent, but located above the keys instead of beneath them, and back of the shaft upon which the keys are pivoted instead of in front of it. The operation of the keys is, therefore, to raise this bar instead of depressing it. A rod projecting from the end of this bar engages with the arm of a bell-crank lever, the other arm of which is so connected with an arm of the sliding bar projecting downwards that the depression of the key moves the bar to one side far enough to release the tablet rod already Opinion of the Court. raised before the lug on the second or rising rod has passed the sliding bar. When the second rod has risen to its full height, the sliding bar is released from the action of the bellcrank lever, and is drawn back to its place by a spring, in time to hold the second rod up by a lug on the bar, corresponding to the lug on the rod. The operation of the two devices is the same, except that in the Ritty and Birch patent the action of the connecting mechanism in pushing back the pivoted wing is simultaneous with, and to a certain extent aided by, the elbow of the rod, while in defendant's device the action of the connecting mechanism in moving the bar is exclusive of any assistance from the rod. But, as already observed, this simultaneous action is a wholly immaterial feature of the Ritty and Birch patent. While the details of the defendant's machine are quite different from that of the plaintiff, the underlying principle of releasing the first tablet before, or simultaneously with, the elevation of the second tablet by the aid of an independent train of mechanism put in motion by the depression of the key, is precisely the same. This principle being already known, the contrivance of a connecting mechanism which should operate to move a sliding bar as the pivoted wing of the Ritty and Birch patent was moved, was a comparatively easy matter, though, perhaps, involving invention to a limited degree. In a word, there were two known methods of accomplishing the same result a pivoted wing and a sliding bar. Ritty and Birch invented a train of mechanism to operate the pivoted wing; defendant adopted a similar method to operate a sliding bar. Had defendant also invented the sliding bar and applied this mechanism to it, the case would have fallen within our ruling in Aron v. Manhattan Railroad Co., as the adoption of a different means of accomplishing the same result. But the means. in this case being well-known equivalents for each other, we think the charge of infringement is made out. The decree of the court below is, therefore, Reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. Statement of the Case. GOLDEY v. MORNING NEWS. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. No. 55. Argued and submitted December 13, 1894. Decided March 11, 1895. Section 1011 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of February 18, 1875, c. 80, providing that there shall be no reversal by this court upon a writ of error" for error in ruling any plea in abatement, other than a plea to the jurisdiction of the court," does not forbid the review of a decision, even on a plea in abatement, of any question of the jurisdiction of the court below to render judgment against the defendant, though depending on the sufficiency of the service of the writ. In a personal action brought in a court of a State against a corporation which neither is incorporated nor does business within the State, nor has any agent or property therein, service of the summons upon its president, temporarily within the jurisdiction, cannot be recognized as valid by the courts of any other government. A corporation sued in a personal action in a court of a State, within which it is neither incorporated nor does business, nor has any agent or property, does not, by appearing specially in that court for the sole purpose of presenting a petition for the removal of the action into the Circuit Court of the United States, and by obtaining a removal accordingly, waive the right to object to the jurisdiction of the court for want of sufficient service of the summons. THIS was an action for a libel, claiming damages in the sum of $100,000, brought in the Supreme Court of the State of New York for the county of Kings, by Catherine Goldey, a citizen of the State of New York, against The Morning News of New Haven, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, and carrying on business in that State only, and having no place of business, officer, agent or property in the State of New York. The action was commenced January 4, 1890, by personal service of the summons in the city and State of New York upon the president of the corporation, temporarily there, but a citizen and resident of the State of Connecticut; and on January 24, 1890, upon the petition of the defendant, appear Opinion of the Court. ing by its attorney specially and for the sole and single purpose of presenting the petition for removal, was removed into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York, because the parties were citizens of different States, and the time within which the defendant was required by the laws of the State of New York to answer or plead to the complaint had not expired. In the Circuit Court of the United States, the defendant, on February 5, 1890, appearing by its attorney specially for the purpose of applying for an order setting aside the summons and the service thereof, filed a motion, supported by affidavits of its president and of its attorney to the facts above stated, to set aside the summons and the service thereof, upon the ground" that the said defendant, being a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Connecticut, where it solely carries on its business, and transacting no business within the State of New York, nor having any agent clothed with authority to represent it in the State of New York, cannot legally be made a defendant in an action by a service upon one of its officers while temporarily in said State of New York." Thereupon, that court, after hearing the parties on a rule to show cause why the motion should not be granted, "ordered that the service of the summons herein be, and the same is hereby, set aside and the same declared to be null and void and of no effect, and the defendant is hereby relieved from appearing to plead in answer to the complaint or otherwise herein." 42 Fed. Rep. 112. The plaintiff sued out this writ of error. Mr. Mirabeau L. Towns, for plaintiff in error, submitted on his brief. Mr. Henry B. B. Stapler for defendant is error. MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. This writ of error presents the question whether, in a personal action against a corporation which neither is incorpo |