« AnteriorContinuar »
kin, in the sense of distributees under statute, it is my will that the same shall be sold and of distributions (2 Gen. St. 1895, p. 2390). the proceeds of said sale together with the net
[Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words amount of rents derived therefrom shall be inand Phrases, First and Second Series, Heirs at
vested and form a part of the residue of my esLaw.)
tate hereinafter mentioned and disposed of.
In making any lease or sale of the house and 4. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION Om 35—HEIRS
lot in this clause of my will mentioned my ex-HALF BLOOD.
ecutors will take care to provide for always Under Statute of Distributions (2 Gen. St.
keeping open a sufficient, convenient and suitable 1895, p. 2390), mother and half sister take equal.
right of way from the public road in front therely with sisters.
of to my homestead premises above mentioned. 5. CONVERSION 15(1)—DIRECTIONS OF WILL Fourth. It is my will that the premises owned -"SHALL" BE SOLD.
by me and occupied by William Tuttle, also the Direction in will that land "shall be sold," house and lot occupied by Henry W. Harman. proceeds invested in bonds. etc.. upon the OC- Also the property I purchased from the estate
dity in the opin. of Henry P. Green shall be kept rented until a ion of his executors," amounted to imperative di. favorable opportunity in the opinion of my exrection to convert.
ecutors shall arrive for the sale of the same [Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words or of any one or more of said pieces of property and Phrases, First and Second Series, Shall.] and then it is my will that the same or any one
or more of said pieces of property of which sale 6. CONVERSION 21(1) – EFFECT - VESTED
can be made shall be sold and the proceeds of RIGITS.
said sale together with the net amount of rents Where right of heir to land is once vested,
derived therefrom shall be invested and form a fact that it has been changed into personalts by
part of the residue of my estate hereinafter menexecutors does not alter such vested right.
tioned. 7. WILLS 524(2)-HEIRS AT LAW-TIME OF Fifth. I do order and direct that the stock of ASCERTAINMENT.
whisky or other liquors I may have on hand Where personalty on death of a certain per
at the time of my death, also my horses, wagons, son goes to heirs at law of such person, heirs harness, sleighs, tools, farming implements and at law must be ascertained by reference to the other goods and chattels not otherwise herein statute in force at death of such person. disposed of shall be sold in such manner, upon
such terms and at such times as shall be most Bill by James P. Albright against Fred advantageous to my estate and the proceeds Van Voorhis and others to construe the will thereof shall be invested and form a part of the of Frederick Springer, deceased.
residue of my estate.
Sixth. I do order and direct that the tract of On June 4, 1883, Frederick Springer died land containing twenty-one acres on the Green leaving the following will:
Village road opposite the Gibbons wash house
shall be held for six years at least after my deI, Frederick Springer of Madison, Morris
cease by my executors who shall use or rent the county, New Jersey, being of sound, memory and
same to the best adrantage until a favorable understanding do here'y make, publish and de
opportunity in their opinion shall arrire, after clare this to be my last will and testament in
the expiration of said six years for the sale manner following that is to say
I thereof and then it is my will that the same shall First. It is my will that all my debts and fu
be sold and proceeds of such sale together with neral expenses be paid as soon as conveniently the net income which shall have accrued from can be after my decease.
said premises shall be added to the residue of my Second. The homestead property whereon Il estate. now reside comprising the three story house and Seventh. All the rest and residue of my estate about two acres of land lying between the rail- shall be divided into five equal shares for the road and the brook and adjoining the graveyard benefit of my wife Louisa, my three children, including the lot occupied by Charles Garrison Frederick, Pauline and Lilly and my grandand all my household furniture and housekeeping daughter Catharine Laubacher and I do order articles (except the piano forte which I have and direct that each of said shares shall be well heretofore given to my daughter Pauline) I give and safely invested upon bond and mortgage of and devise to my wife Louisa for and during the unincumbered real estate and that the interest term of her natural life or for so long as she arising upon one of said shares shall be paid may remain my widow and at her death or re to my said wife Louisa semiannually during marriage I give and devise the same absolutely the term of her natural life or for so long as she to the children I have had or may have by my may remain my widow and upon her death or said wife or their legal representatives,
remarriage, then to the children which have been Third. I do order and direct that my execu- or may be born to me by her share and share tors hereinafter named shall sell the cider mill alike for and during the term of their natural and distillery building, steam engine, machinery, lives and upon the death of all of said children kettles and distilling apparatus at such time and the principal of said share shall be divided in such manner as shall in their opinion pro- among the legal representatives of the children duce the most money and shall use sufficient of which have been or may be born to me by her. the proceeds of said sale to alter and convert in- II. The interest arising upon another of said to a dwelling house, the large building standing original shares shall be put out at interest and next to the cider mill and known as the car- all the interest arising upon said share and the penter shop, according to the plans which I have interest upon said interest shall be retained in caused to be made for said purpose and which the hands of my executors during the minority will be found among my papers and the surplus of my granddaughter Catharine Laubacher and of the proceeds of said sale, if any, shall be in- shall be paid to her in person when she shall vested by my executors and form a part of the arrive at the age of twenty-one years and thereresidue of my estate hereinafter mentioned and after the interest which shall arise upon her disposed of and I do further order and direct original share shall be paid to her semiannually that the said building altered and converted into in person for and during the term of her natural a dwelling house as aforesaid together with a life and at her death the principal of her said suitable quantity of land therewith as a house share shall go to her heir or heirs at law bur in lot for said house, shall be kept rented until a no event shall her said share or any part therefavorable opportunity, in the opinion of my ex- of go to the father of said Catharine Laubacher. ecutors, shall arrive for the sale thereof and then l III. The interest arising upon another of said original shares shall be paid semiannually to , the daughter of his first wife, is expressly the guardian of my son Frederick until he shall excluded from participation in this share. attain the age of twenty-one years and then to him in person for and during the term of his
| Who the legal representatives of the chilnatural life and at his death the principal of his dren may be at the death of the survivors said share shall go to his heir or heirs at law can only be determined when the survivor absolutely.
dies. Smith v. Robinson, 83 N. J. Eq. 384, IV. The interest arising upon another of said original shares shall be paid semiannually to the 389, 90 Ati. 1063. guardian of my daughter Pauline until she shall [3, 4] Frederick's share is given in the attain the age of twenty-one years and then to following terms: her in person for and during her natural life and at her death the principal of her said share “The interest arising upon another of saia shall go to her heir or heirs at law absolutely. original shares shall be paid semiannually to the
V. The interest arising upon the other of said guardian of my son Frederick until he shall atshares of the residue of my estate shall be paid tain the age of twenty-one years and then to semiannually to the guardian of my daughter bim in person for and during the term of his Lilly until she attains the age of twenty-one natural life and at his death the principal of his years and then to her in person for and during said share shall go to his heir or heirs at law the term of her natural life and at her death | absolutely." the principal of her said share shall go to her heir or heirs at law absolutely.
Frederick survived testator four months Eighth. The devises and bequests in this will
and died intestate. At the time of his death and testament in favor of my wife are to be i Jien of all her right of dower or other rights | testator's estate consisted partly of realty and whatsoever either at common law or by statute partly of personalty. The question is, Who in and to any of my estate. And I do hereby are his heirs? If any of testator's estate appoint my said wife to be the guardian of our
was at Frederick's death realty and realty children Frederick, Pauline and Lilly.
Ninth. I do hereby nominate, constitute and not notionally converted, his heirs at law appoint my friends J. Preston Allbright of Madi- were his two sisters. Comp. St. 1910, "Deson, New Jersey, and John H. Hornett of New scent," p. 1918. As far as the estate was York to be the executors of this my last will and testament,
personalty, or realty notionally converted inIn witness whereof, I, the said Frederick to personalty, it went to his next of kin, in Springer, have hereto set my hand and seal on the sense of distributees under the statute of this thirteenth day of April in the year of our distributions. Meeker v. Forbes, 84 N. J. Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventyfive. [Signed] Fr. Springer. [L. S.)
Eq. 272, 93 Atl. 887; Id., 86 N. J. Eq. 255,
98 Atl. 1086. The mother and half sister, Testator left him surviving his wife Marie,
represented by her daughter Catherine take three children, Frederick, Pauline and Lilly,
equally with his other sisters under this and a granddaughter, Catherine, the child
statute. Dickinson's Probate Court Practice, of his first wife. His widow Marie died in
165 Gen. St. p. 2390. See Smith v. McDontestate in 1907 and his daughter Pauline,
| ald, 71 N. J. Eq. 261, 65 Atl. 840. And the who had married Edward Van Voorhis, died
only question is, What portion, if any, of the intestate in 1917 leaving her surviving three
real estate is to be considered as having children Fred, Harold and Preston
been at Frederick's death, notionally conCharles A. Rathbun, of Morristown, for verted ? complainant. C. Franklin Wilson, of Mor-  I think the testator intended a converristown, for defendant Lilly Cook. Howard sion out and out of all his real estate except F. Barrett, of Madison, for defendants Fred his homestead. It is his will that the prop Van Voorhis and others.
erty he particularly specifies "shall be sold"
and that the proceeds "shall be invested" STEVENS, V. C.  Testator gives the and form part of the residue. As to the homestead to his wife for life and at her residue he divides it into five shares and death "to the children I have had or may "orders and directs that each of said shares have by my said wife or their legal repre- shall be well and safely invested upon bond sentatives." The remainders vested in the and mortgage of unincumbered real estate" children at testator's death (Guild v. Newark, -a direction which, if it is to be complied 87 N. J. Eq. 38, 99 Atl. 120), and as her son with, necessitates a conversion of all the real Frederick was then living a one-third inter estate included in the residue. Lindley v. est vested in him. When he subsequently O'Reilly, 50 N. J. Law, 646, 15 Atl. 379, 1 L. died intestate this interest descended upon R. A. 79, 7 Am. St. Rep. 802; Wright v. his heirs at law.
Keasbey, 87 N. J. Eq. 52, 100 Atl. 172. He  Testator directs that the residue of his directs that the interest arising upon each estate be divided into five shares, and that of the shares shall be paid to the wife and the interest of one of said shares be paid to children respectively, and that the principal his wife during her life, and at her death to of the several shares shall go, in the case her children during their lives, and "upon of the wife's share, to the legal representathe death of all of said children the prin- tives of her children and in the case of the cipal of said share shall be divided among other shares to the heir or heirs at law of the legal representatives of the children the children respectively. The direction to which have been or may be born to me by sell is throughout mandatory.
place until the occurrence of “a favorable
(91 N. J. Law, 360) opportunity in the opinion of his executors," NUGENT V. GRASSMAN et al. but this is no more than what is generally (Supreme Court of New Jersey. June 6, 1918.) implied, for unless directed to sell within a 1. ADVERSE POSSESSION m 44 - CONTINUITY specified time executors do not ordinarily oF POSSESSION. sell until the "favorable opportunity" arises.
Occasional acts of trespass committed upon
wild and uncultivated lands, although extending In Lewin on Trusts (*947) it is said: .
| over a period of 20 years, will not give title, "A direction to trustees to sell 'as soon as but if such acts occur with sufficient frequency, they shall see necessary for the benefit of the they amount to that continuity of possession cestui que trust or whenever it shall appear to which is an essential ingredient of title by adtheir satisfaction that such sale will be for the verse possession. benefit of the cestui que trust,' amounts to an 2. ADVERSE POSSESSION 115(4) CONTINUimperative direction to convert," and the prop- ITY OF POSSESSION-QUESTION FOR JURY. erty is under such circumstances considered as In ejectment, whether annual cutting of hay converted from the death of the testator. In on wild land, and placing of corner posts, was re Raw, 26 Ch. Div. 601; Cook's Executors v. sufficient possession to give title by adverse posCook's Administrators, 20 N. J. Eq. 375. session, held, under the evidence, for the jury.
3. APPEAL AND ERROR 301-OBJECTIONS IN I had occasion to consider one phase of
| LOWER COURT-NEW TRIAL. this question in Martin v. Kimball, 86 N. J. On rule to show cause why verdict should Ea. 10. 96 Atl. 565: Id., 86 N. J. Eq. 432, 99 not be set aside, contentions that error in law Atl. 1070, but the question itself was differ
appears in the charge of the trial court cannot
be considered, where not presented by any of the ent. It was whether testator intended the
reasons submitted as ground for setting aside life tenants to have rent or an apportionment the verdict. of the proceeds of sale. I came to the con
Ejectment by James R. Nugent against clusion that he intended them to have only
Edward J. Grassman and others. On rule to rents. I said, however, in the course of the show cause why verdict for defendants should opinion, that:
not be set aside. Rule discharged. "It may be safely asserted that notional con Argued February term, 1918, before GUM. version will not be referred to a time anterior to MERI
MERE, C. J., and PARKER and KAthe time when conversion is directed. If, in my will, I direct that my property shall not be
LISCH, JJ. sold until ten years after my death, it cannot be
George Holmes, of Jersey City, and George deemed converted as of the time of my death."
W. Anderson, of Newark, for the rule. ArThe reason is obvious. The testator in thur F. Egner, of Newark, opposed. tended it to retain its character of real estate for that length of time. In the case of GUMMERE, C. J. This is an action of the Green Village tract, mentioned in para ejectment and involves title to a tract of land graph 6 of the will now under consideration, on the meadows adjacent to Newark Bay. the testator directs that it should be held It is conceded that the ownership of fivefor six years at least.
This was done. It
This was done. It sixths of the tract is in the plaintiff. The was, so counsel states in his brief, subse controversy concerns the remaining one-sixth. quently sold. Its proceeds are now actually
The proofs show that the paper title to this personalty. But at the time of Frederick's
one-sixth is in the defendants. The case of death it was real estate, actually and no
the plaintiff is that originally the whole tract tionally. It therefore descended as such up
was held in common by several owners, and on Frederick's heirs at law. The fact that
that in 1865 the owners of five-sixths interest it has since been changed into personalty
executed a deed to one William F. Haines cannot alter the right once vested. Meeker
purporting to convey the absolute ownership v. Forbes, 84 N. J. Eq. 272, 93 Atl. 887.
of the whole tract; that Haines immediately  Pauline Van Voorhis died intestate in
entered into possession, and exercised acts
of ownership over the land from that time on 1917. The will gives the fifth share in which
until 1901, which were so open, notorious, exshe had a life right to her heirs at law;
clusive, continuous, and uninterrupted as to but these, so called, in a gift of personalty,
vest in him at the end of 20 years from his mean next of kin, not next of kin in the
original entry, a title by adverse possession; technical sense of nearest kinsman, but next
and that this title has now devolved upon the of kin in the sense of distributees under the
plaintiff. statute of distributions. Meeker v. Forbes,
The trial of the case resulted in a verdict supra. Who answer this description cannot
in favor of the defendants, and we are now be known until the death of the person
asked to set it aside for three reasons: whose next of kin they are. Williams on
(1) “Because the verdict of the jury was conExecutors, *1008. As they are the statutory
trary to the weight of the evidence"; (2) "benext of kin, they must be ascertained by ref- cause the verdict of the jury was contrary to erence to the statute then in force, for no law"; (3) "because the verdict of the jury other persons then answer that description. was contrary to the charge of the trial court." Van Tilburgh v. Hollinshead, 14 N. J. Eq. 32. The plaintiff's claim of adverse possession Consequently Pauline's next of kin must be was rested largely upon the testimony of his ascertained by reference to the act of 1914 grantor, Mr. Haines. He testified that im(P. L. 1914, p. 69).
| mediately upon the conveyance to him in 1865
he mowed the grass on this tract, and that he taxes thereon. Chief Justice Green, speaking continued to do this every year until 1901, for this court, used the following language: when the construction of a railroad embank-i “Will an occasional entry upon wild and unment prevented him from further continuing cultivated lands for the purpose of cutting wood this practice: that after that he visited the or making surveys, joined with the payment of land from time to time, and cleaned out the being no actual residence upon any part of the
taxes, by a party having no legal title, there ditches around the tract. He further testi. land, no cultivation, no inclosure, no improvefied that some four or five years after taking ment, no actual occupancy for any purpose what
ever, operate to bar the title of the rightful ownpossession of this land he put a stake at each
er? Or may several distinct entries and acts of corner of the tract; that those stakes were trespass, coupled with temporary actual occulocust stakes; and that they remained in pancy for the purpose of cutting wood, be thus their original position up to the time of the
united, and constitute one continuous adverse
possession? The question is certainly of great trial. There was also proof that the present
moment in this state, where there are extensive plaintiff had paid the taxes upon the prem tracts of wild and uncultivated lands at all ises for the past five or six years; in other times exposed to trespass and encroachments
without the knowledge of the true owners. words, ever since the conveyance to him by
There is no decision of this court to countenance Haines.
| the doctrine, and the decided weight of authorOn the other hand, there was testimony of-ity elsewhere, as well as sound principle, is fered by the defendant tending to show that
opposed to it. * * * And in this view there
is no distinction between a naked trespasser and the stakes at the four corners of this tract
one who enters under color of title. Both are are not locust, and that they very plainly alike trespassers. The title papers of the lathave been there for only a comparatively ter may serve to extend and define the limits
of his occupancy, but it does not change its short period of time, not over 10 or 15 years.
character. He is nevertheless a trespasser, and The defendant's evidence also tended to con- the moment his actual occupancy ceases, the tradict the story of Mr. Haines with relation rightful owner, without actual entry, is in posto his having cut the salt hay on the tract an
session by construction of law. The mere pay
ment of taxes cannot prove possession. It may nually during the period specified by him.
od specimea by am. | be evidence of a claim of title; it may serve This proof, however, was not, in our opinion, to explain the character of the possession, and sufficient to justify the jury in disregarding to extend it beyond the limits of actual occuHaines' testimony upon this point.
pancy; but the payment of taxes by a party
not having the actual possession of any part of The principal question, therefore, would the premises cannot prove possession. It would seem to be this: Does the fact that Mr. | give the owner of the land no right of action Haines for a period of over 20 ecossive against the party paying taxes as a trespasser;
and no act can show possession in a party doing years, annually cut the salt hay upon the lo- it which will not afford to the owner of the cus in quo, justify us in declaring that the land a remedy by action." finding of the jury was contrary to the weight | of the evidence? In the case of Foulke v.
[1,2] Two principles may be considered to Bond, 41 N. J. Law, 527, the principles on
have been established by the authorities re
ferred to: (1) That occasional acts of treswhich the doctrine of title by adverse possession rests are thus stated by Mr. Justice
pass committed upon wild and uncultivated
lands, although extending over a period of 20 Depue, speaking in the Court of Errors and
years, will not give title; (2) if such acts ocAppeals:
cur with sufficient frequency they amount to "The possession must be actual and exclusive, adverse and hostile, visible or notorious, con
that continuity of possession which is an estinued and uninterrupted. Notoriety of the sential ingredient of title by adverse possesadverse claim under which possession is held is sion. These are legal rules, but whether in a necessary constituent of title by adverse pos- |
a given case the acts of trespass relied upon session, and therefore the occupation or possession must be of that nature that the real owner
to establish title are of sufficient frequency is presumed to have known that there was a to amount to a continuity of possession is possession adverse to his title, under which it necessarily a question of fact to be determinwas intended to make title against him. * * A party relying on title derived from such a
ed by the jury under proper instructions from source must prove possession in himself, or in the court. In the present case the jury has those under whom he claims, of such a charac determined that acts of trespass committed ter as is calculated to inform the true owner of
annually upon the property of the real owner the nature and purpose of the possession to which the lands are subjected. The question
do not amount to that continuity of posseswhether possession has been held adversely con sion which is necessary to be established in tinuously for the period of 20 years, with the order to support a claim of title by adverse requisite notoriety, is one of fact for the jury. * * * Occasional acts of trespass extending
possession. We cannot say that they were over the period of 20 years will not give title.” not entirely justified in so determining, and
the claim of the plaintiff that the verdict of In the case of Cornelius v. Giberson, 25 N. I the jury was contrary to the evidence must J. Law, p. 1, in which the title to a tract of therefore fail. timber land was involved, the defendant set The claim that the verdict of the jury was up title by adverse possession, and attempted contrary to law is without merit. The law to sustain his claim by proof of the cutting of of the case was that laid down by the trial timber from time to time, and the erection of court in its charge to the jury. woodchoppers' cabins on the tract. It was! So, too, the claim that the verdict was conout merit. An examination of the instruction (vorce may be decreed, need not be testimony givto the jury shows that it was strictly regard en by another or other witnesses to all of the
same identical facts to the minutest particulars, ed by that body in its finding.
but only their giving such facts in evidence as (3) Some contention is made in the brief already testified to by petitioner, or such circumsubmitted on behalf of the plaintiff that error stances tending to establish them, as renders pein law appears in the charge of the trial
titioner's testimony so much more probable as
to be legally acceptable, and which serves to court. But, as such error, if it exists, is not
empower the judge to accept the truth of the pepresented by any of the reasons submitted by titioner's whole story." the plaintiff as ground for setting aside the | “The case of Foote v. Foote (Court of Errors verdict, we have not given it consideration.
and Appeals) 71 N. J. Eq. 273, 65 Atl. 205, is
cited in the Orens Case as authority for the The rule to show cause will be discharged. above proposition, as is also Williams v. Wil
liams, 78 N. J. Eq. 13, 78 Atl. 693. In the
Foote Case. 71 N. J. Ea. at page 280. 65 Atl. (89 N. J. Eg. 1)
at page 208, the court says: 'If the circumstancROGERS v. ROGERS. (No. 43/413.) es of the case as shown by the expressions and (Court of Chancery of New Jersey. May 29,
conduct of the defendant, together with the let
ters of the parties, all corroborate the testimony 1918.)
of the complainant, the case is complete.' This
case, of course, was decided upon its own par(Syllabus by the Court.)
ticular facts, as indeed every case should be, 1. DIVORCE 127(4)-GROUNDS-ADULTEBY- and it might be thought, in the absence of corCORROBORATION.
roboration by witnesses, that both conduct of The corroboration of petitioner's testimony, the defendant and letters of the parties, or at required by the law of this state in order that least of the defendant, must necessarily be shown a decree of divorce may be granted, need not be to afford corroboration. I do not so take it. the testimony of witnesses, although. when such In the case of Robinson y. Robinson. 83 N. testimony can be procured, it should be intro- J. Eq. 150, 90 Atl. 311, Vice Chancellor Leamduced. The required corroboration may be fur-ing held that corroboration of the testimony of nished by surrounding circumstances, adequate a petitioner need not be by other witnesses, but ly established.
may be furnished by surrounding circumstances, [Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and remarked, at page 152, that surrounding cirand Phrases, First and Second Series, Corrobo cumstances adequately established may be of a ration.)
nature to fully supply the office of corrobora2. EXPLANATION OF SYLLABUS.
tion which the law requires in matrimonial cas
es. In other words, letters and conduct, or eiA misleading statement in the third syllabus ther. if established with sufficient clearness, in Foote v. Foote, 71 N. J. Eq. 273, 65 Atl. 205,
form, as it were, the general atmosphere of the pointed out.
case, which, taken as a whole, will establish a Petition for divorce by Jeffrey J. Rogers
proper basis for a decree, even though there against Julia Rogers. Decree for petitioner,
are no corroborating witnesses to the acts alleged
by the petitioner. advised by an advisory master, adopted as the "Applying the above principles to the case conclusion of the court, and a decree nisi to under discussion we find, in addition to the evibe entered.
dence mentioned above, that there are in evi
dence letters, postcards, and pictures which This matter was referred to Alonzo Church, were found in the defendant's valise. They were Esq., as advisory master, who filed the fol- sent to her by several different men, some of lowing conclusions:
whom are named as corespondents. When con
fronted with these, the defendant confessed, and "This is a petition for divorce on the ground they are evidence corroborating the confession. of adultery. The testimony of the petitioner is | The petitioner's mother testifies that the decorroborated by the confession of the defend- fendant received a large amount of mail, which ant, and by admissions made by her to a friend she refused to read except in private. When who testified to them before the special master. the husband desired to read a letter directed to Were this all the evidence, I should be forced her as 'Miss.' defendant snatched it out of his to the conclusion that the case was one coming hand and ran upstairs with it; and these facts under the rule laid down in Garrett v. Garrett, I are corroborating circumstances. 86 N. J. Eq. 293, 98 Atl. 848, where the Chan- "Upon considering the whole case, therefore, cellor held that testimony of the petitioner, cor- I conclude that there is sufficient corroboration roborated only by the admissions or confession of the petitioner's testimony from the defendof the defendant, will not, without more, supant's confession, corroborated by the above cirport a decree. There is another principle, how- cumstances, to justify a decree for the petitionever, of the law of evidence in divorce cases, er, which I shall accordingly advise." which is sometimes overlooked, but which is highly important in the determination of these
Carl Weitz, of Union Hill, for petitioner. causes. "The Chancellor, in Garrett v. Garrett, supra,
WALKER, C. (1) A decree of divorce nisi held that a decree cannot be granted upon the will be made in conformity with the advice uncorroborated testimony of the petitioner, nor
contained in the conclusions of Advisory upon the uncorroborated confession of the defendant, nor upon one plus the other. He adds,
Master Church, which are hereby adopted as however, that both are admissible in evidence, the opinion of the court. but must be corroborated to amount to legal evi  As the case of Foote v. Foote, 71 N. J. dence. This brings us to a consideration of Eg. 273. 65 Atl. 205, is cited in the opinion of what is corroboration. It need not necessarily be the testimony of witnesses, although when
the learned master, I desire to call attention such testimony can be procured, it is important to a misleading statement in syllabus 3. It that it be introduced. Corroboration may arise is found in this expression: “Under a statout of facts and circumstances.
"In Orens v. Orens. 102 Atl. 436. it was hela | ute requiring corroborative evidence inter alia: "The corroboration of a petitioner's to obtain a divorce," etc. There is no statetestimony, required by law, in order that a di- ment in the body of the opinion that corrobo