tion if it involved his private affairs, not con- | beyond that of an office boy for Mr. Padgett, nected with the matter in controversy, the court, in our opinion, committed no reversible error in permitting the question to be asked. [4] As we have already said, no objection was made to the answer involved in the fifth exception, and the witness was permitted thereafter to state facts that, without explanation, were more harmful to the character of the witness, as affecting his credibility, and more injurious to the plaintiff's case, by reason thereof, than the answer to the question objected to in the sixth exception; and, consequently, we can find no reversible error in the court's ruling upon the sixth exception. The ruling of the court upon the seventh exception was entirely proper upon cross-ex-requisite, under the rule, to make it a priviamination.

that he did not place any great stock in Mr. Hecht, and concluded by saying that Hecht "never was a recognized attorney of mine."

The eighth exception was to the admissibility of a letter from Hecht to the witness Yates. It was offered and admitted to refresh the memory of Yates as to a meeting with Hecht at the Caswell Hotel on January 14, 1917. We find nothing in its contents to injure the plaintiff.

[6, 7] The privilege resulting from communications between attorney and client is designed to secure the client's confidence in the secrecy of his communication, but it assumes, of course, that the communications are made with the intention of confidentiality. The moment confidence ceases privilege ceases. Wigmore on Evidence, § 2311. If Yates did not recognize Hecht as his attorney, the communications were not made to him as his attorney, and consequently such circumstances were without that confidentiality that is

leged communication. It may also be said that while the privilege is for the protection of the client, he may waive the privilege, and this may be done by implication; for instance, he cannot be allowed, after disclosing as much as he pleases, to withhold the remainder. In view of the testimony of Yates, the evidence admitted under these exceptions was properly admitted.

We find no error in the court's ruling in the exclusion of evidence offered in the twenty-third, twenty-fourth, and twenty-fifth

[5] The ninth exception is to the admissibility of another letter of March 21, 1914, from Yates, manager of the Shawmut Mining Company, to Hecht, in which he denied having employed Hecht as his attorney. He had pre-exceptions. viously stated in his testimony that Hecht was not his attorney, and consequently this admission of the letter could not have injured the plaintiff.

We discover no error in the court's rulings in the tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth exceptions.

The fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, twenty-first, and twenty-second exceptions are to conversations had by the witness Hecht with Yates, which are claimed by the plaintiff to be privileged communications, because of the alleged relation of attorney and client existing between Hecht and Yates. Yates was the agent of the Shawmut Mining Company, and it was with him that Llewellyn did all of his dealIngs in connection with the purchase of the goods mentioned in the account, filed with the declaration, upon which this suit is instituted. Yates, produced on the part of the plaintiff, had already testified as to the existence of a copartnership between Padgett and Llewellyn, and had been asked concerning conversations with Hecht, which, as claimed by the defendant, were inconsistent with any knowledge, on his part, of any such copartnership. There were no objections interposed thereto, or any claim made at the time, that said conversations were privileged communications, because of the relation of attorney and client, existing between them; but Yates, on the contrary, denied that Hecht was at the time of such conversations, his attorney. He said of Hecht that he never re

The court's rulings in admitting the evidence in the twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth, and twenty-ninth, and its excluding the evidence offered under the thirtieth and thirty-first exceptions, were proper.

The thirty-second and thirty-third exceptions were to the exclusion of evidence offered in rebuttal, which evidence was properly excluded, and the same may be said of the thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth exceptions.

The thirty-sixth exception goes to the ruling of the court upon the defendant's first and second prayers that were granted, and the plaintiff's second prayer that was refused. The defendant's first prayer relates to the burden of proof, and we are unable to find any error committed by the court in granting that instruction; nor do we find any defect in the defendant's second prayer, to which the appellant, in its brief, makes no allusion.

Both the granted and rejected prayers of the plaintiff appear to have been drawn upon the theory that there was a plea of limitations in the case, but there was none. It is, however, only to the second or rejected prayer that our attention need be given; and this prayer was properly rejected.

There is a motion in this case to dismiss the appeal, involving not only the construction of chapter 625 of the Acts of 1916, but the validity of that act. These questions will be disposed of in an opinion hereafter to be delivered in a case now pending before us; and, as it is our opinion that the judgment below in this case should be affirmed re

ed by the motion to dismiss, it is not neces- Several propositions of law were submitted sary to discuss the motion. by the city, but the only one we think, necessary to discuss, in view of the real contention of the parties, is the instruction asked for, and granted by the commission:

Having found no error in the rulings of the court below, the judgment of that court will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed, with costs to the appel

lees.

(132 Md. 497)
NORTHERN CENTRAL RY. CO. et al. v.
MAYOR, ETC., OF BALTIMORE.
(No. 37.)
(Court of Appeals of Maryland. April 3, 1918.)
TAXATION 391-VALUATION OF RAILROAD'S
Under Code Pub. Civ. Laws, art. 23, § 313,
and article 81, § 193, providing for assessing
and taxing a railroad's property in the same
manner as that of individuals, special utility,
for railroad purposes, of a railroad's land, is to
be considered in determining value.

LAND.

Appeal from Baltimore City Court; Carroll T. Bond, Judge.

Tax proceedings by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore against the Northern Central Railway Company and another. The court affirmed the assessment, and the Railroad Companies appeal. Affirmed.

Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, THOMAS, PATTISON, URNER, STOCKBRIDGE, and CONSTABLE, JJ.

Shirley Carter, of Baltimore (Bernard Carter & Sons, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellants. R. Contee Rose, Asst. City Sol., of Baltimore (S. S. Field, City Sol., of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

"That the utility of the property in this appeal for railroad purposes is a proper element of value to be considered in arriving at the value of said property for the purpose of taxation for the year 1917."

The tax commission affirmed the action of the appeal tax court in the assessment made by it, and the railroad company appealed therefrom to the Baltimore city court. That Court, to which the case was submitted for trial without the intervention of a jury, upon the evidence produced before the tax commission, affirmed the assessment, and this appeal is from the action of the court in affirming the rulings of the commission upon the propositions of law submitted to it.

The sole question before us upon this appeal is whether the taxing authorities, in making the assessment complained of, followed the provisions of the statute. Section 193 of article 81, and section 313 of article 23, of the Code of Public General Laws of 1912. The language of these sections, having relation to the questions before us, is the same, and is as follows:

"The property, real and personal, of each and every railroad company in this state, working their roads by steam, shall be assessed and taxed for county and municipal purposes in the same manner as the property of individuals is now assessed and taxed; and the authorities of the several counties and the city of Baltimore are hereby authorized and directed to proceed to

same manner as upon like property of individuals now assessed and taxed or liable to assessment and taxation by the laws of this state."

The requirement of the statute is that the aforesaid property of the appellant shall be assessed and taxed for municipal purposes in the same manner as the property of individuals is now assessed and taxed, and that the city is authorized and directed to proceed to assess and collect taxes on the same in the same manner as upon like property of individuals. The appellants interpret or construe this language as prohibiting the taxing authorities from considering the utility of the property for railroad purposes in ascertaining its value for municipal tax

PATTISON, J. The Northern Central Rail-assess and collect taxes on said property in the way Company, of which the Pennsylvania Railroad Company is lessee, is the owner of a number of lots or parcels of land in the city of Baltimore, lying and being in Jones Falls valley. In the year 1916 these parcels of land were assessed by the appeal tax court of Baltimore city for municipal taxation at amounts largely in excess of the assessment upon which the taxes had been previously paid. The Northern Central Railway Company and its lessee, being dissatisfied with the assessment, appealed to the state tax commission. The tax commission heard testimony, offered by each of the parties to the proceedings, as to the value of the real estate mentioned, and the city, as well as the railroad company, submitted to the commission propositions of law by which they respective ly contended the taxing authorities should be governed in their valuation and assess ment of the properties for the purpose of taxation. The only proposition suomitted by the railroad company was that:

"The tax authorities of the city of Baltimore were and are required to assess the real property of the appellant railroad company in the same manner as of like property of individuals."

ation. The correctness of this contention

it would seem, depends upon the question whether, under the law of this state, the taxing authorities, in valuing and assessing like property of individuals for municipal taxation, are authorized to consider its util ity for railroad purposes.

The question, therefore, to be decided, is: How and in what manner are lands owned by individuals valued and assessed, under This submission, being in the form of a the laws of this state, for municipal taxaprayer, was granted by the commission. tion? In assessing real estate of individuals

for the purpose of taxation, its full cash value is to be ascertained (chapter 120 of the Acts of 1896) without looking to a forced sale; and in ascertaining its value all utilitles of which the property is capable, and which have the effect of enhancing its value, are elements to be considered. Brack v. Baltimore, 125 Md. 382, 93 Atl. 994, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 880; Bonaparte v. Baltimore, 131 Md. 80, 101 Atl. 594, and cases therein cited. If the lots of land in question, which are shown to possess special utility for railroad purposes by all the witnesses who testified before the commission were owned by individuals, there could be no doubt as to the authority of the taxing powers to consider that utility in ascertaining their value for taxable purposes; or if there are other lots owned by individuals, similarly located in Jones Falls valley, possessing special utility for railroad purposes, the taxing powers of the city have the undoubted authority to consider that utility in ascertaining the value of such lots for taxable purposes.

It is not, as suggested by the appellants counsel, the increased value of the lots of land, resulting from the fact that they are parts or units of the railroad system, which the commission has said may be considered in ascertaining their value; but it is the utility they possess for railroad purposes, without regard to the fact that said lots of land are parts or units of the railroad system. The natural depression in which the lands are situated or located, running through the city, affords great advantages for the construction and operation of a railroad leading into the very heart of the city. It is this high, special utility for railroad purposes that we have said may be considered in ascertaining the value of the land in question, and such utility exists whether the lands are owned by the railroad company or by individuals; and, as such utility may be considered in ascertaining the value of lands owned by individuals, it, under the statute, may in the same manner be considered in assessing the lands of the railroad company.

(132 Md. 476)

BOGGS v. DUNDALK REALTY CO., Inc (No. 29.),

(Court of Appeals of Maryland. April 3, 1918.) 1. APPEAL AND ERROR 713(1)-RECORD.

Where the order appealed from, dismissing the petition, gave no leave to amend the bill, an amended bill in the record will not be considered. 2. ACCOUNT 17(1)—PETITION-FRAUD. Option holder's petition for accounting, etc., setting up fraud, but no facts to show a sufficient basis for charge of fraud, is demurrable. LACHES 3. EQUITY ~71(2) LENGTH OF TIME. What constitutes laches is not a hard and fast rule of a specific length of time, as in the case of limitations; but it is dependent in each case upon the facts of the particular case. 4. EQUITY 71(3)-LACHES-Delay. that transaction relating to land option contract Where plaintiff, after three years, charged was fraudulent, but made no explanation for the delay, a clear case of laches was apparent. 5. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 28(1) CONTRACTS ENFORCEABLE-DEFINITENESS. Specific performance can be granted only where the contract is definite and certain in all its parts.

6. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ~114(2) — PLEAD

ING.

Bill alleging that certain definite agreements were to be set aside for the purpose of entering into a new agreement, which failed to indicate the terms of the new agreement, did not entitle plaintiff to specific performance, which can be granted only where the contract is definite and certain in all its parts.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Baltimore County; Allan McLane, Judge.

Bill by A. Graham Boggs, Jr., against the Dundalk Realty Company, Incorporated. Judgment dismissing the complaint, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, THOMAS, URNER, STOCKBRIDGE, and CONSTABLE, JJ.

Edgar Allan Poe, of Baltimore, for appellant. Robert H. Carr, of Baltimore (T. Scott Offutt, of Towson, on the brief), for appellee.

STOCKBRIDGE, J. This case was begun by the filing of a petition in the nature of a bill of complaint, to which a demurrer was interposed. The demurrer was sustained, and petition dismissed, in the circuit court for Baltimore county, sitting in equity.

There were other propositions of law submitted to and passed upon by the state tax [1, 2] The sustaining of the demurrer and commission, but we find no error in the the dismissal of the petition was on the 9th commission's rulings thereon, which were of July, 1917. On the 7th of September, 1917, affirmed by the court below, or, if so, no er- and thus after the order had become enrollror by which the appellants were injured.ed, upon the petition of the complainant, the There is a motion in the record to dis-order of July 9th was revoked, and leave miss the appeal, but, owing to the import- granted to file an amended bill of complaint, ance of the question presented, we have and on the day following, according to the thought it best to decide it, and in so doing docket entries, an appeal was taken to this it is necessary for us to pass upon the mo- court from the decree previously entered in tion to dismiss the appeal, as we will affirm Baltimore county. At the time when the apthe ruling of the lower court. peal was so taken, there was nothing from which the petitioner could appeal. On September 20th the order passed on the 7th of

Ruling of the court below affirmed, with costs to the appellees.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

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