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OBSERVATIONS, &c.

ART. I. Notes on Politique de Tous les Cabinets de l' Europe,' &c.

THE first edition of this valuable work, which appeared in 1793, contained chiefly the animadversions of the Count de Broglio and Favier, on the system of foreign policy pursued by the Ministers of Louis XV. the substance of which had been from time to time secretly communicated to that weak and dissolute Prince. This occult cabinet, whose plans, covered with the paltry veil that fraud delights in, were never executed, had its origin soon after the death of Cardinal Fleury in 1743. Its first manager, the Prince de Conti, was established by the King's mistress, Madame de Chateauroux; its second, the Count de Broglio, was banished to his estate in the country, and the inferior agents sent to the bastile, by Madame du Barry. The intermediate mistress, Madame de Pompadour, an enemy of the Prince de Conti, (by whose mother she had been introduced at court,) and not in the secret of his correspondence with the King, contrived, in concert with the Abbé de Bernis, a scheme of foreign relati ons the reverse of that recommended by the secret cabinet, and of which the famous treaty of alliance with Austria, signed at Versailles, 1st May, 1756, laid the foundation. A view of the circumstances under which it was entered into, will show that a more politic step could not have been taken. The war with England had commenced; Prussia was united

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with that power; so that while the mutual interests of Austria and France impelled them to a coalition, it enabled the latter, by affording such slender aid to her ally as would hold in check Prussia, to devote the rest of her means to a maritime and colonial war against England. But fortunately for England, personal hostility to the Great Frederick, excited partly by his satirical epigrams on Madame de Pompadour, betrayed the French into a fatal error which neutralized the advantages presented by the treaty of Versailles, and led to all the losses and disgraces that attended their arms in every part of the world. Instead of reserving their main strength to be employed against England, a secret treaty was concluded with Austria, 30th December 1758, engaging to assist her with an army of 100,000 men, and pecuniary subsidies. This error was the more gross, because even the success of these efforts in weakening the counterpoise which Prussia affords against Russia and Austria, would have been no less disadvantageous to France than the loss of credit which she actu ally suffered by their failure: insomuch, that it has been said that the good genius of France lost her the battle of Rosbach. Thus was Lord Chatham enabled to conquer Canada in Germany. But though France, from causes wholly extraneous to the merits of the treaty of 1756, did not reap all the benefits which it was calculated to afford, she was yet indebted to it for a continental peace of thirty-two years, and for the ease with which she struck so effectually at the power of En gland during the American war. It was indeed, as Kaunitz maintained, more advantageous to France than to Austria, since while it relieved the latter from only one of her ene mies, it assured to the former the friendship of the only power that could annoy her on the continent; which is well illus. trated by the fact that during the long continental peace which France enjoyed from 1763 to 1792, Austria waged two wars, one with Prussia, the other with Turkey.

When Favier's declamations against the Austrian alliance

issued from the press in 1793, they were received with rapture corresponding to the delirium that then possessed the public mind. To men inflamed not merely with national resentment, but with the malignity of personal rancour ;-to men predisposed to receive with applause every philippic against government, by a long course of mal-administration, the misfortunes of the seven years' war, the partition of Poland, and the growing importance of the unprivileged orders; how irresistible would seem the proof, how invincible the conviction, that the interests of France had been sacrificed to Austria! Vain would have been any attempt for several years to stem the 'overmatching waves' of prejudice; and Segur did not publish his conclusive refutation of Favier's heresies till 1801, when reason had resumed her influence. Favier can only be considered in the light of an advocate hired to establish a given proposition per fas et nefas; and notwithstanding his skill, he falls into several inconsistencies, and absurdities, which render him an easy prey to his commentator. He admits that the treaty of 1756 gave France a right to demand every thing from the Court of Vienna; (nous avoit mis dans le cas d'exiger tout de cette cour:): upon which place Segur observes: Ici Favier dit la verité. toute entiere; et ces deux lignes seules suffisent pour re futer tout ce qu'on voit de trop systématique dans son ouvrage. Le traité de 1756 nous donnoit le droit de tout exiger de la cour de Vienne. J'ajoute que la position des pays bas Autrichiens nous en donnoít moyens.' (vol. ii. p. 351.) In enumerating the enemies by whom Austria might be attacked, when, from the occurrence of the casus fœderis, she would demand the stipulated succours, (13,000 infantry, and 6,000 cavalry, or a pecuniary commutation,) he does not scruple to reckon the Electors of Bavaria and Saxony, and the Kings of Sardinia and Naples, though he could not seriously apprehend aggression from such puny opponents. (vol. iii. p. 294,297.) Because Austria has no navy, he con

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tends that her union with England during the seven years' war would not have been hurtful to France. Now if during that contest the French were defeated, because they fought ill, how much more must they have suffered if the Austrians had co-operated against them? and if by the exertion of greater courage and better generalship their arms had been successful, how much more victorious would they have been, united against one enemy, than when divided against two? 'Il faut avouer cette verité, ou nier celle des axiomes de l'arithmétique.' (vol. iii, p. 269.)

The feelings of disappointment expressed by Mr. Keith, the British Ambassador at Vienna, when, addressing Maria * Theresa, he said, will you, the Empress and Archduchess, · so far humble yourself as to throw yourself into the arms

of France?' amply testify the opinion he entertained of the advantages secured to the latter country by the treaty of 1756. The gain to France must be commensurate with the loss to England, whose primary object, and chief interest, it must always be, to direct the sword of Austria in conjunc tion with her own trident against the ceaseless renovation of the power of France. This sentiment the great and good Earl of Stair solemnly expressed in a memorial which he delivered to George the Second after the battle of Dettingen; 'I 'shall leave it to your Majesty as my political testament, 6 never to separate yourself from the house of Austria. If 6 ever you do, France will treat you as she did Queen Anne, ❝ and all the courts that were guided by her councils.'+

But as in the field of politics there is room for much vari ety of opinion, so there are men,—at least there is one man, -who thinks Favier a better politician than Segur. In the Edinburgh Review, (vol. i. p. 376, et seq.) we find the following passages: "The singular alliance of 1756, the chef

* Coxe's Austria, vol. ii. p. 387.

+ Dalrymple's Memoirs, part, iii, book i. p. 38.

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