I dine with Gen. Miller, the British consul-general for the Pacific islands, this afternoon, and may be able to pick up some information. I now close this letter, but shall write further by the same conveyance. I have written this as altogether confidential.

With great respect, I have the honor, etc.,

No. 28.]

LUTHER SEVERANCE.

Mr. Webster to Mr. Rives.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, June 19, 1851.

WILLIAM C. RIVES, Esq., etc.:

SIR: In the dispatch from this Department (No. 15) of the 5th of July last, you were instructed with reference to the application of Messrs. G. P. Judd and James Jackson Jarves, special commissioners of the Hawaiian Government, for the mediation of the Government of the United States for the purpose of adjusting the differences between that Government and the Government of France. In your dispatch (No. 49) of the 12th of September, you stated that you would avail yourself of the first suitable occasion towards bringing about an amicable adjustment of the controversy. It is believed, however, that you have not since mentioned the subject.

It appears from the accompanying letters addressed to the Department and to the Rev. Rufus Anderson by Mr. Judd, from Panama, that the French Government declined to accept the mediation of the Government of Great Britain, and dispatched an agent to the Sandwich Islands, whom Mr. Judd met at Panama, waiting for the arrival of an armed force from Callao, with which he intended to proceed to the islands for hostile purposes. The public journals have since announced that he had reached his destination and had entered upon a correspondence with the Hawaiian Government. This intelligence has given the President much pain. It has also alarmed the American Board of Missions, whose corresponding secretary visited this city last autumn, brought with him the letter from Mr. Judd to the Rev. Mr. Anderson above referred to, and made application for vessels of war of the United States to be sent to the islands for the protection of the persons and property of the missionaries there.

Under these circumstances, if you should not already have made the French Government acquainted with the interest we feel in the independence of the islands, you will lose no time in taking that course.

The proceedings of M. Dillon and the French admiral there in 1849, so far as we are informed respecting them, seem, both in their origin and in their nature, to have been incompatible with any just regard for the Hawaiian Government as an independent state. They can not, according to our impressions, be accounted for upon any other hypothesis than a determination on the part of those officers to humble and annihilate that Government for refusing to accede to demands which, if granted, must have been at the expense of all self-respect and substantial sovereignty. The further enforcement of those demands which, it appears, is the object of Mr. Perrin's mission, would be tantamount to a subjugation of the islands to the dominion of France. A step like this could not fail to be viewed by the Government and people of the United States with a dissatisfaction which would tend seriously to

disturb our existing friendly relations with the French Goverment. This is a result to be deplored. If, therefore, it should not be too late, it is hoped that you will make such representations upon the subject to the minister of foreign affairs of France as will induce that Government to desist from measures incompatible with the sovereignty and independence of the Hawaiian Islands, and to make amends for the acts which the French agents have already committed there in contravention of the law of nations and of the treaty between the Hawaiian Government and France.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

DANL. WEBSTER.

JOINT RESOLUTION.

Be it resolved by the nobles and representatives of the Hawaiian Islands in legislative council assembled, That, in the sense of this house, the demands of France are so clearly unjust and contrary to the laws of nations and to treaty, and the course pursued by her so incompatible with the existence of a regular independent government in these israuds; if France should persist in such a course it will be the duty of the King to shield himself and his kingdom from insult and oppres sion by placing this kingdom under the protection of some friendly state; and that should such emergency be so urgent as not to admit of the legislative council being convened, it shall be left to His Majesty by and with the advice of his privy council, under such emergency, to consult the honor and safety of his kingdom, according to His Majesty's best judgment; and that whatever he may do will be binding upon the nation.

Passed both houses of the legislature June 21, 1851.

SIR: I received here three days ago your dispatch No. 28. While Gen. de la Hitte was minister of foreign affairs I had several conversations with him respecting the unhappy differences which had arisen between France and the Hawaiian Government. I availed myself of those occasions to represent to him the deep interest which the people and Government of the United States feel in the welfare and independence of the Hawaiian Islands, and their earnest desire to see the controversy then pending brought to an amicable conclusion, which should be consistent alike with the magnanimity of France and the claims of justice on both sides. Gen. de la Hitte always testified the best dispositions on the subject, and I had reason to think that he was

far from approving in all things the conduct of the French agent in 1849. Since his retirement from the ministry there have been such frequent changes in the department of foreign affairs that I have had no suitable opportunity of recurring to the subject in the brief periods of official intercourse with the successive ministers who have temporarily occupied the department; nor indeed did I suppose from all that has come to my knowledge that there was any serious danger of measures being pursued which might compromise the independence or overawe the freedom of action of the Hawaiian Government in regard to the matters in dispute.

Since the receipt of your dispatch, I have felt it my duty to address a communication to the minister of foreign affairs, setting forth plainly and frankly, but in a tone not calculated to wound the pride or dignity of the French Government, the views of the Government of the United States as embodied in your dispatch, the deep interest it feels in the independence of the Sandwich Islands, and the danger that would consequently arise of an interruption of the good understanding now happily existing between France and the United States, if measures should be pursued by her authority incompatible with a just respect of that independence. To give the full effect you desire to these representations, it seemed to me indispensable that they should be made in writing, for, besides the consideration that mere verbal communications never have the weight and importance that are attached to written ones, a strong additional reason is furnished by the changes of ministry which so frequently occur here for placing the views of the Government of the United States on record, where they will pass under the eyes of whatever ministers may successively be called to conduct the department of foreign affairs. A copy of the communication addressed to me by the minister of foreign affairs is herewith inclosed. I shall return to Paris in a few days, and if anything of importance should occur in my interview with the minister I will embrace the earliest opportunity to communicate it to you.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

Mr. Webster to Mr. Severance.

W. C. RIVES.

No. 4.]

LUTHER SEVERANCE, Esq.:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, July 14, 1851.

SIR: Your confidential communications, Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, have been duly received, submitted to the President, and by him considered.

They relate to a subject of great importance, not only to the Hawaiian Government and its citizens, but also to the United States.

The Government of the United States was the first to acknowledge the national existence of the Hawaiian Government, and to treat with it as an independent state. Its example was soon followed by several of the Governments of Europe; and the United States, true to its treaty obligations, has in no case interfered with the Hawaiian Government for the purpose of opposing the course of its own independent conduct, or of dictating to it any particular line of policy. In acknowledging the independence of the islands, and of the Government established over

them, it was not seeking to promote any peculiar object of its own. What it did, and all that it did, was done openly in the face of day, in entire good faith, and known to all nations. It declared its real purpose to be to favor the establishment of a government at a very important point in the Pacific Ocean, which should be able to maintain such relations with the rest of the world, as are maintained between civilized states.

From this purpose it has never swerved for a single moment, nor is it inclined, without the pressure of some necessity, to depart from it now, when events have occurred giving to the islands and to their intercourse with the United States a new aspect and increased import

ance.

This Government still desires to see the nationality of the Hawaiian Government maintained, its independent administration of public affairs respected, and its prosperity and reputation increased.

But while thus indisposed to exercise any sinister influence itself over the counsels of Hawaii, or to overawe the proceedings of its Government by the menace or the actual application of superior military force, it expects to see other powerful nations act in the same spirit. It is, therefore, with unfeigned regret that the President has read the correspondence and become acquainted with the circumstances occurring between the Hawaiian Government and M. Perrin, the commissioner of France at Honolulu.

It is too plain to be denied or doubted that demands were made upou the Hawaiian Government by the French commissioner wholly inconsistent with its character as an independent state, demands which if submitted to in this case would be sure to be followed by other demands equally derogatory, not only from the same quarter, but probably also from other states, and this could only end in rendering the islands and their Government a prey to the stronger commercial nations of the world.

It can not be expected that the Government of the United States could look on a course of things leading to such a result with indiffer

ence.

The Hawaiian Islands are ten times nearer to the United States than to any of the powers of Europe. Five-sixths of all their commercial intercourse is with the United States, and these considerations, together with others of a more general character, have fixed the course which the Government of the United States will pursue in regard to them. The annunciation of this policy will not surprise the governments of Europe, nor be thought to be unreasonable by the nations of the civilized world, and that policy is that while the Government of the United States, itself faithful to its original assurance, scrupulously regards the independence of the Hawaiian Islands, it can never consent to see those islands taken possession of by either of the great commercial powers of Europe, nor can it consent that demands, manifestly unjust and derogatory and inconsistent with a bona fide independence, shall be enforced against that Government.

The substance of what is here said has already been intimated with sufficient explicitness to the Government of France, and we have the assurance of his excellency, M. Sartiges, minister of the Republic of France near the United States, that that Government has no purpose whatever of taking possession of the islands or of acting towards them in any hostile or aggressive spirit.

A copy of this letter will be placed in the hands of the French minister here; another copy will be transmitted to Paris; and another copy

you will please to communicate to M. Perrin, the French commissioner, upon the appearance of any disposition on his part or on the part of any French naval commander in the Pacific Ocean to proceed to hostilities against the Government of Hawaii for the purpose of enforcing the demands which have been made upon it on the part of France.

The Navy Department will receive instructions to place, and to keep, the naval armament of the United States in the Pacific Ocean in such a state of strength and preparation as shall be requisite for the preservation of the honor and dignity of the United States and the safety of the Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

I have, etc.,

DANIEL WEBSTER.

[Unnumbered.]

Mr. Webster to Mr. Severance.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, July 14, 1851.

SIR: I have written you a regular official dispatch, setting forth the principles of policy which will be pursued by the administration here in whatever respects the Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

I now write you a letter of private instructions, made necessary by suggestions contained in your communications by Lieut. Johnson.

In the first place, I have to say that the war-making power in this Government rests entirely with Congress, and that the President can authorize belligerent operations only in the cases expressly provided for by the Constitution and the laws. By these no power is given to the Executive to oppose an attack by one independent nation on the possessions of another. We are bound to regard both France and Hawaii as independent states, and equally independent; and though the general policy of the Government might lead it to take part with either in a controversy with the other, still, if this interference be an act of hostile force, it is not within the constitutional power of the President, and still less is it within the power of any subordinate agent of Government, civil or military. If the Serieuse had attacked Honolulu, and thereupon the Vandalia had fired upon the Serieuse, this last act would have been an act of violence against France not to be justified, and, in fact, if not disavowed at Washington it would have been an act of war. In these cases, where the power of Congress can not be exercised beforehand, all must be left to the redress which that body may subsequently authorize. This you will constantly bear in mind. But, at the same time, it is not necessary that you should enter into these explanations with the French commissioner or the French naval commander.

In my official letter of this date I have spoken of what the United States would do in certain contingencies. But in thus speaking of the Government of the United States I do not mean the executive power, but the Government in its general aggregate, and especially that branch of the Government which possesses the war-making power. This distinction you will carefully observe, and you will neither direct, request, S. Ex. 77———_-_-_-_-_