Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB
[blocks in formation]

as any debtor, whether by judgment or otherwise, set off against a claim or judgment, but in other respects it is an adjudication binding him. He is so far a part of the corporation that he is represented by it in the action against it."

There is no parallel between the relation of joint tortfeasors and that of a stockholder to his corporation. In the latter case, the stockholder, by the organic law of his corporation, is a member and represented by it so long as it keeps within its corporate powers. In the other instance one wrongdoer when sued does not represent those not sued, although they had coöperated in the wrong and were both liable.

The conclusion we reach is that the Massachusetts court did not deny full faith and credit to the New York judgment, and its decrees are therefore

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE HUGHES took no part in the hearing or consideration of these cases.

STALKER v. OREGON SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO.

No. 225. Argued April 24, 1912. Decided May 27, 1912.

The act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 482, c. 152, granting rights of way and station grounds for railroads through the public lands was a grant in præsenti of lands to be thereafter identified. Railroad Co. v. Jones, 177 U. S. 125.

The right of way becomes definitely located by actual construction, which is unmistakable evidence and notice of appropriation.

A selection and location of station grounds under the act of March 3, 1875, filed with the Secretary of the Interior after construction of the

[blocks in formation]

railroad, is subject to approval by the Secretary, but the approval relates back to the date of filing and thereupon the selection becomes superior to the intervening claim of an entryman initiated while the selection was pending approval. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Doughty, 208 U. S. 251, where the station grounds selection was made prior to actual construction of the railroad, distinguished. The construction now given to the act of March 3, 1875, is in accordance with the settled practice of the Land Department; any other construction would defeat the purpose of Congress in regard to encouraging the building of railroads through the public lands. The failure of a subordinate of the Land Department to comply with the regulations of the department and note selections properly made by a railroad company cannot affect the rights of the company and permit the entry of the land pending approval of the selections by the Secretary. Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U. S. 360. A patent, issued to an entryman whose claim was initiated while the selection of a railroad company was pending for approval, is not an adjudication, but if, as in this case, the selection is approved, such a patent is issued in violation of law and is inoperative to pass title.

16 Idaho, 362, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the construction of the act of March 3, 1875, granting station grounds on the public lands to railroad companies, and the conflicting rights of a company claiming thereunder and an entryman, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Carl A. Davis, for plaintiffs in error, submitted.

Mr. Maxwell Evarts, with whom Mr. P. L. Williams and Mr. A. A. Hoehling, Jr., were on the brief, for defendant in error. '

MR. JUSTICE LURTON delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action brought by the railroad company under a statute of the State of Idaho to quiet title to four certain lots in the town of Meridian, Idaho. The judgment in the trial court for the railroad company was affirmed in the Supreme Court of the State.

Opinion of the Court.

225 U.S.

The defendant in error, as successor in title to the Idaho Central Railway Company, claims that the property in question is a part of the station grounds granted to its predecessor under the act of Congress of March 3, 1875, which grant in part conflicts with a preëmption entry made by one Joseph G. Reed, under whom the plaintiffs in error claim. The lands in question had been surveyed and were open for entry long prior to the initiation of either of the claims here involved. The conflicting rights arose in this way: The Idaho Central Railway was duly qualified under the act of Congress of 1875 to acquire a right of way and station grounds. In June, 1887, its directors formally adopted a route between Nampa and Boise City, which corresponded precisely with the route upon which the railroad was later constructed. This adoption was followed up by the filing of profile maps, which were approved by the Secretary of the Interior on February 17, 1888, and sent back to the proper land office at Boise City. These maps did not include grounds for station purposes. By September 1, 1888, the railroad was constructed along the route first adopted, and at that date was in actual operation. On September 12, 1888, the company filed in duplicate with the Register of the Land Office at Boise City, a plat of ground adjacent to its right of way, desired for station purposes, which selection included the lots here in controversy. This plat was received by the Secretary of the Interior on September 20, 1888, and approved on December 15, 1888. A copy was then transmitted to the register at Boise City. That official received it, but failed and neglected to "note the same upon the plats in the said land office," as it was his duty to do, and it is now stipulated that it has since been lost or mislaid and cannot be found. A blue print of the original map of the station grounds as selected by the plaintiff, with its certificates and endorsements, was stipulated into the record.

[blocks in formation]

The plaintiffs in error claim through Joseph G. Reed, a qualified entryman, who on October 18, 1888, filed a preemption claim upon a quarter section adjacent to the railroad right of way. Later he made final proofs, and, on August 4, 1891, a patent issued. This preëmption included about twelve acres of the ground which the railroad company had theretofore selected for station purposes. There is no evidence of occupation of the portion here involved, and no plea of innocent purchaser, for value, without notice. The question was decided by the state court upon the rights resulting from the facts stated.

The case must turn upon the interpretation of the act of Congress of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 482, c. 152. The relevant sections are the first and fourth, which are as follows:

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the right of way through the public lands of the United States is hereby granted to any railroad company duly organized under the laws of any State or Territory, except the District of Columbia, or by the Congress of the United States, which shall have filed with the Secretary of the Interior a copy of its articles of incorporation, and due proofs of its organization under the same, to the extent of one hundred feet on each side of the central line of said road; also the right to take, from the public lands adjacent to the line of said road, material, earth, stone, and timber necessary for the construction of said railroad; also ground adjacent to such right of way for stationbuildings, depots, machine shops, side-tracks, turn-outs, and water-stations, not to exceed in amount twenty acres for each station, to the extent of one station for each ten miles of its road.

[blocks in formation]

"SEC. 4. That any railroad company desiring to secure the benefits of this act, shall, within twelve months after VOL. CCXXV-10

[blocks in formation]

the location of any section of twenty miles of its road, if the same be upon surveyed lands, and, if upon unsurveyed lands, within twelve months after the survey thereof by the United States, file with the register of the land office for the district where such land is located a profile of its road; and upon approval thereof by the Secretary of the Interior the same shall be noted upon the plats in said office; and thereafter all such lands over which such right of way shall pass shall be disposed of subject to such right of way: Provided, That if any section of said road shall not be completed within five years after the location of said section, the rights herein granted shall be forfeited as to any such uncompleted section of said road."

The uniform construction of this act has been that it is a grant "in præsenti of lands to be thereafter identified.” Jamestown & N. Railroad v. Jones, 177 U. S. 125. In that case the question was whether the right of way became definitely located by the actual construction of the railroad, or only upon the filing of a map of location, which was much later. The conclusion was that by the actual construction of the railroad the boundaries of the grant were fixed by the rule of the statute, which granted a strip one hundred feet wide on each side of the center of the track. That had been the construction of the act by the Interior Department, and was followed by the court below. Mr. Justice McKenna, for this court, said (p. 131): "The ruling gives a practical operation to the statute, and we think is correct. It enables the railroad company to secure the grant by an actual construction of its road, or in advance of construction by filing a map [of its road] as provided in section four. Actual construction of the road is certainly unmistakable evidence and notice of appropriation." It was therefore held that an entry made after construction but before filing a map of location was subject to the prior right of the railroad.

Possibly station grounds might also have been secured

« AnteriorContinuar »