1. "We are also of the opinion that the court did not err in allowing interest to the date of judgment upon the sum found to be due, after deducting the damages caused by the deviations by the contract. It was

not allowed as interest, eo nomine, for there was no contract express or implied for the payment of interest, as such; it was allowed as damages for the detention of the sum found to be due, and the damages were measured by the rate of interest. 'Interest, by our law, is allowed on the ground of some contract express or implied to pay it, or as damages for the breach of some contract or the violation of some duty.' Selleck v. French, 1 Conn. 32, 33; Jonesv. Mallory, 22 Conn. 386, 392.” Healy v. Fallon, 69 Conn. 228, 235.

In no case is interest allowed on claims against the government of the United States unless the government has stipulated to pay interest, or it is given by express statutory provision. Trigg Co. v. Bucyrus Co., 104 Va. 79, 83; citing Tillson v. U. S., 100 U. S. 43; Angarica v. Bayard, 127 U. S. 251.

2. "The claim was wholly a pecuniary one, and was not at large, as are claims for damages for assault and battery, slander or others of like nature. It represented a loss of a pecuniary value ascertainable with reasonable certainty, as of a definite time; and we think damages, in the shape of interest, should be recoverable from that time for such a loss; for only in this way can equity be done between the parties." Healy v. Fallon, 69 Conn. 228, 237.

3. Hollingsworth v. Hammond, 30 Ala. 668; Selleck v. French, 1 Conn. 32; Healy v. Fallon, 69 Conn. 228; Sullivan v. McMillan, 37 Fla. 134; Hoyle v. Jones, 35 Ga. 40; Palmer v. Meriden Britania Co., 88 Ill. 508; Keeler v. Herr, 157 Ill. 57; Goodloe v. Clay, 45 Ky. (6 B. Mon.) 236; Barnard v. Bartholomew, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.), 291; McCormack V. Lynch, 69 Mo. App. 524; Houghton v. Page, 2 N. H. 42; Thompson v. B. etc.. Ry. Co., 58 N. H. 524; White v. Miller, 78 N. Y. 393; Wilson v. Troy, 135 N. Y. 96; 18 L. R. A. 439; Woerz v. Schumacher, 161 N. Y. 530; Bledsoe v. Nixon, 69 N. C. 89; Crit

cher v. Porter Co., 135 N. C. 542; Emerson v. Schoomaker, 135 Pa. St. 437; Durfee v. O'Brien, 16 R. I. 213; Southern Ry. Co. v. Greenville, 49 S. C. 449; Heidenheimer v. Ellis, 67 Tex. 426; Tidball v. Shenandoah National Bank, 100 Va. 741.

"Interest, by our law, is allowed on the ground of some contract express or implied to pay it, or as damage for the breach of some contract, or the violation of some duty.

1. Interest will be allowed in all cases, where there is an express contract to pay it.

2. The law will imply a contract to pay interest, where such has been the usage of trade, or the course of dealings between the parties. Where it is known to be the custom of merchants or others to charge interest on their accounts for goods sold after a certain term of credit, the law will presume the purchaser promises to pay such interest. So where, in accounts settled, interest has been charged and allowed, and the account afterwards continued, it will be presumed that interest was agreed to be paid.

3. Where there is a written contract to pay money or other thing on a day certain, and the contract is broken, then interest is allowed by way of damage, for the breach, as in the case of notes and bill of exchange. Though a policy of insurance contains no day certain on which the losses are to be paid, and yet interest will be computed from the time the money becomes due.

4. Where goods are sold and delivered to be paid for on a day certain, and are charged on book, interest will be allowed after the term of credit has expired. If partial payments are made, interest will be allowed on the balance, though the account is unliquidated.

5. Where one has received money

for the use of another, and it was his duty to pay it over, interest is recoverable for the time of the delay; but if the holder of money for another is guilty of no neglect or delay, he will not be chargeable with interest.

6. Where money is obtained by fraud or deceit, and the party injured, waiving the tort, brings his action on the implied promise, interest will be allowed as damages.

7. Where an account has been liquidated and the balance ascertained by the parties, interest will be allowed thereon, unless there should be some agreement to delay the payment.

8. Where articles are delivered, or services performed and charged on book, and no time of payment agreed on; yet if it appear from the nature of the transaction that they were to be paid for in a reasonable time and not to rest on book, as a mutual account; then if payment be unreasonably delayed, interest will be recoverable as damages, though partial payments have been made and the account has not been liquidated. If one should make advances for the benefit and at the request of another, or a mechanic should perform some considerable piece of work, as building a house, or a farmer should sell the produce of his farm, as his wheat, beef, etc., it could not be presumed that they were to rest on the footing of the mutual account on book, but that payment was to be made when the advancements were closed, the work completed and the produce delivered; of course interest would be chargeable on such accounts, if unreasonably delayed, though partial payments have been made and the accounts were unsettled; for here has been a breach of contract.

9. But where there are current accounts founded on mutual dealings, unless there be some promise or usage to pay interest, it will not be allowed,

for in such cases no time of payment is stipulated; each party is making payment, the balance is constantly varying, it is understood that the demands are to remain on book, and the presumption is that interest is not to be allowed; such is the case of farmers and mechanics in their mutual intercourse.

Such are the principles which have been long established in this State. In England there have been contradictory decisions." Selleck v. French, 1 Conn. 32, 33-4 (book account).

It

"The defendant claimed that the rule of damages was the value of the goods at the time of their destruction without interest, but the court allowed interest from the date of the injury to the date of judgment. has been sometime said that interest is not to be allowed on unliquidated demands. There are actions, such, for instance, as assault and battery, or slander, to which the rule is applicable. But where the demand is for property, that has a market value, susceptible of easy proof, there is no propriety in such a rule. A loss of property, having a definite money value, is practically the same as a loss of so much money; the loss of the use of the property is practically the same as the loss of the use (or interest) of so much money. We think therefore a just indemnity, to the plaintiff, required the addition to the value of the goods at the time of their destruction of the interest from that time to the date of judgment. This court has already applied such a rule to actions of trover for the conversion of goods, as in Clark v. Whitaker, 19 Conn. 319; and Cook v. Loomis, 26 Conn. 483, and to the action of trespass for taking personal property, as in the case of Oviatt v. Pond, 29 Conn. 479;" Regan v. N. Y. & N. E. Ry. Co. 60 Conn. 124, 142-3 (destruction of goods by fire caused

by spark from a locomotive). Quoted with approval in Healy v. Fallon, 69 Conn. 228, 236.

"It is difficult on principle to see why he should not recover, as compensation for that detention, damages measured by the legal rate of interest upon the sum so detained for that time. It is said, however, that the amount due was unliquidated up to the time of the judgment, and that interest is never allowed upon unliquidated amounts. It may be conceded that the amount due the plaintiff was in a certain sense unliquidated up to the time of the judgment, inasmuch as the amount due him under the contract, which was a liquidated amount, was to be lessened by the as yet uncertain damages caused by his deviations from the contract; but it is not true that damages, measured by the rate of interest, are never allowed for the non-payment of money, where the claim is in unliquidated one. In the action for the value of personal property destroyed by the negligent act of the defendant, where the claim was in sense an unliquidated one, damages were allowed in the shape of interest upon the value of the property, as found upon the trial. Parrott Knickerbocker, etc., Ice Co., 46 N. Y. 361; Fraser v. Bigelow Carpet Co., 141 Mass. 126.

In our own State such damages are allowed in actions for damages for the conversion of goods, and in ac tions of trespass for taking personal property, although in such cases the claims are in a certain sense unliquidated until the amount is ascertained by the court or jury. Clark v. Whitaker, 19 Conn. 319; Cook v. Loomis, 26 Conn. 483; Oviatt v. Pond, 29 Conn. 479; Regan v. N. Y. & N. E. Ry. Co., 60 Conn. 124, 142.

We think the damages allowed by way of interest, in the case at bar, comes within the principles applied

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in the cases cited. The claim was wholly a pecuniary one, and was not at large as are claims for damages or assault and battery, or slander or others of like nature. It represented a loss of a pecuniary value, ascertainable with reasonable certainty as of a definite time; and we think damages, in the shape of interest, should be recoverable from that time for such a loss." Healy v. Fallon, 69 Conn. 228, 235-7 (building contract).

"In actions of trover and trespass for property taken and converted by the defendant, where there is no malicious motive on the part of the defendant, but he takes the property under a claim of right, and the read dispute is as to the title, the rule of damages is the value of the property at the time of the conversion or taking, and interest on that sum to the time of judgment," White v. Webb, 15 Conn. 302, 305. To the same effect are Clark v. Whitaker, 19 Conn. 319, 330; Cook v. Loomis, 26 Conn. 483; St. Peter's Church v. Beach, 26 Conn. 355; Oviatt v. Pond, 29 Conn. 479, 486 (trespass); Kennedy v. Whitwell (4 Pick.), 466; Spoor v. Holland, 8 Wend. (N. Y.), 445; Brizzee v. Maybee 21 Wend. (N. Y.), 144; Ingersoll v. Van Bokkelin, 7 Cow. (N. Y.), 670, 681; Lorain Steel Co. v. N. & B. St. Ry. Co., 187 Mass. 500, 516; Greenfield Bank v.

Leavitt, 34 Mass. (17 Pick.), 1, 3; Forbes v. B. & L. Ry. Co., 133 Mass. 154, 158; East Tenn. Land Co. v. Leeson, 183 Mass. 37, 41.

4. Brackett v. Edgerton, 14 Minn. 174; Dana v. Fielder, 12 N. Y. 40; 2 Mechem on Sales, § 1736; Benjamin on Sales, § 870; see sec. 67, p.- ante. 5. 2 Mechem on Sales, § 1741. See sec. 67.

6. 2 Mechem on Sales, § 1850. 7. Terry v. Bamberger, 44 Conn. 558, 562, 14 Blatch. (U. S. C. C.), 234, 238; White v. Webb, 15 Conn. 302, 305; Clark v. Whitaker, 19 Conn. 319, 330; Cook v. Loomis, 26 Conn. 483, 485; St. Peter's Church v. Beach, 26 Conn. 355; Oviatt v. Pond, 29 Conn. 479, 486. (Trespass); 2 Mecham on Sales, § 1784.

8. Ledwich v. McKim, 53 N. Y. 307; Wilkinson v. Ferre, 24 Pa. St. 190; Eicholtz v. Bannister, 17 C. B. (N. S.), 708; 2 Mechem on Sales, § 1709, 1805. See sec. 69.

9. Rowland v. Shelton, 25 Ala. 217, 220; Ellis v. Gosney's heirs, 30 Ky. (7 J. J. Marsh.), 109; Arthur v. Moss, 1 Ore. 193; Crittenden v. Posey, 38 Tenn. (1 Head), 311; Anderson v. Duffield, 8 Tex. 237; Scranton v. Tilley, 16 Tex. 183; Anding v. Perkins, 29 Tex. 348, 353; Gross v. Dysant, 31 Tex. 186, 187; 2 Mechem on Sales, §§ 1794, 1817, 1824.

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10. In sales on account, interest begins on demand for payment. Union Hardware Co. v. Plume & Atwood Mfg. Co., 58 Conn. 219, 222; Parke v. Foster, 26 Ga. 465; Sturges v. Greene, 27 Kans. 235; McIlvaine v. Wilkins, 12 N. H. 474; Beers v. Reynolds, 11 N. Y. 97; Schuwirth v. Thumma (Tex. Civ. App. 1902), 66 S. W. 691.

11. Interest may be charged from the delivery of goods sold for cash in case of non-payment. Shields V. Henry, 31 Ala. 53; Waring v. Henry, 30 Ala. 721; Roberts v. Wilcoxson, 36 Ark. 355; New Boston Church v. Emerson, 66 Ill. 269; Morris v. Wibaux, 159 Ill. 627; Wyandotte, etc., Gas Co. v. Schleifer, 22 Kans. 327; Smith v. Shaffer, 50 Md. 132; Dodge v. Perkins, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 368; Foote v. Blanchard, 88 Mass. (6 Allen), 221; Lackawanna Mills v. Weil, 162 N. Y. 642 (readiness to deliver); Case Plow Works v. Niles Co., 107 Wis. 9; Atlantic Phosphate Co. v. Graffin, 114 U. S. 492.

12. Shields v. Henry, 31 Ala. 53; Roberts v. Wilcoxson, 36 Ark. 355; Milton v. Blackshear, 8 Fla. 161; Bradley v. Palen 78 Iowa, 126; Henderson Cotton Mfg. Co. v. Lowell Machine Shops, 86 Ky. 668; Foote v. Blanchard, 88 Mass. (6 Allen), 221; National Lancers v. Lovering, 30 N. H. 511; Kinard v. Glenn, 29 S. C.

590; Porter v. Munger, 22 Vt. 191; Mountford v. Willes, 2 B. & P. 337. See sec. 63.

The vendee is bound to pay interest after thirty days for goods sold on thirty day's credit. The rendering of a statement not claiming interest is not a waiver thereof. Lambeth Rope Co. v. Brigham, 170 Mass. 518.

13. 2 Mechem on Sales, § 1690. 14. See for special damages for (a) Non-delivery, sec. 67; breach of warranty, sec. 69.

(b) Non-acceptance, sec. 64.

15. Terry v. Bissell, 26 Conn. 23; Dumont v. Williamson, 18 Ohio St. 516; Thomas v. Knowles, 128 Mass. 22; Wood v. Sheldon, 42 N. J. L. 421; Aldrich v. Jackson, 5 R. I. 218; Nash v. Towne, 72 U. S. (5 Wall.), 689; Meyer v. Richards, 163 U. S. 385; Thrall v. Newell, 19 Vt. 200, 208.

Where a fruit crop is sold, the sale becomes null, if the crop fails entirely, the price must be restored.

Where only a hope of a future crop is sold, the price need not be restored although the crop entirely fails.

"All the oranges that my trees may produce in the year 1899," held, to be a sale of the hope of a crop, and not of the crop itself.

Where the purchaser assumes all the risks in the purchase of an orange crop it applies to a risk of the crop, not a risk of the trees.